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The aim of this thesis is to present a rounded picture of British efforts to obtain information 
on German science and technology, both military and civilian, after the Second World War. 
This endeavour was conducted for numerous reasons  W to secure some form of reparations, 
to improve defence capabilities for any future conflict, and to ensure that Germany 
possessed no lasting scientific war potential  W and in various ways  W the examination of 
laboratories and factories, the confiscation of equipment and documents, and the 
interrogation of experts. In some cases, these same experts were detained, brought to 
Britain, and occasionally offered work at government research establishments or private 
companies, in order to exact long-term benefit for Britain from the occupation of Germany. 
Unsurprisingly, an endeavour of this nature encountered difficulty from multiple quarters, 
including public opposition in Britain, conflict with other initiatives, such as reconstruction, 
in Germany, and competition with foreign powers, most notably the Soviet Union. 
 As a result, this thesis sits at the intersection between various fields of historical 
inquiry. It incorporates elements from the history of intelligence, such as the necessarily 
secretive nature of many of the exploitation operations and the involvement of high-level 
intelligence bodies in the direction of the programme; from diplomatic history, not least 
ŚŽǁĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƐŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƐƚĂŐĞ
as it was steadily eclipsed by the United States and the Soviet Union; from the history of 
science, as the programme encompassed some of the most significant technological 
developments of the period, including the atomic bomb, the jet engine and guided missiles; 
and from military history, both because the first units and individuals concerned with the 
initiative were military and because many of the most valuable spoils removed from 
Germany were of a warlike nature. Ultimately, though, the narrative presented in this thesis 
is primarily concerned with British policy  W policy towards occupied Germany, science and 
technology, and the nascent Cold War  W and how this evolved throughout, and was shaped 
by, the deeply transformative period surrounding the end of the Second World War. The 
story of the British exploitation of German science and technology is, therefore, a crucial, 
ďƵƚƚŚƵƐĨĂƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ?ĨĂĐĞƚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁƉŽƐƚ-war era in 1945. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
In Text 
All abbreviations, acronyms and codenames are as they appear in the original source 
material. 
For definitions of some of the more significant terms listed here, please see the appended 
glossary. 
30AU No. 30 Assault Unit UK 
ADI Assistant Directorate of Intelligence UK 
Alsos War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission US/ALLIED 
ASLIB Association of Special Libraries and Information Bureaux UK 
BAOR British Army of the Rhine UK 
BBRM British Bombing Research Mission UK 
BBSU British Bombing Survey Unit UK 
BIOS British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee UK 
BW biological warfare  
CAFT Consolidated Advance Field Teams ALLIED 
CATOR Combined Air Transport Operations Room ALLIED 
CCG(BE) Control Commission for Germany (British Element) UK 
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff ALLIED 
CDEE Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment (Porton Down) UK 
CIC Combined Intelligence Committee ALLIED 
CIOS Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee ALLIED 
CIPC Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee ALLIED 
COGA Control Office for Germany and Austria UK 
CW chemical warfare  
DCOS Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Committee) UK 
DSIR Department of Scientific and Industrial Research UK 
EAB Economic Advisory Board UK 
EDU Enemy Documents Unit UK 
EIPS Economic and Industrial Planning Staff UK 
EPCOM Enemy Publications Committee UK 
EPES Enemy Personnel Exploitation Service UK 
ERDS Enemy Research & Development Sub-Committee UK 
FIAT Field Information Agency, Technical ALLIED 
FIAT (Br.) Field Information Agency, Technical (British Element) UK 
FIAT (US) Field Information Agency, Technical (US Element) US 
FO Foreign Office UK 
G-2 Military Intelligence ALLIED 
GED German Economic Department UK 
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G(T) & CW General (T-Forces) & Chemical Warfare UK 
HMSO ,ŝƐDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇKĨĨŝĐĞ UK 
I.E.T. Groups Investigation of Enemy Technique Groups proposed 
IDCGS Inter-Departmental Committee on German Scientists UK 
JEIA Joint Export/Import Agency UK/US 
JIC Joint Intelligence (Sub-)Committee UK 
JIC-CCG Joint Intelligence Committee, Control Council for Germany UK 
JIOA Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency US 
LFA Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt (Aeronautical Research Institute) GERMAN 
MAP Ministry of Aircraft Production UK 
MEW Ministry of Economic Warfare UK 
MFA&A Monuments, Fine Art & Archives ALLIED 
NID Naval Intelligence Division UK 
NKVD WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽŵŵŝƐƐĂƌŝĂƚĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ) SOVIET 
OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development US 
RAE Royal Aircraft Establishment (Farnborough) UK 
RAF Royal Air Force UK 
RAT Reparations Assessment Teams UK 
RDR Div. Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution Division UK 
RM Royal Marines UK 
RN Royal Navy UK 
RNVR Royal Naval Volunteer Reserves UK 
SCAEF Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force ALLIED 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force ALLIED 
S.H. Parties Sealing & Holding Parties proposed 
SIAS Scientific Intelligence Advisory Service UK 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service SIS 
SPD 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic 
Party) 
GERMAN 
SPOG Special Projectile Operations Group (Backfire) UK/US 
STIB Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch UK 
STRB Scientific and Technical Research Board UK 
T-Force Target Force ALLIED 
TPA Technical and Personnel Administration UK 
TIIC Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee US 
USAAF United States Army Air Force US 
USFET United States Forces European Theatre US 
USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey US 
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Footnotes (primary sources) 
All abbreviations are as they appear in the relevant archives. 
IWM Imperial War Museum 
TNA The National Archives, Kew 
 AB Atomic Energy Authority (and predecessors) papers 
 ADM Admiralty papers 
 AIR Air Ministry papers 
 AVIA Ministry of Aviation papers 
 BERCOMB Berlin Commission (British) [signal shorthand] 
 BT Board of Trade papers 
 CONCOMB Control Commission for Germany (British Element) [signal shorthand] 
 CONFOLK Control Office for Germany and Austria [signal shorthand] 
 CAB Cabinet Office papers 
 DEFE Ministry of Defence (and predecessors) papers 
 FO Foreign Office papers 
 HW Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) papers 
 LAB Ministry of Labour papers 
 PREM Office of the Prime Minister papers 
 RB Research Branch 
 TROOPERS War Office [signal shorthand] 
 WO War Office papers 
 
Note 
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůĞ ?ŵĂŶǇĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƵƐĞƚŚĞŵĂƐƐƵĐŚĂŶĚ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ?ĂƌĞĨĂƌŵŽƌĞ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŚĂŶ ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ? ? ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ?Žƌ ‘h^^Z ? ?/ŚĂǀĞaimed to 
avoid this erroneous elision where possible but of course all primary material is presented 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?/ŶŶĞĂƌůǇĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Žƌ ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŽĨ











Russia and the Western powers: A completely open race for the best talent and skill 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚĂƐƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ? ?1 
This statement, made by an unnamed British intelligence officer of the Field Information 
Agency Technical  W one of the core organisations of the Anglo-American scientific and 
technical exploitation programme  W in Germany in August 1946, was remarkably perceptive 
and prescient. By this time, it was indeed fair to characterise the search for the scientific and 
technical spoils of Germany as a fierce contest between all four of the victorious Allies  W 
Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union  W though this would increase in both 
ferocity and scale as time passed. This contest did not, however, take the form of a mad 
scramble defined by smash-and-grab techniques and unrestrained acquisitiveness; these 
elements certainly featured but the bigger picture was that all the occupying powers, 
including Great Britain, operated comprehensive exploitation programmes, staffed and 
directed by civil servants as well as soldiers, and guided by coherent policy and strategy. 
During the war, the British military establishment had embraced science and technology, 
though often slowly and begrudgingly, and the impact that new developments could have 
on the course of conflicts had become increasingly apparent. To paraphrase Winston 
ŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ĨĂŶŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐƌŝŵƐŽŶǁŝŶŐƐŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶĂ
position of new prominence in 1945.2 As a new world order was established after the war, 
under the long shadow cast by the atomic bomb, the V-2 rockets, and countless other major 
wartime technological developments, it was apparent to policy-makers in Britain and 
beyond that science and technology may well also provide the key to future supremacy. 
Britain and its erstwhile allies, each now responsible for a specific portion of occupied 
Germany, all recognised that the quickest way to obtain a technical advantage over their 
rivals would be to purloin it from the carcass of the Third Reich. 
                                                             
1
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŝĐ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞZĞƉŽƌƚEŽ ? ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
2
 tŝŶƐƚŽŶŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ? ‘D/dDŝĚ-ĞŶƚƵƌǇŽŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?
http://libraries.mit.edu/archives/exhibits/midcentury/mid-cent-churchill.html [accessed 22 January 2016]; see 
also David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
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 As Britain and the other main post-war powers settled into their new roles and 
sought the technology which could give them an edge on the battlefield or at the 
negotiating table, the exploitation initiative came into its own. However, the roots of 
exploitation go back a little further than this and were predicated on the belief among the 
Allies that, despite their own appreciation of science and technology, Nazi Germany 
exceeded them as a true scientific behemoth and one which had made unparalleled 
advances in countless fields of research during the war. Michael Neufeld describes 
exploitation as  ‘ĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŚĂƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƵŶŝƋƵĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ? ůĂƌŐĞůǇ
because at the end of no other recent war has the perception been so strong that the 
defeated opponent was in possession of technologies equal or superior to that of the 
victorious powers.3 Although it has been argued that these perceptions were inaccurate,4 
their accuracy is actually of fairly limited relevance  W what matters is that they were 
supported by experts, internalised by policy-makers and thus became a driving force of 
post-war strategy.5 Armed with this viewpoint and with the whole of Germany practically at 
the mercy of its occupiers, it is no wonder that the British sought to extract what they could 
from their former enemy, and thus exploitation became a key occupation policy. 
It is worth briefly mentioning here that although the term  ‘exploitation ? (which was 
used by contemporaries) has obvious connotations of unfairness and mistreatment, those 
responsible for its conduct in the post-war period would not have seen these as relevant; 
instead they used exploitation as a synonym for utilisation and saw what they were doing as 
the justifiable use of a resource which was freely available to them.6 Other terms are slightly 
more problematic  W  ‘loot ? and  ‘plunder ? for instance, with their connotations of mindless 
battlefield barbarity, were generally avoided by those involved in exploitation and instead 
they became staples in the vocabulary of those who sought to cast aspersions on the 
legitimacy or ethical rectitude of the initiative. Their use in retrospect, especially by 
historians, should be done only with great caution as their negative implications can 
                                                             
3
 DŝĐŚĂĞů : ? EĞƵĨĞůĚ ?  ‘dŚĞ EĂǌŝ ĞƌŽƐƉĂĐĞ ǆŽĚƵƐ P dŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă 'ůŽďĂů ? dƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?History and 
Technology, 28 (2012), 49. 
4
 David Edgerton, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐtĂƌDĂĐŚŝŶĞ PtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚǆƉĞƌƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ (London: 
Allen Lane, 2011), 290-2. 
5
 Brian Balmer, Secrecy and Science: A Historical Sociology of Biological and Chemical Warfare (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 73. 
6
 Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 4. For 
a wider discussion of the morality of exploitation, see Chapter Six below. 
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misrepresent the true nature of the exploitation scheme. In this thesis, these words are 
almost completely avoided, and used only in the appropriate context.  ‘ǆƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂƐ
also not been used here and is almost entirely absent from the primary material too, 
probably on account of its more narrow legal definition (as will be discussed, the 
relationship between exploitation and the law was more flexible than this would permit) 
and the fact that it tends to apply only to physical property, and not to skills or know-how. 
 Science and technology was not the only area of German expertise which the Allies 
exploited at the end of the war. As Cold War divisions became more apparent, Britain and 
America began to see Germany as a tool to be wielded against Soviet aggression and 
territorial ambitions. While much of the former Third Reich lay in physical and structural 
ruin, its human (and some material) resources remained generally available for use. Certain 
sections of Nazi personnel, among them scientists and engineers, had an impressive 
reputation and the victors were keen to capitalise on having these experts in various fields 
at their disposal. Even senior Nazis believed that this utilisation would form a part of Allied 
post-war policy  W in an interrogation which took place in British captivity after the war, 
former Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture and committed Nazi ideologue, Richard 
Walther Darré, shared his belief that the British would take SS men with a bad record and 
 ‘ŵĂŬĞĂůĞŐŝŽŶŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚƵƐĞƚŚĞŵƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůŽŶŝĞƐĂƐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?/ŶĂǇĞĂƌ
or two they will have an excellent front line unit which will sĂǀĞŶŐůŝƐŚďůŽŽĚ ? ?7 Although 
this particular scheme never materialised, a similar tactic was adopted by both the French 
and the Americans: the French Foreign Legion employed SS anti-partisan specialists to hunt 
down guerrillas in the jungles of Indochina while the Americans tasked SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Klaus Barbie, the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƵƚĐŚĞƌŽĨ>ǇŽŶ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚWĂƌƚǇŝŶ
Bavaria.8 A better-known case is that of Reinhard Gehlen, who, between 1942 and 1945, 
headed the Wehrmacht General StaĨĨ ?ƐFremde Heere Ost department, which handled 
intelligence (with mixed success) on the Red Army  W this expertise led the Americans to 
redeploy him, after a year-long debriefing in the United States, to the US zone of Germany 
                                                             
7
 TNA, WO 208/4969, Interrogation of Richard Walther Darré, October 1945. 
8
 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 
2001), 181. 
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where he established the Gehlen Organisation, which was concerned with intelligence on 
the Soviet Union and which employed several former SS and SD operatives.9 
 As this shows, the victorious Allies had no real qualms with utilising German 
personnel of all stripes after the war, often with little or no regard for their political records 
or wartime activities. Science and technology was certainly the area where this exploitation 
was carried out most comprehensively and on the largest scale though, as this was perhaps 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ĂƐƐĞƚĂƚǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚ ?h^ ƌŝŐĂĚŝĞƌ-General Leslie Groves, head of 
the Anglo-American Manhattan Project, took a keen interest in parallel German efforts to 
develop an atomic bomb and dispatched an Allied team to gather the brightest minds of the 
German project in 1945. Regarding the successful capture of Werner Heisenberg, the Nobel 
Prize-ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƉŚǇƐŝĐŝƐƚ ? 'ƌŽǀĞƐ ůĂƚĞƌ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ Śŝŵ ĂƐ  ‘ǁŽƌƚŚ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ ƵƐ
than ten divisions ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ? ƋƵĂůŝĨǇŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ďǇ ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŚĂĚ ŚĞ ĨĂůůĞŶ ŝŶƚŽ ZƵƐsian 
ŚĂŶĚƐ ? ŚĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵ ? ?10 This shows not only how important 
German scientists and technicians were believed to be, but also that any success in the 
exploitation endeavour was viewed not only in terms of the benefit to the West but also in 
terms of the negative impact on the Soviets. 
 The importance and scale of the exploitation programme means that it has some 
place in the public consciousness to this day. In the preface to his 1990 book on American 
exploitation, Science, Technology, and Reparations, John Gimbel ƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŵŽƐƚ
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ŬŶŽǁ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞůůŝĞĚ ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ
scientists and the competition between the Western powers and the Soviet Union for their 
services.11 In the course of this present research, it has become clear that this still holds true 
today, albeit to a lesser extent, especially in Britain  W a country whose exploitation 
programme is frequently forgotten beside its larger American equivalent. Certain elements 
of exploitation lore have greater currency than others; the name Wernher von Braun 
generally has high levels of recognition and in many ways his story has come to symbolise 
                                                             
9
 EŽƌŵĂŶ: ?t ?'ŽĚĂ ? ‘dŚĞ'ĞŚůĞŶKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ĞŝŶǌ&ĞůĨĞ ĂƐĞ ? ?ŝŶĂǀŝĚ ?DĞƐƐĞŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ<ĂƚƌŝŶ
Paehler (eds.), The Nazi Past: Recasting German Identity in Postwar Europe (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2015), 273ff; Constantin Goschler and Michael Wala, Keine Neue Gestapo: Das Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz und die NS-Vergangenheit (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2015). 
10
 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963), 
244, emphasis in the original. 
11
 John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), vii. 
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the wider exploitation narrative. As a scientist in Nazi Germany, he was instrumental in 
developing the V-2 rockets (primarily assembled by slave labour in underground factories) 
which fell on London and Antwerp in the latter part of the war, but after the war he was 
whisked off to the USA, never called upon to answer for any war crimes, and then 
contributed significantly to the American space programme, earning the affectionate 
ŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ&ĂƚŚĞƌŽĨZŽĐŬĞƚ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇ ?12 His tale, with its undertones of 
injustice and cover-up, has earned him a place in the popular consciousness, especially in 
the United States, and his fame (or infamy) was cemented when, in 1965, he became the 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨĂƐŽŶŐďǇƐĂƚŝƌŝƐƚdŽŵ>ĞŚƌĞƌ ?ǁŚŽůǇƌŝĐĂůůǇĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĂƉƚůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŝŵĂƐ ‘Ă
man whose allegiance is ruled by expedience ?.13 
 Wernher von Braun (and the legacy of exploitation which he represents) has 
appeared in popular culture remarkably often, considering that exploitation was supposedly 
highly secretive and not for public consumption. It is widely accepted that von Braun was 
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ WĞƚĞƌ ^ĞůůĞƌƐ ? ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂů ŽĨ ƌ ^ƚƌĂŶŐĞůŽǀĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ^ƚĂŶůĞǇ
Kubrick film of the same name, while another interpretation appeared in The Right Stuff 
(1983), a film which also gave prominence to the quip, apparently originally attributable to 
ŽŶĞŽĨWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƵƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ?14 
ůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ůĂƌŐĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉůŽƚŽĨ:ŽƐĞƉŚ<ĂŶŽŶ ?ƐďĞƐƚƐĞůůŝŶŐŶŽǀĞů ?The Good German 
(later adapted into film), depict elements of the exploitation programme and the 2016 BBC 
drama series, Close to the Enemy, focused on concerted British efforts to recruit one 
particularly intransigent (fictional) German scientist after the war.15 More widely, passing 
references to the scheme in general can be detected across popular media, from television 
to video games. 
There are two themes which are common throughout the vast majority of these 
cultural references to exploitation  W one is the overwhelming focus on the American 
initiative and a simultaneous neglect of the parallel efforts of the British (or French); the 
                                                             
12
 On von Braun, see Wayne Biddle, Dark Side of the Moon: Wernher von Braun, the Third Reich and the Space 
Race (London: W.W. Norton, 2009); Michael Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New 
York: A.A. Knopf, 2007). 
13
 dŽŵ >ĞŚƌĞƌ ?  ‘tĞƌŶŚĞƌ ǀŽŶ ƌĂƵŶ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEJ9HrZq7Ro [accessed 13 
January 2016]. 
14
 Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, dir. Stanley Kubrick (USA: Columbia 
Pictures, 1964); The Right Stuff, dir. Philip Kaufman (USA: Warner Bros., 1983). 
15
 Joseph Kanon, The Good German (London: Sphere, 2004); Close to the Enemy (UK: BBC, 2016). 
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second is the portrayal of the scheme as shadowy and clandestine, a sinister conspiracy 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ? ĚŝƌƚŝĞƐƚ ƉŽƐƚ-war secrets. While it is true that 
certain elementƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƚŽƉƐĞĐƌĞƚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŚĂĚŵŽƌĞƚŽĚŽ
with the sensitive nature of the material which was gleaned from Germany, such as that 
pertaining to chemical, biological or atomic weapons, than any attempt to hide the basic 
nature of the scheme from the public  W indeed, articles concerning exploitation appeared in 
the press with relative frequency and it was discussed quite openly several times in the 
House of Commons.16 Negative imagery of the scheme has also been reinforced in more 
recent journalism on the subject, which commonly arises when a new batch of related 
documents are released to the public in government archives. In one such article, appearing 
in the Daily Telegraph ŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌĚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ůŽŽƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂďĚƵĐƚ ?ĂƌĞused to describe 
British methods, which are also directly compared to those of the Gestapo.17 It is usually the 
case that veracity plays second fiddle to sensationalism and the search for a big story, and 
one of the main aims of this present study is to challenge these prevailing evaluations and 
present a more accurate and lucid picture of post-war British exploitation. However, a 
cultural history of exploitation, encapsulating the ways in which the scheme has been 
portrayed since and engaging with the concepts of memory and public consciousness, 
would certainly shed a new and interesting light on the subject. Although Monique Laney 
touches on this briefly in German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie, there is no doubt a richer 
seam of potential research here, albeit one that does not fall under the necessarily limited 
purview of this thesis.18 
 In addition, exploitation did not exist in isolation and therefore should not be studied 
as such. As mentioned above, one of the main areas of discourse on this topic has been 
related to the competition over German scientific and technical spoils between East and 
West and the links which this implies to the beginning of the Cold War. Post-war Germany 
was the crucible in which the geopolitical structure of the second half of the twentieth 
century was forged and so it is unsurprising that it was also here that the very first chapter 
of the Cold War arms race between the Soviet Union and the West was written. This 
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 Balmer, Secrecy and Science, 59. 
17
  ‘,ŽǁƌŝƚĂŝŶƉƵƚEĂǌŝƐ ?ƚŽƉŵĞŶƚŽǁŽƌŬ ? ?Daily Telegraph, 30 August 2007. 
18
 Monique Laney, German Rocketeers in the Heart of Dixie: Making Sense of the Nazi Past in the Civil Rights 
Era (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015). 
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provides what is essentially the central contention of this present study  W that concerns 
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵŵĂŬŝŶŐĨƵůůƵƐĞŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
scientific and technological resources, became the driving force of the British exploitation 
programme, at the expense of practically any and all other considerations. Other historical 
accounts have challenged the significance of exploitation at this particular juncture in 
international relations, arguing instead that exploitation is just one instance in a long-
running tradition of technology transfer between nations and, moreover, that it is a case of 
limited historical significance.19 This present study aims to show that on account of the 
circumstances, the organisation, the execution, and the ramifications of post-war 
exploitation, this argument does not hold up under close scrutiny. 
 Although this study posits that exploitation was inextricably connected to the 
dichotomous rivalry of the Cold War, it also rests on the assumption that exploitation was 
not a fixed or static programme, but rather one which evolved and changed considerably 
during its lifespan. For instance, the importance of concerns about Soviet intentions and 
potential aggression in Europe began as a relatively minor factor and grew throughout, later 
becoming the defining priority of the whole initiative. This process followed a different 
trajectory within the British programme than it did in the American equivalent which is, in 
part, why it warrants such close examination here. Other external pressures played an 
important role in shaping the exploitation scheme and the course which it followed, 
including economics and occupation politics, which again were experienced differently by 
the British officials than they were by their counterparts across the Atlantic. On the whole 
the British exploitation programme, though relatively small, was unique and should be 
studied as such, rather than being considered, as it often has been in the past, as a mere 
offshoot or subsidiary of the larger and better-known American operation. One of the 
primary responsibilities of this thesis is to show that the British exploitation programme is 
worthy of this individual analysis and that research based on this principle is sufficiently 
robust. 
 
                                                             
19
 sŽůŬĞƌĞƌŐŚĂŚŶ ? ‘Technology, Reparations, and the Export of Industrial Culture. Problems of the German-
American Relationship, 1900- ? ? ? ? ?, in Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla (eds.), Technology Transfer out of 
Germany after 1945 (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1996), 4. 
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The bulk of the literature on exploitation has, somewhat disconcertingly, followed the 
trends evident in popular culture and press representations of the subject. Not only is 
coverage disproportionately weighted towards the American programme, but the portrayal 
of the scheme rarely strays beyond notions of government conspiracy and clandestine 
activity by shadowy intelligence agencies, particularly regarding the employment of Nazi 
experts in the Allied countries almost immediately after the war. Many of these are lurid 
accounts written by journalists or non-academic historians, who have built their research 
around their (sometimes predetermined) conclusions, rather than the other way around. In 
ƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬĂůŽŶĞďĞƚƌĂǇƐŝƚƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƐĐĂŶĚĂů ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ>ŝŶĚĂ,ƵŶƚ ?Ɛ
Secret Agenda Žƌ dŽŵ ŽǁĞƌ ?ƐThe Paperclip Conspiracy, while others abandon any 
semblance of subtlety and state their outrage clearly on the front cover, as in Eric 
>ŝĐŚƚďůĂƵ ?ƐThe Nazis Next Door: How America BĞĐĂŵĞĂ^ĂĨĞ,ĂǀĞŶĨŽƌ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐDĞŶ.20 It is 
clear why these authors have opted for a sensationalist approach, and why it seems like an 
appropriate lens to apply to exploitation, but in reality, as Brian Balmer has shown, secrecy 
in these circumstances is rarely a straightforward concept.21 Other accounts instead focus 
on the remarkable acts of daring undertaken by the commandos who were responsible for 
ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƐ ‘ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶŚĞƌŽĞƐ ?
and often failing to sufficiently discuss the fact that their actions constitute only a very small 
part of the wider initiative.22 While this present study acknowledges that the exploitation 
programme obviously had the potential for controversy and certainly trod some uncertain 
ethical and legal ground, as well as involving some very real occasions of enterprise and 
heroism in the field, it also hopes to reposition the discourse on this topic away from 
sensationalism and into the territory of scholarship. 
 The work which has achieved this most significantly in the past, and one which I 
therefore seek to align this present study with most closely, ŝƐ'ŝŵďĞů ?ƐScience, Technology, 
and Reparations which provided the first scholarly account of the American exploitation 
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 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany (London: 
Grafton, 1988); Linda Hunt, Project Paperclip: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and Project 
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programme. There is no denying that it is an important and revealing book  W the result of 
over ten years of intensive research by a historian who had studied the American 
occupation for over 30 years. Gimbel focuses heavily on material exploitation, that is, the 
removal of documents, equipment and finished products, and does not go into much depth 
when discussing the recruitment of German scientists and technicians themselves. As a 
result, he also commits a large section of the book to attempting to assess the value of the 
material which the USA was able to secure from Germany. Gimbel also focuses almost 
exclusively on the American efforts and clarifies in his preface that, except for occasional 
brief references, the book does not deal with the parallel endeavours of the other Allies.23 
/Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ 'ŝŵďĞů ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? ZĂǇŵŽŶĚ ^ƚŽŬĞƐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘detailed 
examinations of the French, British, and even the Russian counterparts to the American 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĨƵů ? ?ďƵƚƚŽĚĂƚĞƚŚĞƐĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĞůƵƐŝǀĞ ?24 This thesis aims to redress 
this in the British respect, and though it would not be fair or appropriate to consider this 
ǁŽƌŬ Ă ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶ ƉŝĞĐĞ ƚŽ 'ŝŵďĞů ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ
deliberately sought and are happily acknowledged, and certainly both works exist in the 
same historiographical environment. In addition, this thesis discusses both the material and 
personnel exploitation which the British conducted and posits that greater significance 
should be attached to the latter, as this had further-reaching ramifications and was more 
closely entwined with the Cold War rivalry. Cementing his position as an authority on the 
history of exploitation, Gimbel also produced several articles on the topic, including one 
which provides an interesting exploration of the relationship between exploitation of 
personnel and denazification (his focus throughout remains on the American programme).25 
 Science, Technology and Reparations made a substantial impact upon its publication 
in 1990 and three years later the German Historical Institute in Washington DC hosted a 
conference to consider GiŵďĞů ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐ ůĂƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
proceedings of that conference were published as an edited volume entitled Technology 
Transfer out of Germany after 1945, and this book provides the majority of the extant 
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historiography on American exploitation. OŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ 'ŝŵďĞů ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚ ? ƚŚĞ
British, French and Soviet efforts are only mentioned peremptorily.26 It includes discussions 
on the nature of intellectual property within reparations policy, denazification in science, 
and the reconstruction of the German economy on terms that allowed for its reintroduction 
ƚŽ ŐůŽďĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? Ɛ Ă ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ŽĨ 'ŝŵďĞů ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŝƚůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƚĂŬĞƐ ŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
expands on them  W that is, it examines the wider implications of exploitation for both 
Germany and America, rather than re-evaluating the programme itself. Another product of 
'ŝŵďĞů ?ƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐ:ŽŚŶ&ĂƌƋƵŚĂƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽŶĞŽĨ'ŝŵďĞů ?Ɛ
key contentions  W that the American occupation featured a central conflict between 
 ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞƌƐ ?  W could be extrapolated and applied to the British zone. In 
answering this question, Farquharson gave a good overview of the British programme and 
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƚ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the idea of  “ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ǀĞƌƐƵƐ
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞƌƐ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ Ă ǀĂůŝĚ ƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?27 This present study also 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ƚŚŝƐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ &ĂƌƋƵŚĂƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ǁŚŽůůǇ
accurate. Paul Maddrell approaches the subject from a somewhat different angle by 
discussing how British post-war scientific intelligence on the Soviet Union emerged from the 
experience and structures of exploitation, which further develops the idea that exploitation 
represented a significant intersection between science and technology, intelligence-
gathering, and military strategy  W an assumption which lies at the core of this present 
study.28 
 There are three slightly older histories of exploitation which are also worth 
mentioning here  W Michel Bar-ŽŚĂƌ ?ƐThe Hunt for the German Scientists (1967), Clarence 
' ?>ĂƐďǇ ?ƐProject Paperclip (1971) ?ĂŶĚŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐBlowback (1988).29 With all 
now being many years out of date, they can provide little more than a rough outline of the 
exploitation programme, with few details, especially as it was not until the 1990s and 2000s 
that many of the more pertinent official documents were made available. They attempt to 
make up for this dearth of archival material with a wealth of anecdotal evidence, which 
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though often fascinating and revealing, is difficult to trace or verify and thus only of minimal 
value. As with Gimbel, their emphasis is overwhelmingly on the American programme 
though, unlike Gimbel, they all primarily discuss the interrogation and recruitment of 
German specialists rather than material exploitation. In addition to these histories based on 
anecdotal evidence, there are also several memoirs and personal accounts of work in 
various aspects of the exploitation initiative which can provide a valuable insight into the 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌŽǀĞƐ ?Now It Can Be Told ?^ĂŵƵĞů'ŽƵĚƐŵŝƚ ?ƐAlsos ĂŶĚŽƌŝƐd ?WĂƐŚ ?ƐThe 
Alsos Mission all deal with the Anglo-American investigation of German atomic physics (a 
key precursor to full exploitation) from slightly differing perspectives.30 Attain by Surprise is 
an edited volume of recollections which amounts to a unit history of 30 Assault Unit, the 
ĨŝƌƐƚ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƚĞĂŵ ƚĂƐŬĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶǇ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝůĞ DŝĐŚĂĞů ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
Otherwise Occupied is an annotated collection of the author ?Ɛ ůĞƚƚĞƌƐŚŽŵĞƚŽŚŝƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ
written while he was serving with exploitation troops in Germany after the war.31 All of 
these works provide fascinating insights into the real work of the individuals involved in this 
programme, which could not otherwise be obtained from official documents or elsewhere, 
but there is an underlying risk of bias or, particularly in the case of senior figures such as 
Groves, the accounts being written with an eye to painting a favourable picture for the sake 
of posterity. Furthermore, these sources usually focus on only a very limited part of the 
wider scheme and due to the diversity of experience within the exploitation scheme, cannot 
be easily extrapolated or considered to be indicative of the programme as a whole. This is 
not to diminish their validity as historical sources in a general sense, only that their 
relevance to this study, which is primarily concerned with government policy, is more 
supportive or peripheral than it is central or integral. 
 Naturally, it is necessary to situate any study of exploitation within the history of the 
British occupation more broadly, but literature on this topic is sadly also lacking.32 Aside 
from a 500-page official history which provides little more than a dry factual account with 
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practically no analysis,33 the only academic work in English dedicated solely to this topic is 
/ĂŶ dƵƌŶĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ĞĚŝƚĞĚ ǀŽůƵŵĞReconstruction in Post-War Germany, which includes 
chapters from many established scholars on everything from denazification and propaganda 
to currency reform and the coal and steel industries, all within the British zone.34 While this 
has proved a highly valuable work of reference during the present research, it is over 25 
years out of date and lacks the benefit of more recently released primary material. In 
addition, the fragmented nature of an edited volume means that discussion of some of the 
more holistic themes is, in places, disappointingly absent. dƵƌŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ŵŝƌƌŽƌĞĚ
somewhat by an earlier German-language work, edited by Josef Foschepoth and Rolf 
Steininger, which does contain chapters which examine dismantling and industrial control, 
both peripherally relevant to the present study.35 
As a point of comparison, works on the other occupation zones have featured 
greater engagement with the issue of exploitation. EŽƌŵĂŶEĂŝŵĂƌŬ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ
occupation of Germany includes a chapter which exclusively examines the Soviet utilisation 
of German science, alongside discussions of economics, democratisation and security,
36
  
while Klaus-ŝĞƚŵĂƌ ,ĞŶŬĞ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶcontains a sizeable 
evaluation of US personnel exploitation, and is remarkable for its consideration of German 
responses, including organised protest, to the scheme.37 The closest to an equivalent book 
on the British zone is the relevant entry in sŽůŬĞƌ<ŽŽƉ ?ƐBesetzt series which, despite being 
ůĂƌŐĞůǇĂũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĚŽĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞĨƚ ?ŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
patents by the British occupiers, as part of dismantling policy.38 More recently, with the 
wider release of pertinent files, there has been a move towards studying distinct facets of 
occupation policy across the zones, including Francis Graham-ŝǆŽŶ ?ƐThe Allied Occupation 
of Germany which focuses on the post-war refugee crisis (and the relationship between 
occupiers and occupied )ĂŶĚ :ĞƐƐŝĐĂ ZĞŝŶŝƐĐŚ ?ƐThe Perils of Peace, which examines public 
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health in occupied Germany.39 There has not yet been a comparable monograph which 
primarily discusses scientific and technical exploitation policy.  
The international dimension of this present study, and particularly the fact that 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĞŵĞƉĂůĞĚŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĐĂůĞĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨŝƚƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
counterpart, means it is also ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞǁŝƚŚŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚĞĞƉĚĞĐůŝŶĞ
as a world power during the post-war period. While there have been several histories which 
ƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚĚƌĂƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
begun during the war, or even before) and was largely replaced on the global stage by the 
new powers of the United States and the Soviet Union, the story of exploitation shows that 
Britain did not immediately accept this new role and was instead still in a position to actively 
compete with both the USA and the USSR for the best scientific and technical spoils of 
Germany, even if the ultimate success rate remained relatively low.40 
 In general, the history of the exploitation programme sits within the history of the 
post-war period as a whole which, in recent years, has become a distinct area of research in 
ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ƌŝŐŚƚ ? dŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĨŝĞůĚ ŝƐ ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇ dŽŶǇ :ƵĚƚ ?ƐPostwar which 
reimagines its titular subject matter as a distinct historical concept rather than a mere 
temporal descriptor while also attempting, and by any fair measurement succeeding, to 
provide a history of all aspectƐŽĨůŝĨĞŝŶƵƌŽƉĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
2005.41 Though this immense scope is part of what makes this book stand out, some topics 
are inevitably dealt with in much greater depth than others, and what emerges can, in many 
ǁĂǇƐ ? ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ Ă ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŝĚĞĂƐ ? KŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ :ƵĚƚ ?Ɛ
interpretation is his examination of the legacy of the Second World War on subsequent 
European development and his conclusion reinforces this, with particular reference to the 
Holocaust. This study, as a history of the post-ǁĂƌ ? ƐŚĂƌĞƐ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ :ƵĚƚ ?Ɛ ŽǀĞƌĂƌching 
themes, not least that the unusual programme of exploitation, despite being in essence a 
Cold War phenomenon, emerged very much as a product of the unique conditions of the 
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war which preceded it. Furthermore, :ƵĚƚ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ƌĞƐƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚEurope 
entered a discrete new phase after 1945  W that the end of the war marked a caesura, or 
 ‘ǌĞƌŽ ŚŽƵƌ ? ? ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ŵŽƌĞ ƐŽ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ  ?ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
 ‘Stunde Null ? ŐĂǀĞ ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ǌĞƌŽ ŚŽƵƌ ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ŚĂƐ ƐƵďƐĞƋĞŶƚůǇ ƐƉĂƌŬed a 
historiographical debate about whether 1945 truly represented such a sharp break with the 
past or whether this was an illusion and there was, in fact, greater continuity across this 
apparent barrier than perhaps one first assumes. 
 At first glance, 1945 (and specifically 8 May 1945, the date of the German 
unconditional surrender) does appear to be an obvious historical caesura for the German 
people42  W marking the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War as 
well as the collapse of the Third Reich and the beginning of the Allied occupation. However, 
numerous historians have challenged this as a valid historical turning point, instead 
characterising it as an artificial break constructed by those, mostly Germans, who were keen 
to leave a tarnished past behind them and make a fresh start. Ian Buruma comments that 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽ ƌĞĂů  ‘ĐůĞĂŶ ƐůĂƚĞƐ ? ŝŶ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ŶŽ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŚŽǁ ŵƵĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ
following a particularly unpleasant or traumatic period, while Jeffrey K. Olick warns of the 
aƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂů ‘ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐŽĨƚĞŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚĞƐĞĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽĂŶ
ignorance of the continuities and discontinuities which surround them.43 Richard Bessel, in 
his book, Germany 1945, which provides an in-depth study of this important year of 
transition and upheaval as well as a comparative examination of the early occupation 
policies of the four Allies, offers up perhaps the most compelling appraisal of this 
contentious term. Bessel suggests that 1945 was a fundamental break with the past because 
the German people wanted it to be, and that it is the role of historians not to judge this 
desire to be free from the horrors of war and Nazism but to understand it and its 
significance.44 Similarly, in her generational approach to twentieth century German history, 
Dissonant Lives, Mary Fulbrook ĨŝŶĚƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǌĞƌŽ ŚŽƵƌ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ƵŶĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ
structures or personnel, but does acknowledge that there was a genuine desire for a fresh 
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start.45 This idea, that conceptions of change and continuity in Europe at this time were 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ? ŝƐ explored in greater depth by 
Bessel and Dirk Schumann in the co-edited volume Life after Death, which summarises that 
ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ƐĂƌĞ ‘the hinge on which the history of Europe in the twentieth century 
ƚƵƌŶƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ? ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƉŚĞƌ Ɛ ? ?46 Certainly, exploitation sits within 
this interpretation as a distinct feature of the critical, transformational post-war period, 
both deeply shaped by the Second World War and geared towards transcending it. 
 More generally, the history of exploitation does not completely coincide with either 
the acceptance or dismissal of 1945 as a point of dramatic change. Exploitation neither 
began nor concluded in 1945 and the end of the Second World War was, in fact, a relatively 
insignificant event for the exploitation officials  W it simply marked the fairly nominal shift 
from a military operation to an occupation policy and presented the opportunity to 
gradually increase the scope and range of their activities. Instead, a different periodisation is 
relevant here and this thesis suggests that it is not about a single point of dramatic change, 
on 8 May 1945 or otherwise, but rather about a longer period of transition, running 
approximately from 1943 to 1948. This timeframe would have felt familiar to many German 
citizens who experienced 8 May as just another day of hardship in the difficult period which 
ran from the military defeat at Stalingrad in 1943 until the currency reform brought in by 
the Allied occupiers in 1948 or the establishment of German nation-states in 1949.
47
 It 
would also have resonated with the German scientists who were selected for exploitation  W 
though the nationality of their employer might have changed, they continued plying their 
specialist trade in much the same way after the war as they had during it. Efforts were even 
made by the British to treat the scientists with similar levels of respect as they had been 
familiar with in the Third Reich in order to minimise friction and thus maximise productivity. 
Similarly, it would also seem valid to the British officials tasked with conducting the 
programme  W the planning, preparation, and early missions of exploitation began as soon as 
the ƚŝĚĞŽĨǁĂƌďĞŐĂŶƚŽƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?ĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŵĞƌĞůǇĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ?ĂůďĞŝƚŽŶĂ
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larger scale, after the German surrender and into the post-war years. This transitional 
periodisation also holds up in broader assessments of contemporary diplomacy and military 
strategy  W :ƵůŝĂŶ >ĞǁŝƐ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ŵĂƌŬĞĚ Ă  ‘ĐƌƵĐŝĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ
transitioned from fighting Germany to fighting the Soviet Union.48 Indeed, while it seems 
counterintuitive that the Cold War could have started while the Second World War was still 
being fought, it has been argued that many British officials, especially those within the 
intelligence community, never ceased to see the Soviet Union as the real enemy, even while 
the two countries were working in close coordination to defeat Nazi Germany, and this 
allowed for a swift and smooth adjustment to the new paradigm after 1945.49 In short, the 
Cold War constellation, which lasted in Europe until 1989-90, emerged from this short 
transition period between war and peace.50 
 British exploitation adheres to this notion of a transition phase because, as will be 
shown in this thesis, its origins dated back to the first commando raids and exploitation 
missions of 1943 and it was not truly wound down until 1948, when the impending creation 
of an independent West German state made it increasingly unviable. As noted above, the 
changes signified by the end of the war had little real impact on the conduct of the 
programme as a whole. This present study, therefore, aims to offer a new approach to the 
histories of exploitation, the British occupation of Germany, and the start of the Cold War. 
This will be achieved by contending that the American exploitation programme is not the 
only one worth studying and that the British, although junior partners in this respect, still 
contributed to this policy in a meaningful way; by asserting that exploitation was a central 
part of the occupation strategy of the British authorities in Germany and that the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞƌƐ ? ǁĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƚŚĂŶ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ
elsewhere; by showing that exploitation and British foreign policy, particularly towards the 
Soviet Union, were inextricably entwined; and lastly by showing that exploitation provides 
evidence, not of dramatic change in 1945 nor of a complete lack of it, but rather of a five-
year period of steady transition, as Britain moved from the last war into the next  W a war in 
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which the parameters were substantially different than in any conflict Britain had seen 
before. 
 
The road to this thesis began with an interest in how nerve agents  W a central but unused 
component of the Nazi chemical warfare arsenal, and almost completely unknown to the 
Allies during the war  W were transferred to the British armoury in 1945.51 This was the 
opening which led into a much wider exploration of how this process of enforced 
technology transfer took place but the limited literature on offer was, as shown above, both 
sensationalist and generally preoccupied with the American programme. Wider reading 
began to reveal that the parallel British endeavour had a narrative of its own and that this 
did not have to follow the lines of an enormous government conspiracy; instead it became 
clear that this was a largely unexamined and yet significant element of British occupation 
policy and one which could provide a fresh perspective on science and technology, 
intelligence-gathering, military strategy, and diplomacy in this critical period of British 
history. It is prudent to note here that if this thesis was to be pigeon-holed into any one 
particular field of study it would be modern British history, albeit with a transnational 
outlook  W although Germany provides the setting for the narrative, this study focuses mostly 
on British organisations, their policies, and the resultant actions.52 
 In fact, it is perhaps wise to delineate exactly what the purview of this study is and, 
arguably more importantly, what it is not. The primary focus is the British government, 
encompassing both the civil service and the military (who shared the responsibility for the 
occupation of Germany), and the narrative herein charts the preparation for, and execution 
of, exploitation as conducted by organisations under the aegis of the British government, 
which were the ultimate instigators of the scheme. While numerous other groups had 
agency as part of this process  W the individual British investigators, the German scientists 
and technicians, the communities in both Germany and Britain which were affected by 
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either the removal or introduction of these specialists  W this study is primarily concerned 
with the government policy itself. A key ƚŽƵĐŚƐƚŽŶĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐƌŝĂŶĂůŵĞƌ ?Ɛ
history of the British biological warfare programme which focuses on both government 
policy and the way in which this was influenced by military scientific and technical experts.53 
Future research on the roles of the other actors in this process will no doubt add new 
dimensions to the understanding of the exploitation programme as a whole, not least a 
grasp of the human experience involved, but for the first account of the British scheme, it 
seemed logical to begin with the policies and actions which formed its essential framework. 
It is certainly hoped that what might be deemed a  ‘ƚŽƉ-ĚŽǁŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŚĞƌĞǁŝůů
later serve as a starting point for, and be augmented by, further studies which discuss the 
agency of other relevant groups (especially the German experts involved) and which 
therefore contribute towards a sociocultural history of exploitation. In addition, this is 
neither an economic nor a legal history, though elements of both do feature (such as the 
profitability of technology transfer and the law surrounding patents), but the necessary 
brevity of this study and the breadth of the material covered within means that it would not 
be feasible to fully do justice to these sizeable subjects here. Moving forward, what would 
be of immense value to this field is a fair and balanced assessment of the economic benefits 
derived from exploitation by each of the occupying powers (and of individual firms and 
companies therein), and of its corresponding impact on Germany. 
Of course, the epistemological positioning of this thesis has necessarily shaped its 
research methodology which, on account of the relative lack of secondary literature on the 
subject, has relied heavily on primary material. As the focus of the study is government 
policy and procedure, the bulk of the material has been archival, in particular the official 
documents  W minutes of meetings, civil service correspondence, memoranda, and so on  W to 
be found in the National Archives at Kew, as well as the Final Reports filed by the 
exploitation agencies on all manner of topics, which are held at Churchill College, 
Cambridge. In addition, these have been supplemented by the personal diaries and 
correspondence of the British investigators themselves, found within the collections of the 
Imperial War Museum. As mentioned above, a full examination of the human experience of 
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Palgrave, 2001), 6ff. 
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exploitation does not fall within the ambit of this study so these personal papers were 
mostly used to explore how the policies of the British government were actually enacted on 
ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ďǇ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞ ? ŽĨƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?In addition, studying 
contemporary press reports gave some indication of the impact the scheme had in Britain, 
and how the government managed this, but there is doubtless a larger story to be explored 
here too. Those wishing to understand more about the human experience may wish to 
pursue an oral history approach, but this was not considered to be particularly compatible 
with a history of policy and initial efforts to establish contact with the relevant figures 
proved fruitless. In short, therefore, the aim here is to use archival documentary evidence to 
craft a comprehensive history of the British exploitation of German science and technology 
between 1943 and 1948, from the point of view of the British governmental bodies which 
both initiated and directed it.  
 Within this overarching purpose, there were several smaller aims which the thesis 
sought to achieve. The first was to understand how exploitation was first conceived in 1943-
44 and how it developed into the large operation which it was by 1946  W what had occurred 
during the latter part of the war and immediately after its conclusion, first to make 
exploitation a plausible scheme at all, and then to raise it to a position of such prominence 
and significance? Secondly, the scarcity of literature on British exploitation meant that there 
was very little evidence of how Britain actually conducted exploitation on the ground. Did it 
follow the American methodology or did it differ? How did it evolve from the far simpler 
process of visiting facilities and removing documents and equipment to the more 
complicated and ethically uncertain territory of detaining, interrogating and recruiting the 
German specialists themselves? Within this framework, to what extent did the British 
government rely on private firms to help facilitate extensive exploitation, especially of 
expert personnel? Thirdly, as it was well established that Britain was only one of four 
powers implementing an exploitation strategy, it was necessary to understand how these 
ĐŽŶĐŽŵŝƚĂŶƚƐĐŚĞŵĞƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?,ŽǁĚŝĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ
junior partner in the Anglo-American relationship, its competition with France for 
supremacy in Europe, and, perhaps most importantly, its rapidly worsening relations with 
the Soviet Union shape exploitation policy? In addition, was this only a one-way flow or did 
exploitation have any impact on BrŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?Finally, it was imperative 
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that this study of exploitation did not exist in a vacuum  W this thesis rests on the belief that 
exploitation influenced, and was influenced by, the context in which it operated. The 
occupation of Germany was a huge undertaking and a major burden on a Britain which was 
weak and exhausted, especially economically, after the war  W how did exploitation relate to 
other important aspects of the occupation, such as denazification or the control of German 
science and industry? Did exploitation, an ultimately more prosaic and pragmatic 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ  ‘ŶŽďůĞ ? ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĨĞůƚ ǁĞƌĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
moral duty, as occupiers, to scold, re-educate, and eventually rehabilitate post-war 
Germany? This also provides a chance to examine whether the sensationalism which has 
dominated accounts of the programme has any grounding, by assessing how secretive the 
scheme was, how much the public knew, and how those responsible for its oversight 
justified it in both moral and legal terms. 
This present study examines these questions by utilising a part-chronological and 
part-thematic approach to the history of exploitation. The chronological angle is essential 
because exploitation grew and changed substantially over the time period in question and 
charting this evolution is a central aim of the work. However, the sheer plurality of agencies 
and operations tasked with exploitation which were simultaneously active during the period 
means it is impossible to generate a smooth and continuous timeline and thus the thematic 
angle is necessary to gather certain related points into a single fluent discourse. The thesis is 
divided into six chapters and these are then paired up in order to create three discrete parts 
 W this trifurcated structure was chosen in order to thoroughly tackle the three key elements 
of the exploitation narrative: the preparation, the execution, and the context. The fact that 
each part comprises two chapters is not an act of contrived symmetry but a natural 
alignment as the two chapters in each part are intimately connected and mutually 
complementary and, across the three parts and six chapters, the whole story of British 
exploitation can be told. 
dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƉĂƌƚ ŝƐ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘ǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ tĂƌƚŝŵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŚĂƌƚƐ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
exploitation programme from the earliest recognition that Germany was ahead in certain 
aspects of research and development, through the first deployment of scientific and 
technical investigators in continental Europe (mostly in France and the Low Countries), and 
then to the movement of these agents across the borders of the Reich and into Germany 
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itself in the last few months of the war. Chapter One aims to set the scene for the larger 
narrative, by presenting a picture of science, strategy and intelligence in Britain during the 
Second World War, and showing how these interests became increasingly entangled. There 
is also a focus on the organisations which came before the exploitation agencies proper, and 
whose actions served as a framework around which the exploitation programme was built. 
Chapter Two documents the first steps which the combined Anglo-American exploitation 
initiative took, leading to it adopting a form which bears a clear resemblance to the 
programme which was predominant during the post-war period. The story moves between 
policy-ŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ďŽŽƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ŝŶWĂƌŝƐ
less than a week after its liberation by Allied troops, and into Nazi Germany as the Second 
World War entered its final destructive phase. 
dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƉĂƌƚ ŝƐ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘ǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƵŶĚĞƌ KĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƐ Ă ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
chronological successor to the preceding part but then moves away from chronology and 
instead examines two distinct, but generally simultaneous, aspects of the main exploitation 
programme. Chapter Three begins as the war comes to an end and the previously joint 
exploitation organisation is split into two unilateral elements along national lines. At this 
point, the British exploitation programme was able to develop its own character and its 
direction was placed exclusively in the hands of British policy-makers. This, and the fact that 
active combat had now ceased, granted greater freedom but also came with greater 
limitations  W while it was now possible to send a much larger cohort of investigators to 
Germany (many of whom were civilians with no military training) and the whole territory of 
the Reich was now accessible to Allied operatives, Britain was also forced to rely on its own 
overstretched resources alone and the exploitation teams were forced into frequent 
interactions with the representatives of other post-war initiatives, such as war crimes 
investigators and bombing surveyors. This chapter also provides an appraisal of the physical 
material which Britain was able to secure from Germany, including in high-importance fields 
such as chemical warfare and rocketry. Chapter Four explores how Britain went about 
acquiring arguably the most desirable prizes of exploitation: the German scientists and 
technicians themselves. This process took many forms, beginning with the detention and 
interrogation of these experts in Germany and then in Britain, and then progressing to their 
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employment, initially only on military topics and in government research facilities, but later 
expanded to include civil fields and recruitment by private firms. 
dŚĞ ƚŚŝƌĚ ƉĂƌƚ ? ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘ǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ĂďĂŶĚŽ Ɛ ƚŚĞ ĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
approach and seeks to re-evaluate the exploitation programme, not in terms of its 
preparation or implementation but in terms of its relationship to external factors. Chapter 
Five focuses on the international dimension of exploitation and describes the coexistence of 
the British programme alongside those of the USA, France, and the Soviet Union. While 
Britain generally enjoyed an amiable relationship with its two Western allies, in terms of 
exploitation competition was as likely as collaboration between them, and mistrust, 
underhand tactics, and open disagreements were commonplace. Impressions of the Soviet 
Union had the most influence in shaping the British programme, however, not least because 
the desire to deny any German specialist of note to the Soviets quickly became the defining 
feature of British exploitation. As discussed, this thesis is concerned primarily with the 
British perspective but a broader future study could certainly utilise foreign archival sources 
to see how the British scheme was viewed by the other major post-war powers. Chapter Six 
narrows the focus and examines the contemporary domestic political landscape (in Britain 
and in the British zone of Germany) in which exploitation was situated. This encompasses 
the role which exploitation played within the occupation, where it was just one of countless 
competing and interrelated policies, the morality and legality which was attributed to 
exploitation in order to make it viable (and the use, and misuse, of the terms of reparations 
to this end), and the British public ?Ɛ reaction to exploitation, as expressed by various voices 
and in various media. This chapter ends by discussing how conflict with the growing need to 
reconstruct a healthy and self-sufficient Germany meant that exploitation ceased to be 
tenable, and charts the conclusion of exploitation as it was necessarily brought about in the 
late 1940s. 
On the whole, the purpose of this present study is to provide the first complete and 
thorough history of the British post-war exploitation programme. In some respects, this 
means its role is to debunk theories which have characterised the scheme as an illicit 
conspiracy, while still acknowledging the controversial nature of the initiative. In others, it 
means dispelling the idea that the British programme was just a subsidiary of its American 
counterpart, while stilůĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂƐďŽƚŚ ůĂƌŐĞƌĂŶĚ
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further-reaching. However, the chief contention of this thesis is that it is impossible to 
understand the British exploitation programme on its own merits alone and that it is 
therefore essential to situate it within both its domestic and, more importantly, its 
international context. For the former, this entails an appreciation of the policy-making 
process which led to exploitation, a grasp of the malleable political, legal and ethical basis in 
which it was rooted, and a comprehension of how it fitted into British occupation strategy 
as a whole. For the latter, this involves an awareness of three British priorities in this period: 
the desire to keep Germany militarily weak, the desire to compete successfully with the USA 
ĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂƌŵŽƵƌŝĞƐĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Soviet Union, in preparation for a potential future war against this inscrutable enemy in the 
East. It is only through this approach that an accurate and well-rounded understanding of 
the British exploitation of German science and technology at the end of the Second World 
War can be attained. 
 
 
N.B.: The sheer multiplicity of organisations and agencies which were responsible for 
exploitation and its related subjects, many of which were known by acronyms, abbreviations 
or codenames, can be daunting and all but unfathomable. Hopefully, the list which precedes 
this introduction and the appended glossary will serve as navigational aids through this 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Scientific War 
 
In order to fully understand the British post-war exploitation programme, it is necessary to 
trace its roots back into the Second World War. Certain specific conditions were evidently 
necessary for this policy of comprehensive scientific and technological utilisation, which 
often courted controversy and caused considerable division within Britain and between the 
Allies, to come about. The post-war period was shaped decisively by the nature of the war 
which preceded it, and this is abundantly clear when studying exploitation  W various 
elements of the way the Second World War was fought, especially the rising significance of 
research and development, as well as changing perceptions of military capacity in 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ĂůůŝĞƐ ? ƉůĂǇĞĚ an influential role in the 
development of this new initiative, which straddled the boundaries between intelligence 
gathering, scientific and technical development, and international relations. The war also 
provided an opportunity for the tactics later employed by agents of exploitation to be tried 
and tested  W the experimental conditions of the contemporary battlefield allowed a strategy 
to emerge and be refined, in preparation for much broader deployment as the war came to 
an end. Overall, this chapter charts the first steps taken on the path towards a major 
programme of British post-war scientific and technical exploitation, by exploring how 
science and technology shaped the war in general, and military intelligence in particular, 
and by examining two forerunner operations, the successes and failures of which directly 
influenced the form which the exploitation initiative later assumed.  
 
Science and Strategy 
It has often been noted that war is a locomotive for change and nowhere is this truer 
than in the fields of science and technology. When so much is at stake, it really is no wonder 
that the belligerents in any modern war invest so much effort and so many resources into 
developing new forms of weaponry. The twentieth century, when human scientific 
endeavour was eliciting new discoveries with astounding regularity, highlighted this critical 
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relationship between science and conflict more clearly than ever before. It has been said 
that invention is a form of evolution, through which military societies can adapt to 
overcome new challenges.54 The First World War, which shaped subsequent military action 
perhaps more than any other conflict before or since, was saturated with scientific 
developments which influenced the course of the war; tanks, gas warfare and aerial 
ďŽŵďŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŶĂŵĞ ďƵƚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ? sŝĐƚŽƌǇ ĐĂŵĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ƵƉŽŶ Ă  ‘ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƐĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞŚĞĂǀŝůǇ
to deciding the outcome of many battles and campaigns, they had much further-reaching 
ramifications too.55 They became indispensable on future battlefields and, in the spirit of 
 ‘ƐǁŽƌĚƐŝŶƚŽƉůŽƵŐŚƐŚĂƌĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĐŽƵůĚďĞĚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĞĚĂŶĚĂďƐŽƌďĞĚŝŶƚŽĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Žƌ ŝŶƚŽƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?Ǉ  ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘ĂŐigantic military-academic-
industrial complex, co-ŽƉƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?56 In 
addition, technology brought the frontline much closer to home, whether in the form of 
attacks on civilian targets or the more extensive dissemination of information by a 
technologically-advanced press  W it marked the true advent of total war. New weapons 
demanded not only new military tactics and strategy but also new politics, diplomacy and 
even morality.57  
As a result, the exploitation initiative cannot be understood without first exploring 
ƚŚĞ ƌŽŽƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
wider influence that this has had. The First World War serves as an interesting precursor but 
exploitation was undeniably a product of the Second World War. This was due, in no small 
measure, to the sheer vast scale of this latter conflict and the enlarged role which science 
and technology necessarily played in it.
58
 SŽŵĞŚĂǀĞĞǀĞŶĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?ĨĂƐƚĞƌĂŶĚ
more comprehensive adoption of scientific tactics was instrumental in their eventual 
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ĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ P dŽǁĂƌĚ Ă EĞǁ dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŐĞ ? ? ŝŶ
Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Second World War, vol. III (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2015), 196-219. 
- 34 - 
 
victory.59 /ŶŚŝƐĨŽƌĞǁŽƌĚƚŽ/ƌǀŝŶ^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
Research and Development (OSRD), its former head, Vannevar Bush, wrote that: 
World War II was the first war in history to be affected decisively by weapons unknown at 
the outbreak of hostilities. This is probably the most significant military fact of our decade: 
that upon the correct evolution of the instrumentalities of war, the strategy and tactics of 
war must now be conditioned.60 
This change in strategic thinking was already taking place in the first years of the war. Once 
the fearsome Nazi Blitzkrieg was forced to a halt at the English Channel, and a stalemate of 
conventional land warfare was temporarily reached in Europe, finding a new way to tackle 
the enemy became an issue of the utmost importance to both sides. British recognition of 
this had been officially noted as early as January 1940, in a memorandum from the Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƚŽƚŚĞ:ŽŝŶƚ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŶŽƚĞĚ P ‘dŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
results of scientific research to warfare has increased and is increasing needs no 
demonƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?61 
 This was by no means all bad news for the British. Their real strength did not lie in 
their small ground army but rather in their navy and air force, and it is in these two domains 
where science flourished most impressively. In particular, the new air war was very different 
to that of the First World War and relied far more heavily on the technology of mass 
production to ensure that an air force would not be overwhelmed by the ĞŶĞŵǇ ?ƐŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĂů
superiority. Total war had now fully matured and the bombing of civilian targets became a 
common feature of the ongoing conflict.62 Popular pressure to defend against these 
devastating raids was understandably immense and this drove a process of technical one-
upmanship between the warring powers, which ended up centring quite heavily on 
detection and advance warning, specifically on radar. This was arguably one of the most 
important scientific developments of the Second World War and one that would fascinate 
experts and provoke fervent study and modification for the duration of the conflict and 
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beyond.63 Another element of the air war was the push to make aircraft faster and thus far 
more effective in aerial combat as well as safer from attack from the ground. This led to the 
invention of the jet engine, which was largely experimental right up until the end of the war, 
with only small sections of any national air force occupied by jet aircraft. As such, like radar, 
jet research progressed beyond 1945 and soon the jet engine came to dominate not only 
military but also civilian aviation.64 
 These are just two examples of the myriad advances in science and technology which 
fed directly into the waging of the Second World War and the impact of which was felt far 
beyond 1945. However, no discussion of military technology in this period can be complete 
without mention of the atomic bomb. The product of unprecedented Anglo-American 
collaboration, and the result of the largest tactical military science operation of all time, the 
atomic bomb had the power not only to bring a swift end to war in the Pacific (though there 
is some debate as to how necessary its use truly was) but also, in creating the requisite 
conditions for the Cold War, to shape international relations for the next fifty years.65 More 
than anything, it showed that the possible results of applied research in modern warfare 
were potentially limitless, and ensured that from then on science and warfare would be 
indefinitely and inextricably entwined.  
The impact of science and technology on modern warfare cannot be judged on the 
merits of individual developments alone, no matter how significant or far-reaching they 
have proven to be. Instead, it is important to examine the way in which science factored 
into the waging of war as a whole, thus creating the necessary preconditions for the Cold 
War arms race and the exploitation initiative. In the traditional view of wartime Britain, 
despite the indispensable contributions they had made during the First World War, 
scientists were not always taken that seriously by the government and in many cases their 
expertise was not utilised to its full potential or at the best possible time.66 It took the work 
of tireless and enterprising scientific experts, who were not easily deterred in their desire to 
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contribute to the war effort, to truly transform the role of science in Britain during the war. 
These efforts are perhaps best exemplified by both Frederick Lindemann, 1st Viscount 
Cherwell, and Henry Tizard, though these are only two examples from a large and esteemed 
cohort of inĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ŚĞƌǁĞůů ? ŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĚ  ‘dŚĞ WƌŽĨ ? ? ŚĂƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ
ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ ŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?Ɛ ĐůŽƐĞƐƚ ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌ ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ŚĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Prime Minister (who was himself deeply sympathetic towards scientific innovation) to 
ensure new research played a key role in the British war effort.67 Tizard meanwhile did 
much to foster improved Anglo-American collaboration on military science, even before the 
USA entered the war, but he was also involved in policy-making regarding the defence of 
Britain and attacks on Germany.68 Strong advocates of science like Cherwell and Tizard were 
invaluable in ensuring that Britain did not fall behind its enemies in terms of the technical 
capabilities of its arsenal. 
This view of Britain, particularly in the earlier part of the war, as militarily backward, 
largely unresponsive to innovation, yet courageously holding fast as the only active 
opponent to Nazi expansion, has not gone unchallenged. Most notably, David Edgerton has 
questioned this myth and strongly supported his argument with statistics which show that 
the economic and industrial potential of Britain and its Empire remained undented for much 
of the war and that scientific and technological development was integral to this. Edgerton 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐĂ ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚ ‘ĂŶŽďƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ
with masses of machines, specifically machines designed to destroy enemies both physically 
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ŵƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?/ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?
he argues that the British government and military, especially the navy and air force, were 
ƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ƐŽ ĂƐ ƚŽ ĨŝŐŚƚ  ‘Ă ǁĂƌ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŶĞǆƚ ǁĂƌ ? ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ
ůĂƐƚ ? ?69 Certainly, by thĞ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǀĞƌǇ ƐĐĂůĞ ŽĨ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ŽĨ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ‘ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚĂůĨ
of government-funded research and development, and something like a quarter of the 
national total, wĂƐ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ? ?70 However, what Edgerton fails to 
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address is the role of the myth  W the public (and many politicians) at the time did not easily 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĨŝĞůĚƐ ?ƐŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽŝŶŶŽǀĂƚĞ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞ 
remained constant, and divorced from the reality. 
This situation in Britain cannot be viewed in isolation. It was necessitated and 
motivated by the enthusiastic adoption of research and development in the German war 
effort.71 The Nazi war machine had to rely heavily on science from the very beginning in 
order to expand and modernise their armed forces from the level prescribed by the Treaty 
of Versailles to a level adequate for waging aggressive war across Europe and beyond.72 In 
/ĂŶ <ĞƌƐŚĂǁ ?Ɛ ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŽĨ ,itler, he notes that Nazi Germany was initially so successful 
because it combined the imperialism of the nineteenth century with the technological 
potential of the twentieth.
73
 This fusion of battlefield technology with military planning and 
military-economŝĐ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
resulted in a devastatingly effective unit.74 After the war, British authorities commented 
ƚŚĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇďĞůůŝŐĞƌĞŶƚŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
to such an extreme.
75
 Civilian industrial concerns were closely involved with supporting the 
regime and fighting the war, especially in the form of large corporations such as IG Farben, 
which were able to work towards German victory while also making a healthy profit 
themselves. In addition, the scale of the Final Solution meant that it could only be 
perpetrated with the use of modern scientific and industrial techniques. In return, the 
enormous reserves of slave labour offered up by the concentration camp system made 
available a considerable workforce to a range of mass production projects, from rubber 
manufacture to the construction of missiles.76 
ǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽůĚƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?ƐƵƚŝů ƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?,ŝƚůĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Nazis also cultivated a remarkable belief in secret so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ǁŽŶĚĞƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞ
the product of applied research too and of far more interest to the British establishment. 
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They were threatened as early as September 1939, when Hitler gave a speech to a Nazi rally 
in Danzig where he boldly stated:  ‘The moment might very quickly come for us to use a 
weapon with which we could not be attacked ? ?77 It is undeniable that such a statement was 
mostly posturing but it nonetheless created a great panic in the offices of British 
govĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ĨƵĞůůĞĚ ŵŽƐƚůǇ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĚƌĞĂĚ ŽĨ  ‘ĚĞĂƚŚ ƌĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ rumoured fantastical 
weapons.78 When these failed to materialise, rational thought quickly returned to Whitehall 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŐĞŶĞƌŽƵƐƉŝŶĐŚŽĨƐĂůƚǁĂƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĞĚƚŽ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
However, Hitler was not simply giving voice to his wildest fantasies. The Third Reich 
was a regime which embraced science and technology to achieve its ends, and in reality 
Germany did have an impressive pool of brilliant minds, including some of the worůĚ ?ƐƚŽƉ
atomic physicists, and many of the most remarkable technologies of the Second World War 
had their origins in the Third Reich.79 When Hitler gave his speech in Danzig, he was 
probably thinking more of technology on which research was substantially advanced  W 
recoilless guns or rocketry, for instance  W rather than absurd weapons which more 
accurately belonged to the realm of science fiction.
80
 Later in the war, these new 
developments were sometimes easier to mass-produce than older technologies, on account 
of particular material shortages, which Germany suffered on a huge scale.81 As a result, 
ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƚŚĞůĞŐĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽŶĚĞƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƉŽƚĞŶƚ ?ůĂƐƚŝŶŐŝŶ
the popular consciousness until the very end of the war, when, as Allied armies crossed 
ƚŚĞŝƌďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽŶůǇ ĨĂŝŶƚŚŽƉĞĨŽƌĂƌĞǀĞƌƐĂůŽĨ ĨŽƌƚƵŶĞƐ ?82 The 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽŶĚĞƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶ ? ƚŚƌĞĂƚ did not evaporate immediately in Britain either. It 
ƐĞĞŵĞĚ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ǁŚŽůůǇŐƌŽƵŶĚůĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ďĞĐĂŵĞĐůĞĂƌ ƚŽ
military scientists and policy-makers alike that Britain would be incredibly vulnerable to 
attack by a weapon about which they knew nothing. It now became of utmost importance 
that nothing drastically new was added to the German arsenal without the British knowing 
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about it  W not only would this help them to defend against potential secret weapons but it 
would also allow them to add the technology to their own armoury. From now on, the race 
for scientific developments would have to be run in conjunction with the race for scientific 
intelligence, and so a new facet of modern warfare was born.  
 
 
Spying on Science 
In F.H. HinslĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ŽĨ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ^ĞĐŽŶĚ tŽƌůĚ tĂƌ ? ŚĞ
notes that, along with order-of-battle information and operational intentions, one task of 
ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ 
ƐƉƌŝŶŐ Ă ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƐŽŵĞ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ Žƌ ŶĞǁ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ Žƌ ĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?83 
Richard Aldrich concurs with this when he writes that rapid technological change, and the 
increased risk of surprise attack which this entails, essentially necessitates the 
contemporaneous growth of intelligence communities.84 This gathering of details on new 
ĂŶĚ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƌǇ ŐŽĞƐ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĂŵĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
exploitation initiative was but one chapter in its story, which has run from the Second World 
War and before to the present day, but featured particularly prominently during the early 
arms race of the Cold War  W arguably the period of the greatest revolution in military 
technology in history.85 
 However, in wartime Britain scientific and technical intelligence was merely a 
nascent branch of a nebulous military intelligence network, the co-ordination of which 
repeatedly proved to be a massive challenge for senior figures throughout the 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǁŝƚŚŚĞƌǁĞůůĂŶĚdŝǌĂƌĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝbutions to the marriage of science with 
warfare in Britain, scientific and technical intelligence too relied partly on the brilliance and 
determination of individuals to show its true worth, in this case Professor R.V. Jones. 
Reginald Victor Jones, with his recently-earned doctorate in Natural Philosophy, was the 
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first civilian scientist to be attached to a military intelligence agency in Britain, when in 
September 1939 he joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). From this position, he 
established himself as the head of scientific intelligence at the Air Ministry, in the form of 
the Assistant Directorate of Intelligence (Science), for the duration of the war  W a role which, 
thanks to the RAF being perhaps the most technologically-competent wing of the British 
armed forces, placed him at the forefront of British military scientific intelligence.86 
 His appointment was perhaps characteristic of the brand of total war which the 
Second World War necessitated (as had the First World War before it), where many civilian 
experts had to be drafted in to support the military in a number of roles  W a tradition which 
would later be integral to the exploitation initiative too. The military lacked a significant 
scientific establishment of its own so was forced to rely on the resources of private research 
institutions and universities to compensate for this potential weakness. Jones, in his highly-
acclaimed memoir, Most Secret War, acknowledges that his initial appointment, made a 
mere matter of weeks before the outbreak of war, came about because the existing 
intelligence services admitted that they could not provide adequate information on German 
scientific developments.87 It is important to note at this point that regardless of the impact 
of men such as Jones, and the networks and practices that they established, British 
gathering of scientific intelligence remained a largely piecemeal process and an effective, 
co-ordinated policy continued to be elusive. 
 A large part of the problem was a perennial reluctance among the relevant agencies 
and ministries to adopt a proactive strategy, instead preferring to allow Jones and his 
colleagues to struggle on, gleaning information from wherever they could, in a decidedly 
haphazard manner. There was a surprising reliance on German scientific journals from 
before, and sometimes during, the war as a source of intelligence on German progress in 
various fields.88 Even at the Air Ministry, where there was often the greatest scope for 
technical innovation, intelligence-gathering methods were mostly passive and opportunistic. 
Downed Luftwaffe aircraft were examined as a means of keeping tabs on development in 
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that field  W this served remarkably well in the earlier part of the war, as the German air 
ĨŽƌĐĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ŝƚƐŽǁŶƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ led it to adopting a policy of modifying older, 
often pre-1939, models, as opposed to embracing new innovative designs. This made it very 
easy for the British scientific intelligence experts to build on existing knowledge and simply 
keep abreast of these relatively small alterations. Understandably, this did lead to shocks, 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ >ƵĨƚǁĂĨĨĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚof the Focke-Wulf FW 190 in 1941, which was both 
faster and carried heavier armour and armaments than its contemporaries, and was itself 
not fully appreciated until one force-landed in Wales in June 1942. This reactive approach 
was also hindered by the sheer variety of different aircraft in use by the Luftwaffe, many of 
which were only ever so slightly different from each other; the product of competition 
among aeronautical firms in Germany, all vying for the attention and favour of senior 
Nazis.89 
Another source which wartime British scientific intelligence utilised was information 
passed on by officials in neutral countries or resistance operatives in Nazi-occupied 
territories  W a method almost as passive as waiting for planes to crash. In many cases, even 
when intelligence which hinted at a major threat from new technology in the German war 
effort was received, it was paid no heed. In the cases of both the jet engine and long-range 
rocketry, because no advanced work was taking place on these topics in Britain at the time 
the information was assessed, it was assumed that it could not possibly be taking place in 
Germany either.90 This represented a dangerous, blinkered arrogance within the British 
military-scientific establishment.91 This method did have its successes though, perhaps most 
notably the Oslo Report, which consisted of details of current and future German weapons 
projects compiled by an anti-Nazi German physicist in November 1939, mailed to the British 
embassy in Oslo and subsequently passed on to MI6. It was picked up by R.V. Jones who 
vouched for its veracity and accuracy, and it did indeed prove invaluable, especially in 
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Despite occasional victories like the Oslo Report, the approach of waiting for 
intelligence to fall into their laps proved an infuriatingly slow one for the British intelligence 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ŝƚǁĂƐ ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚƵƐŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĐĂŶ ƌĂƌĞůǇďĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞĚĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŵĂǇďĞĨĂƵůƚǇ ? ?93 Continuing this passive process was motivated by a belief 
that it would be unwise, if not impossible, to infiltrate agents into Germany to obtain this 
information first-hand. If an agent was to be effective in collecting details about complex 
scientific issues, he would need to be very extensively briefed; if such a knowledgeable 
operative was then captured whilst on a mission in Germany, any information they might 
disclose could seriously jeopardise some high-priority military projects in Britain  W this risk 
was judged to be too high.94 This attitude did undergo some revision during the Second 
World War but persisted into the post-war period, and was perhaps reignited somewhat by 
the difficult intricacies of warming relations, and increased intellectual interaction, between 
the British and German peoples after 1945. 
In the face of these numerous shortcomings in the British scientific intelligence 
system, which Henry Tizard considered to be greatly inferior to the German equivalent, the 
successes of Jones and his peers seem even more impressive.95 The solving of the 
Knickebein problem is perhaps the best example, and thus warrants a brief aside here. The 
>ƵĨƚǁĂĨĨĞ ?ƐKnickebein system involved the use of radio beams to direct night-bombing 
ƌĂŝĚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛ night-fighter force was not adequately 
equipped to defend against them. Jones identified the role these beams played and, against 
considerable disbelief and opposition from many senior advisers, including Cherwell, was 
able to convince Churchill and his Cabinet of his argument. Tizard, one of those who had 
ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚ :ŽŶĞƐ ? ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ŶŽǁ ƐĂǁ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶǁƌŽŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ŚŝƐ
resignation as a result.96 Having won the necessary political support, Jones was able to 
initiate a procedure to jam the Knickebein transmitters and thus severely frustrate the 
subsequent German night-bombing efforts  W the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĂƚƚůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĂŵƐ ? ? /Ŷ ŚŝƐ
memoirs, Jones comments that he considered this his greatest wartime victory, partly 
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because of its significant contƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂŝƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĨŝŶĂůůǇ ‘ƉƵƚ
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƉ ?ĂŶĚŵĂĚĞŝƚ ‘ĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?97  
As a key achievement of wartime scientific intelligence, solving the Knickebein 
problem was crucial in making exploitation both a viable, and desirable, post-war initiative. 
However, it was a later operation which displayed the more proactive side of scientific 
intelligence-gathering and thus laid down some of the earliest foundations for the post-war 
exploitation programme. Once again it took place on that most important scientific 
battlefield of the early years of the war  W radar. In early 1941, confirmation reached Jones at 
the Air Ministry that Germany was employing a new radar array, mentioned in the Oslo 
Report and known as Würzburg, which could assess the height of aircraft, essential to 
deploying an effective defensive response, either by fighter or by anti-aircraft batteries.
98
 
Aerial photographs were taken but little more could be ascertained about this important 
technological development without close examination. This need gave rise to the scientific 
intelligence mission known as Operation Biting or, in more common parlance, the Bruneval 
Raid. 
On the night of 27 February 1942, 120 specially-trained British Combined Operations 
commandos were dropped by parachute near to the small town of Bruneval on the northern 
French coast. They moved to their target  W a villa in the area, which housed a radar 
installation  W which they successfully attacked, allowing them to seize Würzburg radar 
equipment and take prisoners, before evacuating by sea from a nearby beach.99 This daring 
raid had numerous repercussions  W it was trumpeted in the British press in order to boost 
morale, which was at low ebb thanks to military losses in North Africa and the Far East;100 it 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĂƌĂĐŚƵƚĞ ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă ŵĂũŽƌ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ military capacity 
from then on; and it gave scientific intelligence experts a remarkable opportunity to unravel 
one of the most important mysteries of German air defence. 
Perhaps of the greatest relevance to future exploitation were the techniques used to 
carry out the raid. It was the first modern example of a behind-enemy-lines incursion for 
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which scientific and technical intelligence was the prime objective.101 Although no civilian 
expert could take part on account of the strictly specialist military nature of the mission, an 
Air Force radar mechanic, Flight Sergeant C.W.H. Cox, a peacetime cinema projectionist who 
had never been in a plane or on a ship before, volunteered and, along with a team of Royal 
Engineers, played an essential role in dismantling the radar equipment at Bruneval and 
ensuring the elements of greatest value were returned to Britain for examination.102 This 
inclusion of a non-combatant technician in a commando unit would later come to 
characterise the exploitation initiative, especially in its actions before the end of the war, 
which would share much DNA with operations like the Bruneval Raid. Another interesting 
similarity between Operation Biting and future exploitation endeavours was the capture of 
trained German technicians as prisoners and their subsequent interrogation by intelligence 
services back in Britain. In the case of Bruneval, the radar operator who was detained 
turned out to know very little about the equipment he worked with, though he was quite 
forthcoming with what he did know. This questioning, paired with thorough investigation of 
the device itself, elicited plenty of useful information about the Würzburg radar system and, 
like so many other scientific discoveries made by British Intelligence about the German war 
machine, they were shocked to discover how much more advanced German capabilities 
were.103 This reaction would continue to be all too common throughout much of the early 
exploitation process. 
dŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĨŽƌĂǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƉƌŽĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ-gathering but it 
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚ
of Blitzkrieg tactics had been the involvement of the Abwehr ?ƐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƵŶŝƚƐ ?
ƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶĐŚŝůĚŽĨĚŵŝƌĂůtŝůŚĞůŵĂŶĂƌŝƐ ?ŚĞĂĚŽĨ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ service at the 
outbreak of war. They travelled with, or sometimes ahead of, the first wave of ground 
troops, and had a remit to seize pre-ordained targets and anything else of intelligence value 
which they came upon.104 Just as the Bruneval Raid commandos were representative of the 
new technique of airborne assault, these Abwehrkommando teams could only exist thanks 
to the advent of rapid motorised ground warfare. Made up of handpicked operatives, many 
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of whom had been born outside the Reich so they could bring valuable knowledge of foreign 
cultures and languages into their activities, the commandos were extensively trained, with a 
particular focus on speed and mobility  W for instance, most were experienced cross-country 
motorcyclists.105 Although their background was military, they were often equipped with 
civilian clothes to allow them to advance while attracting only minimal attention, and they 
were prepared for unarmed combat and the use of foreign radio sets to communicate with 
their superiors or mislead the enemy.106 
When Canaris first envisaged his Abwehrkommando, he saw their primary role as 
being a preparatory one, laying down groundwork, through espionage and sabotage, for the 
advance of conventional ground troops. This was first employed in the invasion of Poland in 
1939, where they captured numerous targets of industrial as well as military significance, 
including coal mines, factories and a rail junction.107 For naval operations, they were often 
tasked with securing ports and harbours, as well as cyphers and top-secret documents 
before the defenders could destroy them.108 They were also responsible for obtaining 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
could have benefits when implementing occupation of foreign territories and opposing any 
resistance therein.109 They also had some similar ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ Z ?s ? :ŽŶĞƐ ? ĨůĞĚŐůŝŶŐ
scientific intelligence department at the Air Ministry, in the gathering of information on 
military technology in the enemy countries which Germany invaded.
110
 Unsurprisingly, it did 
not take too long for word of these commando units, the like of which had never before 
been seen in modern warfare, to reach Britain. The first details came from a British 
accountant, Trevor James Glanville, who was working for the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE, a British sabotage organisation) in Yugoslavia when it fell to the Nazis in 1941, and was 
subsequently taken prisoner, but who eventually returned to Britain with tales of these 
special German commandos. This, along with the success of Bruneval and other such raids, 
was enough to convince the British military intelligence establishment of the need for, and 
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feasibility of, a special commando unit of their own, to be consciously modelled on the 
Abwehrkommando example.111 
 
Forerunners to Exploitation: 30 Assault Unit 
For a British intelligence commando unit to come into being, it once again took the work of 
a particularly talented individual, who by merit of education and experience, was in the right 
place at the right time. In this instance, that individual was Ian Fleming who, for the duration 
of the war, held the position of Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence, but who 
would later receive much greater acclaim for creating the most famous spy in fiction, James 
Bond. During his time at the Naval Intelligence Division (NID), he had proven over and again 
that he was a master strategist and he continuously displayed a remarkable level of 
operational creativity. It was he who began to take real note of the operations of the 
German intelligence commando units, especially those led by the infamous Otto Skorzeny 
during the German invasion of Crete, where they avoided much of the main fighting, instead 
striving to secure British military headquarters and the sensitive documents stored within, 
and in his mind formulated plans for a British equivalent.112 On 20 March 1942, only three 
weeks after the Bruneval Raid, Fleming submitted a memo to the Joint Intelligence Chiefs 
(JIC) outlining the methods and successes of the German commandos and suggesting that: 
We would do well to consider organising such a Commando within the NID, for use when we 
reassume the offensive on the Continent, in Norway or elsewhere. The unit would be 
modelled on the same lines as its German counterpart and would be placed under the 
command of CCO [Chief of Combined Operations], perhaps a month before a specific 
objective is attacked.113 
dŚĞ :/ ŵĞƚ ƐŚŽƌƚůǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ &ůĞŵŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ  ‘Intelligence 
Assault Unit ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞ ƚŽŐĂƚŚĞƌ  ‘ĞŶĞŵǇŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĂŶĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
immeĚŝĂƚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǀĂůƵĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĂƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ?ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŽĨŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?
would be very useful.114 Their approval ensured that this new unit was considered for use 
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during the preliminary planning of Operation Sledgehammer  W a proposed invasion of 
continental Europe which never materialised but would later be successfully reconsidered 
as Operation Overlord. With approval given, Fleming was free to begin assembling, training 
ĂŶĚƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐŚŝƐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƐĨŽƌ ŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?,ĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞŵŚŝƐ ‘ZĞĚ /ŶĚŝĂŶƐ ? ?
on account of their fast and light movement and aggressive raiding tactics, but they were 
given the official naval designation of 30 Commando, later changed to 30 Assault Unit, or 
30AU.115 
 Their story has been widely and extensively told, perhaps ďĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĂǀŝĚ EƵƚƚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
Attain by Surprise, which gathers many fascinating wartime recollections from members of 
the unit, but their role is worth exploring here, if only briefly, as its impact on future 
exploitation endeavours was indelible.
116
 The composition of the unit was split between two 
 ‘tŝŶŐƐ ?  W one from the Royal Navy (RN) and one from the Royal Marines (RM). The RN 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ŵĂĚĞ ƵƉ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
intelligence and research departments of the AdmŝƌĂůƚǇ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞZDĞůĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞ
ďƵůŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶƉŽǁĞƌ ?  ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐ  ?ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ĂŶĚ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǁŽƌŬ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ĞƐĐŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ? ? dŚĞ
selection of Marines, already an elite division of the military, to be part of 30 Assault Unit 
was still a rigorous process and the criteria were numerous  W at its inception, 30AU 
numbered fewer than 40 men. Their officers were to be able to speak another language 
besides English  W German, French, Dutch, Flemish, possibly Norwegian  W and to have a 
general knowledge of the countries in which they might be operating; there should be a 
good number of trained parachutists in case a naval insertion was not possible; some should 
have specialised technical or mechanical knowledge, or a familiarity with the relevant 
documents and material; ĂŶĚĂůůƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƉĂďůĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŵĞŶ ‘ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽŵĞĞƚ
ĂŶǇĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?117 Fleming justified the slightly unorthodox dual composition thus:  ‘the 
functions of each Wing are therefore equally essential to the success of the Unit as a whole 
 W i.e. without the RN Wing there would be no purpose in the Unit; without the RM Wing the 
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RN Wing would not long survive in the field. ?118 Even with all the specifications met, Ian 
Fleming knew that the success of these intelligence assault units would hinge on their 
training  W even if they were able to reach key targets before the enemy could conceal or 
destroy them, it would be in vain if they were unable to identify items of value or to utilise 
them. Here once again, unconventionality was the order of the day. A veteran chief 
inspector at Scotland Yard was engaged to instruct the men in the theory and practice of 
blowing safes, picking locks and breaking and entering. They were then subject to a series of 
demonstrations in the use of gelignite, plastic explosive, booby traps, mines and small arms 
weapons. Away from these practical sessions, with which the Marines would have been far 
more familiar, were the sessions devoted to the recognition and capture of the so-called 
 ‘ƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞ ƚƌŽǀĞ ? ŽĨ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ǁĂƌ  W ciphers, code books, intelligence reports, secret orders, 
new weapons, radar sets, and so on.119 
 With this training in mind, it is unsurprising that 30 Assault Unit were considered to 
ďĞ ‘ĂƌŵĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚůŽŽƚĞƌƐ ?, even by those directly involved in their formation 
or deployment.
120
 They were viewed with caution or hostility by many of the more narrow-
minded members of the naval establishment, or were seen as foolish, even before they had 
been given a chance to prove themselves in action. Rear-Admiral Jan Aylen, who served with 
30AU in Germany and elsewhere, recalled that the Deputy Engineer-in-Chief chided him for 
ũŽŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŚĂƌĞ-brained skylark on the ContŝŶĞŶƚ ? ďƵƚ ǁĂƐ ƐŽŽŶ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
feedback from the operations, once they began to show their worth.121 The level of 
scepticism which this new intelligence assault unit faced when it was in its infancy is simply 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚƚŽ&ůĞŵŝŶŐ ?ƐĨĂŝƚŚŝŶhis idea and commitment to seeing it through. 
  ? ?ƐƐĂƵůƚhŶŝƚ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽƐƚƉƌŽǀĞĚŝƚƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶŽĨĂƵůƚ
of its own. Fleming had insisted on involving a small cohort of his commandos in the ill-fated 
raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. They were tasked with entering the Kriegsmarine 
headquarters in the French port and seizing codebooks and cyphers; instead, their landing 
craft was struck by a shell before they reached shore and they were forced to swim back out 
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to the ships anchored some distance from the coast.122 It was an ignominious beginning but 
it taught Fleming and NID some valuable lessons which could be applied when 30AU next 
went into action, only three months later, in Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French 
North Africa. Again, due largely to factors beyond their control, it was a slow and uncertain 
start and they did not achieve their primary objective, of capturing the Vichy French 
Admiralty building intact and securing the cyphers within.123 However, in continued exploits 
in North Africa, they did acquire an unbroken Enigma machine and accompanying 
codebooks, which allowed the Allies to intercept and decode German radio communication 
in the area for the next six weeks.124 
 Undeterred by their difficulties and encouraged by their successes, their momentum 
picked up and despite a couple of returns to Britain to be debriefed and re-briefed, and 
changes in leadership and composition, they began to truly justify their existence in 
operations in Sicily and Italy in 1943, whĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ  ‘a substantial quantity of 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ǀĂůƵĞ ? ?125 Using information they gleaned from 
Italian industrial concerns, which were fulfilling military contracts for the German navy, they 
were able to furnish the NID with specifications for new designs of torpedoes, sea mines 
and depth charges.126 The shift from operational and order-of-battle intelligence to include 
scientific intelligence was well underway and by 1944, 30 Assault Unit, increased to a 
strength of 50, were concerned ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?ƐĂƌŵŽƵƌǇ ?127 
 Unsurprisingly, this newly-expanded remit necessitated much more careful planning 
than had been utilised before ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝƚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ĨŝŶĚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞ
opportunistically and on the fly, by officers who were trained to know what to look for, as 
all of continental Europe was set to be the next theatre, including the research 
establishments and arms factories of Germany itself, pre-approved target lists, and orders of 
priority, were going to be essential in order to derive maximum benefit from their activities. 
This was effected by the NID asking various other divisions of the Navy to submit requests 
for intelligence on, or examples of, technology which they were especially interested in. 
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They were duly swamped by a deluge of responses  W the Director of Anti-Submarine 
Warfare wanted information on sonar and hydrophones, the Gunnery Division wanted to 
know more about automatic guns and all calibres of ammunition, the Director of Torpedoes 
and Mining requested details of external markings on these devices and their launching 
mechanisms, and the Signals Division were keen to learn more about infrared and 
ultraviolet technologies in detection. This is just a small cross-section of the great quantity 
ŽĨƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĨŝůĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ůĂĐŬ>ŝƐƚ ? ?128 
 As a result of the sheer volume of demands placed upon 30 Assault Unit and their 
administrative support in Room 39 at the Admiralty, it soon became apparent that the list 
would need to be prioritised. The top priority, A.1, was only afforded to intelligence of 
 ‘ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?. This 
included items such as codebooks, cyphers, and anything pertaining to the Enigma 
ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚĞĂǀǇ ĐĂƐƵĂůƚŝĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ  ? ? ƐƐĂƵůƚ hŶŝƚ ? ? /t was a 
remarkably frank account which measured the value of intelligence in the terms of 
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƐ ?ůŝǀĞƐ ?129 
 DƵůƚŝƉůĞ  ‘ůĂĐŬ >ŝƐƚƐ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ůĂƚĞƌ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ
exploitation effort, the guiding documents for the hundreds of investigation teams which 
swarmed across Europe in the aftermath of D-Day. In many respects, they were based on 
 ? ?h ?Ɛ ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ &ůĞŵŝŶŐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞE/ǁĞƌĞƋƵŝĐŬƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ ‘ĂĞƌŝĂůďŽŵďŝŶŐŽƌĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂůůŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉƌŽďĂďůĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĞůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƐŚŽƵůĚ
be reviewed continually in the light of aerial reconnaissance photographs, the interrogation 
of prisoners of war and enemy civilŝĂŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ĞŶĞŵǇ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?130 The use of 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐǁĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌƚĂĚĂƉƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƉůĂǇĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ?ƐƐĂƵůƚhŶŝƚ ?Ɛ
successes. French naval personnel in particular were found to be exceptionally useful and, 
with their co-operation,  ? ?h  ‘ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ŽĨ ŚŝŐŚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĐŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ Ă ƉƵƌĞůǇ  ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? hŶŝƚ ? ?
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Furthermore, it was known that there were many Frenchmen working in German naval 
dockyards who would be far more likely to share technical knowledge if there was a French 
component to the unit. As a result, international composition became a common 
characteristic of later exploitation efforts.131 
 The degree of influence which 30 Assault Unit had on exploitation agencies which 
came later is often hidden because these later efforts very quickly dwarfed and eclipsed 
30AU. It is important to note that 30 Assault Unit did serve very successfully in France, the 
Low Countries and Germany as the advancing line of Allied liberation made its way across 
Europe, but their remit narrowed and their greatest contributions were already behind 
them.132 In part, their small number  W only around 150 at the time of D-Day  W meant that 
ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŽŚĂŶĚůĞ ‘ƐŽŵĂŶǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƐŽ ůĂƌŐĞĂŶĂƌĞĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŽƌŬĞĚ
 ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƵŶĚĞƌĨŝƌĞ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĞŚŽƵƌƐŽĨĚĂǇůŝŐŚƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚƵƌŶƐŽŶƚǁŽ-hour 
ǁĂƚĐŚĞƐĂƚŶŝŐŚƚ ? ?133 It is important to note, however, that this reduced role was not simply 
the result of a shortage of manpower, or of other larger organisations overshadowing them, 
but was also down to the culmination of a gradual falling out of favour which had its origins 
in the initial scepticism shown towards the unit since its formation. 
 30 Assault Unit was viewed fairly critically even by those who worked closely with 
them. Lieutenant-ŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌZŽďĞƌƚ,ĂƌůŝŶŐ ?ŽŶĞŽĨ/ĂŶ&ůĞŵŝŶŐ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƚƌƵƐƚĞĚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐ ?
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞŵĂƐ ‘ŵĞƌƌǇ ?ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŽƵƐ ?ĂŵŽƌĂů ?ůŽǇĂů ?ůǇŝŶŐƚŽƵŐŚƐ ?ĚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞŶŽĨŽƌ
an answer from foe or Fräulein ? W something of a mixed bag of praise and critique  W which in 
ƚƵƌŶ ůĞĚ&ůĞŵŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ƚŽĚƵďƚŚĞŵ ‘ ? ? /ŶĚĞĐĞŶƚƐƐĂƵůƚhŶŝƚ ? ?134 They could not always 
even justify their unorthodox methods with results, as negligence often meant that many of 
their prizes were lost en route.135 dŚĞŝƌ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ŽĨ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ŚĂŶĚĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƵŶƐĐƌƵƉƵůŽƵƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŵĞŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐĞǀĞŶ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƐĂƵůƚ ? ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŶĂŵĞďĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƚŽ  ‘/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ĂƐƚŚĞy apparently 
ĚŝƐůŝŬĞĚ ‘ďĞŝŶŐƚŽůĚƚŽĚŽĂďŝƚŽĨĂƐƐĂƵůƚŝŶŐ ? ?136 
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 Once Overlord and the main campaign in continental Europe got underway, it was 
considered that the already controversial tactics of 30 Assault Unit, widely regarded as a 
 ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂƌŵǇ ? ?ĚŝĚŶŽt fit in with the massive co-ordinated organisation structure of SHAEF. 
They were created to serve the need for daring smash-and-grab intelligence raids, not the 
ŵĞƚŝĐƵůŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ŐƌĂĚƵĂů ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ăůů ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
knowledge.137 The agencies which took their place mistrusted 30AU, haranguing them 
constantly to make sure that they shared all the information they accrued and making it 
abundantly clear that they did not want to fight alongside them.138 Nonetheless, even 
during this phasĞ ŽĨ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ? &ůĞŵŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƐ ĞŶũŽǇĞĚ Ă ŵĂũŽƌ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŝŶ
securing the immensely valuable Waltherwerke submarine plant in Kiel on 5 May 1945, and 
had their swansong in capturing the entire German naval archive at Tambach Castle near 
Coburg, Bavaria, shortly after the war had ended. There was even a lingering possibility that 
ƚŚĞǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ &Ăƌ ĂƐƚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƐĞŝǌŝŶŐ  ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ŽĨ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĐŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀĞǀĞƌǇƵƐĞĨƵů ?but the end of the war in the Pacific in August 1945 
put paid to that idea.139 
 
Forerunners to Exploitation: Alsos 
30 Assault Unit was not the only precursor to exploitation active during the war. While 
&ůĞŵŝŶŐ ?ƐŵĞŶǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŶŐŝŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶdŽƌĐŚŝŶEŽƌƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
coming together in the hot, dry desert of New Mexico where, at a secret laboratory complex 
at Los Alamos, American and British scientists were working enthusiastically to develop an 
atomic bomb. Known as the Manhattan Project, and largely subsuming the similarly-
purpŽƐĞĚ  ‘dƵďĞ ůůŽǇƐ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ǁĂƐ ǇĞƚ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĨĂĐĞƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ongoing wartime arms race between the Allies and Axis powers. The secrecy afforded to all 
work on the atomic bomb was unequalled and naturally all those involved feared that 
parallel German efforts, similarly hidden from view, would exceed their own; certainly, 
German physicists who had fled from the Nazi regime and come to work in the Allied 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝf a 
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bomb could be built, the Germans could  W and would  W ďƵŝůĚ ŝƚ ? ?140 Ultimately, the Allies 
were terrified that they would fall victim to atomic warfare before they were in a position to 
unleash it themselves.141  
 To try and avoid this fate, or at least to better understand similar work going on in 
hostile countries, the head of the Manhattan Project, Brigadier-General Leslie R. Groves, 
ordered the creation of a War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission, better known by 
its codename, Alsos (derived from ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů 'ƌĞĞŬ ǁŽƌĚ ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘ƐĂĐƌĞĚ ŐƌŽǀĞ ? ) ?Headed 
militarily by Colonel Boris T. Pash, a US Army career soldier of Russian descent, and 
scientifically by Samuel A. Goudsmit, a Dutch-American physicist, Alsos was inter-Allied in 
make-up but the bulk of its staff, and the ultimate command, lay with the Americans. This 
was not because the Americans were necessarily better-equipped to handle the demands of 
the task (in fact, British scientific intelligence was rather more advanced than that of their 
allies across the Atlantic), but rather that the US created a team first and it seemed better 
diplomacy for British operatives to ask permission to join that, than to create their own rival 
unit. It was in this way that the British, who were perhaps more accustomed to a senior 
partner role, were effectively demoted to juniors.142 
Alsos began operation in the Mediterranean and was later deployed across western 
Europe and into Germany. In his memoirs, Brigadier-General Groves has stated that the 
ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƉƵƌƉŽƐĞǁĂƐ P 
 QƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƚŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝŶ/ƚĂůǇĂŶĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐŝƚǁĂƐ
logical to expect that, in the course of its work, the mission would also come upon data 
about other enemy projects; accordingly, it was directed to exploit to the fullest sources in a 
number of fields of technical interest.143 
dŚŝƐ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞŶĞŵǇ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ? ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞchnical 
research taking place in Germany, or under German supervision, which had a potential 
military application. It included both chemical and biological warfare, as well as ordnance 
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and aircraft technology. Atomic energy and weaponry would remain their primary concern 
throughout their period of operation but the additional intelligence they gathered, often 
just by having a keen eye for items of scientific interest, proved to be immensely valuable. 
 While in the upper echelons of Allied command preparation was being made for a 
vast operation to examine all aspects of German scientific and technical endeavour, as shall 
be explored in the next chapter, Alsos was able to get into the field much sooner. It was a 
more streamlined operation, with fewer men and a unilateral command structure, but more 
than that, it was designed to supplement existing intelligence organisations, not duplicate 
them, and could therefore count on shared resources and co-operation at the front, and 
could minimise administrative hassle or superfluous personnel.144 In addition, so great was 
the fear of a German atomic attack to which the Allies would be completely vulnerable, that 
the objectives of Alsos always had highest priority. It is no surprise that it is now widely 
considered to be the first large-scale scientific intelligence mission in history,145 but at the 
time it was thought to be so unprecedented as to be an experiment of sorts.146 
 The Alsos operatives, many of whom were trained scientists, were also aided in their 
mission by their own inherent knowledge of the state of atomic research in Germany, and 
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĨƵƌŶŝƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚůŽŶŐůŝƐƚƐŽĨ ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?
to investigate, many of which were in fact individual specialists, but these lists could quickly 
be cut down as the agents themselves knew which scientists were important and which 
were not. This was a level of insight which the military chiefs could not comprehend but 
'ŽƵĚƐŵŝƚŚĂƐĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂŶǇ ƌĞƉƵƚĂďůĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĨŝeld would have 
ŬŶŽǁŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?147 The involvement of these experienced and knowledgeable 
experts also furnished the project with the perfect interrogators to elicit maximum 
information from the German scientists who they detained. This was particularly relevant 
because Alsos agents were not only permitted to pursue and investigate civilian research, 
but actively encouraged to do so.148 The realisation had already dawned on those with a 
vested interest in the fruits of German scientific effort during the war that the best results 
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may be gleaned from non-military institutions  W this would later become a common aspect 
of the whole exploitation initiative. 
 The fears of a German atomic bomb were far from baseless. Nazi Germany was 
ŚŽŵĞƚŽƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛmost renowned nuclear physicists, including Otto Hahn, who 
had isolated pure uranium-235 in December 1938, and Werner Heisenberg, who had 
recognised its potential if weaponised.149 dŚĞDĂŶŚĂƚƚĂŶWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŚĂĚ
discounted Japan, which they felt lacked the necessary scientific and technical prowess to 
develop an atomic bomb, but strongly believed that Nazi Germany, with its extensive 
resources and eager support for research into new ways of killing, not to mention its 
unrivalled cadre of physicists, could add such a weapon to its arsenal sooner rather than 
later. Add to this the constant misinformation ƐƉĞǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚďǇ:ŽƐĞƉŚ'ŽĞďďĞůƐ ?DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇof 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda which spoke of secret super-weapons, and it appears 
unsurprising that Alsos continuously expected to find evidence of a German atomic bomb 
project nearing completion. 
 In reality, the German project was still very much in its harmless infancy, but the 
Alsos investigators only found this out gradually, as they moved across Europe in the 
immediate wake of the advancing Allied forces. Colonel Pash laid claim to being among the 
first column of Allied troops to enter Paris on 25 August 1944, his small jeep nestling among 
much larger vehicles and surrounded by crowds of the liberated French public, being 
showered with adulation. The high-spirited local populace were not allowed to become a 
distraction or hindrance, and Pash and his colleague Major Horace Calvert soon tracked 
down eminent French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie in his laboratory at the Collège de 
France. He was flown immediately back to London for interrogation and more investigators, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ'ŽƵĚƐŵŝƚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘dƵďĞůůŽǇƐ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ?DŝĐŚĂĞůWĞƌƌŝŶ ?ĐĂŵĞŽǀĞƌƚŽWĂƌŝƐƚŽ
run through all of Joliot-CuriĞ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂĨŝŶĞƚŽŽƚŚĐŽŵď ?ůůƚŚĞǇƌĞĂůůǇ
managed to learn was that the German physicists had some solid ideas about nuclear fission 
but were not far along in the process of developing it into a weapon.150 
 These conclusions were based primarily on Joliot-ƵƌŝĞ ?Ɛpoorly-informed suspicions 
and there was also a sense that the Nazis were unlikely to have conducted their most 
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important military research in Paris  W the search would have to continue. The next 
investigation of importance took place in Strasbourg, on the border between France and 
Germany, where the University had housed much recent endeavour in the field of nuclear 
physics. Alsos operatives entered the city and University on 25 November 1944 and pored 
over the wealth of the material available there. They found out much about other areas of 
science and technology  W medicine, aircraft and naval matters, for example  W and were able 
to detain and interrogate seven senior German physicists and chemists. The products of this 
further confirmed their suspicions that the German atomic bomb project was still mired in 
the early experimental stages.151 
 dŚĞĨŝŶĂů ƌĞĂůƉƌŝǌĞ ŽĨůƐŽƐ ?ƐĂƚŽŵŝĐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐůĂǇŽŶůǇƐŝǆƚǇŵŝůĞƐŽƌƐŽĂĐƌŽƐƐ
the German border, at the small town of Hechingen, just south of Stuttgart. Aerial 
reconnaissance and word-of-mouth from scientists in neutral countries suggested that 
Werner Heisenberg, by now the most desirable figure of the German atomic establishment, 
and many of his similarly esteemed colleagues, were based at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
for Physics at Hechingen (relocated from Berlin after severe bombing) and were continuing 
their research there. By now, the Americans and the British were confident that Nazi 
Germany did not have the capability to launch an atomic strike, but they pressed on 
nonetheless. This was because Hechingen was now one of many targets in south-western 
Germany included in Operation Harborage  W an Anglo-American effort to secure equipment, 
documents and individuals from sites which would later fall under French occupation. 
Groves feared that anything which the French seized might very soon become accessible to 
the Soviets, and mistrust of the USSR was growing day by day.152 Harborage therefore 
ŵĂƌŬĞĚ ƚŚĞ ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨĂ ƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ  ‘ĚĞŶŝĂů ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐǁĞƌĞ
seized by the British or Americans, not necessarily for their own use but simply to prevent 
the French or Soviets laying claim to them, which would persist in exploitation throughout 
the occupation and set the tone for the Cold War. In this instance, the Americans were even 
sufficiently suspicious of their British partners (who had thus far given more than they had 
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got in scientific intelligence) to refuse to share with them the key documents found at 
Hechingen, and instead shipped them straight back to the United States.153 
 Perhaps the greatest prizes seized in Hechingen and its environs were ten of the 
most prominent of the German atomic scientists, including Heisenberg and Otto Hahn, who 
were then detained, incommunicado, at Farm Hall, in Godmanchester, near Cambridge, 
from the time of their capture in July until they were released in December 1945. This 
ĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐĞĐƌĞƚŝǀĞ ?Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚĂƚ ĨŝƌƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞ Ăůů ĨŝƚƚĞĚ
with listening devices, unbeknownst to the men themselves.154 This eavesdropping shed 
some interesting ůŝŐŚƚŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ǁŽƌůĚ-view, particularly when news broke of the 
bombing of Hiroshima, but was hardly legally, let alone ethically, sound, though it would 
come to set the tone for the detainment of numerous scientific and technical personalities 
of interest throughout the post-war period.155 Alsos did some more investigative work after 
Hechingen, largely concerned with completing records and denying personnel and materiel 
to the Soviets, but ceased to exist as an organisation on 15 October 1945, despite urgings by 
many, particularly in the USA, that it should become a permanent scientific intelligence 
agency.156 Even in its fairly short period of operation, Alsos had visited over seventy targets, 
including sixteen universities and four concentration camps, and had filed approximately 
400 scientific reports.157 
 Though at first glance it may seem that the story of Alsos has little to contribute to 
the history of exploitation  W it swiftly established that there was no threat from the German 
bomb project and was disbanded fairly promptly at the end of the war  W its influence on 
organisations which came into being simultaneously or after it should not be understated. 
Firstly, the very fact that it discovered the absence of a direct wartime threat so soon and 
yet pressed on is significant. Those involved with Alsos, whether on the ground or in a 
supervisory role, understood that there were benefits to unravelling German science and 
technology beyond mere direct tactical utility. As early as March 1944 this was displayed in 
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a memo pertaining tŽ ůƐŽƐ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ǁestern Europe, which included 
 ‘ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨŽǁŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝĨƐŝŵŝůĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŽƌƚĂĐƚŝĐƐĂƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽŽƵƌŽǁŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ŽǁŶ ǁĂƌ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?Ɛ ŵĂŝŶ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĂŝŵƐ ?
alongside more immediate military objectives.158 
Later on, as we have seen, denial policy also became part of their operating remit. 
This in turn transformed and expanded into something different. As the Second World War 
ended and the Cold War began, many Western eyes, particularly those in the United States, 
stopped perceiving Germany as an enemy and instead focused suspicion on the Soviet 
Union. The work Alsos had carried out in investigating the research undertaken in Germany 
during the war, and by observing which German physicists the Soviets snapped up, now 
allowed them to make measured estimates of the progress of similar atomic research in 
Russia.159 This is just one example of how the exploitation initiative provided a smooth 
transition from investigating a current enemy to sizing up a future one.160 
 In this way, and in many others, the actions of Alsos played a major role in shaping 
the structure of future exploitation organisations. Their methodology, as outlined by 
Goudsmit, was as follows: 
It was the task of the scientists to obtain and analyse all pertinent information having to do 
with German science. From such information they had to deduce just what places, 
institutions, buildings, and people in enemy territory were important for giving us the 
information we wanted. It then became the task of Colonel Pash and his men to see that we 
got to these people and these places before anyone else got there. They also had to supply 
us with all relevant intelligence collected by other groups in the American and British armed 
forces.161 
This could describe the modus operandi of any one of the numerous exploitation agencies 
which came into being in the last year or so of the war, or immediately afterward. Two 
elements of this were particularly crucial  W the first was the combination of civilian scientist 
investigators with conventional military operatives on the ground, not common even in an 
era of total war but absolutely necessary if exploitation was to be both genuinely beneficial 
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and logistically feasible, and the second was the interaction between the multiple 
organisations operating alongside one another in the field.162 Both of these policies were 
sensibly adopted by the agencies which Alsos had preceded. 
 More than just an inheritance of ideas and methods, Alsos was also able to pass on 
some hugely valuable concrete intelligence to help the fledgling operations of their 
successors get off the ground. Their findings were, for the most part, shared and liaison 
officers were tasked with ensuring smooth relations between different agencies. Perhaps 
the most significant information that Alsos was able to bestow upon their descendants was 
that contained within the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘KƐĞŶďĞƌŐ>ŝƐƚ ? ?ƌtĞƌŶĞƌKƐĞŶďĞƌŐǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂĚ ŽĨ
the Wehrforschungsgemeinschaft (the Nazi Military Research Association) when he was 
captured by Alsos operatives near Göttingen in early 1945. The information he furnished, 
complemented extensively by his list of 15,000 leading German scientists and technicians 
(found in scraps, which someone had supposedly attempted to flush down a toilet at Bonn 
University), allowed all future exploitation teams to identify key targets more quickly and to 
pursue them more accurately. Unsurprisingly, this would prove time and again to be utterly 
invaluable.163 
 
To conclude, exploitation was very clearly a product of the conflict in which it originated. As 
this chapter has shown, the Second World War was characterised by the influence of 
science and technology, though it is worth noting that no state, even the most richly 
endowed, was able to achieve a truly radical transformation of military technology before 
1945.
164
 Nonetheless, the scene was set for the future  W the course of the war had proven 
that appropriate application of research and development had the very real potential to 
bestow both tactical and strategic advantage on the state in question. In turn, this made 
understanding the armouries of potentially hostile nations absolutely essential and while 
this was first realised during the Second World War, it was the fog of suspicion and secrecy 
fostered by the Cold War in which scientific intelligence really came of age.165 There is no 
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question that exploitation emerged from this atmosphere as both a fascination with the 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ĞŶĞŵǇ ?Ɛ ĂƌƐĞŶĂů ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ŚĞĂĚ-start in any future 
arms race. 
30 Assault Unit and Alsos both played relatively small but still crucial parts in the 
developing story of scientific and technical exploitation. They were pioneering forces which 
represented the changing priorities of modern warfare and were well-suited to this new 
relationship between science and strategy, developed during the war and influenced by 
individuals like Frederick Lindemann and R.V. Jones. It is clear that the exploitation initiative 
would not have existed in the form that it did, if at all, without the experience of 30AU and 
Alsos, and it would have faced much greater difficulty had it not been able to build on the 
problems faced, and solutions devised, by these two agencies. It is for this reason that the 
issues discussed in this chapter, though perhaps initially seeming peripheral, are relevant to 
the wider history of exploitation and their influence will be detected throughout this study. 
As the war entered its final destructive stage, the operational techniques of these small, 
daring enterprises began to fall from favour and it became clear that the era of 











- 61 - 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Origins of Exploitation 
 
While the inchoate operations of 30 Assault Unit and Alsos were unfolding rapidly and 
effectively in western Europe, driven, initially at least, by pure military utility, an idea was 
dawning in the minds of officials in London and Washington alike that something on a much 
grander scale could be possible, and perhaps necessary. The aim of this broader scheme 
would not just be to hasten the end of the war against Germany, and bƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ
defeat, but also part of a larger strategy to ensure peace and security in Europe, particularly 
in the face of any future Soviet aggression. This new programme would be designed as an 
attempt to glean every last morsel of scientific or technical intelligence from Germany while 
it lay at its most vulnerable  W invaded by foreign armies, society in disarray, ordinary people 
living in chaos and uncertainty, and the Nazi political system stumbling towards its complete 
implosion. This chapter will chart the progress of the exploitation initiative in the final 
chaotic year of the war; a significant and formative prelude to the comprehensive and 
unremittingly thorough investigation of German science and technology which would unfold 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?s destructive denouement. 
As such, it will begin by exploring the original germ of the idea to exploit on a large 
scale, through the injection of urgency contributed by the Allied invasion of Europe, and the 
gradual formulation of policy which arose from this early thinking and the changing military 
circumstances. What this policy entailed was the establishment of a complex but effective 
administrative framework to handle the sizeable task of full-scale exploitation of German 
science and technology. Once this framework was successfully established, no time was 
wasted in despatching teams of expert investigators to the continent as it was liberated 
from Nazi occupation, racing forward just behind the advancing frontline troops and in 
parallel with the men of 30AU and Alsos, and seizing all the scientific and technological 
spoils on which they could lay their hands. In the last months of the war, these exploitation 
operatives followed the regular armies across the German border and, as the conflict 
entered its final violent throes, they began examining the technical marvels of the Third 
ZĞŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ǁĂƌ ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ ? dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ĂŐĞ-ŽůĚ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĐƚŽƌ ? ƚŚĞ
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ƐƉŽŝůƐ ? ƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ŽŶ ĂŶ ƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚ ƐĐĂůĞ  W it was to be 
methodical, systematic, and irresistible. 
 
Ideas for Exploitation 
Considering its numerous successes, it really is no surprise that the actions of Alsos quickly 
caught the attention of British officials, especially those who were tasked with planning for 
the post-war future. In September 1944, Colonel George Vickers, Director-General of the 
Enemy Branch of the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) wrote to Major-General Kenneth 
Strong, the British G- ? ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ĐŚŝĞĨ ĨŽƌ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ǁŝŐŚƚ  ? ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?Ɛ ^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), noting the missions which Alsos had been 
conducting. He incorrectly described it as an exclusively American force, and one primarily 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŚĞŵŝĐĂů ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘there might be considerable 
advantages to all concerned if there were a similar British team which could work in the 
same or adjacent fields and could arrange for an exchange of ideas and information with 
Alsos ?. ,ĞĂĚĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂƚĞĂŵƐƵƌĞůǇĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ‘ĨĂŝůƚŽďĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚǀĂůƵĞƚŽƚŚŽƐĞ
Sections of the proposed Military Government which are charged with responsibility for the 
administration of German induƐƚƌǇĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?166 
 dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŽůŽŶĞů sŝĐŬĞƌƐ ? ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ
exploitation, as he was also a member of the government body which first became 
responsible for co-ordinating this programme  W the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC), 
which existed as a subsidiary of the Chiefs of Staff committee.167 The first indication that 
there was a perceived demand for intelligence on Germany after the war came about 
through the JIC, in a meeting in January 1944, when Vickers noted that the MEW would be 
keen to ascertain how much impact economic measures against Germany had made during 
ƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŚĂǀĞŵƵĐŚŽĨĂĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ ? ?EŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ or technology was made at this 
stage. Then, on 29 March, the Enemy Research and Development Sub-Committee produced 
Ă ƉĂƉĞƌ ŝŶŶŽĐƵŽƵƐůǇĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘WŽƐƚ-,ŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ WŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ
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central thrust of the British exploitation initiative, elucidated here in a manner which would 
remain largely unchanged, outwardly anyway, until the end of the war and beyond. The first 
element of this was the official recognition, long after R.V. Jones and his colleagues in 
scientific intelligence had reached the ǀĞƌǇƐĂŵĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵƵĐŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ
ŝƐĂƐŐŽŽĚ ?ŽƌďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂŶŽƵƌƐ ? ?168 In May, Vickers remarked that the Admiralty had begun 
ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ Ă ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ :/ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ? sŝĐƚŽƌ
Cavendish-Bentinck, recommended that a representative from the Ministry of Supply be 
involved in any further deliberations, which suggests that technology was, by this point, very 
definitely under consideration.169 
 Experience from the end of the First World War also played a role in shaping future 
exploitation policy. In August 1944, Brigadier William van Cutsem, the former Deputy 
Director of Military Intelligence, who had worked closely with the Special Operations 
Executive during the war and was a member of a number of bodies concerned with the 
post-war future of Germany, filed a report on German war material, in which he recounted 
several tales of failure from the post- ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨĂŶĞǁ ‘ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ-gun with a 
ĐĂůŝďƌĞŽĨ ?Đŵ ?ĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞdh& ? ?ŚĞƌĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘Ğǀery effort was made to obtain a specimen 
Žƌ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ĨƵůů ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?  ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ
information regarding processes in the manufacture of chemical warfare products under the 
relevant article in the peace treaty failed dismally. The answers provided were dubbed by an 
ůůŝĞĚĞǆƉĞƌƚĂƐŵĞƌĞůǇ “ĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŐƵŝĚĞƚŽŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨǁĂƌ
material factories, van Cutsem noted that incomplete information had been gathered on 
them and, in aĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŚĂĚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚŵĂŶǇĨŝƌŵƐŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇŐŽŶĞŽǀĞƌƚŽ
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚŝŵĞ ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŶĂŵĞƐ ? ? dŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ ƌĞƉĞĂƚŝŶŐ
these mistakes, van Cutsem recommended that information should be gathered both 
quickly and comprehensively (arguably this was easier in 1945 than it had been in 1918-19 
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The process of formulating exploitation policy was accelerated by the impending 
Allied invasion of Europe under Operation Overlord. Cavendish-Bentinck appointed a JIC 
Special Sub-ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ŽŶ /ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ WƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ  ‘ƚŽ ĚƌĂǁ ƵƉ Ă ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂů
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ ƉŚĂƐĞ ? ?171 This sub-committee met on 19 May and 
consisted of representatives from the War Office, MEW, Ministry of Supply and Air Ministry, 
as well as Ian Fleming of the Admiralty who, through his involvement with 30 Assault Unit, 
had already contributed indirectly to the preparations for exploitation. NotinŐƚŚĂƚ  ‘^,&
ǁĞƌĞĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĐůĞĂƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĨƌŽŵ QĂŶŝŶƚĞƌ-Service inter-
ůůŝĞĚ ďŽĚǇ ? ? ƚŚĞ ƐƵď-committee resolved to draw up lists of intelligence targets  W the 
essential first step of the exploitation programme. In fact, the main outcome of the single 
meeting of this special sub-committee was, in an act of all too familiar bureaucratic 
perpetuation, to recommend the establishment of another committee to gather 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŽĨ ŐƌĞĂƚ ǀĂůƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ĨŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂl purposes at present, or of 
ƐƵĐŚ Ă ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ĂƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ Ă ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?172 This would 
become, with the involvement of the Americans, the Combined Intelligence Priorities 
Committee (CIPC), the first true exploitation agency. 
 Science and technology was now a major part of this planning, as shown in a MEW 
ŵĞŵŽ ĨƌŽŵ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? dŚŝƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ŚŽǁ  ‘a nation at war or planning for war 
stimulates, to a very high degree, research and technical developments in all its major 
activities. This speeding-up process produces in months what would normally take years 
ƵŶĚĞƌƉĞĂĐĞƚŝŵĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?dŚĞ ŵĞŵŽ ƚŚĞŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚďǇĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ
would open up at the end of the war: 
 After the capitulation of Germany we will have before us the results of this speeding-up 
process. Since this has been accomplished by the organised effort and best talent of 
Germany exerting all its efforts in this direction, it seems logical to assume that there are 
available many ideas, developments and techniques military and industrial that would 
benefit the Allies.173 
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It is important that these estimations of German superiority be qualified. The Allies did not 
believe that Germany was ahead of them in all fields, or else their eventual defeat in the 
war would seem rather too improbable, but the realisation was made that, in some aspects, 
earlier wartime Allied arrogance had been misplaced. Vannevar Bush, the influential head of 
the American Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) throughout the war and 
beyond, put it most clearly when he explained that modern industrial societies advance 
unevenly and variously; at any given time, each will be ahead of its rivals in some, but not 
all, of the countless areas of endeavour.174 
 In some cases, the desire to exploit was driven forward particularly eagerly by 
perceived German progress in just one of these areas. For Britain, with its understandably 
pronounced fear of bombing, the most prominent was almost certainly the field of rocketry, 
in particular the revolutionary long-range offensive power of the German V-weapons.175 
Between 12 June and 31 July 1944 some 5,200 V-1 flying bombs were launched against 
Britain, averaging a total of 110 a day, and 35-40% of these reached their target of 
London.
176
 Although the destruction wreaked by these new weapons, and by their 
stratospheric successors, the V-2s, was significantly less than that inflicted by Luftwaffe raids 
during the height of the Blitz, the terror of a one-ton explosive warhead dropping to earth 
faster than the speed of sound was unrivalled, and shook the courage of even the hardiest 
of Blitz survivors.
177
 The Joint Planning Staff even considered whether the V-weapons should 
ďĞ  ‘ĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂĐƚ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ
conceding that they were really just a long-range alternative to conventional bombing 
ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŚǇƉŽĐƌŝƐǇƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ŝƚĐŽŶƚƌĂǀĞŶĞƐƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŽf 
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇƵƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐǁĂƌ ? ?178 
Despite the shock and awe inspired by these attacks, Britain was still uncertain of the 
value of total scientific innovation over incremental improvements to existing conventional 
weapons and had paid only limited attention to the development of these rockets until it 
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was almost too late and they threatened British cities.179 From mid-June 1944, the Crossbow 
committee, which handled all issues pertaining to rocket warfare, became increasingly 
prominent and views on rocketry began to change  W by November, the Joint Committee on 
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚWƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ‘ǁĞƌĞŶŽǁŽŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚŽĨ
great changes in the sphere of ordnance. There were some who believed that the days of 
the heavy gun wĞƌĞŶƵŵďĞƌĞĚ ? ?180 The bold statements and predictions did not stop there. 
Allied technical experts believed that the V-weapons had not only changed the nature of 
warfare but would also leave behind a terrifying spectacle of what a future war might be 
like.181 It was correctly suspected that German experts had been working on a bomb to 
cross the Atlantic to attack US soil and this hinted at the potential of all manner of 
intercontinental missiles, which, it was estimated, could replace raids by manned bombers 
in ten years or less. In any case, Britain, with its direct experience of attack and advanced air 
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ǁĂƐ ǁŝĚĞůǇ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă  ‘ǀŝŐŽƌ ƵƐ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŽƌ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-war 
missile race.182 
For the time being, however, the focus still remained very much on winning the war. 
This, as we have seen with the deployment of 30 Assault Unit and Alsos, was the primary 
motivator in establishing an exploitation initiative. This applied not just to the V-weapons 
and long-range rocketry, though this was an area of particular importance, but to all manner 
ŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?dŚĞ ‘WŽƐƚ-,ŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚWŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚ
ĂŶǇ ĐŽŶĨŝƐĐĂƚĞĚ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?  ‘ŝƚ ŝƐ ĨŽƌ ŽƵƌ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ it should be used either by 
ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ Žƌ ŽƵƌ ĂůůŝĞƐ ? ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ Žƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ&Ăƌ ĂƐƚ ? ?183 In terms of the defeat of 
Germany, it would not be unfair to claim that this outcome was expected widely enough 
within the Allied establishment to justify planning extensively for it, even before Operation 
Overlord had been successfully mounted. The reality vindicated their predictions, with Allied 
progress across Europe, though often slow and sometimes beset by major difficulties, such 
as Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge, fairly inexorable all the way into 
Germany. As a result, the focus in the European theatre was merely hastening an outcome 
which most Allies (and many Nazis) saw as inevitable. The Pacific theatre posed a different 
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problem  W some feared the conflict there would last a further three years after the defeat of 
Germany,184 while even the more conservative estimates did not think it would wrap up 
until well into 1946. Either way, it was acknowledged that specific technologies, such as 
carrier-borne aircraft and swimming tanks, would be very helpful in securing victory, and so 
any technical benefits gleaned from Germany might prove pivotal.185 
However, bringing about a swift Allied victory in the war in both theatres was only 
one reason why exploitation was able to build momentum. No-one involved expected the 
scheme to conclude as soon as both Germany and Japan had capitulated. In fact, many 
assumed, correctly, that exploitation proper would not begin until the former enemy 
countries had been defeated and were completely open to unchallenged Allied 
investigation.
186
 One individual who acknowledged the potential which exploitation had, 
beyond mere military utility, was Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-
General Sir Ronald Weeks.187 In March 1944, he made the following statement to the Enemy 
Research and Development Sub-Committee: 
It is considered that the obtaining of German research records and as much information as 
possible of design and development projects in hand, is one of the most vitally important of 
our immediate post-war aims; not only would the confiscation of this information deprive 
Germany of many years of painstaking work, but it would also be of the greatest value to us. 
It may be that this is the only form of reparation which it will be possible to exact from 
Germany. Everything possible to ensure that it is exacted must be carefully planned now.188 
tŚĂƚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚtĞĞŬƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĞƚŽƵĐŚĞƐŽŶƚǁŽƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ
driving forces behind exploitation  W one of which was the seeking of reparations, an age-old 
process of restitution exacted by victor over vanquished foe, and the other was the 
punishment of Germany through the removal of its valuable science and technology, in 
reality a precautionary measure against any future resurgence as much as a punitive one. 
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 Reparations have, throughout modern history, been a notoriously problematic issue, 
but perhaps never more so than at the end of the Second World War. Allied statesmen and 
officials alike sought to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, 
which had played so substantially into the hands of Hitler and the Nazis in their quest for 
power.189 Stripping Germany of its scientific and technical resources, including skilled 
mĂŶƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĨŽƌƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŽǁŶĞŶĚƐǁĂƐŽŶĞǁĂǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
this while still securing some recompense. In the words of Alec Cairncross, loot and slavery, 
the age-old traditional forms of reparations, quickly returned to favour.190 This approach 
also offered some security  W before the polarised mentality of the Cold War had become 
truly entrenched, many feared that a German resurgence was still the biggest threat to 
peace in Europe, and that comprehensive disarmament should therefore feature very highly 
in Allied post-war priorities. This was influenced initially by historical precedent, as well as 
by deep-seated racial stereotyping of the German people as aggressive and militaristic, and 
later by concerns that Germany could become a socialist satellite of the Soviet Union.191 In 
the USA, meanwhile, the Morgenthau Plan (as advanced by Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr.) proposed that Germany be totally demilitarised and deindustrialised and 
reduced to a simple pastoral state  W Morgenthau felt that, in light of the German treatment 
ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĞǇ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚƵƌŶ ďĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ ? ?192 In this way, both reparations and 
retribution came to feature very heavily in early discussions around the exploitation 
initiative  W it was a policy which would continue to be inextricably linked to divisive politics 
for its entire lifespan.193 
 As time went on, the savvier British officials came to acknowledge that the real 
threat to European peace and stability was more likely to come from the Soviet Union than 
ĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?dŚĞƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĞƵƉŚĞŵŝƐƚŝĐƚĞƌŵ ‘ƉŽůŝĐŝŶŐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ďĞŐĂŶƚŽĐƌŽƉƵƉŽĨƚĞŶ
in official memoranda and directives, referring mostly to a general defence against a 
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possible Soviet hegemony over the continent.194 As we have seen, even before the war 
ended, and especially once the future zonal divisions of Germany had been decided upon, 
British and American exploitation teams scurried to seize the best scientific and technical 
spoils from areas which would later fall under the impenetrable blanket of Soviet control. 
Science and technology, and the new weapons which they could elicit, would be of 
particular value to the Western Allies in order to counter what they saw as the SovietƐ ?
 ‘ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽŶůĂŶĚ ? ?195 In short, Britain and the US were under no pretences 
that the Soviets would pursue exploitation, ruthlessly and on a grand scale, and they knew 
they could not afford to be left behind while the Soviet Union, an ally for now but almost 
certainly a future rival or even foe, vastly increased its war potential.196 
 The final motivation for exploitation was somewhat more prosaic than defence of 
the peace or preservation of the values which Western democracies held dear. It was a 
purely financial aim, driven less by government officials and more by industry chiefs, who 
felt they had contributed, at great commercial cost, to the Allied victory and now wanted to 
seek reimbursement from the vanquished enemy. Initially, this pressure came mostly from 
the military industries, and by March 1944, the Army was already stating as one of its long-
ƚĞƌŵĂŝŵƐŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂǁĞůů-founded and virile British armament 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?197 By September, the Ministry of Economic Warfare was planning to collect 
 ‘ĨĂĐƚƵĂů ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ŽŶ  ‘German industry, economic transport, food and agriculture, fuel, 
labour conditions, economic administration, prices and price control, and the employment 
ŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶǁŽƌŬĞƌƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?198 The influence which civilian industry was able to exert on 
what was essentially a military initiative was, to some extent, inevitable  W it was the product 
of the complete mobilisation of total war and no exploitation of any kind could conceivably 
go ahead without the input of civilian experts; they were the only ones knowledgeable 
enough to glean the details of true value from their targets of investigation.199 
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 With so much justification for exploitation available, it is no wonder that it soon 
became an essential part of planning for the assault on Europe and the end of the war. One 
of the most important manifestations of this was in the Draft Armistice, the document 
which it was planned to present to the German high command to bring about an end to the 
conflict. As early as October 1943, G.W. Turner of the Ministry of Supply wrote to Colonel 
C.W.G. Walker of the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee suggesting that the terms of 
ƚŚŝƐ ƌĂĨƚ ƌŵŝƐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ĂŶ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ  ‘prepare and 
provide at once a detailed statement of all research and development carried out by or on 
behalf of the German GovernŵĞŶƚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ? ? He felt they should also 
ensure  ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐŽƌotherwise, necessary 
ƚŽĞŶĂďůĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?200 The Draft 
Armistice was later replaced by a proposed Instrument of Surrender; Article 5 of which 
ordered that the German authorities should hold intact, and make accessible to Allied 
representatives, all arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval vessels, military establishments, 
travel and communication facilities and, most critically: 
 all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical 
data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ? ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ  Q ƚŽ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
conduct of war. 
It went on to instruct that the German authorities also furnish the labour force necessary to 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞĐŽƌĚƐǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŶĚŬĞƉƚ
up-to-ĚĂƚĞ ? ?201 
 Of course, this rested very heavily on the uncertain premise that this directive could 
be successfully circulated throughout a bombed-out and dislocated Germany, and that 
those who received it were co-operative and obedient. Many exploitation officials had little 
ĨĂŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌĨĞůƚ ‘ĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ Germans will 
take every possible step to prevent the United Nations from learning their technical 
ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ? ?202 As a result, in a memo concerning the proposed actions of the Technical Sub-
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Division of G-2 Military Intelligence during the SHAEF occupation of Germany, it was 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌŽůĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƚŽ  ‘ĨĞƌƌĞƚ ŽƵƚ ? ĂŶǇ ŝƚĞŵƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƌĞƚŝǀĞ
ĞŶĞŵǇŚĂĚƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ  ‘ďƵƌǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚŝƐshould be done aggressively with the full military 
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞůůŝĞƐďĂĐŬŝŶŐŝƚƵƉ ? ?/ŶĂĐĐordance with the widespread fear 
ŽĨĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌĞƐƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵĞŵŽŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
be allowed to retain any advantage, whether military or industrial, resulting from his 
preparations for, or activities during, hostilitiĞƐ ? ?203 
 Now that the reasoning behind exploitation had been solidly accounted for, and the 
official policy had both acknowledged this need and put measures into place to facilitate it, 
all that was left to do was to prepare for it in logistical terms. Of first consideration was the 
form which the agency, or agencies, responsible for exploitation on the ground would take. 
In April 1944, the Enemy Research and Development Sub-Committee, submitted a report to 
its parent group, the Joint Technical Warfare CommitƚĞĞ ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ŽĨ Ă ďƌŽĂĚ
exploitation plan. It started by showing remarkable prescience and recognising that there 
were many unknown variable factors involved when concocting such a scheme  W these 
included: the parts of Germany to which British personnel would have access, the extent of 
inter-Allied co-operation, the extent of inter-departmental co-operation, and the way in 
which Germany would become accessible to investigators, whether by formal armistice, 
ŐƌĂĚƵĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞƚƌĞĂƚŽƌĂŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ ?/ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƌĂŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƉůĂŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ
ŵƵƐƚďĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇĞůĂƐƚŝĐƚŽĂĚũƵƐƚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽƚŚĞƐĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?204 
 Nonetheless, these uncertainties did not stop the report elucidating a very clear 
programme for exploitation which, though in its early stages, would later come to 
characterise the whole initiative, in a fairly unchanged format. Firstly, it proposed, Sealing 
and Holding (S.H.) Parties wouůĚ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ ƚŽ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ  ‘ǁŚĞŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
becomes accessible in whole or in part and immediately ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ƉĞƌŵŝƚ ? ?
They would then, as their name suggested, secure the targets and defend them against 
counter-attack and sabotage for as long as necessary. These S.H. Parties would be almost 
exclusively military, though would have to include at least one technical officer for guidance, 
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and would get first priority on travel, moving against their targets swiftly and as 
simultaneously ĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?  ‘ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĞŵǇ
ƚĂŬŝŶŐ “ĞǀĂƐŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƵŶŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?205 They would also be responsible for 
 ‘ƐĞĞŝŶŐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌǇŝƐĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŬĞǇƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĚŽ 
ŶŽƚĂďƐĐŽŶĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ ? ?206 
 The S.H. Parties would not operate in isolation; instead, they were to work in co-
ordination with Investigation of Enemy Technique (I.E.T.) Groups. These would proceed, 
with a military escort, directly to the facilities secured by the S.H. Parties and conduct 
thorough examinations there. That was only one part of their role though. In response to 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŝƐ ŐŽŽĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĞ
ŬŶŽǁŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ? ?/ ? ?d ?'ƌŽƵƉƐǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽ ?ĂŶĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞ
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ Z ? ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? &ƌŽŵ ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽƵůĚ
establish targets which had not been included in the preliminary plan and ensure that S.H. 
Parties were dispatched with haste to seal and hold these too. In order for this to work, it 
ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ / ? ?d ? 'ƌŽƵƉƐ  ‘ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚ ŽĨ ǀĞƌǇ ŚŝŐŚůǇ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?207 Although the eventual form that the exploitation 
programme took was a little less neat and dichotomous than this proposal, many of the 
features became central to its success, most notably the complementary use of both 
conventional military troops and civilian scientific experts, and the allowance that some of 
the most important finds would be so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? /ƚǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
officials responsible for planning and preparing for exploitation had done their job to the 
very best of their ability. Now all they could do was wait for the Allied armies to make 
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ǁĞƌĞĂĚŽƉƚĞĚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞŝƚ ? ?208 This concern, raised by SHAEF, fed directly into the creation of 
the proposed Sealing and Holding Parties, which were given the actual designation of 
 ‘dĂƌŐĞƚ &ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ more commonly referred to as T-Forces. The Director of Naval 
/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƉƌŽƵĚůǇ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĚŵŝƌĂůƚǇ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ Ă ƉŝŽŶĞĞƌ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ? ĂƐ
^,&ǁĞƌĞ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂĨŽƌĐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞƚǁŽĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĂŶd manned on lines 
similar to 30 ƐƐĂƵůƚhŶŝƚ ? ?209 Though sometimes for the wrong reasons, 30AU had obviously 
caught the attention of a number of senior SHAEF planners and now provided a model for 
the training and technique of the new T-Forces. These new units were comprised of 
intelligence specialists, prisoner of war interrogators, linguists, engineers, bomb disposal 
experts and a bulk of combat personnel, and were attached to the 6th, 12th and 21st Army 
Groups.210 
 The prescribed role for the T-Forces, following on from the original designs for the 
S.H. Parties was to be primarily a military and logistical one. It was split into four parts, thus: 
a. Moving in the immediate wake of the assaulting forces. 
b. Locating and securing intact the targets concerned. 
c. Preserving them from destruction, loot, robbery and, if necessary, counter attack 
until the completion of their examination by teams of experts or until the removal of 
the essential installations or documents. 
d. In enemy territory, providing armed escorts for the expert investigators.211 
For many regular soldiers, the troops of the T-Forces were a welcome sight, arriving to 
defend properties which were often some distance from the frontline, allowing the ordinary 
forces to move on to their next objective or to relax at the conclusion of a particularly tough 
advance. This is not to suggest that the work of T-&ŽƌĐĞƐǁĂƐĞĂƐǇŽƌŝŶĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?/ŶƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? ‘ƚŚĞ
highly mobile T-Forces ultimately had to cover the whole area of operations in the course of 
ĂĨĞǁŚĞĐƚŝĐǁĞĞŬƐ ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽŵƵĐŚŽĨ the same criticism as 30 Assault 
Unit, no doubt largely down to the fact that they were an unusual formation which did not 
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conform to the same norms as the majority of regular fighting men, and were often referred 
ƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĂƌŵǇ ? ?212 
 With the T-Forces surging forward and seizing all manner of targets, based on a 
haphazard set of priorities provided by a number of different agencies, and roughly co-
ordinated by their headquarters division, it was now necessary to furnish the structure and 
manpower to facilitate proper investigations and to ensure that nothing of scientific and 
technical value was missed. On 12 June 1944, less than a week after D-Day, General 
Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff, stating that:  
Need has arisen for an Anglo-American Inter-Service Organisation to deal with Anglo-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ Q ?ƚŽ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƵĐŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂŶĚ
information of military importance, either of great value to the Allies for operational 
purposes, or constituting a dangerous potential threat in the future as to justify urgent 
action on the part of the Allies in seizing them.213 
This organisation, which would have responsibility for drawing up lists of targets, arranging 
the dispatch of troops (primarily T-Forces) to seal and hold them, and of investigators to 
assess them, and of the dissemination of the resulting intelligence to all concerned parties, 
was the Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee (CIPC). 
 While 30AU had directly influenced the T-Forces, CIPC looked to Alsos for guidance 
on their own methods. The Combined Chiefs even suggested that Alsos provide the entire 
h^ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŶĞǁ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ďƵƚ ^,& ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĂƌĞƚŽŽŶĂƌƌŽǁ ? ?214 Instead, the CIPC was made up of representatives from seven 
British and seven American departments  W for the British these were the Foreign Office, the 
Ministries of Economic Warfare, Supply, and Aircraft Production, and the Intelligence 
sections of all three Armed Services; for the Americans: the State Department, the Foreign 
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ KĨĨŝĐĞ ŽĨ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ K^ZĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?
Intelligence divisions.
215
 As this list of constituent agencies would suggest, the intelligence 
with which CIPC was concerned ůĂǇ  ‘between normal technical intelligence obtained by 
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established means during operations and intelligence of a clearly non-military nature. It thus 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƚĞŵƐƐŽůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?216 
 CIPC, in this role, was remarkably short-lived. On 22 August 1944, all of its members 
and most of its responsibilities were migrated to the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-
Committee (CIOS), which met fortnightly from that date until the dissolution of SHAEF, after 
the cessation of European hostilities, on 13 July 1945. It was chaired by the American 
Brigadier-General Thomas J. Betts, and had British Professor Reginald Patrick (R.P.) Linstead, 
an esteemed organic chemist then serving as deputy director of scientific research at the 
Ministry of Supply (and who would later go on to become dean of the Royal College of 
Science, and Rector of Imperial College, London) as its Deputy Chairman.217 >ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?Ɛ
involvement was indicative of the influence of experts on policy, even at such a senior and 
ƐĞĐƌĞƚŝǀĞ ůĞǀĞů ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂĚ ƉƌŽǀĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ Ă ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁĂƌ
effort up to this point.218 It is important to note that CIOS was, of itself, not an investigating 
agency and did not have a permanent staff of exploitation personnel of its own. Rather, its 
role was primarily a supervisory one  W it was responsible for aiding its member agencies, co-
ordinating and facilitating their efforts, and settling any disputes between them. In its own 
official retrospective report, published just two months after it ceased to exist, CIOS was 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďŽƚŚĂƐ ‘ĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘means whereby intelligence and information 
ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽŽůĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ďƵƌĚĞŶ ŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ? ?Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ ? ŝƚƐ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚ ? ĐƌƵĐŝĂů ƚŽ
serving these purposes, which began as just one British and one American officer, had 
expanded by the end of the war to a total of 25 officials and 58 enlisted and civilian 
stenographic personnel.219 
 The separation which existed between CIOS in London and the T-Forces in the field 
caused some issues. Despite the diverse make-up of the T-Force units, they were widely 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ? ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ Ă ůŝƚƚůĞ ƵŶĨĂŝƌůǇ ? ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇĚƵŵď ƐŽůĚŝĞƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŶŽƚ
properly equipped to assess the worth of any particular target, especially if it was seized by 
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opportunity and had not featured on the initial designated lists.220 In response to this, the 
ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ  ‘/K^ &ŽƌǁĂƌĚ KďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ? ǁĂƐ ŵŽŽƚĞĚ  W they would not be experts in any one 
particular area but would be located forward in thĞĨŝĞůĚ ‘to ascertain the definite existence 
of CIOS targets, their physical condition, to reassess priorities, and to follow up all lines of 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?221 C.H. Noton, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, was particularly eager to 
see these reconnaissance officers deployed, as he feared that T-Force in 21 Army Group was 
ďĞŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞĂƌĂƌĞĂ ?ŽĨŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƚŚƵƐŚĂǀĞŶŽŵĞŶƚŽƐƉĂƌĞ
ƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐǁŚĞŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽůŽŐŶĞ ?ĨĞůůƚŽƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?Ă ‘ŵŝƐĚistribution 
 ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞĚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇďǇƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽĐŽƵůĚŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞd-Force 
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ‘ǁŚŝĐŚ/K^ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽďĞŐƵĂƌĚĞĚƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƐƉĂƚĐŚŽĨĂŶ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚĞĂŵĨƌŽŵ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ? ?222 
The eventual form which this forward exploitation reconnaissance took, in provision 
for the expected sudden expansion in the number of targets available which would come 
ǁŚĞŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ ZŚŝŶĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŝŶĂůůǇ ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĚ ? ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞĚ
Advance Field Teams (CAFTs). ThĞƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚ  ‘Ă ůŝŵŝƚĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ƚŽ
the advancing spearheads, with the following remit: 
As a target was seized, the CAFT assessors quickly appraised it and advised the combat 
commanders whether its importance merited the assignment of guard troops. Reports 
covering each target assessment were sent to the Rear to CAFT leaders at each Army Group, 
and by them through SHAEF channels to the Operations Section of the CIOS Secretariat. 
Targets meriting further investigation were exploited by specially qualified investigators 
dispatched by CIOS.223 
It is important to remember that, although the process described here suggests a smooth 
collaborative effort, shared by the different agencies and teams to ensure that 
comprehensive exploitation was conducted, the reality was a little different. All this had to 
take place not just in wartime, with all its attendant disorder, but also incredibly close to the 
frontlines of a land offensive on a scale never before seen  W no amount of careful 
preparation would ever have been sufficient. One American aerospace expert who was 
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ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ůĂƚĞƌ ƌĞĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ? ĐŚĂŽƐ ĂŶĚ ŵƵƚƵĂů ĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
characterised the  ‘ƚĞĂŵƐĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĨŽŽůƐ ?ĂƐ
ƚŚĞǇ  ‘ĚĂƐŚĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ĂďŽƵƚ  Q ŝŵƉŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƐ ? ůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?  ?ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ? ǁŚŽůĞ ůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?224 CHAOS even became a somewhat critical 
nickname for CIOS.225 
All the endeavours of all the exploitation organisations were guided by lists of 
targets. The entire initiative would have been completely unable to function without them. 
Included as targets were such things as industrial firms, factories, laboratories and research 
facilities, scientific and technical institutes, military installations, universities, and individual 
scientists and technicians, all of which the T-Forces were detailed to secure.226 The targets 
of top-ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ  ‘for operational purposes, or constituting a 
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ŝŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? featured on the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ůĂĐŬ>ŝƐƚ ?227. Devising 
this list, and making sure it was accompanied by sufficient information about the targets it 
contained, was arguably the greatest challenge faced by CIOS in this period.228 Data for the 
ůĂĐŬ>ŝƐƚǁĂƐ ‘provided by the Service Intelligence Directorates, MEW and anyone else, e.g. 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉƉůǇDŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŽĐĂŶŚĞůƉ ? ?229 In some cases, the requests filed by the 
relevant ministries or departments were not even for specific items but would instead be 
formulated in broad terms in the hope that CIOS teams might come across pertinent 
material while investigating other targets.
230
 As investigations progressed, and more 
intelligence duly became available, the Black List was altered and updated to reflect this, 
especially as intensified Allied bombing and the encroaching Soviet advance on the Eastern 




 To give some idea of scale, the Black List in circulation in August 1944 contained a 
ƚŽƚĂůŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘WƌŝŽƌŝƚǇKŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞ ‘WƌŝŽƌŝƚǇdǁŽ ?
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ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ǁĞƌĞ  ‘WƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ dŚƌĞĞ ? ? dŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ŶƵmber were spread across all of northern and 
western Europe, with targets mentioned in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Denmark. Over half of the total targets listed (658) were in Germany, while for 
Norway there were only nine. Furthermore, every target belonged to one of twenty-eight 
different categories, which ranged from obvious ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ Žƌ
ŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ DŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚĞŵŝĐĂů tĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ƚŽ ŵŽƌĞ ŐŶĞƌĂů ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
 ‘DĞƚĂůůƵƌŐǇ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘WŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂŶĚKƉƚŝĐĂů /ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ
designations for more miscellaneous groupŝŶŐƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  ‘ŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ WĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘/ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? dŚĞƐĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƌ ĨƵů ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ŶŽƚ
only by country but also by sub-national location, were essential to ensure the right experts 
were allocated to investigate facilities which their knowledge and experience best-equipped 
them to assess.232 
 Despite the three priority levels within the Black List, it still only contained targets of 
direct and immediate importance. A separate Grey List was created to deal with the 
multiplicity of less pressing subjects and CIOS described it thus: 
 The difference between Black List and Grey List targets is essentially one of military urgency. 
dŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞǇ >ŝƐƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ǀĞƌǇ ǁŝĚĞ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚ
include targets of a general economic, industrial, commercial or political interest, even if 
their purely military value were only secondary. 233 
Practically speaking, targets of economic interest alone were not considered to be 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ‘to justify ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƐŽůĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂůĨ ? ?ĂŶĚŶŽ
T-Force protection was accorded them.234 In terms of science and technology, the rough 
distinction between Black and Grey Lists was that the former concentrated interest more on 
 ‘ĞŶĚ-products, e.g. a new tank, torpedo, or jet engine plane, and the power and limitations 
ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ? ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?
 “ŬŶŽǁ-ŚŽǁ ? ? ?235 This interest in items of indirect utility was not purely academic, it was 
nŽƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƉĂƐƚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the control of Libraries, as well as Archives, will be of 
ŐƌĞĂƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽďƌĞĂŬƵƉ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇDĂĐŚŝŶĞ ? ?dŚĞƐĞ ůŝďƌĂƌŝĞƐĂŶĚ
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archives included those of major Nazi governmental bodies, such as the Propaganda 
Ministry and the German Labour Front, as well as Wehrmacht, SS and SA headquarters.236 
Certainly, the broader remit of the Grey List meant that it had a much grander scale than 
the Black List  W a CIOS report from 28 December 1944 predicted that the eventual number 
of Grey List targets might be as high as 10,000.237 
An interesting case study of the distinction between the Grey and Black Lists, and the 
process involved in splitting targets between the two, is that of the German Patent Office. 
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 
recommended to CIOS that the Patent Office be considered a Black List target. Linstead 
ƌĞƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĨĞůƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘a very important long range target, but not one of urgent military 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?,ĞĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĂƚŝƚƐŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞůĂĐŬ>ŝƐƚǁŽƵůĚŚŝŶŐĞŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞ
likelihoŽĚŽĨ ŝƚ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƐĞĐƌĞƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉĂƚĞŶƚƐ ? ?ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚWĂƚĞŶƚKĨĨŝĐĞ ĚŝĚ ?ĂŶĚŚĞ
agreed to look into it.238 Just over two weeks later, Brigadier John G. Foster, the Chief of 
^,& ?Ɛ >ĞŐĂů ƌĂŶĐŚ ? ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ǁŽƌĚ ĨƌŽŵ ŚŝƐ ^ƉĞĐŝĂů >ĞŐĂů hŶŝƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂn Patent 
Office did indeed handle secret military patents and, furthermore, that they were 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŽĨƐƵĐŚŚŝŐŚǀĂůƵĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ‘ĚŝƐĐůŽ ƵƌĞŽĨƐĞĐƌĞƚƉĂƚĞŶƚƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂŶ
ĂĐƚŽĨƚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶWĂƚĞŶƚKĨĨŝĐĞď ĐĂŵĞĂůĂĐŬ>ŝst target, albeit of 
the lowest priority.239 
 While the bulk of this planning was geared towards the exploitation of Germany, 
CIOS was keen to have investigators at work in the occupied countries, where plenty of 
research ordered by the Nazis had taken place. Even if nothing of particular utility could be 
unearthed there, it was still hoped that it would give a clearer idea of what the assessors 
would find once the borders of the Reich were breached, and thus a more accurate and 
detailed Black List could be devised. It was believed that France, Holland, Czechoslovakia, 
EŽƌǁĂǇ ? ĞŶŵĂƌŬ ? ĞůŐŝƵŵ ĂŶĚ >ƵǆĞŵďŽƵƌŐ ŵŝŐŚƚ Ăůů ŚĂǀĞ ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƵƐĞĨƵů ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǁĂƌĞĨĨŽƌƚ ? ƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŚĂĚŶŽ ƋƵĂůŵƐ
about ruthlessly exploiting research conducted in countries which were ostensibly their 
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allies, and fellow members of the United Nations, whose governments were often in exile in 
Britain. Their proposed policy was that: 
The examination of establishments and records in these countries on their liberation should 
be carried out along the same general lines as those laid out for Germany. It is considered 
the Allies should take a firm stand in this on the grounds that all European research has been 
for the Germans and is therefore a legitimate prize of war.240 
dŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞƉƌŝǌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ǁĂƐďƵƌĚĞŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ
in international law, and would later form part of the major debate about the legality of 
Allied exploitation programmes.241  
The first CIOS-sponsored mission on the European continent was to Paris on 28 
August 1944, a mere three days after the French capital had been liberated. From the outset 
the mission was beset by difficulties  W eight individuals who were supposed to take part did 
not even show up at Northolt Air Field for the flight to Chartres, near Paris, delaying it by 
over an hour. Of the 52 specialists who did attend, several had not been properly briefed 
ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵĂŶǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚǇ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ WĂƌŝƐ ? ? hƉŽŶ ĂƌƌŝǀĂů, the 
transport provisions from Chartres Airport to Paris, and within the city itself, were described 
ĂƐ ‘ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ? ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?
communication was difficult, and it took over five hours before contact was established with 
them all. Despite these numerous shortcomings, CIOS remained optimistic, summarising 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? ?ĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞ
first of many such missions, and not only had  ‘ŵƵĐŚǀĂůƵĂďůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ QďĞĞŶŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?
ďƵƚŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞůĞƐƐŽŶƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚďǇĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽ
ĨĂƌƚŽŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŵŽƌĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ?242 
 The first report to emerge as a result of the Paris mission was ŽŶ ‘ZĂĚĂƌĂŶĚ'ƵŝĚĞĚ
DŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚŝƐ ĨŝĞůĚ ?dŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ ?ƚŚĞ
investigators had ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽ ‘confer with engineers of the French Radio Companies and to 
inspect the work they had done for the Germans to attempt to learn the information they 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐŚĂĚŐůĞĂŶĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐŝŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
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This proved to be a fairly successful method although the assessors did encounter 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ  ‘ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ŶŽƚ ƚŽƌĞǀĞĂů ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?ĂƐ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ
ďŽůĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚƐĞŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞƉƌŝǌĞƐŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĨƌŽŵĂůůƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚ
possess the authority to compel French enterprises to share their work with British or 
American investigators.243 
The Paris operations were swiftly followed up by further CIOS investigations in 
Brussels, Eindhoven, Vlissingen and Strasbourg as soon as these target areas were occupied 
by Allied armies. Eindhoven was visited by a previously-selected field team within 24 hours 
of its occupation.244 In the case of Strasbourg, a large city which had multiple targets of 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? /K^ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů  ‘/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƐƐĂƵůƚ &ŽƌĐĞ ? ƚŽ ĐĂƌƌǇ ŽƵƚthe most 
efficient exploitation, reflecting the flexibility of the scheme and the pressure the agencies 
were under to act effectively in a fairly small time window.245 In addition, CIOS also made 
early perfunctory excursions into Germany; at Aachen, which was the first German city to 
come under Allied control on 21 October 1944, and at nearby Stolberg.246 Unsurprisingly, 
one of the main concerns of the CIOS teams at this stage, while the terrifying V-weapons 
were still striking targets in Britain and elsewhere, with steadily increasing accuracy, was to 
stop these attacks and learn more about the advanced rocketry involved at the same time. 
In early November, CIOS investigator Lieutenant-Colonel Greatbatch travelled to Holland 
and, near Eindhoven, met with a Dutch Resistance fighter who had supposedly witnessed 
some V-2 launches in the area. His account suggested that the launches could be made non-
ǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƌŽŵŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƌŽĂĚǁĂǇƐ ?ďƵƚǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇĐŽƐƚůǇŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶůŝǀĞƐ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘on 
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ŽŶĞŵĂŶŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞǁĚŝĞĚĨƌŽŵƐĞǀĞƌĞďƵƌŶƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚ ůĂƵŶĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞ ? ?
He also passed on a rumour, never verified before or since, that some of the V-2 warheads 
were filled with anthrax.247 This is just one example of the degree of uncertainty and 
conjecture on which CIOS teams had to often rely during their work. 
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 This was by no means the only difficulty which the exploitation initiative faced during 
its early phases of operation. Despite the best intentions of the co-ordinators in London, 
there was still considerable distance between the straightforward soldiers of the T-Forces 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚƐƐĞŶƚŝŶďǇ/K^ ?dŚĞ&dƐǇƐƚĞŵŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ůĂƌŐĞ
ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ  Q ǁĞƌĞ ĂďůĞ ǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇ ƚŽ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚĞƐŬƐ and drawing boards 
ƵŶƚŝů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ƚĂƐŬ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƚǁĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ŵĞĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂŶǇ
ĂƌƌŝǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ‘ĞǆƉĞĐƚŝŶŐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂĐŚĂŝŶŽĨŚŽƚĞůƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŽůŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ
unlimited supplies of transport, clerical facilitieƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞ ? ?248 Instead, the 
ďĞƐƚ ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽƵůĚ ŚŽƉĞ ĨŽƌ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƌŽƵŐŚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞĂĚǇ ? ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ŵĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ůŽĂĚ-carrying 
vehicles, and even theƐĞǁĞƌĞŚĂƌĚůǇĞĂƐǇƚŽĐŽŵĞďǇ ?dŚĞ/K^ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ?ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚ
everything from comfort to cleanliness did not often sit well with the fighting men of the T-
Forces, many of whom had been directly involved in D-Day and the subsequent fierce 
combat across western Europe.249 
 This was by no means a one-sided story though. The civilian investigators were not 
ĂůǁĂǇƐƐŝŵƉůǇƵŶƵƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ǁĂƌĂƚƚŚĞƐŚĂƌƉĞŶĚ ? ?ďƵƚŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĚŝĚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶǁĂǇƐǁŚŝĐŚŶŽƚ
only made them very uncomfortable but also prevented them from doing their job 
effectively. In December 1944, Arthur R. Stella, an investigator working on mainland Europe 
for the Economic Advisory Branch (EAB) wrote to C.H. Noton  W the Ministry of Economic 
tĂƌĨĂƌĞ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽŶ/K^ Wenclosing a report which he had entitled  ‘ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶ
difficulties experienced as a civilian investigating targets in or near tŚĞ ďĂƚƚůĞ ǌŽŶĞƐ ? ? ,Ğ
detailed how, as a civilian, he was given none of the appropriate battlefield clothing, none of 
the relevant medical inoculations, no financial aid, and no means to purchase small 
comforts, such as cigarettes, biscuits or sweets. In addition, his lack of rank and full military 
apparel meant that he was often denied access to crucial targets of interest. This resulted in 
him having to borrow equipment and supplies from his military companions, having to 
 ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŬŝŶĚŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĂŵ ĨŽƌ ƐŵĂůů ĐŽŵĨŽƌƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŚĞ ĞǀĞŶ
ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐ  ‘ĨŝĐƚŝƚŝŽƵƐĂƌŵǇƌĂŶŬƐ ŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?dŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƚ ŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŚĂƌĚƚŽ
feel too much sympathy for Mr Stella, who cannot truly have expected too many comforts 
so close to the frontline, it is worth noting that his civilian status actually hindered the 
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progress of exploitation. Stella concluded his report by recommending that no other EAB 
ŵĞŵďĞƌ  ‘ďĞƐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂƌĞĂƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďĞŝŶŐĨƵůůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂůů ƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞƐ
which, from the above, appear to be indispensable for the successful carrying out of duties 
ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ? ?250 
 The T-Forces caused their own problems too, though in a very different way. With 
attitudes altered by the privations of the front, and tasked with a certain degree of officially 
ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚ  ‘ƉůƵŶĚĞƌ ? ? ŝƚ ŝƐƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ŝŶĂ ďŝƚŽĨ ůŽŽƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ?
The T-Force troops were not alone in this; theft on varying scales was perpetrated by 
soldiers in every battalion of every army in the field at some point  W though unlike the 
vengeful criminality of the Red Army troops, whose country had suffered severely from Nazi 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ‘ǁĂƌŽĨĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ ?, British soldiers did it with the childlike mischief of a school 
bully, taking what they wanted but rarely resorting to any serious physical violence.251 
Nonetheless, it created a slightly different problem when exploitation forces were involved 
as their indiscriminate personal plunder threatened to shatter the already fragile legitimacy 
of the initiative as a whole. A directive issued to 30AU in late 1944 showed the position the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ŝƚ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
enemy can be taken provided that it can be utilised for the good of the ƵŶŝƚ Q “&ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞ
ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůǀĂůƵĞŝƐůŽŽƚŝŶŐ ? ?252  
 Logistics also provided a major difficulty for the planners of exploitation. Moving 
such a considerable quantity of men from Britain to targets near the frontline, when 
transport was so direly needed by pretty much every other element of the armed forces was 
a particular challenge. This situation was grossly exacerbated by the actions of the agencies 
and investigators themselves, who all too regularly changed plans and travel details after 
the necessary Army Group approval had been obtained. Complaints were raised that these 
last-ŵŝŶƵƚĞĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ  ‘seriously jeopardising the co-operation being shown by both 
Air Transport Companies and CATOR [Combined Air TranspŽƌƚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐZŽŽŵ ? ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
when the inclusion of CIOS investigators often resulted in the removal of lower-priority 
                                                             
250
 TNA, FO 935/25,  ‘Comments on difficulties experienced as a civilian investigating targets in or near the 
ďĂƚƚůĞǌŽŶĞƐ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
251
 ^ĞƚŚ ?'ŝǀĞŶƐ ?  ‘>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ PdŚĞh^ƌŵǇĂŶĚ>ŽŽƚŝŶŐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚ
tĂƌ ? ?War in History, 21 (2013), 46. 
252
 TNA, ADM 223/500, December 1944. 
- 84 - 
 
passengers on these transports. This in turn led to fears that it would become very difficult 
ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽ-operation of the Transport Companies in genuinely urgent cases where 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ďŽŽŬĞĚ ? ?253 Furthermore, another set of resources which 
were almost in as high demand as transport were interpreters. German-speakers, ideally 
technically trained, were an essential part of the exploitation process, but they were few 
and far between and in many cases improvisation was necessary, such as drafting in the T-
Force transport personnel who could often speak German.254 However, as more and more 
targets needed investigation, CIOS had to start looking to the civilian population at home, 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚŽƉĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ  ‘Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŽůĚĞƌ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ-speaking personnel who would be 
unfit for any form of military service but who would be suitable for interpreting work under 
static conditioŶƐĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚŚĞŶĐĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ?255 
One problem which the exploitation planning staff had anticipated but which did not 
materialise to the expected extent for the men on the ground was German efforts to 
impede Allied investigations. T-Force rĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶ ŶŽ ƉůĂĐĞ ǁĞƌĞ  ?ĨŝůĞƐ ? ĨŽƵŶĚ
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĚŝƐĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ Žƌ ĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞĚ ? ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ƐŽŵĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ
burn documents, or transport them to secret locations.256 A report on T-Force activity with 
the 2nd British Army commented thaƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůĚĂŵĂŐĞǁĂƐĚŽŶĞďǇĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ
ŝŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨŝŶĞďƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƌŽǁŶƚƌŽŽƉƐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐĂďĂĚƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞ
ƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ĂĨĂƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŵĞŶĂĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚĂƌŐĞƚƐƚŚĂŶĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ
the enemy to destƌŽǇƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚĞŶƚƐ ? ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƌĞůĞƐƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ďǇ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ  ‘ǁĂƐ ƚŽ Ă ůĂƌŐĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ŶƵůůŝĨ ĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ-hearted co-
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƐŬŝůů ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ?257 These 
individuals could obviously see that the end of the war was coming and were shrewd and 
pragmatic enough to do what they could to appear co-operative to the imminent victors. 
 In fact, the French often threw up more obstacles to CIOS operations in France than 
the Germans did to those taking place in Germany. Wing-Commander T. Jackson of the 
KǀĞƌƐĞĂƐŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŽŶƚƌŽůǁƌŽƚĞƚŽŝƌŽŵŵŽĚŽƌĞ ?D ?'ƌŝĞƌƐŽŶ ?^,& ?ƐƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚŚŝĞĨŽĨ
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Air Staff, recounting the story of a CIOS party which arrived in France to investigate aircraft 
factories. Jackson took the captain heading this party to the French Air Ministry to get 
clearance, and once there: 
he caused a certain amount of alarm and despondency by suddenly announcing that MAP 
[Ministry of Aircraft Production] had instructed him not to confine himself to the collection 
of intelligence concerning the enemy, but also to study French production, and interrogate 
personnel in French factories regarding types of aircraft now being produced by the French 
for the French.258 
The French were then understandably reluctant to grant any permission for such 
investigations, and this was far from an isolated incident. Reports stated that many CIOS 
field teams had been stranded in Paris, unable to secure clearance to visit any of their 
targets within France. Moreover, it was believed that French manufacturers had received 
formal instructions to release no information to foreign military, naval or civilian personnel 
without specific authority from the French government. The only hope for a thawing of 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŝĨ ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂŶĚ
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇĞǆŝƐƚƐ ? ?259 If the French were allowed to learn from the 
British and Americans, then perhaps they would be more willing to share their own secrets. 
French reticence was not the only cause of strained relations between exploitation 
personnel and the people of recently-ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? /K^ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ŽĨƚĞŶ ĐůŽƐĞ
contact with the local populace meant they were sometimes treated as reliable channels of 
information on Allied conduct of the war, especially when the targets under investigation 
were located particularly close to the frontline. In November 1944, three CIOS officers who 
had been investigating a V-weapon launching site near Watten, in the Pas-de-Calais, left the 
area and word got out to the local people that their departure was due to the fact that the 
h^&ǁĂƐƐĞƚƚŽďŽŵďƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŝŵŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇ ?dŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĐŚĂƐƚŝƐĞĚĨŽƌĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ‘alarm 
ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƌĞĂ ĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽůĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞĨƌĂŝŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƵĐŚ depressing 
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ĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚƐ ? ŝŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ƚŚƵƐ highlighting the delicate nature of interactions between 
exploitation operatives and local residents.260 
 Despite not coming into existence until the end of August, and having to operate 
while the war was still raging, CIOS achieved a considerable amount during 1944. It 
dispatched 197 investigators from all fourteen of its constituent departments across Europe, 
to examine 115 Black List items and many more targets of opportunity. No casualties were 
suffered at all during this period.
261
 Of course, CIOS was aided throughout by the logistical 
capabilities of the T-&ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ǁŚŽŵ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ  ‘Ă ŐƌĞĂƚ ĂŵŽƵŶƚ ŽĨŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ŝƌƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂďůǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ůŽƐƚ ? ?262 The product of this first wave of 
exploitation was that 211 reports were filed with the CIOS Secretariat; reports which were 
then available to all concerned parties. In fact, dissemination of the reports had to be 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ‘ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŝƐƚƐŽĨƚŝƚůĞƐ ? ?/Ŷ
concluding the final report on CIOS activity in 1944, the British Deputy Chairman, R.P. 
>ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ŝĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŽďĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚŽŶ
 ‘ŶĞǁ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵĂǇ ŝŵƉĞƌŝů ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ EĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶ Ŷew 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŽƵƌŽǁŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?263  
>ŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?>ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌĚǁŽƌŬŝŶ
planning and exploitation are now becoming apparent and the record to date promises well 
for the futuƌĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƉƌŽƉĞƌ ? ?264 All attention within CIOS, T-Forces and 
the numerous other bodies concerned with exploitation was now focused in this direction. 
Their investigations in the occupied countries and the few brief incursions across the 
crumbling borders of the Reich had been impressive in their own right, but had also most 
definitely whetted appetites for the spoils of Nazi science and technology which would be 
accessible as sizeable amounts of German territory fell into Allied hands, undoubtedly 
containing countless laboratories, factories, and research establishments. The exploitation 
officials did not have long to wait.  
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Into the Reich 
In the first few months of 1945, Western Allied forces began to seriously threaten, and then 
broke through, the German defences along the Rhine. By late March and early April, British, 
American, Canadian, French and Polish troops (among others) began pouring across the 
border of the Reich and surging eastwards. The Germany that they encountered was a land 
of desolation: cities bombed to rubble, a population living without adequate access to food, 
power or shelter, and death in abundance.
265
 The Wehrmacht, by now well aware that 
victory or even an agreeable stalemate were out of the question, fought on regardless, 
fighting a war without real strategic considerations, but simply for its own sake, obeying the 
orders of a crumbling but still dangerous regime.266 While the primary consideration of the 
Allied forces was obviously to bring the war to a swift end, and secure a satisfactory peace 
in Europe, the exploitation initiative was not neglected. Rather, it too, like the war effort, 
was increased as the vast scientific, technological and industrial spoils of Germany became 
more accessible. 
 The T-Forces moved ahead with, and occasionally in front of, the main combat 
troops and seized targets on the Black List, as they had done in the campaign across France 
and the other occupied countries. CIOS teams were rapidly dispatched to investigate these 
targets, usually only a very short time after the fighting had ended. This was certainly true of 
Cologne, where investigators were already at work on the American-occupied left bank of 
the Rhine by late March 1945, while districts on the right bank remained in German hands 
until the middle of April. Lieutenant-Commander John N. Bradley of the Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), who was deployed on investigations in Cologne and the 
surrounding area, wrote home to his wife Margaret on 23 March, and recounted the 
precarious nature of his situation. He described how it had been impossible to secure a 
guard from the Americans for the works they were visiting, so they had had to act as guards 
themselves. Fortunately, he also noted how obliging the local German people were, who 
woulĚ  ‘literally do anything you want, including putting up beds for us in the works 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?267 
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 Bradley also described the entry into Lübeck, following a rapid advance, and noted 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶĞǀĞƌ ŚĂǀĞ / ƐĞĞŶ ƐƵĐŚ ĐŚĂŽƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ĨĂŶƚĂƐƚŝĐ ƐĐĞŶĞƐ ? ? ,Ğ ǁĂƐ ĂŵŽŶg the first Allied 
troops to enter Kiel, an accolade that has been claimed variously by 30AU, T-Force and the 
SAS, and it was to the latter that Bradley was attached. Despite these exciting and daring 
exploits, which Bradley related home with a mixture of relish and discontent, he soon found 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵǇƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƵƐĞĨƵůŶĞƐƐǁĂƐŽǀĞƌŶŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĂŶŬŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌƚƐŚĂĚĂƌƌŝǀĞĚ ?/ƐĞĞŵĞĚ
ƚŽďĞĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞĚƵƚŝĞƐŽĨĂůŝĂŝƐŽŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵŶĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ƐƐŽŽŶĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŝƚĞƐ
were secured, as Bradley quickly learned, it was a matter of great urgency to get the 
appropriate experts involved.268  
 Of course during these final months and weeks of the war, one of the targets of 
greatest importance was Berlin. Although many of the key scientific and industrial facilities 
had been evacuated out of the capital, either as a result of bombing or out of fear of Soviet 
capture, all the Allies were convinced that the heart of the Nazi regime would still contain 
some of the greatest spoils of war.269 T-Force preparations for the assault on Berlin began in 
the summer of 1944 when an airlift of 119 specialist officers, to arrive on the day the city fell 
ƚŽƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?ǁĂƐĚĞĞŵĞĚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?dŚŝƐĞǀĞŶĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚƌĞĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ
ƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐible for restructuring the German Kriminalpolizei and 
ŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐ ?ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘all 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŝĚƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?270 By November, 
expectations had drastically increased  W ŝƚǁĂƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ĐŽ-ordinate, seize 
and hold targets of OI [operational intelligence], CI [counter-intelligence], Censorship, 
Signals and CIOS within a 30 mile radius of Berlin so that they may be exploited by 
specialisƚƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĞƌůŝŶd-&ŽƌĐĞǁŽƵůĚŶĞĞĚƚŽŶƵŵďĞƌ ‘ĂŵŝŶŝŵƵŵŽĨŽŶĞŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ
ƉůƵƐƚǁŽďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶƐ ?ĂďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶŽĨĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ĂŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƉŽůŝĐĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂŶĚƐŝŐŶĂůƚƌŽŽƉƐ ? ?271 
 In January 1945, plans had reached an even more advanced stage of development. 
Conventional military personnel would not be sufficient, it was felt, and special teams were 
thus deemed necessary. The form that these teams would take was laid down as follows: 
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8 Microfilm Teams, 8 Document Teams, 5 Interpreter Teams, 4 Interrogation Teams, 1 Safe 
Breaker Team, 4 individual females to search females held at Detention Centre, and 30 
individual guides who speak German and are familiar with the city. These Special teams and 
individuals will comprise approximately 40 officers and 160 other ranks.272 
In addition to this, ŝƚǁĂƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽŵĞ  ? ? ?  ‘attached specialists will be provided by 
various interested intelligence agencies when needed. Some will accompany T-Force into 
ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐǁŝůůĂƌƌŝǀĞůĂƚĞƌ ? ?/ŶĂůů ?ƚŚĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŚĂƚĞŵĞƌŐĞƐŝƐŽŶĞŽĨĂĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ-planned 
operation on a vast scale, and all this was borne on the assumption that T-Force troops 
ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĞŝǌĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŽůĚ ŽŶůǇintelligence targets, of which there are more than 
 ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽǁůŝƐƚĞĚ ? ?273 However, the Soviet seizure of Berlin on 2 May 1945, after a period of 
vicious fighting, meant that these plans were made in vain and no exploitation airlift into the 
capital ever took place.274 
 Less than a week after Berlin had fallen, the war in Europe ended. On 8 May 1945, 
representatives of the four main Allies (Britain, USA, Soviet Union and France) and 
representatives of the three parts of the German armed forces (Army, Navy and Luftwaffe) 
signed a document of capitulation and brought hostilities to a conclusion.275 At the Yalta 
Conference, held in Crimea in February 1945, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt had agreed on 
the division of a conquered Germany into three roughly equal zones (a fourth zone, 
allocated to the French, was later carved from the American zone).276 At the end of the war, 
the armies of the Western Allies had advanced further east than these prearranged zonal 
boundaries and it was July before this territory was duly ceded to the Soviets and all the 
Allies took formal control of their respective zones. As such, between April/May and July, 
particularly high priority was often accorded to exploitation of those targets in parts of 
Germany which had been occupied by British or American forces but which were very soon 
to be handed over to Soviet control, such as Saxony and Thuringia.277 From July onwards, 
when the theoretical divisions became official borders, the politics of mutual access for 
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foreign investigation teams to each zone added a new and complex dimension to 
exploitation which would persist throughout the period.278 
Once the war had ended, it became clear that the exploitation activities conducted 
in the formerly Nazi-occupied territories had been a mere prelude. The German authorities 
had been reluctant to relocate many sites of scientific or technological significance outside 
of Germany so the majority of important targets remained within the borders of the Reich. 
Even once these borders had been crossed by the Allies, accessing these targets had not 
always been easy while conflict continued, but in peacetime access and investigation swiftly 
became more viable. In addition, once the war was over, military targets no longer had such 
an exclusively high priority and interest grew in industrial and economic targets. This 
created issues for the current system of co-ordination, handled by Special Sections Sub-
Division of G-2 SHAEF, which had been in place since the first Allied landings in Europe, but 
which was not sufficiently equipped to handle this sharply increased demand for 
exploitation. 
 As a result, it was decided that a more powerful organization than Special Sections 
Sub-ŝǀŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŶĞĞĚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŶĞǁďŽĚǇ ‘should have a technical staff and include 
a reference library and card-ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĂůůƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĂŶĚĞŶĞŵǇĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?KŶ ? ?DĂǇ
1945, therefore, a SHAEF Directive formally established the Field Information Agency, 
Technical (FIAT)  W a combined Anglo-American effort under the auspices of G-2 SHAEF and 
the command of British Brigadier R.J. Maunsell.279 FIAT would become a central part of the 
exploitation machinery for almost its entire post-war duration.280 Although it would later be 
split into separate, but complementary, British and American elements, it continued to 
ƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂŐƵŝĚŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?/ƚƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ŝŶďƌŽĂĚƚĞƌŵƐ ?ǁĂƐ ‘to provide for 
the seizure, freezing and exploitation of intelligence targets of scientific, technological and 
economic interest in enemy territory, to deal with which was outside the interest and 
ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶĚƐƚĂĨĨƐŽĨĨŝĞůĚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?281 
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 Such a brief sumŵĂƌǇ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ ƌĞǀĞĂů ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ &/d ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ
which serve to reflect the curiously convoluted and diverse nature of the exploitation 
programme, especially once it truly got off the ground. A central part of the FIAT mission 
statement was ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝt does not itself undertake intelligence investigations, but merely 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŵ ? ? /ƚ
comprised six branches: Scientific and Technological, Industrial, Economic and Financial, 
Navaů ?ƌŵǇ ?ĂŶĚŝƌ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚWůĂŶŶŝŶŐƌĂŶĐŚǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ŬŶŝƚƐ
together the operations of the six technical branches, is responsible for the general co-
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?/Ŷ order to fulfil 
these multiple functions, FIAT was outfitted with an Interpreters Pool, a Publications Branch 
(for printing and disseminating reports), a Records Branch (to keep records of all FIAT 
operations), an Enemy Documents Branch, an Administration Branch and a Control Branch 
(which handled transportation, movement of supplies and obtaining necessary 
clearances).282 
 At a meeting of CIOS in early June, deputy chairman R.P. Linstead commented that 
&/d  ‘ǁĂƐ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ ĂŶǇ ǁĂǇ to disturb the existing CIOS 
ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ĨŽƌ ŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?283 Certainly, with the FIAT structure in place, it was 
possible for CIOS to begin exploitation in earnest. In January 1945, during a typical fortnight, 
CIOS despatched fewer than a dozen investigators; by the end of May, a typical fortnight 
saw the despatch of more than 250. This was in addition to the 240 CAFT assessors who had 
ďĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐůǇƐŝŶĐĞůĂƚĞDĂƌĐŚ ?dŚĞ ‘/K^WƌŽŐƌĞƐƐZĞƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞĚ
that the investigations ŚĂĚ ďŽƌŶĞ Ă  ‘ƌŝĐŚ ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚ ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ďĞƚƚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉůĂŶŶĞĚƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚĚĂƌĞĚƚŽŚŽƉĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚ
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ /K^ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ƚǁŽĨŽůĚ P  ‘ƚŽ ŐĞƚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
places, and tŽŐĞƚ ƚŚĞŵƚŚĞƌĞ ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ? ?/K^ŚĂĚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚďŽƚŚŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂŝŵƐ
ĂŶĚŚĂĚƚŚĞǇŶŽƚ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ? ‘ŵƵĐŚƉƌŝĐĞůĞƐƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŐŽŶĞƵŶĚĞƌŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?
ŶĞǀĞƌƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂŐĂŝŶ ? ?284 
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 However, irrespective of how successful CIOS had been in its eleven months of 
operation, it could not realistically be expected to last indefinitely. It was, after all, a product 
of the distinctly Anglo-American character of SHAEF and now that the war was over, it 
seemed likely that SHAEF would be dissolved and that CIOS would have to follow suit. The 
full programme of exploitation had barely begun so there was no doubt that some new 
organisation would need to take its place. Even as early as April, while the war was still 
being fought, the demise of SHAEF could be imagined and discussions about how 
exploitation would continue were conducted. The central proposal was that  ‘ĞĂĐŚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌǁŝůů ŚĂŶĚůĞ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶ ŝƚƐŽǁŶǌŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ
ĞĂĐŚ  ‘ĂĨĨŽƌĚ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ from the other controlling powers to visit these 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?285 Though this notion was couched in fairly generic terms, it did indeed form the 
basis for the future of exploitation in the post-war period. 
 Having served its purpose in co-ordinating the Allied military offensive on the 
western front in the European theatre, SHAEF was due to cease existence on 13 July 1945. 
Brigadier-'ĞŶĞƌĂůd ?: ?ĞƚƚƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨ/K^ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘this would affect CIOS in 
the sense that CIOS had been created to work with SHAEF and would raise the question of 
the continuation of CIOS after SHAEF. He felt that it was most desirable that CIOS should 
continue in the post-^,& ƉŚĂƐĞ ? ? KŶ  ? ? :ƵŶĞ ? &ŝĞůĚ DĂƌƐŚĂů ĞƌŶĂƌĚ DŽŶƚŐŽŵĞƌǇ ?
Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR; the British occupying force in 
Germany) received a telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing him that CIOS 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĚĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ^,& ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ  ‘ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŝŶƚĞƌŝŵĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ
for continuing exploitation of inƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ  QǇŽƵ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ h^ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ƚŽ
visit targets in your zone and that you exchange intelligence procured from such targets 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌŽĨh^ǌŽŶĞ ? ?286 
 No such interim arrangement was ever necessary because by the time SHAEF and 
CIOS were terminated, new organisations were already in place and prepared to shoulder 
the burden of exploitation.  In fact, on 18 July 1945, only five days after SHAEF had been 
liquidated, Squadron Leader S.M. Harris, acting secretary of the Joint Intelligence Sub-
ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞǁƌŽƚĞƚŽĂůůƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨ/K^ĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚ  ‘the functions of 
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CIOS, so far as the British interests are concerned, shall be continued by the British portion 
of the CIOS organisation under the title of British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee 
 ?/K^ ) ? ?287 It was a remarkably smooth, and primarily administrative, changeover and 
marked the transition from a period of joint Anglo-American exploitation to unilateral, 
national programmes, the relationship between which would vary between extremes of co-
operation and competition.288 A month and a half later, having only been in existence for 
three months in total, FIAT also split into two components; one American and one British. 
 CIOS may have ceased to operate as a central body, but investigators sent out under 
its auspices continued their work throughout the summer of 1945. Its final report, printed in 
September in the form of a book entitled The Intelligence Exploitation of Germany, noted 
that CIOS had despatched a total of 2,197 personnel, of whom 1,876 were investigators and 
321 were CAFT assessors.289 In the course of their investigations, these experts visited 3,377 
different individual targets and filed 58 final reports.290 These figures are impressive in their 
own right, but even more so when considered in context  W ƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ/K^ ?  ‘no planned and 
coordinated exploitatŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞŶĞŵǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ŚĂĚ ĞǀĞƌ ďĞĞŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ? ? ŝŶ
addition, CIOS only operated for eleven months and for nine of those, the war with 
Germany was ongoing. Brigadier-General Betts and Professor Linstead wrote in their 
foreword to this report tŚĂƚ  ‘the value oĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ  “ŬŶŽǁ-ŚŽǁ ? thus 
ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĐĂŶŶŽƚŶŽǁďĞĨƵůůǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ?ďƵƚ ‘ƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚ
US industry will be measured in terms of economic progress and well-being for many years 
ƚŽĐŽŵĞ ? ?291 
 
As we have seen, the roots of the exploitation initiative were firmly entrenched in the 
Second World War, and were nurtured both by the growing prominence of science within 
the strategic considerations of British military planners and by the changing nature of 
intelligence, which became increasingly preoccupied with the contents of foreign arsenals, 
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especially those of potentially hostile nations. From these influential but initially 
inauspicious beginnings, and guided by the experiences of its first iterations  W 30 Assault 
Unit and Alsos  W the programme grew rapidly and underwent a remarkable transformation 
throughout the last year of the war. Gone was the dominance of these small agencies, 
operating under military authority and racing from target to target in a desperate pursuit of 
the next piece of valuable technical intelligence, with their main aim being to facilitate a 
swifter and safer end to the war against Germany. Their place had been taken by much 
larger and more interconnected organisations, with control and oversight in the hands of 
the civil service as opposed to military authorities, and thus subject to a greater number of 
regulations but also with access to a much larger pool of resources, including investigators 
drawn from very useful non-military backgrounds. Those responsible for this new phase of 
exploitation were not just looking towards the end of the war, but looking beyond it, and 
ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĨŝŶĚǁĂǇƐŶŽƚƚŽĐƵƌƚĂŝů ƚŚĞŝƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƚ ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
surrender, but to expand them. 
 This transitional period was also one of growth, both in terms of the scale of the 
endeavour and its objectives and in terms of the machinery necessary to execute it. It was 
during the last months of the war that T-Force began operating, and in so doing developed a 
skill set and strategic approach which would continue to facilitate the smooth running of 
exploitation missions throughout the post-war period, as well as providing an outline 
eagerly adopted by FIAT upon its inception in May 1945. CIOS too were able to formulate a 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀĞĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚĂůƐŽƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚ  Wit was no 
accident that BIOS appeared to be almost a carbon copy of its predecessor, excepting its 
exclusively British membership. Valuable though the operations in the formerly Nazi-
occupied territories undoubtedly were, it would be fair to surmise that the experience 
gained once the borders of the Reich were breached was especially instructive. Once the 
officials and investigators were able to visit facilities on German soil and speak to German 
staff, they were not only able to ascertain quite how rich and tantalising the scientific and 
technical spoils on offer were, but they were also able to refine the strategy to best exploit 
them. Overall, while exploitation was indubitably a product of the Second World War as a 
whole, counting the Bruneval Raid of 1942 and Alsos actions in Italy in 1943 among its 
antecedents, it was during the final year of the war, from D-Day to VE-Day, that it really 
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came of age and showed its true potential  W had it failed to do this by May 1945, there is a 
good chance that post-war exploitation proper would have failed to materialise. In short, 
the successes of the exploitation initiative during this crucial period, as evidenced by the 
CIOS statistics mentioned above, augured well for the next phase, which could take place 
with the benefit of experience, on a grander scale, and in the immensely preferable 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Exploitation in Earnest 
 
With the war over, the character of exploitation changed substantially. Speed was no longer 
of the essence to the extent which it had been before. The risk of targets being damaged by 
fighting or bombing, or sabotaged by Nazis, was greatly diminished, and even the potential 
for valuable material to be destroyed or removed by displaced persons or over-zealous 
Allied troops was gradually being lessened. Some semblance of order was being imposed by 
the occupying powers on Germany and this allowed exploitation to expand and become 
more thorough.292 With no risk of stumbling into open combat, the investigators could now 
be selected from a much wider pool  W they did not need to have any military connection, 
and civilian experts were now drawn wholesale from private industry and elsewhere. This of 
course necessitated a change in the exploitation machinery too: 30 Assault Unit, for 
instance, had been well suited to daring raids and frontline activity, but their gung-ho 
modus operandi ǁĂƐĚĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ŚĂƌĚůǇƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĨŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐĂƚĞĂŵŽĨŵŝĚĚůĞ-aged metallurgists 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƉůĂŝŶƐŽĨŶŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?293 The same was true of T-Force, which had been 
the forward combat echelon of the exploitation initiative during the war, but now began 
evolving into a logistics provider for the increasing numbers of investigators who were 
travelling from Britain to Germany.294 
 This greater volume of exploitation agents raised its own set of problems. It was not 
feasible that all these operatives, many of whom had different but overlapping remits, 
would be able to work in harmony. The sheer value of the scientific and technical spoils 
which were on offer in Germany at the end of the war meant that fierce competition was to 
be expected. In addition, exploitation was not the only mission for British and Allied 
occupation forces; the exploitation teams were joined in the field by a plethora of other 
investigators  W those looking into Nazi war crimes, the extent of bombing damage, or the 
ƐĂůǀĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĂŶĚ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ƚŽ ŶĂŵĞ ũƵƐƚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ? dŽ ĨƵůůǇ
understand exploitation, and particularly to appreciate the importance afforded it, viewing 
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its internal and external relationships is essential. In addition, it is also of great value to 
study the spoils which the exploitation teams were able to secure: what forms these took 
and which subjects they pertained to. Two of these subjects  W chemical warfare and 
rocketry  W were considered especially significant by the agents in the field, and thus warrant 
particular examination here. It is, therefore, the purpose of this chapter to study how 
exploitation was conducted in its most comprehensive phase; the months and years 
immediately following the capitulation, when Germany lay at the mercy of its Allied 
occupiers. 
 
The British Programme 
One of the first concerted exploitation efforts launched by the British after the end of the 
war was the Fedden Mission. Named for its leader, the eminent aircraft engineer Roy 
Fedden, this enterprise was established by the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) and 
travelled to Germany on 12 June 1945 for three weeks. It was tasked with investigating 
various aeronautical topics, including fuel injection, ignition for aero-engines, gas turbines, 
ũĞƚ ĞŶŐŝŶĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ƉŝƚĐŚ ƉƌŽƉĞůůĞƌƐ ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƐĐŽƵƌŝŶŐ  ‘universities, research 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ǁŽƌŬƐ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ  Q ƚŽ ĞĂƌŵĂƌŬ ƉůĂŶt, equipment, books, 
instruments etc., suitable for the new College of Aeronautics which is now being set up in 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ?dƌĂǀĞůůŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌƵŝŶƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƚŚĞŵ ŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞDŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚĞŶĨŽƵŶĚ
themselves without accommodation, telephone connections, or proper food, coming to rely 
very heavily on American K-rations, but they were impressed by the whole-hearted co-
operation of most of the German scientists and technicians whom they interviewed and by 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵƉĞƌĂďƵŶĚĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƚƌĂǀĂŐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚƌƵments and subsidiary tools and 
ĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂĐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚ ůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ ? ?295 The conclusion of the 
&ĞĚĚĞŶ DŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂů ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ǁŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞǇƐĂǁŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĨĞůƚ ‘ƌŝƚŝƐŚ industry will be well advised to learn all the 
ůĞƐƐŽŶƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŽƌŬ ? ?ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚŝŶŐďŽƚŚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
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interrogation of the relevant experts (though in Germany, alongside their materials, and not 
in Britain) and the evacuation of the more elaborate research equipment.296 
Despite its substantial successes, in many ways the Fedden Mission represented the 
last vestige of the opportunist, cavalier approach to exploitation, as the emphasis shifted 
from enterprising field-based units to the more considered work of committees back in 
Britain. Foremost among these in the post-war era was the newly-formed British 
Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, based in the same office in Bryanston Square, 
London, as its predecessor CIOS, and initially chaired by CIOS deputy chairman, Professor 
R.P. Linstead. In addition, it retained the same basic composition as the British half of CIOS, 
but also expanded it somewhat, so that it was made up of representatives from  ‘the 
Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Supply, the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the 
Department for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Government of the Dominion of 
ĂŶĂĚĂ ? ?297 
 The ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ƌĞŵŝƚ ŽĨ /K^ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚůĞ  ‘all requests of British Government 
departments for intelligence of military, political, industrial or economic significance which 
may be available in Germany and in European Countries lately under German occupation ? ?
compile target lists, liaise with organisations responsible for logistics, and, upon completion 
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ‘to arrange for the appropriate dissemination of the resulting information to 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?/K^ůĂƌŐĞůǇŵŝƌƌŽƌed the actions of CIOS, 
but now the approach was unilateral  W British investigators, working to British target lists, 
and preparing reports for British circulation. Nonetheless, careful liaison, and arrangements 
for mutual information exchange, with the Americans became another central function of 
BIOS.298 ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ĂŶ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
exploitation planning that other nations were pressing ahead and that, through delay or 
ƉŽŽƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚdamage our own interests while the other Allies were helping 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?299 
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 In order to enact a successful exploitation policy, which not only gathered the best 
information and material for the country as a whole but also ensured that it was fairly 
distributed among the various interested parties within Britain, perhaps the most important 
step was to establish a solid set of procedural guidelines for the investigators on the ground. 
Some of this was almost exclusively bureaucratic, including the three different officials (the 
BIOS Administrative Officer, Technical Liaison Officer and a member of the Economic 
Division of the CCG) that investigators had to report to upon arrival in Germany, but this was 
necessary on account of the sheer volume of visitors who arrived in, and travelled through, 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǌŽŶĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌŽƌƐŽĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ
perceived risk of unofficial individuals visiting German factories and obtaining technical 
intelligence for the exclusive benefit of themselves or their employers, which necessitated 
the repeated statement of the importance of possessing the right credentials and always 
obtaining permission to visit targets from the local Military Government detachment.300 
Indeed, the issue was significant enough to warrant Lieutenant-General Brian Robertson, 
the Deputy Military Governor of the British zone, sending a memo to the Trade and Industry 
Division (the agency responsible for the control and revival of German industry) warning 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘unauthorised visits are most undesirable, may lead to severe abuses and in any case 
ǁĂƐƚĞƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂĐƚŽƌǇDĂŶĂŐĞƌŽƌŚŝƐƐƚĂĨĨ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂsŝƐŝƚŽƌƐŽŽŬďĞ
made compulsory at all factories and similar sites.301  
 In general, although many of the investigators were sourced from private industry, 
during their time on BIOS trips they were considered to be official representatives of the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? KŶĐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ KĨĨŝĐŝĂů^ ĞĐƌĞƚƐ Đƚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽůĚ  ‘ǇŽƵ
become a temporary Government Servant and remain one until your final report is 
ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚǁĂƐŵĂĚĞĂďƵŶĚĂŶƚůǇĐůĞĂƌƚŽĂůůŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ P 
a) All information that you obtain, even if it is outside the actual scope of your 
investigation, is the property of HM Government and is a Government secret. You 
are bound to report it fully and accurately to the proper authority. Until your final 
report is published, you must not discuss this information with anyone who is not a 
Government Servant. 
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b) You are an official representative of Great Britain, wearing British Armed Forces 
uniform and you are regarded as such by our Allies and by the Germans. Consider 
carefully in this light everything you do and say. 
c) You are NOT permitted to conduct business of a private nature whilst you are in 
Germany. 
They were also cautioned on matters of security, not just their own, which was largely 
guaranteed by the significant British military presence anyway, but also that of the German 
citizens they encountered, who could possibly be at risk of reprisals by a handful of diehard 
Nazi fanatics who saw them as treacherous collaborators.302 Investigators were sternly 
ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ǁŝƚŚŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƵŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ
persons the names of German individuals or organisations which have co-operated with you 
ŽƌĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚǇŽƵŝŶĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ?303 
Another safeguard which was put in place came in the form of the limited scope of 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ‘/K^ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ůŝŵŝƚ ǇŽƵƌ
investigations to scientific and technical developments and do NOT cover current and future 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ? /Ŷ ƐŚŽƌƚ ? ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ďƵƚ
economic exploitation was not. However, other elements of the programme were far less 
restricted, for instance BIO^ƚĞĂŵƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ďǇŝŶƚĞƌ-Allied agreement any plant 
situated in Germany and in operation during the war is a legitimate target. It does not make 
ĂŶǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝĨŝƚŝƐƉĂƌƚůǇŽƌǁŚŽůůǇŽǁŶĞĚďǇĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?304 This is 
indicative of the difficulty which BIOS faced throughout the period, of wanting to ensure 
that no stone was left unturned and the maximum benefit was gleaned from their 
examinations of German science and industry, so that they were not left behind by their 
Allied rivals, while still ensuring that Germany did not suffer disproportionately as a result. 
Although the Black Lists were used as comprehensive guides of the targets which 
investigators should look into, the members of BIOS were aware that, as a result of the 
secrecy which characterised the Nazi regime, there would be many targets which they were 
not previously aware of which might be of immense value. As such, experts who had 
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travelled to Germany were allowed to rely on their own knowledge and instincts and make 
ƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇƚŽĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
part of the programme but it did generate its own set of problems, particularly in terms of 
opportunity targets in Berlin. Major Baukham of FIAT complained to T-Force in July 1946 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƋƵŝƚĞĂůŽƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŽŶƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐĐůĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƚŽĞƌůŝŶ ?ĚŽĂƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚũŽďŽĨ
sight-ƐĞĞŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŽƚŚĞƌƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?305 His complaints fell on 
deaf ears however; T-Force acknowledged the issue, saying that sight-seeing occurred not 
only in Berlin but in many other major cities and famous locations, but then was dismissive 
ŽĨĂŶǇĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĐƵƌƚĂŝůŝƚ P ‘/ƚŝƐĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂůůŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ?
movements would not only raise great administrative difficulties but would also cause 
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚƌĞƐĞŶƚŵĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĂůůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?306 
This exchange of correspondence, though somewhat petty in its subject matter, is 
actually indicative of another crucial facet of the exploitation initiative. While the experts 
were marshalled and prepared for their missions by BIOS in Britain, once they got to 
Germany, their interactions with the machinery for exploitation would have been primarily 
with FIAT and with T-Forces. These organisations were the workhorses of the project and 
there is no doubt that without them it could never have gone ahead, and certainly not on 
the scale which was eventually achieved.307 Exploring the relationships between BIOS 
investigators and the agencies which were responsible for facilitating their efforts reveals 
two interesting elements of the initiative as a whole: the first is the sheer enormity, 
complexity and diversity of the programme, which utilised a great multitude of committees, 
teams and special units, each with their own identity and terms of reference, and with their 
various interrelationships governed by careful and strict administration; and the second is 
the continuation of that fusion of the civilian and military spheres which had proved so 
essential during the war, and now allowed for the specialist knowledge of civil industry and 
science to be effectively paired with the unique logistical capabilities of the armed forces.308 
T-Force, initially the true spearhead of the exploitation programme, had numbered 
some 5,000 personnel at the time of the crossing of the Rhine, but was reduced to 3,000 in 
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November 1945. At this time, it also took on responsibility for handling reparations teams 
and British business owners visiting their properties in Germany, alongside its exploitation 
commitments, and by June 1946, oversight for its activities was switched from HQ, British 
Army of the Rhine, to the Control Commission for Germany (British Element).309 This was 
clearly representative of its shift from a direct military purpose to a more general logistical 
one, as was the unheeded suggestion by the Chief Administrative Officer that the name T-
Force be changed to Technical Travel Agency.310 Its duties ranged from provision of 
ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ? ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ?
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ŽŽƚǇ ? Žƌ ĂƐ  ‘ZĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?311 In information provided to BIOS 
investigators before they arrived in Germany, they were adviƐĞĚ ‘ƚŽ contact T-Force for all 
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝůĞŽƵƚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞ the general responsibilities of T-Force 
were elucidated as follows: 
T-Force arrange your clearance into the British zone, supply transport to your targets from 
limited resources, run a chain of messes from the Ruhr to Kiel, provide interpreters, escorts, 
fuel supplies en route, valuable intelligence re: targets, and arrange the evacuation of 
documents and equipment.312 
To give some sense of scope, T-Force operated 15 Transit Messes throughout the British 
zone and, in the period June 1945 to October 1946, they handled the visits of 6,084 BIOS 
investigators, as well as 1,400 Reparations/Restitution Teams, and facilitated visits to 7,300 
separate targets in total.313 
As the situation in Germany became more stable and the multiple threats which had 
abounded immediately after the end of the war subsided, the military nature of T-Force was 
called into question. The majority of targets which were being examined were peaceful 
industrial concerns and demobilisation across the British armed forces was the order of the 
ĚĂǇ ?/ƚǁĂƐĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ƚŚĂƚĂůůd-Force functions could efficiently be carried out 
ďǇĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚŽƐĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞĨĞůƚ ŝƚǁĂƐ  ‘ĚŽƵďƚĨƵů ŝĨǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞ
ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽƌĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĞǀĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
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surrounding the possibility of allowing British personnel to return home by replacing them 
with German citizens. Though this may have offered many benefits to the operation of T-
Force, security concerns, among other things, precluded it from going ahead.314 This 
distinguishes exploitation from other spheres of the occupation, where the British were 
quite content to hand over the day-to-day administration to German officials; a form of 
ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽůŽŶŝĂů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? Interestingly, when 
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ? ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨĨicials were 
ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝŶ ŵŽƐƚ ƐƉŚĞƌĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ďĞ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚĂĐƚ ?  W presumably a different approach to that 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌ ?ůĞƐƐ-developed colonies.315 In addition, for the British personnel 
working for T-Force, there was a certain sense of pride in the nature of their task. Michael 
Howard, who served as an Intelligence Officer with No. 1 T-Force in 1946-7, wrote home to 
ŚŝƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘this is the only unit in Germany which is not a liability to the taxpayer in 
that the consequences of the work have a considerable and direct bearing on our economic 
ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?dŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŚĞůƉŽŶĞĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŝƐĚŽŝŶŐĂŐŽŽĚũŽďŽĨǁŽƌŬ ? ?316 
Alongside T-Force, FIAT was the other element which helped to bear the burden of 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?Ɛ ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂů ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?tŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƉůŝƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ&/d
into its separate British and American components at the end of August 1945, FIAT (Br.) was 
placed under the administration of the British Control Commission, and its costs were to be 
ďŽƌŶĞŽŶƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?/ƚƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚƵƐ P 
The Field Information Agency, Technical (British) will coordinate, integrate and direct the 
activities of the various missions and agencies interested in examining, appraising and 
exploiting all information pertaining to German economy other than direct military 
intelligence. It will provide centralised information services and facilities covering this 
technical intelligence field. It will not, however, be responsible for final collation of such 
information or its exploitation.317 
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Although this set-up was adopted so as to provide the greatest possible assistance to BIOS 
investigators when navigating the difficulties of carrying out their work in the chaos of post-
war Germany, it did, as complicated bureaucratic structures so often do, generate almost as 
ŵĂŶǇƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂƐ ŝƚƐŽůǀĞĚ ?>ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ investigators 
for the British zone which had to be done ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ&/d ?ǁĂƐĐĂƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚĞůĂǇƐĂŶĚ
ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ?  ‘&/d ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƉĂƐƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐůĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ĚĂǇƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇ
cleared so many trips that RAF Transport Command could not cope with the requests for air 
ďŽŽŬŝŶŐƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĞǆĂĐĞƌbating the problem.318 
 Perhaps the greatest attribute which FIAT possessed was its role as an Anglo-
American co-ordinating body, the result of a hangover from its origins as a combined unit. 
Even after the two national elements were split, both retained their headquarters in the 
ƐĂŵĞ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ŝŶ &ƌĂŶŬĨƵƌƚ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ŽĨ  ‘closest co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? &/d ǁĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƵŶŝƚin the American zŽŶĞ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
goodwill which it had built up with the Americans (and FrenĐŚ )ǁĂƐ  ‘ŽĨ ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞǀĂůƵĞƚŽ
ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ DŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ? ?319 This was 
important as FIAT (US) was responsible for granting passes and permits for British 
investigators to visit targets in the American zone, where many sites of interest were 
located, and the arrangement was duly reciprocal. FIAT (Br.) was also the agency to which 
all British investigators had to report upon entering, and before leaving, the American zone. 
It helped to provide the facilities which T-Force offered in the British zone  W transport, 
accommodation, library access and the evacuation of documents or material, as long as 
clearance could be obtained from the Americans. In order to allow this positive relationship 
to continue, British experts visiting the American zone were sternly instructed to be on their 
best behaviour. In terms which some would have undoubtedly found condescending, they 
ǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚ P ‘ǇŽƵǁŝůůĨŝŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŐŽŽĚƚĞŵƉĞƌĂŶĚƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?320 
Nonetheless, as well as creating an administrative network to enable exploitation to 
run as smoothly as was possible for an operation with practically no established precedent, 
it was also the responsibility of the agencies involved to effect some degree of influence on 
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the general activities of the investigators on the ground. Many of these were civilians who 
had not seen active service during the war and were therefore unused to any form of 
military culture and who would find the British forces of occupation as unfamiliar to them as 
Germany itself. There were also a great number of them, travelling across the British zone 
and beyond, with very little central co-ordination, so rules were needed to maintain some 
semblance of general order. Furthermore, this was a period of relative diplomatic 
uncertainty, with Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union and Germany, among many others, all 
trying to find their place in the new world order. This added great fragility to the peace and 
there was always a risk that exploitation, a contentious issue from inception to termination, 
could jeopardise that peace. As a result, the restrictions that were imposed on the 
investigators, who could be considered the personification of this controversial enterprise, 
were often strict but in many cases were much the same as the general controls which 
applied to all British personnel in Germany during this period. 
 To start with, it was not a time of plenty and with such high numbers of British 
personnel heading over to Germany, the authorities could not be responsible for providing 
them with all the essentials during their trip. They were instructed to take with them sheets 
and a pillowcase (but not a blanket or bedroll), knife, fork and spoon, a water bottle, a 
torch, a towel and soap, as ǁĞůů ĂƐ  ‘ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ŽĨ ĐŝŐĂƌĞƚƚĞƐ ? ƌĂǌŽƌ ďůĂĚĞƐ ? ƐŚŽĞ-
cleaning material, soap (including laundry soap), toothpaste, chocolate etc. to last you for 
ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ƚƌŝƉ ? ? dŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĚǀŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶƚĞĞŶ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
zone and non-existent elsewhere.321 It became even more restrictive if they travelled to the 
FIAT mess at Höchst, near Frankfurt, in the American zone, where the standing orders 
dictated that visitors should provide their own blanket; they could be loaned one but if they 
ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƉƵƌůŽŝŶ ? ŝƚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵĂů ƌŵǇ ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ
ŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ? ?322 dŚĞƐĞƌƵůĞƐƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŚĞƌďƌƵƐƋƵĞ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŽƚŚŽƐĞĂƚd-Force HQ, and 
Major Hughes of that headquarters wrote to his counterpart at FIAT, to comment thaƚ ‘ůŝĨĞ
ƐĞĞŵƐǀĞƌǇ^ƉĂƌƚĂŶĂƚ,ƂĐŚƐƚ ? ?ďĞĨŽƌĞĂĚĚŝŶŐ ‘/ĂŵƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĨŝŶĚ^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐKƌĚĞƌƐ
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necessary. We used to have similar instructions to investigators in all our bedrooms and we 
found that they merely annoyed people unnecessarily and did very ůŝƚƚůĞŐŽŽĚ ? ?323 
 Although the restrictions on supplies available to investigators in Germany were 
necessary, they were open to a certain degree of interpretation on both sides. Another issue 
which proved very difficult to navigate for all concerned was that of non-fraternisation. The 
standard orders given to regular servicemen on this matter were clear; in the information 
booklet issued to all members of the British armed forces as they prepared to cross the 
Rhine in 1944, they were told, in no uncertain terŵƐ ?ƚŽ ‘ŬĞĞƉ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĂƚĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĞǀĞŶ
ƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚǁŚŽŵǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐ ? ?324 This was something that British troops found 
easier than the Americans, who had suffered no direct German attack on their homeland, 
but either way it was found to be unworkable in the long-term.
325
 By the end of September 
1945, all the official British non-fraternisation measures had been abolished, with the 
exception of marriage to German citizens and the billeting of troops in German homes. This 
marked a shift in favour of common sense policy as key occupation initiatives such as 
reconstruction and re-education could hardly go ahead if no civil contact was permitted 
between the British officials and the German people.326 This was particularly true in 
exploitation, where experts could often only elicit the best information through lengthy and 
in-depth conversations with their German counterparts, many of whom they knew on a 
personal level from before the war, having mixed in the same professional circles and even 
collaborated on some projects.327 
 Although with hindsight these numerous restrictions may appear to be cumbersome 
and inflexible, the programme of exploitation was a mammoth one and it was only through 
this meticulous preparation and careful governance that it was able to proceed at all. 
Studying the top-down policy is, therefore, essential to understanding exploitation but it 
does not present the complete picture; for that, it is important to examine how the process 
was viewed by those directly involved  W the men and women who served as investigators in 
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the field. Gilbert Hunter, of the coking firm Stewarts and Lloyds of Corby, travelled to 
Germany in January 1946 as a member of BIOS Trip 1539, tasked with investigating the 
German coking industry. He recognised from the ŽƵƚƐĞƚƚŚĂƚ ‘one cannot defeat the system, 
ƐŽ Ă ǁŝƐĞ ŵĂŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ůĞĂƌŶ ŝƚ ĂŶĚ ĂĚŽƉƚ ŝƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂƐ ŐŽŽĚ Ă ŐƌĂĐĞ ĂƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ? ,Ğ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ
consider this to be a problem though; he marvelled that after a mere half an hour in the 
office of Major Peterson at T-Force ,Y ? ‘ǁĞ ?ĚǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇŐŽƚƚŚĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ P  ‘,ĂƚƐ ŽĨĨ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƌŵǇ ĨŽƌ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ĨŝŶĞ ũŽď ŽĨ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?328 
 Monica Maurice, of the family-run Wolf Safety Lamp Company of Sheffield, who 
travelled to Germany on a BIOS trip in April-May 1947 to investigate German lamp 
manufacturers, was not quite as enamoured with the military organisational style and 
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞƌŵǇ ŝƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽŵŽǀĞ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŽƌĚĞĐŝĚĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƵŶůĞƐƐ ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
written down on a pŝĞĐĞ ŽĨ ƉĂƉĞƌ ? ? KŶĞ ĂƌĞĂ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
proved helpful was in terms of transport, which Ms Maurice noted was essential as without 
ŝƚ  ‘ŽŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŵŽǀĞĂƚĂůůĂƐŵĞƐƐĞƐĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŽƌŵŽƐƚůǇƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵŝůĞƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ,Y
or map-room oƌ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ĞůƐĞ ŽŶĞ ǁĂŶƚƐ ? ?329 Both Hunter and Maurice commended the 
transport and drivers which they were given  W ,ƵŶƚĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŝƐƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ,ƵŵďĞƌĐĂƌƐĂƐ
 ‘ĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞĂŶĚĐŽƐǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚƌŝǀĞƌƐĂƐ ‘ƋƵŝĞƚ ?ƌĞůŝĂďůĞĨĞůůŽǁƐ ? ?330 while Maurice and her 
companion formed such a bond with the driver of their brand new Austin 12 that they took 
it in turns to drive from Berlin to Hanover to let him rest up after drinking rather too much 
the night before.331 Eddie Aspden, however, who visited Germany to investigate engine 
factories in autumn 1945, described covering some 2,500 miles in five weeks, and how they 
ǁĞƌĞƐƉĞŶƚŵŽƐƚůǇŝŶ ‘ĂĐƵƚĞĚŝƐĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ ? ?332 
 To a certain extent, these differences in experience can be explained by the timing of 
the trips. Those who travelled to Germany in 1945, whether during the war or immediately 
after it, found resources short and comfort lacking but, by mid-1946, conditions had 
improved considerably and visiting experts tended to have a less miserable time of it, and 
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nowhere was this more clearly reflected than in comments on accommodation and 
provisions. When Lieutenant-Commander John Bradley was making his way through 
northern Germany in the last weeks of the war, he and his colleagues mostly slept in barns 
or out in the open, or would on oĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ  ‘ĐĂůŵůǇĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐ ?Ă ĨĂƌŵĞƌŽĨŚŝƐŚŽƵƐĞ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ǁĞŵĂǇĚƌŝŶŬŚŝƐƐĐŚŶĂƉƉƐĂŶĚƵƐĞŚŝƐƵƚĞŶƐŝůƐďƵƚǁĞĚŽŶŽƚĚŽƵƐĞůĞƐƐ
ƐŵĂƐŚŝŶŐ ? ?333 Matters were little improved five months later when Aspden and his team 
visited Nuremberg; acĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŚĂƌĚƚŽĐŽŵĞďǇ ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŚĂĚďĞŶĂůŵŽƐƚ
completely destroyed ? and they were only able ƚŽ ŽďƚĂŝŶ ŵĞĂůƐ  ‘ŝŶ Ă ƚƌĂŶƐŝĞŶƚ ŵĞƐƐ  Q
 ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŵĞĚŝŽĐƌĞ ? ?334 
 Within a further four months though, in February 1946, Gilbert Hunter felt it only fair 
ƚŽ ‘ĂĐĐŽƌĚd-&ŽƌĐĞĂǀĞƌǇŚĞĂƌƚǇǀŽƚĞŽĨƚŚĂŶŬƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
 ‘ƚŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨŚŽƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐŚŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚions were improved 
ďǇ ŚŝƐ ƚĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĚŝŶŝŶŐ Ăƚ sŝůůĂ ,ƺŐĞů ? ƚŚĞ  ? ? ?-room mansion near Essen, 
formerly the home of the Krupp family of industrialists and requisitioned after the war by 
the Allied North German Coal Control agency, of which he wrote this glowing review: 
Dinner was something to be remembered for many, many days to come and should be 
written down in capital letters  QdŚĞĚŝŶŶĞƌǁĂƐŐŽŽĚ ?ƚŚĞǁŝŶĞƐĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞƐŝůǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ
china, the glass, the napery, the room, the service, etc., etc. were all as nearly perfect as 
makes no matter, but the real attraction was the atmosphere which was so perfectly natural 
that one felt it might have been rehearsed many times.335 
In April 1947, Monica Maurice recorded visiting the Landeshaus Club in Düsseldorf which 
ǁĂƐĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŽŶƚƌŽůŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚƐŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘Ă
marvellous and beautifully furnished club with dining room, games room, lounge, and dance 
ĨůŽŽƌ ? ŽŶ Ă ĐŽƌŶĞƌ ŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝǀĞƌ ? ?336 This image of sophisticated socialising seems 
unrecognisable when placed alongside such earlier accounts of shortage, discomfort and 
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extreme improvisation, or against the privations and hardships suffered by most ordinary 
German citizens in this period.337 
 One element which all accounts seem to agree on, though one which contradicts 
wartime expectations for the experience of investigators on the ground, was the nature of 
their interactions with German citizens. Lieutenant-Commander Bradley dealt frequently 
with German naval perƐŽŶŶĞů ĂŶĚ ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ǁŝĨĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘/ ĂĚŵŝƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ĂŶĚ
ďĞĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚ/ƐŚŽƵůĚĨŝŶĚŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŚĂƚĞƚŚĞŵ ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ŚĞ
accurately predicted that non-fraternisation measures would prove futile and difficult to 
enforce.338 Maurice described the German individuals ƐŚĞ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ǁŝůůŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
ĂŶǆŝŽƵƐ ƚŽ ƚĂůŬ ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ƚŽ ƐŚŽǁ ƵƐ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ
ĞĂƐŝůǇĐŽĞƌĐĞĚ ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌƚǁŚŽǁĂƐ ‘ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇƉůĞĂƐĞĚƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
wŝƚŚ  ? ? ?ůď ĐŽĨĨĞĞ ? ?339 There were understandably some German people who resented the 
outcome of the war and the imposition of having investigators visit and root out their 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ? ďƵƚ ,ƵŶƚĞƌ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ĨĂƌ ĨƌŽŵ ŚĂƉƉǇ ? Ɛƚŝůů
 ‘ƌeceived us with dignity and as naturally as present circumstances (for them) could 
ƉĞƌŵŝƚ ? ?340 There were, of course, exceptions. Brigadier W.P.T. Roberts, who led a team to 
investigate a cartridge case factory in Karlsruhe in May 1945, described a Major-General he 
ŵĞƚ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ Ɛƚŝůů ƚŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ŚŝƐ EĂǌŝ ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝĞƐ ? ?341 Gilbert Hunter, 
meanwhile, looked upon lingering political loyalties with less sympathy, writing of a visit to a 
ŚǇĚƌŽŐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƉůĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽƵƌ ŐƵŝĚĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ƚǇƉŝĐĂů EĂǌŝ ĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇ ŽŶe of us would have 
ĞŶũŽǇĞĚŬŝĐŬŝŶŐŚŝŵŝŶƚŚĞƐůĂƚƐ ? ?342 
 Eddie Aspden had a generally negative impression of his time as an agent of 
exploitation, describing ŚŝƐ ƚŽƵƌ ĂƐ  ‘ŶĞƌǀĞ-ǁƌĂĐŬŝŶŐ ? ?  ‘ĂƌĚƵŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ĞǆĂĐƚŝŶŐ ? and requiring 
 ‘ŐƌĞĂƚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?and in an effoƌƚ ƚŽ ƐĂǀĞ ƚŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚǇ ? ? ŚĞ ĚŝĚ ŵĂŬĞ ƐŽŵĞ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵů ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ŚŽǁ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ
conducted in the future ? ŵŽƐƚ ŶŽƚĂďůǇ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝƚ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ ŽŶĞ ƐŵĂůů ƚĞĂŵ Žƌ Ă
number of small teams to make a series of concentrated investigations, each of not more 
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than three weeks or a month's duration, than for one team to be expected to make a 
ƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŵĂŶǇŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ?343 Such issues and suggestions were 
not just advanced by dissatisfied experts in the field, but also by the BIOS committee itself, 
which met fortnightly and expended a great deal of time trying to find ways to streamline 
and boost the efficiency of British exploitation. 
 Certainly, issues on proper briefing received frequent attention. Brigadier 
Pennycook, of T-Force HQ, who regularly attended BIOS meetings, gave a scathing 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ P ‘in many cases teams arrived without 
having seen the reports available in London and totally unfamiliar with the targets they 
ǁĞƌĞ ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞĚ ƚŽ ǀŝƐŝƚ Žƌ ĞǀĞŶ ǁŚǇ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ĐŽŵĞ ŽƵƚ Ăƚ Ăůů ? ?344 This in turn fed into 
another problem which was the saturation of teams and the increased pressure which this 
put on the limited resources available. Although Monica Maurice and Gilbert Hunter only 
had praise for the transport they used while in Germany, the bigger picture was one of 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƐĐĂƌĐŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŽŶůǇĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚŝŶďĂĚǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶ ‘ƚƌŝƉƐǁĞƌĞƚĂŬŝŶŐ
ĂŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨƚŚƌĞĞǁĞĞŬƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƚĞŶĚĂǇƐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ?A?ŽĨǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐǁĞƌĞŽĨĨƚŚĞƌŽĂĚĂƚĂŶǇ
one time for maintenance.345 In addition, some of the trips which were contributing to this 
congestion were  ‘ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇŶŽƚŽĨĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƉŽŶƐŽƌŝŶŐŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐ
 ‘ŶŽƚ ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ƐŚŽǁĞĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ /K^ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ? KĨƚĞŶ
these teams were larger than they needed to be (thus claiming unnecessary extra transport) 
and were revisiting targets which had already been completely exploited, causing a state of 
ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂůĂĐŬŽĨĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶĂŶĚŝŶ
the fiĞůĚ ? ?346 
 It is worth noting here that the Whitehall administrative structure to which BIOS was 
answerable did little to simplify matters. As has been shown, the origins of exploitation lay 
within the realms of espionage, and the initial responsibility for its co-ordination lay with the 
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.347 This arrangement was able to operate, without much 
imposed change, until the end of the war in Europe. However, during this immediate post-
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war period, it was monitored closely not only by the JIC but also by the Deputy Chiefs of 
Staff (DCOS), who were responsible for co-ordinating scientific and military co-operation, 
and for whom exploitation became one of the most frequently discussed subjects at their 
fortnightly meetings. In the summer of 1945, questions began to be asked as to whether the 
JIC was still the body which should have main control over exploitation activities. In July, it 
was suggested that BIOS was no longer a conventional intelligence operation and should 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ  ?ŝƚƐ ? ǁŚŽůĞ ĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞ ? ĨƌŽŵ :/ ƚŽ K^ ? ǁŚŝůĞ Ɛƚŝůů ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ
input from the former.348 In September, responding to the belief that future BIOS work 
ǁŽƵůĚ ůŝŬĞůǇ ďĞ  ‘ŽĨ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ǀĂůƵĞ ƚŽ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? EŽƌŵĂŶ ŽƚƚŽŵůĞǇ ? ƚŚĞ
Deputy Chief of Air Staff, suggested that BIOS be responsible to the DCOS committee on 
technical military matters, the JIC on intelligence matters, and the Board of Trade on 
industrial matters.349 One year later, responsibility for BIOS was fully transferred to the 
Board of Trade, with the exception of a few issues in which the DCOS committee would have 
a particular interest.350 As this shows, exploitation was not closeted away in some obscure 
corner of Whitehall bureaucracy, but was rather open to observation and interference by 
numerous governmental parties. 
 The picture that official documents, personal accounts and the minutes of BIOS 
meetings present is undeniably a mixed one. While a huge amount of preparation and 
administration was entailed in executing the exploitation initiative, it was not always 
necessary; on some occasions, it was not sufficient to overcome difficulties incurred by 
paucity of resources or poor conduct by the ministries and departments involved, and on 
others, it created problems of its own by being inflexible and unrealistic. One thing that is 
certainly clear is that British exploitation was not a linear process under the jurisdiction of a 
single organisation, but rather the product of myriad agencies and departments working in 
varying degrees of co-operation and competition, both on the ground and in London. Even 
though all these elements were striving towards roughly the same aim  W to attain the 
greatest spoils of German science and technology for the betterment of Great Britain  W their 
relationships were not always smooth. To fully understand the process of exploitation, 
therefore, it is necessary to examine the interactions which the various representatives of 
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the exploitation initiative had with each other and with agencies pursuing different aims, 
whether they were of British or foreign origin, in the field in Germany. 
 
Competition and Co-operation 
As has been discussed, the situation in post-war Germany was chaotic, with numerous 
military and civilian organisations all striving to contribute towards creating the best 
possible post-war world  W some were concerned with gathering evidence of war crimes, 
others wished to assess the merits of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, while others 
ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ? ,Žǁ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ
operations related to the exploitation programme is critical to understanding the context 
within which exploitation took place where, on the ground in Germany, there were 
countless occasions of logistical limitation and shortage of resources, prompting either 
competition or co-operation among the agents in the field. In many cases, the actions taken 
by these units and individuals had to be carried out with great speed in response to rapidly 
changing circumstances and thus had very little recourse to official policy as dictated from 
above. In short, the departmental line was often incompatible with the pragmatism 
necessary on the ground. 
 The first example of true competition emerged in the dying months of the war when 
the earliest exploitation teams were racing across Europe, trying to keep up with the 
advancing Allied armies, desperate to be the first to seize the most valuable scientific and 
technical targets. One CIOS ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚŽƚŚĞƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐ ‘ƐĞŵŝ-piratical 
ĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨǁŚŝĐŚďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ǁŝƚĐŚĞƐ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ  ‘ƚŚĞǇĨůĞǁŽǀĞƌ
ŽƵƌŚĞĂĚƐŽŶďƌŽŽŵƐƚŝĐŬƐ ? ?351 Elsewhere, the Economic Sections of SHAEF complained that 
Ministry of Supply parties were causing confusion by gathering economic intelligence which 
did not fall under their remit, and this then had to be referred to CIOS for adjudication.352 
The confusion worsened once individual countries began sending their own unilateral 
expeditions to Europe too  W in February 1945, Colonel Geoffrey Vickers of the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare ǁĂƌŶĞĚ ŚŝƐ ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ  ?, ? EŽƚŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘Ă ŶĞǁ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĐĂůůĞĚ  “dŚĞ h^
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dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů DŝƐƐŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ǁŚŝĐŚůŽŽŬĞĚ ĂƐ ŝĨ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ŬŶŝŐŚƚĞƌƌĂŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ/K^ĨŝĞůĚ ? ?sŝĐŬĞƌƐŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŶĞǁ
mission could somehow be absorbed into the existing CIOS machinery.353 In fact, Vickers 
may well have been referring to the US Technical Oil Mission which was already active in 
Germany and was responsible to both CIOS and the American Technical Industrial 
Intelligence Committee (TIIC).354 
In many cases, it seemed that the exploitation agencies active in late 1944 and early 
1945 were more concerned with keeping their activities secret from one another than they 
were with securing the best spoils of Nazi Germany.355 As time passed, the number of 
different organisations involved increased exponentially and by 1946, British FIAT recorded 
that there were 52 other agencies with which they had to liaise in the course of their regular 
operations.356 However, many of these other units were tasked, at least in part, with 
rendering assistance to the larger organs of the exploitation machinery. The Scientific 
Intelligence Advisory Service (SIAS), for instance, was established under G- ?^,&ƚŽ ‘find 
out, or to create opportunities for others to find out, what scientific discoveries of 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞǇďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽƵůĚŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďǇďĞŝŶŐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽŚĂŶĚůĞ ‘ƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŽĨ
the procurement of German scientific intelligence which necessitates lengthy contact 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶĂŶĚůůŝĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐŽĨĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?357 
However, in some cases, bureaucratic clutter meant that the utilisation of these 
supplementary services did not run at maximum efficiency. For example, the German 
Economic Department, part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, which was in possession 
ŽĨ  ‘Ă ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ ďŽĚǇ ŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ŝƚƐ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĂƚĞ ŽĨ
production and technical developmenƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂďůĞ ƐƚĂĨĨĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ
consultation,358 ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ ‘far too many agencies making demands upon 
ƚŚĞŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƵŶŝĨŽƌŵ ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ďĞ ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁ ƚŚĞŵ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞĂů ŵŽƌĞ
                                                             
353
 Ibid., Col. C.G. Vickers to C.H. Noton, 19 February 1945. 
354
 AƌŶŽůĚ <ƌĂŵŵĞƌ ?  ‘dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ dƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ĂƐ tĂƌ ŽŽƚǇ P dŚĞ h^ dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů Kŝů DŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
Technology and Culture, 22 (1981), 68-103. 
355
 Hogg, German Secret Weapons, 11. 
356
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘>ŝƐƚŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
357
 TNA, FO 1031/51,  ‘Scientific Intelligence Advisory Section of G-2 ^,& ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? 
358
 TNA, FO 1031/51,  ‘Facilities Offered to BIO^ďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 115 - 
 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝůǇ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽƵƐůǇ ?with these demands.359 Similarly, the Inter-Services 
Topographical Department (ISTD), which, as its name suggests, supplied topographical 
intelligence to all branches of the British armed forces and which felt it had much of value to 
offer to CIOS and others, complained of being: 
insulated from all knowledge of, or contact with, the working parties and their chairmen. 
This insulation was carried to the degree that, not only were we forbidden all contact except 
via SHAEF (and this channel did not work), but we knew none of the personnel who, it was 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ?ǁĞƌĞĂůů ‘ŐƌĞǇďĞĂƌĚƐ ? ?360 
Here, though the will for co-operation was present, the lack of adequate means by which to 
facilitate it meant that much progress was hindered. Lessons were certainly learnt from this 
chaotic arrangement and led, in many ways, to the formation of the Joint Intelligence 
Bureau in 1948  W this office, part of the Ministry of Defence, was responsible for co-
ordinating economic, scientific, industrial and atomic intelligence throughout the early Cold 
War, and even incorporated some existing agencies, such as the ISTD, to ensure smooth, 
well-informed operations.361 
 Once the war ended, so too did the most urgent phase of the race for the spoils. 
Now, with all of Germany open to exploitation, it was no longer a case of which agency 
could reach a certain target first, but rather which could cover the most targets at any one 
time; the most valuable attribute was no longer speed, but rather scale. This in turn meant 
that logistical concerns now came to the fore and opened up new fertile territory for both 
competition and co-operation. CIOS and its successor agencies, with their ability to 
command the support of troops, transport and storage facilities, became the gatekeepers 
for any civilian agency wishing to conduct exploitation in Germany, even for entities as 
powerful as the Foreign Office or the US State Department.362 On the ground itself, similar 
roles were fulfilled by FIAT and the T-Forces. 
 As the post-war period wore on and the number of agencies active in Germany grew 
to unprecedented levels, the scope for competition increased exponentially. One group 
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which proved especially problematic was the Monuments, Fine Art and Archives (MFAA) 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?EŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘DŽŶƵŵĞŶƚƐDĞŶ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐation was one of the more unusual 
operating in this period; led by a motley band of archaeologists, art historians and museum 
curators, they were tasked with protecting the cultural and architectural treasures of 
Europe from damage during the fighting, as well as being responsible for the restitution of 
works or art or other precious possessions which had been stolen by the Nazis or hidden for 
safekeeping.363 As their remit included archives, those exploitation investigators who were 
seeking valuable documents on German science and technology were often brought into 
contact with MFAA officials. No top-down policy as to how the two operations should 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚ ǁĂƐ ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘precise limits of responsibility 
between the two will ďĞ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ďǇ  Q ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ  ?ĨƌŽŵ ďŽƚŚ ƐŝĚĞƐ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůĞǀĞů ? ?364 This was a clear example of how a pragmatic approach by the men on 
the ground was considered to be the best way to ensure healthy relations between 
concurrent programmes. In fact, it could even lead to positive collaboration, as the specialist 
D& ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ  ‘advice and assistance on all technical matters concerning German 
ĂƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚ be of great use to the uninitiated exploitation investigators who were 
seeking specific documents.365 
 More significant problems arose when departments in Britain dispatched teams to 
Germany outside of the proper BIOS channels. Here there was a great risk of duplication or 
ƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶĐǇŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛssistant 
Directorate for Intelligence (Science), under the leadership of R.V. Jones, sent its own 
investigators to continental Europe two days after D-Day. Jones proudly recalled how these 
men were enthusiastic enough to often be ahead of the frontline troops, and were soon 
sending back a steady stream of information, documents and equipment. He notes that 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŝŶĚĞĞĚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐďĞƐŝĚĞƐŽƵƌƐ ?ďƵƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞĐŽƌĚĂŶǇĐůĂƐŚĞƐŽƌ
conflicts of interest.366 What does become apparent, however, is that the left hand did not 
always know what the right was doing. In an Air Ministry report from October 1945, it notes 
that many prominent German atomic scientists, including Professors Hain (misspelt  W Hahn) 
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and von Lane (again misspelt  W ǀŽŶ>ĂƵĞ )ĂƌĞ ‘ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽďĞŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ ? ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĞǇ
were being held at Farm Hall, just outside Cambridge, a fact which was known by ordinary 
members of the public but that had apparently eluded the Air Ministry. In the same report, 
they also assert that the SoviĞƚhŶŝŽŶŝƐ ‘ďǇŶŽŵĞĂŶƐĂďĂĚĨŽƵƌƚŚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĂĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƉŽŝůƐ
of Germany which, even by this stage, was a gross miscalculation.367 
 Similarly, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) also dispatched 
its own experts to Germany at this time in order to procure laboratory equipment, such as 
microscopes, centrifuges and x-ray sets, for research establishments and private industry in 
Britain, despite the Board of Trade and Research Branch both insisting that such removals 
could only be carried out legitimately through the existing BIOS channels.368 These two 
examples barely scratch the surface of the true range of different exploitation programmes 
which coexisted in this period. By late 1947, often in conjunction with British authorities, the 
US Army was operating six different projects, through military intelligence channels, to tap 
the talents of German specialists, and the focus was not just on scientific and technical 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘WĂũĂŵĂƐ ?ǁĂƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƚƌĞŶĚƐ ?  ‘ŝƌĐŚǁŽŽĚ ?
ǁŝƚŚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?  ‘ǁŝŶĚůĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĐƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŽĚĞďƌ ĂŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ  ‘WĂŶŚĂŶĚůĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ
operational military expertise.369 Countless agencies roamed through Germany, determined 
ƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƵƐĞĨƵůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƐŽƵrces for their own 
benefit. 
 Teams working on utilisation ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞ
only other investigators that scientific and technical exploitation units encountered in the 
field. Another major operation which was undertaken at this time was designed to uncover 
the impact of Allied bombing on Germany, and to try and ascertain which techniques were 
the most successful in order to prepare the air forces of Britain and America for any future 
war. After all, the Second World War was the first conflict to employ strategic bombing on 
this enormous scale and both the RAF and USAAF were convinced that the next war would 
do much the same, but to an even greater extent.370 In order to conduct effective 
                                                             
367
 TNA, AIR 20/1715,  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
368
 TNA, FO 942/425, C.F.C. Spedding to C.A. Spencer, 29 March 1946. 
369
 Simpson, Blowback, 73. 
370
 Overy, Bombing War. See also Süss, Death from the Skies; Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A History 
of Bomber Command (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). 
- 118 - 
 
assessments of their bombing efforts, both Britain and America created investigative 
agencies, which were tasked with sending teams to Germany and compiling reports of their 
findings; respectively, these were the British Bombing Research Mission (BBRM; later also 
the BBSU  W British Bombing Survey Unit) and the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS).371 
 Both these enterprises soon discovered how important it was to be the first on the 
scene, in order to secure valuable documents before they were seized by another party; an 
endeavour in which they actually benefited from their small size, as they went unnoticed 
ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇďĞŶƚƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞĚ ŝŶ  ‘ƐůŝƉƉŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŶĞƚŽĨƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
which was in place as the war ended.372 The British especially lacked the manpower to send 
multiple teams out into the field so instead hoped that collaboration would offset the 
problems of other agencies reaching key sites first. They hoped to work closely with CIOS, 
perhaps even to the extent where they would be able to attach an operative of their own to 
a CIOS team, thus facilitating a sharing of expertise.373 They also liaised with FIAT to ensure 
that relevant German individuals would be relocated from the Dustbin detention centre at 
Schloss Kransberg to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre at Bad Nenndorf 
when only the BBRM retained an interest in them.374 There was also international co-
operation, with the BBRM utilising a lot of the data collected by the USSBS, which had the 
downside of leading to the British drawing many of the same conclusions as the Americans, 
despite the fact that the strategies of the RAF and USAAF had differed notably during the 
war.375 It is also worth noting that Britain was largely disinterested in the results of their 
bombing survey and swiftly swept it under the carpet after publication, fearing that it might 
ŚĂƌŵ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŚĞĂƌƚƐĂŶĚŵŝŶĚƐ ? ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚĚƌĂǁƵŶĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ
with the very war crimes which they were planning to prosecute senior Nazis for.376 
 In short, the relationship between the scientific and technical exploitation 
programmes and the bombing research missions was competitive in the gathering of data 
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but far more co-operative in sharing the results. In many ways, the two operations were 
complementary  W in March 1945, the Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal wrote about the 
links between evaluation of bombing campaigns and the evolution of future strategy, noting 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚŶĞǁǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŵƵƐƚďĞŐƵŝĚĞĚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐŽĨ
such doctrine; theǇĚŽŶŽƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞ ŝƚ ? ?377 In a way, the bombing assessments 
ĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚƚĂŬĞƉůĂĐĞĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚĨĞĞĚ
into, the scientific and technical exploitation which was occurring simultaneously. Certainly, 
their methods were not altogether different. In June and July 1945, while British weapons 
technology experts were test-firing V-2 rockets off the North Sea coast of Germany under 
the auspices of Operation Backfire, bombing specialists were conducting Operation Post 
Mortem which was designed to observe how the German authorities responded to an 
incoming bomber raid, partly to observe the German techniques and partly to judge how 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĞZ& ?ƐƌĂĚŝŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞ ?378 
 An area where a clash, or even a conflict of interests, was more likely was between 
exploitation and the quest for post-war justice, specifically the prosecution of war crimes or 
the newly-designated crimes against humanity. During the war, as word of the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis filtered back to Britain, it became clear that bringing the 
perpetrators to justice would have to be a main priority of the post-war period and in 
OctoďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?ŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐƌŝŵĞƐŵƵƐƚŚĞŶĐeforth take its 
ƉůĂĐĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?379 This was in itself a British commitment to an 
earlier declaration, signed in January by representatives of nine European governments-in-
exile in London, which both condemned Nazi atrocities and asserted that justice would be 
sought with determination ĂƚǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚ ?380 The best-known manifestation of this was the 
International Military Tribunal, held in Nuremberg, which began in November 1945 and 
ƚƌŝĞĚ  ? ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚǁhich was conducted jointly by all 
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four occupying powers.381 After this, the Americans conducted further war crimes trials at 
Nuremberg, dealing with senior figures from various sections of Nazi society, such as 
doctors, lawyers and industrialists.382 Meanwhile, the bulk of the other trials were held on a 
ƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ďĂƐŝƐ ? ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚ ƚŽ ĞĂĐŚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ǌŽŶĞ ŽĨ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ (and often to 
specific concentration camps, such as Bergen-Belsen or Ravensbrück) ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶ
this respect was inconsistent and beset by numerous difficulties throughout the immediate 
post-war period.383 
Perhaps foremost among these difficulties were problems in gathering evidence and 
detaining the accused individuals, and this presented fertile ground for a conflict of interests 
with the concomitant exploitation initiative. This was particularly true in the field of 
medicine, where the Nazis had often relied on brutal human experimentation in the pursuit 
of progress  W means which were rarely, if ever, justified by the ends.384 Some historians 
have claimed that the Allies faced a stark choice in this matter, between exploiting German 
know-how and prosecuting its criminality, and there is some evidence to that effect.385 At a 
meeting of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in September 1945, it was stated that  ‘tĂƌ
ƌŝŵĞƐƚƌŝĂůƐŚĂĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ QĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽƐƐŽĨ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ? ? Z ? ? ůǇĚĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ tĂƌ ƌŝŵĞƐ
Executive, responded to this with surprise ? ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂĚ  ‘ĂůǁĂǇƐ
considered the preparation of cases against war criminals to be of secondary importance to 
ŽƵƌ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?386 Indeed, certain German individuals attempted to take 
advantage of these potentially contradictory aims  W for instance, Albert Speer, Nazi Minister 
of Armaments and War Production, bombarded his interrogators with scientific details and 
industrial statistics, which he knew were of immediate interest to them, in order to divert 
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them away from more troublesome topics, such as his culpability in cases of slave labour 
and concentration camp atrocities.387 On the whole, however, the situation was somewhat 
more nuanced. Any notion of a conflict of interest is only really apparent in retrospective 
analysis and would not have appeared as such to the agents on the ground.388 The two 
initiatives coexisted but co-operation was more likely than competition in most cases. 
 This was mostly a result of the individuals involved in exploitation who, being moral 
human beings first and foremost, were incensed by the horrors of which they found 
evidence during their investigations. Leo Alexander, an Austrian-Jewish doctor who 
emigrated to the USA in 1933 and would later become a senior medical adviser to the Nazi 
ŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? dƌŝĂů Ăƚ EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ďĞŐĂŶ ŚŝƐ ƉŽƐƚ-war career as a CIOS investigator, 
tasked with examining German aviation medicine.
389
 In several of his official CIOS reports, 
which were always supposed to be objective and factual, Alexander criticises the inhumanity 
ŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŽŶĞƐĞƚĂƐ ‘ĂĐĂůůŽƵƐǁĂƐƚĞŽĨƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨ
ŚƵŵĂŶ ůŝǀĞƐ ? ?390 In another, he unequivocally recommended that the German doctors 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇďĞƚƌŝĞĚĂƐǁĂƌĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƌĐĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚƐŽŶŚƵŵĂŶ
ďĞŝŶŐƐ ? ? ĐŝƚŝŶŐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ŝŶĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶ Ĩ ƉĂŝŶ ? ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĂƚŚ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
subjects but also the fact that the results added nothing new to what had been learnt from 
previous animal experiments.391 Elsewhere, when Ministry of Supply investigators 
encountered Otto Ambros, the IG Farben nerve agent specialist who was accused of 
authorising cruel human experiments and overseeing slave labour at Auschwitz, they 
 ‘ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚĂĚǀĞƌƐĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŵĂŶǁŚŽŝƐƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĞĚ
ŽĨǁĂƌĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?392 
 It was not just morally indignant individuals who created the links between 
exploitation and war crimes investigation; there were also connections made via unofficial 
networks operating through official channels. For example, on 15 May 1946, Brigadier R.J. 
Maunsell, the chief of FIAT, chaired a meeting, consisting of nine Brits, four Americans and 
                                                             
387
 Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (London: Picador, 1996), 552. 
388
 Schmidt, Justice at Nuremberg, 111. 
389
 On Leo Alexander, see Schmidt, Justice at Nuremberg. 
390
 IWM, CIOS Report XXVI-37,  ‘The Treatment of Shock from Prolonged Exposure to Cold, Especially in Water ? ? 
391
 IWM, CIOS Report XXIX- ? ? ?  ‘DŝƐĐĞůůĂŶĞŽƵƐ ǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ DĞĚŝĐĂů DĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? ?  ? ? ƵŐƵƐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? WƌŽĐƚŽƌ ?  ‘EĂǌŝ
ŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? 
392
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WŽŝƐŽŶŐĂƐ PŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 122 - 
 
two Frenchmen, the purpose of which was to establish a policy for exploitation staff to 
handle any material pertaining to war crimes.393 In his opening statement, Maunsell 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ǁŽƌŬ ?&/d ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ  ‘ŚĂĚ ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚed some 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůǁŚŝĐŚďŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚ&/d
 ‘ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƐŝŶĐĞ ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚŶŽ
investigational organisation of this character was available within F/d ? ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ŚĞƉůĞĚŐĞĚ
that all possible assistance would be rendered by FIAT to the war crimes agencies, including 
the loaning of scientific experts to aid legal investigators and interrogators.394 This was 
especially essential as the organisations created to investigate war crimes were often short-
staffed and under-resourced, particularly when compared to the well-equipped behemoth 
of exploitation, and is yet another example of co-operation and collaboration trumping any 
competitive urge.395 
 In all, the relations which the exploitation agencies had with other organisations 
operating in Germany at the same time were mixed. Initially they followed an instinct of 
competition, which was reflected on an international scale too, driven by the desperation to 
secuƌĞƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨŝŶŝƚĞŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ
material) for themselves. As time passed however, it became clear that their interests were 
best served by co-operation, not least because they shared a common purpose  W ensuring 
Germany never again posed a threat to world peace  W and later, a common enemy  W the 
Soviet Union. This co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ?ŝŶŵĂŶǇǁĂǇƐ ?ƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?Ɛ
procedural successes as it allowed for a sharing of scarce resources and access to expertise 
in a very broad range of fields. Nonetheless, it is neither appropriate nor effective to judge 
exploitation on the merit of its procedure and implementation alone; a much more relevant 
assessment can only be achieved by considering the fruits of its labours, in the various forms 
which these took. 
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The Spoils of War 
Alongside the German scientists and technicians who were detained, interrogated and in 
some cases recruited by the British during this period,
396
 the scientific and technological 
spoils of war came in several different manifestations. Firstly, there were documents and 
archives which, once discovered in their often secretive locations in Germany, were shipped 
to Britain for comprehensive analysis and assessment. Secondly, equipment and materiel 
were also transported back, either to fill shortages from which post-war Britain was 
suffering, as in the case of machine tools, or to be deconstructed and studied to reveal their 
technological secrets, as in the case of V-2 rockets or nerve gas shells. Thirdly, the final 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞǀĞƌǇ /K^ ĂŶĚ /K^ ƚĞĂŵ ǁĂƐ ƚŽůĚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂů ŽďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ǇŽƵƌ ƚƌŝƉ ? to 
Germany, were compiled upon their return and all those on non-military topics were then 
mass-produced, thus becoming widely available to the public and to private industry across 
the country.397 Those concerning more sensitive topics, especially new methods of warfare 
and the science and technology involved therein, were, in line with official Anglo-American 
polŝĐǇĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ‘dŽƉ^ĞĐƌĞƚ ? ?398 Finally, there was something of a reverse in 
flow in the exploitation process. For a number of reasons, the focus changed from bringing 
materials and intelligence back to Britain, and instead, with the increased stability which 
had been achieved in occupied Germany, it became more common to facilitate the visits of 
all manner of private individuals to German factories, laboratories and other sites of 
interest, and to transform this process from one of intensive government oversight to a 
more widely-ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ‘ƚŽƵƌŝƐŵ ? ?
 Arguably, documents and archives were some of the most important prizes of 
exploitation. The bulk of those brought over to Britain were handled at the Halstead 
Exploiting Centre, near Sevenoaks in Kent, where a number of German POWs and civilians 
were engaged in translation.399 Once translated, these documents could provide clear and 
comprehensive information on anything from industrial processes to records of 
development and experimentation and, especially if accompanied by blueprints or technical 
drawings, could allow British laboratories or businesses to very quickly replicate German 
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ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ ‘a considerable intrinsic value. At the 
least this may be the cost of raw materials and man hours, but in actual value the cost 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌ ? ?400 As such, it was considered desirable to implement a clear policy 
on them as soon as post-war exploitation got underway. In September 1945, the British 
Element of the Control Council issued Intelligence Directive No.  ? ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘The Handling of 
'ĞƌŵĂŶŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƌĐŚŝǀĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽ P 
 QĞŶƐƵƌĞ the opportunity of access by all exploiting agencies to such German documents as 
are essential to their researches and to prevent the researches of one agency from impeding 
those of another; and to provide means for the collection and dissemination of information 
concerning the location, movement and content of German documents and archives. 
What this meant in practice was the establishment of Documents Centres at the 
headquarters of the British Army of the Rhine and in each of its Corps Districts, which were 
to be responsible for the protection of the files, the maintenance of a register of 
information on all of the files and the circulation of this register to all interested bodies.401 
Unfortunately, as the staffing of these Documents Centres was mostly provided by ordinary 
T-Force personnel, proper archival procedure was not always followed and archivists often 
had to explain in exasperation that if finding aids were lost or destroyed, a professional 
organised archive lost the great majority of its value.402 
 There was another major problem with this scheme; arising, as was so prevalent in 
all facets of exploitation, as a result of the multitude of agencies co-existing and thus 
competing for access to the most valuable documents. As well as the Documents Centres 
operating under the aegis of BAOR, there were also Enemy Documents Units, which were 
co-ordinated by the JIC. Furthermore, in August 1945, BIOS established the  ‘ŶĞŵǇtĂƌƚŝŵĞ
WƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ZĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ) ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚƌĞǁ ŝƚƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĨƌŽŵ organisations 
such as the Association of Special Libraries and Information Bureaux, the Royal Society, and 
the Committee of University Vice-Chancellors, and was tasked with managing all 
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ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌ ‘ĞŶĞŵǇǁĂƌƚŝŵĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂŶĚĂƌƚƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
then co-ordinating their procurement and distribution, as appropriate.403 
Evacuation of documents from the British zone back to Britain itself also became a 
highly contentious issue. In December 1945, the Economic Division released a memo which 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘sufficient emphasis is not given to the commercial value of technical drawings 
ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞ ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ
similar items, and that as a result they were being removed without regaƌĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ
ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ? ?404 There were also considerable delays in making documents accessible to 
interested parties in Britain, as a result of a number of factors, including investigators not 
following instructions, the necessity of relying on sea transport to evacuate files and the lack 
of any kind of reproduction service operated by the British (there was a German service but 
it was perpetually short on supplies).405 All of this was being discussed and debated at the 
same time as pressure was mounting to destroy large numbers of documents and drawings 
ĂƐƚŚĞƚĞĂŵƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŚĂĚ ‘ŶŽƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŶŽƌƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨ ?ƚŽĂƐƐĞƐƐƚŚĞŵĂůů ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞ
ǁĞƌĞǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ďǇƐŽĚŽŝŶŐǁĞŵĂǇŵŝƐƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƵƐĞĨƵů ? ?406 
The procedure for seizure and evacuation of equipment was equally beset by 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ĞŵĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ŚŝŐŚ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ĞƋƵŝƉƉŝŶŐ defence 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? Žƌ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ? ŵŽƐƚ
notably by the fact that it had to be accounted for in terms of the total reparations which 
Britain was allowed to claim.407 Moreover, if equipment was removed from a target by one 
team, it could substantially prejudice the investigations of another team, if they were to visit 
that same target subsequently.408 This of course took on an additional degree of complexity 
if the desired equipment was located in the American zone where, unless it was considered 
 ‘ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ǁĂǇ ŽĨ ŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ďǇ ǁĂǇŽĨ Ă  ‘ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ? ?409 It is 
worth noting also that this was not a small-scale issue  W by the end of 1946, T-Force 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽŶƐŽĨĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŚŝƉƉĞĚƚŽƚŚĞh<ƐŝŶĐĞ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂ
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ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĞĂƌŵĂƌŬĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂƌĞ ĂǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƐŚŝƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? dŚĞ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ
equipment this included varied from tanks and major machine tools to delicate scientific 
apparatus and optical instruments.410 
Even in the light of these figures, it is still fair to surmise that the main product of 
exploitation was always expected to be a sizeable catalogue of Final Reports covering every 
topic of scientific, technological or industrial interest in Germany which would allow Britain 
to ensure it was as up to date as possible on these subjects. Investigators were told in no 
ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǇŽƵŐĂŝŶ ŝƐǀĂůƵeless unless it is fully and clearly set 
ŽƵƚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ŚĂǀĞ Ă ǁŝĚĞ ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ h< ? h^ ? &ƌĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ůůŝĞĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?411 Certainly the dissemination was 
ample but the quality and value of the reports themselves did not always meet high 
standards. While there was inevitably a moderate probability that some reports would 
contain information of nothing novel, they were also criticised, including by senior trade 
association figures, for being poorly written, very limited on detail and impossible to follow 
up; ultimately a very poor testament to the huge effort expended on such comprehensive 
exploitation.412 
/Ĩ ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŝt is 
really no wonder that the form which exploitation took shifted so as to represent a reversed 
flow. As well as general dissatisfaction with the quality of the Final Reports, there are 
several other reasons why facilitating the travel to Germany of private individuals became 
the most viable way for exploitation to continue after the initial post-war rush. As 
mentioned above, documents and blueprints were far too numerous and labour-intensive 
to be effectively utilised, and all equipment which was shipped to Britain had to be 
deducted from the national reparations allowance, which was obviously both finite and 
highly dependent on problematic assessments of value. Moreover the removals of any form 
of physical material began to be wound down from mid-1947, as part of multilateral 
international agreements, though the British found loopholes to continue this to some 
extent, in contradiction of announced policy.413 In November 1947, the BIOS Secretariat was 
                                                             
410
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨd-&ŽƌĐĞ PZĞƉŽƌƚEŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
411
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĚǀĂŶĐĞEŽƚĞƐĨŽƌ/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ?^Ğptember 1946. 
412
 Bower, Paperclip Conspiracy, 215. The reports are discussed further in Chapter Six. 
413
 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, 132. 
- 127 - 
 
absorbed into the new Technical Intelligence and Documents Unit (TIDU), but T-Force 
continued to exist almost a year beyond this point.414 
The role of T-Force however was changing dramatically in this period. The number of 
BIOS teams they handled was expected to drop to a nominal figure, while the number of 
commercial buyers was expected to reach an average of some 200 a month, visiting 
businessmen to stay at roughly 60 a month, and official Reparations and Restitution Teams 
were expected to rise from 150 to 600 a month.
415
 This shifting onus of exploitation from 
official ministry-sponsored teams to private individuals and groups was, to a certain degree, 
an inevitable outcome of the close involvement which business and industry had had in the 
programme from the start. This was itself an extension of the innumerable contributions 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĨŝƌŵƐŚĂĚŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂĚƉƌŽǀĞĚƐŽ ŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
capacity to fight in such a technologically-advanced conflict.416 Initially, as we have seen, this 
post-war collaboration was characterised by industrial concerns supplying the experts to 
participate in BIOS missions to Germany, and working closely with the various branches on 
any matters relating to the procurement of information from Germany.
417
 This was a 
productive relationship because, as BIOS investigator Monica Maurice remarked, there were 
ŵĂŶǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ǇŽƵĐĂŶŽŶůǇĚĞƚĞĐƚďǇŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞũŽď ? ?418 
As time moved on though, it became clear that it would perhaps be more mutually 
beneficial if representatives of industry were able to conduct investigations unrestrained by 
the regulation and administration of government. It was acknowledged as early as the 
ƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůǀŝƐŝƚŽƌƐǁŚŽĂƌĞŶŽǁ
on private rather than official businĞƐƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ ‘ǀĞƌǇŐƌĞĂƚ QƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ
in faǀŽƵƌŽĨƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŝŶŐƐƵĐŚǀŝƐŝƚƐ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? no such allowance could be made at the time 
ĂƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁĞƌĞƐŽƐĐĂƌĐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘no [German] industry can be started that is not vital either 
to the needs of the occupying forces, or for maintaining the standard of the civil population 
Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ĂŶĚ ƵŶƌĞƐƚ ? ?419 There were, of course, 
loopholes to be exploited. In October 1946, Margarete Steiff GmbH, a stuffed toy 
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manufacturer based near Heidenheim, famed for its invention of the teddy bear, 
complained to US occupation authorities that representatives of rival British toy firms had 
visited their factory, taken photographs of special machinery and demanded samples. The 
company argued, justifiably, that the manufacture of toys was the most peaceful of 
industries and the actions of the British amounted to no less than unrestricted commercial 
espionage.420 However, by early 1948, these cases ceased to be unsavoury exceptions, as 
policy changed to facilitate this private exploitation on a larger scale. 
One crucial organisation in this period was the Joint Export Import Agency (JEIA), an 
Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ďŽĚǇ ƚĂƐŬĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-war economic 
recovery, including facilitating trips of Western businessmen to Germany, and German 
businessmen abroad.
421
 In February 1948, at a meeting of the JEIA, it was asserted as 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚĂƚ ‘the facilities afforded to businessmen [in Germany] be as nearly as possible 
equiǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŽĚĂǇ ? ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
achieving this end was the reactivation of the German hotel industry which, by this stage, 
had been successfully carried out in nine hotels in the American zone but not at all in the 
British zone. The idea was that these hotels, usually de-requisitioned T-Force messes, would 
 ‘ůĞĂĚ ĂŶ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ŶŽƌŵĂů ůŝĨĞ ? ďĂƌƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƐƚŽĐŬĞĚ ? ƉƌŝĐĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŽŶ Ă
commercial basis and visitors would not have to conform to the Military Government 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ dƌĂŶƐŝƚ ,ŽƚĞůƐ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ŚĞůƉĞĚ
with the initial set-up by JEIA, who would, for instance, help source furniture and buy food 
in bulk.422 This co-existed alongside a remarkable desire among the German population to 
revitalise their own domestic tourism industry, as a method of returning to pre-war 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?423 
An attempt to replicate this American success in the British zone was made on a 
purely experimental basis, where a hotel was handed over to German ownership but 
provisioned by the British Army. The verdict was not wholly promising: 
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The experiment had not been a complete success owing to the extreme demands of the 
employees, suspected black market activities in food and a reluctance on the part of a 
German manager to continue under these conditions. It had also been found necessary to 
employ a British supervisor to deal with complaints and to supervise the general running of 
the hotel.424 
Discouraged, the British authorities began to consider alternative options, such as the 
outsourcing of all private and civilian travel to the commercial travel agent, Thomas Cook, 
ďƵƚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚŝĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ  ‘ƌĞĨƵƐĞ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ
established that it would be uneĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůƚŽŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĐĞƚŚŝƐƚĂƐŬĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
disbandment of T-Force loomed ever closer, the chosen course of action was to hand over 
responsibility for these hotels from T-Force to the Regional Administrative Offices of the 
Control Council.425 By 23 May 1949, the issue had become moot as the occupation zones of 
Britain, the USA, and France ceased to exist and were replaced by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, an essentially sovereign nation. 
 It is worth noting as an aside that, after the war, Germany was not the only nation 
which was subject to exploitation. BIOS was also responsible for co-ordinating a similar 
programme in Japan, although the bulk of the investigations there were conducted by 
American personnel, as they constituted the majority of the occupying force.426 In August 
1945, the BIOS Committee was informed that although Japanese research had been fairly 
advanced, they had generally failed to apply science to war on a substantial scale and that, 
as a result, any investigations in Japan should focus on research rather than development, 
and on laboratories rather than plants.427 By November, BIOS had been instructed to liaise 
with the British Staff Office in Tokyo and perhaps create a similar Black List as the one used 
in Europe, albeit smaller.428 The initial steps which BIOS took were uncertain and poorly-
governed, while the US was pressing ahead and flooding Japan with scientific intelligence 
missions.429 In the end it was decided ƚŚĂƚ  ‘/K^ ŚĂĚ ŶŽ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ :ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞ
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ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ŽŶůǇŽĨƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞƚŽŚĞůƉŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘channelling ?ŽĨƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŝnto Britain.430 
 In Germany, the story which the exploited materials tell is one of an effort to obtain 
the best results for British science and industry by amassing a vast quantity of documents, 
equipment and Final Reports compiled by expert investigators. Certainly these spoils of war 
had their benefits but they could not unravel the whole, or even the greater part, of the 
ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? tŝƚŚŝŶ Ă ŵŽŶƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ?Ɛ ĞŶĚ ? /K^ ŚĂĚ
recognised ƚŚĂƚ  ‘some of the most spectacular results have tended to be associated with 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĨƌŽŵŵĞŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĨƌŽŵƉůĂĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƉƚŝŵƵŵƌĞƐƵůƚƐǁŝůůďĞ
obtained when men, equipment and records bearing on a single problem are examined 
concurreŶƚůǇĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉůĂĐĞ ? ?431 It was not long before British policy changed to reflect 
these realisations and the greater emphasis of exploitation was placed on German 
scientists, technicians and other knowledgeable personnel, who not only had the potential 
for longer-term benefit to Britain but were also less subject to the strict regulations 
ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dǁŽ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂƌĞ
below, while the next chapter will cover the detainment, interrogation and eventual 
recruitment of German individuals which formed arguably the most significant and certainly 
the most lasting element of British exploitation. 
 
Chemical Warfare and Rocketry 
Both chemical weapons and rockets are examples of scientific advances which occurred due 
to the increased military research and development which was a common feature of all the 
belligerent nations during the Second World War. They are also the most striking instances 
where the scientific capabilities of Nazi Germany exceeded that of Britain and its allies. That, 
however, is where the similarities end. Rocketry, particularly in the form of the V-2 ballistic 
missile, was used extensively by the German military against Britain, and against targets in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and France, while chemical warfare was never actively employed 
on any scale during the war. Accordingly, while rocketry was an area of high priority for 
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exploitation planners, sites relating to chemical warfare research and development proved 
ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ŽĨ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ĂƐ ƵŶƐƵƐƉĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ
uncovered a whole new class of war gases  W the nerve agents  W by chance. Therefore, 
studying the way in which these two topics were investigated by exploitation teams sheds 
light on the variety and flexibility which was integral to the programme as a whole. 
 Despite the ubiquitous wartime imagery of men, women and children in Britain 
carrying gas masks as they went about their daily lives, no belligerent decided to employ 
chemical weapons during the conflict and the prevailing opinion on why they remained 
unused is that a mutual fear of retaliation existed, and no country wished to be the first to 
unleash weapons of such horror, lest they be visited on their own civilian population in 
return. Germany, however, was in a stronger position than its military leaders or scientific 
experts realised. In 1936, scientists at Anorgana, a subsidiary of industrial giant IG Farben, 
which focused on chemical products, had, while researching new insecticides, developed an 
agent which could inflict great harm on the human nervous system, sometimes resulting in 
death, which gave it great potentiality as a chemical weapon. It was given the designation 
Tabun and, through further research, two even more potent derivatives were developed, 
named Sarin and Soman. These have been described as being as great an advance over the 
chemical weapons of the First World War as the machine gun was over the musket.432 
Neither Britain nor any of its allies had a chemical weapon that even came close to the 
destructive power of these new agents but, due to the endemic secrecy of wartime 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ŽďůŝǀŝŽƵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ? ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ĚŝĚ ŽĨ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƐuperiority.433 
 As such, it is unsurprising that the exploitation programme did not at first count 
chemical warfare as a category of any particular importance in their preparation for entry 
into Germany. The first indication that it was an area of any interest at all came on 6 April 
1945, when British troops came across truckloads of strangely-marked shells at a rail-yard in 
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Espelkamp, seven miles north of Lübbecke.434 In addition, the discovery of a wealth of 
information, including documents and manufacturing equipment, at a chemical warfare 
experimental station at Raubkammer and munitions storage facilities at nearby Munster-
East and Oerrel proved that this topic warranted further investigation.435 Fortunately, 
procedures for the discovery of enemy possession of new chemical weapons had been in 
place during the war and samples were immediately sent to the British Chemical Defence 
Experimental Establishment (CDEE) at Porton Down, Wiltshire, where their contents could 
be examined by experts.436 So alien to these experts were the chemicals contained within 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂůůďƵƚĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŵ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŶŽǀĞůƚǇ ? ?ŝƚŝƐ ?ŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
charging has any advantage over other well-ŬŶŽǁŶĐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐƐ ? ?437 In short, the initial reaction 
ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĞŵŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶƚǁĂƐƌŽƵŐŚůǇĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚŝŶƉŽƚĞŶĐǇƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǁŶŽďƐŽůĞƐĐĞŶƚ
agent, PF-3; in reality, it was up to ten times more dangerous.438 
 This illusion of relative impotency did not last long and within days, scientists at 
Porton had realised that, if deployed on the battlefield, these new nerve agents could have 
an absolutely devastating effect.
439
 Just over two weeks after the nerve gas shells had been 
discovered, a 19-man CIOS team, including nine experts from Porton Down, plus five other 
British members, four Americans and a Canadian, travelled to Raubkammer and the 
surrounding sites to conduct their investigations. On arrival they discovered that a great 
deal of equipment and documents had been transferred there from the main German 
chemical warfare establishment at Spandau Citadel, near Berlin, during the war, to avoid it 
being captured by the advancing Red Army. The CIOS team was on site for six weeks, at the 
end of which they filed a 482-ƉĂŐĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ  ‘based upon an examination of the range, 
laboratories, plant and equipment, upon a preliminary examination of a mass of documents 
and samples, and ƵƉŽŶ Ă ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ Ăůů ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?440 This was an 
ĞĂƌůǇĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨ  ‘ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇďĞŝŶŐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ
as the most effective method of exploitation. 
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 Even this extensive assessment was not considered to be sufficient so in the summer 
of 1945, Britain despatched a unilateral investigation team, known as Porton Group No. 1, 
to Raubkammer to conduct a three-month study of German chemical warfare.441 One of the 
core elements of this examination was the use of field trials  W there were 26 in total, many 
of which were carried out by German technicians, with members of the Porton group simply 
acting as observers, in order to understand German technique as well as the nature of the 
weapons themselves.442 This observation-led method would later be replicated in Operation 
Backfire, for the study of V-2 launching procedure. All in all, the comprehensive 
investigation into German chemical weapons allowed Britain, and the United States, to add 
nerve agents to their arsenals within a few months of their discovery and it also ensured 
that the CDEE at Porton Down survived and that chemical warfare retained its place in 
British military doctrine.443 
 WŽƌƚŽŶŽǁŶǁĂƐĂůƐŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?and 
the energetic wartime work in this field, both defensive and offensive, carried out there was 
driven by the need to be able to protect the country from, and retaliate in kind against, any 
form of German bacteriological attack which might occur.444 This policy was based on a 
widely-held assumption, which predated the war, that Nazi Germany was actively 
developing biological weapons and possessed an arsenal which far outstripped that of the 
Allies.
445
 In reality, though, this assumption was almost completely false. Though the Third 
Reich had possessed a biological warfare programme, it had been rendered wholly 
dysfunctional by the bureaucratic quagmires and departmental infighting which typified so 
ŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞEĂǌŝ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ, and had not enjoyed any support from the leadership, 
with Hitler himself expressly forbidding any offensive research.
446
 In addition, Kurt Blome, 
ƚŚĞ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ƉŽƐƚ-war 
interrogation that  ‘ĂůůƚŚĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐďĂĐƚĞƌŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ in Germany consider B[iological] W[arfare] 
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to be impracticable and not worthy of any serious study ? ?447 Alsos investigators, who 
counted chemical and biological warfare as part of their remit along with atomic research, 
recognised, before the war was even over, the truth of the matter and, in March 1945, the 
War Office decreed that the amount of work entailed in the biological warfare aspect of 
German disarmament would not even  ‘justify the services of a full time Technical Officer ? ?448 
 Nonetheless, exploitation officials still conducted a relatively thorough examination 
of facilities, documents and personnel with any link to biological warfare in Germany, and 
Alsos produced several reports on their investigations into this field. They also encountered 
many of the same issues as did their counterparts working on other topics, such as problems 
in locating senior German experts  W even the wife of the Wehrmacht biological warfare 
expert, Heinrich Kliewe, did not know where he was when interrogated in April 1945 (he 
later turned up in a temporary German hospital)449  W and difficulty in securing the relevant 
files  W in late May, Alsos operatives reported locating 50- ? ? ůĂƌŐĞ ĐŚĞƐƚƐ ? ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘dŽƉ
^ĞĐƌĞƚ ? 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ
Surgeon-'ĞŶĞƌĂůŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŵǇ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ŝŶĞƌůŝŶ ?hidden in the cellar of a monastery in the 
village of Niederviehbach, near Landshut in Bavaria.450 
It is also worth noting that, despite the overwhelming evidence that Germany posed 
no biological warfare threat whatsoever, the genuine fear of biological warfare among the 
Allied officials made them unwilling to ignore any possible lead on the subject, which in turn 
made them susceptible to being misled, as happened in the series of incidents collectively 
codenamed as  ‘DĂǇĨůǇ ? ?dŚŝƐessentially comprised a plot by a small group of low-ranking 
German officials and ordinary citizens to influence the occupation policies of the Western 
Allies by offering the British authorities exclusive access to the details of a German  ‘BW 
weapon capable of destroying the Anglo-Saxon states quickly ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞĞŶĚ
up in Russian hands, if the British did not comply. When the British displayed their clear 
scepticism, the German plotters switched to bare-faced extortion, threatening to leak 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ƉƌŽǀĞĚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ǁĂƐ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇ ĨŽƌ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ŶĞǁ
biolŽŐŝĐĂůǁĞĂƉŽŶƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂůůŝĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŝŵ ?ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇ ?ŽĨĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
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ƚĞŶƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?/ŶƌĞƚƵƌŶĨŽƌŶŽƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽ
ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƉůŽƚƚĞƌƐ ĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?  ‘the immediate 
release of POWs and internees, the limiting of denazification and the cessation of the 
dismantling of German industry ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶĐĂďŝŶĞƚƚŽďĞ
headed, almost certainly without his knowledge or consent, by future West German 
chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Despite the fact that the British seemed at no point to fall for 
ƚŚŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚĨĂƌĐŝĐĂůĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚďůĂĐŬŵĂŝů ?ƚŚĞ ‘DĂǇĨůǇ ?ĐĂƐĞƌƵŵďůĞĚŽŶĨŽƌƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵ
September 1946 to March 1947.451 Exceptional incidents such as this aside, biological 
warfare only formed a very minor part of the exploitation scheme, for obvious reasons. 
Despite this, the British biological warfare programme did not disappear after 1945, with 
the threat of the Soviet Union simply supplanting that of Nazi Germany as a ƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞ.452 
However, as with chemical weapons, though to a far greater degree, any strategic 
advantages conferred by biological weapons were, by this stage, becoming largely eclipsed 
by the atomic bomb.453 
By contrast, the potential future use of atomic weapons was one of the many 
reasons why a good understanding of rocketry was considered so important in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Wernher von Braun, German pioneer of rocket 
technology and one of the most widely-desired prizes of exploitation, wrote a report for 
/K^ǁŚĞŶŝŶůůŝĞĚĐƵƐƚŽĚǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐĂǁ ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ  Q ƚŚĞ ŚĂƌŶĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĂƚŽŵŝĐ ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƌŽĐŬĞƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ
consequence of which cannot yeƚ ďĞ ĨƵůůǇ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ? ?454 Major-General A.M. Cameron, of 
ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞĚ ^ƉĞĐŝĂů WƌŽũĞĐƚŝůĞ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ 'ƌŽƵƉ  ?^WK' ) ? ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ǀŽŶ ƌĂƵŶ ?Ɛ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
future, noting that if a V- ? ĐŽƵůĚďĞ ĨŝƚƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶĂƚŽŵŝĐǁĂƌŚĞĂĚ ?  ‘ŝƚƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ
ǁŝůů ďĞ ĐŽůŽƐƐĂů ? ?Cameron also hypothesised optimistically about a piloted rocket which 
could be used as a mail service and would be able to cross the Atlantic in forty minutes, 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ŚĞ ĨĞůƚ  ‘ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ŽĨ ŵŽƌĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ǁĞĂƉŽŶ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ? ?455 More peaceful 
applications aside, it was commonly believed that rockets would change the face of warfare 
                                                             
451
 TNA, FO 1032/247,  ‘DĂǇĨůǇ W^ŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƚ ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?, 6 March 1947. 
452
 Brian Balmer,  ‘dŚĞh<ŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůtĞĂƉŽŶƐWƌŽŐƌĂŵ ?, in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rosza and Malcolm Dando 
(eds.), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 83. 
453
 GƌĂĚŽŶW ?ĂƌƚĞƌĂŶĚ'ƌĂŚĂŵ^ ?WĞĂƌƐŽŶ ? ‘ƌŝƚŝƐŚďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǁĂƌĨĂƌĞĂŶĚďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ?, in 
Giessler and Moon, Biological and Toxin Weapons, 188. 
454
 IWM, CIOS Report XXVIII- ? ? ? ‘ZŽĐŬĞƚƐĂŶĚ'ƵŝĚĞĚDŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ? ? 
455
 /tD ?DŝƐĐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚŽŶKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂĐŬĨŝƌĞ ? ? ?EŽǀ ŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
- 136 - 
 
in the future, with all manner of long-range, and potentially intercontinental, ballistic 
missiles possible.456 For Britain, this was an especially acute fear, knowing that the 
traditional defensive value of the English Channel had been eroded by the development of 
long-range weapons, particularly in the form of guided missiles.457 
 Whatever its eventual uses were to be, there was no doubt that a good 
understanding of rocket technology was essential for any nation which desired to exist as a 
world power after the war. The key to unlocking this was undoubtedly the V-2, also known 
ĂƐƚŚĞ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞůĂƌŐĞůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞƚŽĂůů
jet and rocket ƉƌŽƉƵůƐŝŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?458 Here it was felt that Britain had a certain advantage, 
partly because its cities had been the primary target for these new weapons and partly 
because of the efforts of Duncan Sandys, Financial Secretary to the War Office and later 
Minister of Works, sometime son-in-law of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and a staunch 
advocate of investigation into the German long-range rocket programme, even before the 
first V-weapons fell on London. Not only had Sandys instigated a major bombing raid on the 
German rocket development site at Peenemünde in August 1943 but he also chaired the 
wartime Crossbow committee  W a subsidiary of the War Cabinet which handled all matters 
relating to defence against flying bombs and rockets.459 As a result, by the end of the war, 
Britain had unilaterally amassed a great quantity of intelligence on German rocketry  W Major 
Robert Staver, Chief of the Jet Propulsion Section of the Research and Intelligence Branch of 
the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, admitted that British rocket experts had given him 90 per 
cent of his target intelligence, including all the information they had gathered on 
Peenemünde during the Crossbow investigations.460 
 As soon as the war ended, exploitation teams rushed to sites of interest across 
Germany  W not only to Peenemünde, which had been captured by the Red Army in May 
1945, but also to storage dumps under British and American control and to the Mittelwerk, 
an enormous underground missile factory, located near Nordhausen in the Harz Mountains, 
which was occupied and stripped of everything of value by the Americans before being 
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handed over to the Soviets as part of their zone of occupation. CIOS filed several reports on 
the subject, including one based on the interrogation of key figures who were held at 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen in southern Bavaria and were led by both Professor von Braun, and 
the military head of the V-weapon programme, General Walter Dornberger. Both these men 
ŚĂĚ  ‘the attitude that if they can convince the British and Americans of the value of their 
work, there is a chance that facilities may be offered in England or America for continuing 
ŝƚ ? ?461 For the British though, these investigations were mere preludes to what would prove 
to be the most comprehensive evaluation of German guided missile technology conducted 
in the post-war period  W Operation Backfire. 
 On 22 June 1945, General Eisenhower instructed Major-General A.M. Cameron, head 
of Special Projectile Operations Group, to conduct an operation, the primary object of which 
was to ascertain the German technique of launching long-range rockets. This was to 
conclude by actually conducting a launch, in order to prove this method, as well as offering 
 ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƐƚƵĚǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞrocket and 
ĂŶĐŝůůĂƌǇĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ ŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐŽĨ ĨƵĞůƐ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶ ĨůŝŐŚƚ ? ?dŚƌĞĞǁĞĞŬƐ ůĂƚĞƌ^,&
was disbanded, but the operation, now known as Backfire, continued regardless, with the 
British shouldering the majority of the burden and command for it assumed by the War 
Office. The chosen site for this operation was Cuxhaven on the North Sea coast, fifty miles 
ŶŽƌƚŚ ŽĨ ƌĞŵĞŶ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ǌŽŶĞ ? Ɛ ŶŽ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ? ƵŶĚĂŵĂŐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂďůĞ ?
rockets had been found, the idea was to assemble them from various parts which had been 
ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ  ‘ĨƌŽŵĨŝĞůĚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵĚŝƚĐŚĞƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƌĂŝůǁĂǇǇĂƌĚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵĐĂŶĂůƐ ?ĨƌŽŵĨĂĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the initial rush of exploitation activity in Germany, and the assembly, preparation and firing 
was to all be conducted by German personnel, with the British experts acting simply as 
technical officers and observers.462 
 dŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚ  ‘ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ďǇƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ so that it 
 ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ŚĂŶĚŝĐĂƉƉĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŶŽŶ-availability of the necessary technical 
persoŶŶĞů ? ?463 Certainly, the most valuable component of Backfire was the assembled group 
of German technical experts, who brought with them the benefit not only of their 
                                                             
461
 IWM, CIOS Report XXVIII- ? ? ? ‘ZŽĐŬĞƚƐĂŶĚ'ƵŝĚĞĚDŝƐƐŝůĞƐ ? ? 
462
 IWM, Misc. 21/382. 
463
 dE ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨK^DĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 138 - 
 
accomplishments but also of their mistakes  W  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝŶŐƌĞĚŝĞŶƚŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ŝĞƚĞƌ,ƵǌĞů ?ƉŝƚŚŝůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞĨĨŽƌƚ ‘ƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌĞŶĚŽĨĂƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇ ? ?ďƵƚĨĞůƚŝƚǁĂƐǁĞůů-conducted and considered the British 
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ƚŽŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌŽƵƐ ? ?464 On the whole, Operation 
Backfire was a success. Despite initial expectations that it would require 30 rockets,465 in the 
ĞŶĚŽŶůǇƚŚƌĞĞǁĞƌĞůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞŽŶ ?KĐƚŽďĞƌĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞbehaviour of the 
rocket from the moment of take-off to the point of fĂůůǁĂƐƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚǁĂƐĨĂƌůĞƐƐ
successful and crashed into the sea almost immediately after take-off; and the third, taking 
ƉůĂĐĞ ŽŶ  ? ? KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ǁĂƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ  ‘Ă ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞƉ ƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ
States, Russia, France, the Dominions ? tŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ WƌĞƐƐ ? ? DĂũŽƌ-General Cameron 
was suitably impressed by the conduct of his operation, noting in the conclusion to his 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌŽĐŬĞƚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ‘ŝƚŝƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĂůůŝƐŬŶŽǁŶ
and that it now remaŝŶƐĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĂƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?466 
 The success was widely celebrated, at least in Britain. A Daily Telegraph 
correspondent who had been present at the third launching wrote an article which 
conveyed his awe at the rocket, which he described aƐ ‘ĂƉĞŶĐŝůŽŶĂƐƉĞĂƌŽĨĨůĂŵĞĂƐůŽŶŐ
ĂƐŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?467 Members of the British technical team who had supervised the operation were 
awarded with a trophy in the shape of a V-2, and were invited to attend lectures on the 
subject, screenings of the official Backfire film, and a celebratory dinner which included, for 
ĚĞƐƐĞƌƚ ?ƚŚĞŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ ? ?^ƉĞĐŝĂů ? ?468 The far-reaching importance of Backfire was not lost 
on those involved either and Cameron added a grave warning to the end of his report that, 
 ‘for the sake of their very existence, Britain and the United States must be masters of this 
ǁĞĂƉŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?469 Certainly it can be argued that the most significant weapons 
technology of the Cold War, after the atomic bomb, was the rocketry which would most 
likely be used to deliver it  W as a result, ballistic missile defence became both a technically 
challenging and politically controversial field.470 This was already becoming clear on the 
international stage, as noted by American Major Robert Staver, who had admitted how 
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much his country had relied on British V-weapon intelligence during the war, and who now 
recognised the irony that in the post-war missile race between the world powers, it was the 
British who would finish last.471 
 
Without doubt, the exploitation process was at its most extensive and comprehensive in the 
period immediately following the collapse of the Third Reich and the end of the war in 
Europe. This chaotic situation provided the ideal circumstances for all the victorious powers 
to pursue their policies of exploitation with maximum vigour and enthusiasm. Documents, 
samples of machinery and other valuable material were all purloined wholesale, often in 
conditions of dubious legality.472 This scientific and technological material was 
supplemented by the expertise gained by government-sponsored investigators who 
conducted thorough examinations of facilities and processes and compiled equally thorough 
reports on their findings. Combined, these various fruits of exploitation allowed the Allies to 
learn much about German military science and technology, and improve their own 
armouries as a result, especially in areas in which they had genuinely lagged behind, such as 
chemical warfare and rocketry. For the British, the process of exploitation was no longer the 
preserve of the clandestine secret intelligence agencies, but was instead under the auspices 
of the civil service bureaucracy, in the form, primarily, of the British Intelligence Objectives 
Sub-committee. This organisation was able to exert its will on the ground in Germany due to 
the impressive logistical framework of the T-Forces and, to a lesser extent, the Field 
Information Agency Technical. 
Naturally, there were significant problems which faced the British exploitation 
programme, and the operatives which were charged with conducting it. One of these was 
the sheer plurality of organisations active in Germany at the time, and their varying and 
often conflicting aims, though their interactions in the field gave rise to collaboration at 
least as often as competition, if not more so. The great number of these other agencies is 
indicative of the fact that the exploitation initiative did not exist in a vacuum but instead 
was part of a broad and complex network which represented the early days of the British 
occupation administration, and the success which exploitation enjoyed despite this is 
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testament to the powers and priority conferred on the mission to strip Germany of its 
scientific and technological spoils. Nonetheless, this comprehensive exploitation of files, 
factories and facilities was just one, arguably quite minor, part of the process as a whole and 
a key belief which was reinforced during this phase was that the greatest benefits would be 
derived where the subjects of study were not documents or machines, but the men who 
had created and operated them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Brain Drain 
 
The exploitation of German personnel by the victorious Allies is arguably the best-known 
element of the post-war exploitation programme, largely because of the controversy which 
it often created. While cases such as that of Wernher von Braun have attained more 
prominent positions in the public consciousness, largely on account of his subsequent fame 
and the moral ambiguity of his Nazi past, his story was not unique; he was just one of 
hundreds of German scientists and technicians who were treated as targets of exploitation 
by the Allies after the war, and his experience of detainment, interrogation and then 
employment was a familiar one.473 In intelligence circles, the use of enemy personnel as 
assets was not a new approach, a fact which can be seen by the way in which senior German 
prisoners of war, held in the UK, were secretly wiretapped during their imprisonment in the 
hope that they would reveal important military secrets which Britain and its Allies could 
utilise.474 However, as we have seen, continuing a trend from the First World War, science 
and scientists became even more influential during the Second World War and began to act 
as advisors to their military colleagues.475 This, coupled with the fact that scientific 
intelligence as a field had truly come into its own during the war, ensured that at its 
conclusion much attention was focused on the wartime efforts of formerly enemy scientists 
and technicians. 
 While some histories of the post-war period suggest that Britain was a junior partner 
to the US in the exploitation of German experts,
476
 ŽƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŚĞŝŶventions to 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌƐ ? ŽŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ůĂĐŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ŝŶ
detention and interrogation,477 others present Britain as the leading power in exploiting 
individuals and one which proved to be far less scrupulous in the process too.478 However, 
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as is often the case, the truth is something of a combination of the two and there is little 
doubt that Britain was at least as enthusiastic about the opportunity of exploiting German 
scientists and technicians as its wartime allies, if not more so, and that it formed a major 
part of its post-war exploitation efforts on the whole. The importance of utilising personnel, 
as well as documents, equipment and on-site investigations by specialist teams (as 
discussed in the previous chapter), was clearly recognised by policy-makers at the time. A 
July 1947 Board of Trade circular, sent to numerous British trade associations, described 
active exploitation of German experts as  ‘ƚŚĞĐůŝŵĂǆŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽ
say: 
In some cases it is being found that without the services of the key Germans concerned with 
either the development or application of the novel processes in Germany these processes 
cannot be reproduced or developed in industry here or, alternatively, that their exploitation 
is unnecessarily protracted or costly.479 
As revealing as these comments are, they were made more than two years after the initial 
decision to exploit German scientific and technical personnel, and the origins of such a 
decision were far less certain and confident than this memo would suggest. 
This chapter will first briefly examine these origins and how British policy on the 
exploitation of German expert personnel, which had enormous potential for risk and 
controversy, was first approached, challenged, and then accepted. The rest of the chapter 
will then consider the number of forms which personnel exploitation took on the British 
side, roughly in chronological order  W firstly, the short-term approaches, beginning with 
detention and interrogation in Germany, followed by the same process in Britain; and 
secondly, the long-term tactics, most notably the employment of German specialists in 
British defence research and development, and the subsequent extension of this to the civil-
industrial sphere. This chapter will examine all of these elements in order to present a 
holistic view of what was arguably the most significant component of the British 
exploitation programme. 
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Formulating Policy 
On 5 June 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff received a telegram from the Joint Staff Mission in 
Washington, D.C., which informed them that the US Chiefs of Staff had informally decided 
 ‘ƚŽďƌŝŶŐ'ĞƌŵĂŶĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ
exploiting their knowledge by the military in the development of weapons which can be 
ƵƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞ ? ?480 Nine days later, after some American prompting, the British 
Chiefs of Staff signalled their assent, but with the inclusion of several key provisos. Firstly, 
that the intelligence gained by such investigations be shared between the Americans and 
British; secondly, that the security risks of letting exploited German experts return to 
Germany armed with knowledge of British or American research needed to be addressed; 
and thirdly, that a system of allocation of such human resources between the two powers 
ďĞ ĚĞǀŝƐĞĚ ? dŚĞǇ ĂůƐŽ ĂĚĚĞĚ ? ĨŽƌ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĞǇĞƐ ŽŶůǇ ? ƚŚĂ  ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂů ŝĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂůůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽǁĞĂƉŽŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞǁĂƌ ? ?481 
During considerations of the American proposals, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚďĞŽĨĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞǀĂůƵĞƚŽŽƵƌ
ŽǁŶ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?482 This acknowledgement, though appearing somewhat self-evident in 
hindsight, shows the original germ of the British plan to exploit specialist personnel. The 
idea quickly gathered momentum and, six weeks later, the DCOS committee considered a 
report by the Directors of Scientific Research at the Admiralty, Ministry of Aircraft 
Production and Ministry of ^ƵƉƉůǇ ?  ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽǁ ďĞ
sought to the limited employment of a number of German scientists in this country under 
ƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?483 Extensive discussion ensued and concerns were raised 
about security risks and potentially problematic public reaction. The Joint Intelligence Sub-
Committee registered their particular anxiety on the former issue, utilising a Security Service 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ĨŽƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘based on 
dangerous assumptions and that the security risks had been under-ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ? ?484 The Home 
Office too resisted the plan, worrying that it would be too difficult to keep tabs on the 
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German experts brought over, and practically impossible to prevent them from learning 
valuable British defence secrets.485 Ultimately, however, the fear of being left behind proved 
the deciding factor  W at a meeting on 15 August, Professor Charles Ellis, scientific advisor to 
the War Office, remarked that he was sure the Americans would press ahead with importing 
Ă ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƐŬĞĚ  ‘ĐŽƵůĚ ǁĞ ĂĨĨŽƌĚ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?486 
 The DCOS were not in a position to make the final decision, however, and it had to 
be referred up the chain to their superiors on the Chiefs of Staff committee. The reactions at 
that level were somewhat mixed: First Sea Lord Andrew Cunningham and Chief of the Air 
^ƚĂĨĨŚĂƌůĞƐWŽƌƚĂů ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ ?ǁĞƐƚŽŽĚƚŽŐĂŝŶŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ ůŽƐĞďǇ
ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?, while Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
^ƚĂĨĨ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ǀĞƌǇ ĞǀĞŶůǇ ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ? ?487 Nonetheless, on 24 
ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŚŝĞĨƐŽĨ^ƚĂĨĨ ‘ĂŐƌĞĞĚŝŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƚŽƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ
and technicians in this cŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌŝƐŬƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?ƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ
August, the Chiefs of Staff sent a paper outlining the policy to the highest body of military 
decision-making in Britain, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, for their consideration. 
The Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister (the recently-elected Clement Attlee), 
discussed this paper thoroughly and then approved it on 31 August.488 
 
Short-Term: In Germany 
As explored in the previous chapter, the apparatus in place to enact exploitation was large 
and multi-faceted, and a considerable portion of its efforts were directed towards the 
tracking down and safe detainment of key German personnel. Not only were these roles 
considered to be part of the remit of T-Forces and FIAT, there was also established a 
separate sub-division of the latter to focus exclusively on this element of the programme. 
The Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section (EPES) was formed on 1 May 1945 and, as with 
FIAT, was split into national components shortly after. The main objective of EPES was to 
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build up and maintain a comprehensive set of records on all German scientists and 
technicians of note, and then to provide the information therein to interested agencies on 
request, and to facilitate exploitation by establishing appropriate contact between the 
target and relevant agency. Within a year of operation, EPES had compiled an index of 
18,000 personality cards and 400 persona dossiers, and was cŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘the only place 
where a general picture of exploitation of German scientists and technicians can be 
ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ ? ?ǇĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?W^ǁĂƐŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ? ?ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐĞǀĞƌǇŵŽŶƚŚ
on behalf of British Ministries and Agencies who wish to trace and locate German scientists 
ĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ? ?489 
 Such extensive record-keeping was only possible because of the quality of the staff 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇW^ ?ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ ‘ǁĞůůƚƌĂŝŶĞĚŝŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂĚĞquately 
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŚĂŶĚůĞƚŚĞ ‘ǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĂŶĚĚĞůŝĐĂƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?
ĂƌŝƐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ? ?490 Before being despatched to conduct their activities with 
FIAT Forward in Berlin, EPES operatives were sternly instructed to adhere to a number of 
security regulations, including not entering the Soviet ǌŽŶĞ ? ŶŽƚ ƚĂůŬŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘any person 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚǁŚŽŵŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌǇŽƵƚŽĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĂůǁĂǇƐĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ
agents to contact unknown persons at addresses which are not known to you outside the 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ?491  EPES was, however, only a fairly small organisation and the bulk of its workload 
was administrative, so the legwork involved was usually delegated to the greater manpower 
of T-Force and FIAT, as well as support being rendered by the other intelligence agencies of 
the occupying powers.492 
As with the removal and transportation of documents and equipment, and the 
facilitation of investigative trips to Germany, T-Force acted primarily in the British zone 
while FIAT was largely responsible for parallel work in the US and, less often, French zones. 
Perhaps the most critical part played by T-Force in the execution of personnel exploitation 
ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ Žƌ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶ ŝŶ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ŽĨƚĞŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĐĂŶƚŝĞƐt of 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
                                                             
489
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Officer, or the Education Branch at Regional level, or any number of other administrative 
bodies operating at this time.493 Once the German expert was located, it was necessary to 
secure clearance from the relevant Military Government officials before moving him to the 
desired location, either elsewhere in Germany or over to Britain for interrogation or 
employment.  
 Such a sensitive issue as this unsurprisingly entailed a certain amount of bureaucratic 
excess as shown by the number of agencies which EPES and FIAT were in regular contact 
with  W a staggering 52, including 20 British, 13 American, 14 Combined, and one French.494 
This can, to some extent, be accounted for by the international character of FIAT, which was 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘the location of German scientists and technical personnel in the US and 
French zŽŶĞƐ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ ƵƐƚƌŝĂ ? ?495 The other major contribution which FIAT made 
towards the exploitation of German personnel was its involvement in the operation of the 
largest scientific and technical detention centre in the western zones of Germany, 
codenamed Dustbin. This had initially been established at Versailles but once the war 
ended, it was relocated to Schloss Kransberg, a medieval castle in the Taunus Mountains, 
about 25 miles north of Frankfurt, and a former residence of Hermann Göring, among other 
senior Nazis. Here, senior German scientists and technicians were detained and 




 KŶĞŽĨƵƐƚďŝŶ ?ƐŵŽƐƚŶŽƚable residents was Albert Speer  W architect, Nazi Minister 
of Armaments and War Production, and close confidant of Hitler  W who, in a twist of not 
uncommon post-war irony, had overseen the construction of the very ƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ ? ĂŶŶĞǆ Ăƚ
Kransberg where he himself was interned for a short time in the summer of 1945. In his 
memoirs, Speer recalls his time at Dustbin relatively favourably: the excellent views from 
the unbarred windows of his top-floor room, the sizeable US Army rations, and the 
entertainment organised by the other internees, including comic cabaret scenes on account 
of which, in SpĞĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶǁŽƌĚƐ ? ‘ƚĞĂƌƐŽĨůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌƌĂŶĚŽǁŶŽƵƌĨĂĐĞƐĂƚƚŚĞƚƵŵďůĞǁĞŚĂĚ
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ƚĂŬĞŶ ? ?497 ƐǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇŽĨ^ƉĞĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?'ŝƚƚĂ^ĞƌĞŶǇƚĂŬĞƐŝƐƐƵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
account  W ŚĞƌ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ^ƉĞĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨĞůůŽǁ ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐ ƌĞǀĞĂů ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ
isolated himself while at Kransberg, interacting only with his secretary, Annemarie Kempf, 
and not participating in any of the musical or sports events which the others used to pass 
the time. Sereny also describes how Speer became quite despondent while at Dustbin, and 
how the Allied authorities encouraged him to write reports on various technical and political 
topics in order to lift his mood and thus make him more amenable to their purposes. This 
was most successful when he worked with a British intelligence officer, Captain Hoeffding, 
to prepare profiles of other senior Nazis, a process which he evidently found cathartic.498 In 
September 1945, Speer was taken to Nuremberg to stand trial before the International 
Military Tribunal  W the scientific informant became a war criminal.499 
 Ɛ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ƐŝƚĞ ĨŽƌ ĚĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ
ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĞůŝƚĞ ? ƵƐƚďŝŶ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞ ǁĂƐ ƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůǇ ŚŝŐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽĨƚĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ŝƚ Ă ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ
subject between the British and Americans. When SHAEF was disbanded in July 1945, 
'ĞŶĞƌĂůtĂůƚĞƌĞĚĞůů^ŵŝƚŚ ?ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐŚŝĞĨŽĨ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ŝƐƐƵĞĚĂƉŽůŝĐǇŵĞŵŽǁŚŝĐŚƐƚĂƚĞĚ
ƚŚĂƚ ‘the appropriate US and British agencies will have equal facilities and responsibilities for 
the intelligence exploitation of Dustbin, and each will receive copies of all reports resulting 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?500 Dustbin was operated on this combined Anglo-American basis 
until August 1946, when it was replaced with an informal system of mutual co-operation 
between the two national components of EPES, which in turn was removed in the following 
November, when the Americans assumed complete control and excluded the British officers 
from any and all policy decisions. At the end of 1946, the Americans closed Dustbin, an 
outcome which the British considered deeply unsatisfactory.
501
 
 The source of this British dissatisfaction lay in the unique nature of Dustbin, as it 
featured, in the opinion of Air Commodore Victor Bennett, the chief of British FIAT,  ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
facilities which cannot be obtaŝŶĞĚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ? ?&ŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ?ŝƚŚĂĚ ‘an 
ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ŵŽƐƚ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŝŶĚƵĐĞ  ?ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐ ? ? ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŚĞŶĐĞ
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ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶďǇh^ĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƵƐƵĂůĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨĂŶŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
detention centre, Bennett continued, was not suitable for dealing with these German 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ  ‘ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂŵĞŶƚĂů ĂŶĚ ǁŚŽ ŽŶůǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůǇ ƚŽ ŐĞŶƚůĞ ĂŶĚ
ĐĂƌĞĨƵůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƵƐƚďŝŶŚĂĚĂŵƉůĞƐƉĂĐĞƚŽĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞŶĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŶĞĞƐĂƚ
short notice, which was important as speed was often of the essence in ensuring desirable 
German targets were not snapped up by rival powers.502 Furthermore, the security at 
Dustbin was high; all the guards, and even the drivers, were armed, and no members of the 
press were ƚŽďĞĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĞŶĚƵƉ ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďĞŝŶŐ
conducted there.503 
 Dustbin possessed many unique qualities but it was not the only scientific and 
technical detention centre established after the war. In the late summer of 1945, the British 
occupation authorities established an all-'ĞƌŵĂŶ ‘tŽƌŬƐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐŽǁŶĞĚďǇ
ZŚĞŝŶŵĞƚĂůů ŽƌƐŝŐ ? ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘the most advanced technically of the German 
ĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚĨŝƌŵƐ ? ? at Unterlüß, near Celle.504 At its peak, 150 German specialists in a range of 
fields, especially munitions and ballistics, were billeted and administered at the Unterlüß 
tŽƌŬƐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ‘ƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŽĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚĂŶǇƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚƚŽ
ŵŝŐƌĂƚĞ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǌŽŶĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚĂƐŬĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽŵƉŝůing reports on their wartime work.505 
Information provided by the Unterlüß internees also enabled the Technical and Personnel 
Administration (TPA) of the Ministry of Supply to produce a comprehensive report in 
October 1948, entitled German Organisation and Personalities Engaged in Research and 
Development of Armaments during the Second World War.506 When the Works Centre was 
closed on 20 August 1948, the German scientists and technicians who had worked with 
limited compensation for the British for up to three years were not guaranteed employment 
in Britain but were simply moved to other secure facilities in Germany so that they would 
ŶŽƚďĞ ‘ŵĂĚĞůŝĂďůĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŽĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƐƚŽƌďĞŵĂĚĞƚŽƐƵĨĨĞƌƵŶĚƵĞŚĂƌĚƐŚŝƉ ? ?507 
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 This fate of uncertainty was a common experience shared by many, if not most, of 
the German scientists and technicians who were targeted by the British. Unwilling to let 
them slip away to take up employment in the Soviet zone or the USSR, but unable to offer 
them any serious prospects themselves, the British preferred to keep their German 
detainees in a state of limbo, preparing reports or subject to interrogation, with only a 
limited hope of future remuneration. This process began almost immediately after the war 
ended, as a result of a policǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĞƵƉŚĞŵŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂƐ  ‘ĨƌĞĞǌŝŶŐ ? ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
roughly the divisions of zonal boundaries, the British and American occupying forces kept 
close tabs on all German individuals of interest, preventing them from relocating or even 
travelling too far from their homes, so that should they be required for any further 
investigation they could swiftly be rounded up and delivered. By September 1945, T-Force 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ  ? ? ? ? ?'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐǁŚŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶ  ‘ĨƌŽǌĞŶ ? ?
the vast majority of which reŵĂŝŶĞĚ ‘ŝŶďŽƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚĂŶĚh^ǌŽŶĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? ?
They urged the British departments to find work for these specialists soon, as it was 
ƵŶƚĞŶĂďůĞƚŽƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨƌĞĞǌŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĨŽƌŵƵĐŚůŽŶŐĞƌ ?508 However, in January 1946, as 
attention moved from exclusively military personnel to those in civil industry, the British 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ǁĞůĐŽŵĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ‘ĨƌĞĞǌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞĨŽƌŝƚƚŽ
continue.509 
 Obviously, such a policy was not at all favourable in terms of the treatment of the 
German specialists  W in March 1947, the Scientific and Technical Research Board (STRB) 
reported that a group of 100 German aeronautical experts who had been tasked with 
writing monographs with little chance of future British ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞůǇ
ĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůŽƚ ? ?510 Some German specialists even founded protest groups to 
register their discontent with the occupation authorities.511 This issue of mistreatment was 
highlighted especially clearly in the case of Bad Gandersheim, a small town, approximately 
40 miles south of Hannover, which, in June 1945, became the temporary home of around 90 
German scientists, technicians, and their families, when SHAEF ordered that they be 
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evacuated there from Magdeburg, before the British handed it over to the Soviets.512 
However, this hasty evacuation was not swiftly followed by a multitude of job offers. Rather, 
the German specialists remained somewhat stranded at Gandersheim, being fed and 
housed by the British Army, accumulating considerable debts and with practically no 
prospects of the future. 
DĂũŽƌ ǀĂŶƐ ? ŽĨ ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƌĂŶĐŚ ? ' ? ) ? ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚĞ  ‘'ĂŶĚĞƌƐŚĞŝŵ
'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŚĞĂĚĂĐŚĞƐůĞĨƚƵƐďǇ^,& ? ?ǇĞƚŝƚǁĂƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞextent morĂůůǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ had been moved 
 ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĚůǇ ?ĂƚƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĞƐƚ ?513 The issue was raised at a BIOS meeting on 3 March 1946, where 
ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘position regarding the dependents of these scientists was not 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ĂƐ ǁĞll as concerns that if word of such poor treatment got out, it could 
seriously hinder British recruitment attempts in Germany.514 The decision made was that 
ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ƐƵŝƚable employment in the 
British zone for ƚŚŽƐĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƚŽŵŽǀĞ ?515 In reality though, this did 
not materialise quite as promised, and by October, many of the men were still at 
Gandersheim and Military Government continued to gripe about the costs of maintaining 
them there.516 
Other British personnel exploitation schemes were more successful. Operation 
Surgeon was an Air Ministry initiative to utilise the brightest minds of German aeronautical 
science, jointly conducted by the Ministry of Aircraft Production and Ministry of Supply, and 
begun in July 1945.517 /ƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞĂƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘^ƵƌŐĞŽŶƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǌŽŶĞ
of Germany, which included the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute at Göttingen, AVA 
(Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt  W Aerodynamic Research Institute) Reyershausen, and the 
Focke-Wulf facility at Detmold, but by far the most significant was LFA 
(Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt  W Aeronautical Research Institute) Völkenrode, located near 
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Braunschweig. British investigators described Völkenrode as having  ‘ŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĐĞŶĐĞŝŶůĂǇŽƵƚ ?
structure and furnishing that beggars the imagination of anyone who has seen similar 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞh< ? ?ƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶ
of equipment and machinery to Britain, one of the main aims of Operation ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶǁĂƐ ‘ƚŽ
pick the brains of German aeronautical scientists by setting them to write monographs of 
ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŽƌŬŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?518 
This work entailed the use of 180 German experts and by November 1946 it 
appeared that LFA Völkenrode alone would produce 252 separate monographs, each of 
which would be reproduced, with a print run of six in German and 200 in English.519 In order 
to circumvent the restrictions on warlike research laid out in Allied Control Council Law No. 
22, the writing of monographs was considered as interrogation and not research.
520
 As shall 
ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ůĂƚĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐĂŵĞ ƚŽ Ă ĐůŽƐĞ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ
numerous employment offers made to many of the German specialists involved. The 
desirability of these men can perhaps be explained by post-war perceptions of the 
significance of aeronautics and the associated fear that Soviet utilisation of this particular 
'ĞƌŵĂŶĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞǁŽƵůĚ ‘ĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŵƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂůŽŶŐ-range bomber force superior to any 
ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶŶƵŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚƐƉĞĞĚ ? ?521 In reality though, the jet engines developed by 
Britain during the war were greatly superior to their German equivalents, though far fewer 
in number, and both the USA and the Soviet Union actually copied British, rather than 
German, designs in their post-war jet engine programmes.522  
Small-scale personnel exploitation operations, such as Surgeon, the Unterlüß Works 
Centre and many others of a similar type which were conducted by a range of agencies and 
government departments throughout the British zone and beyond, played a key role in 
supplementing Dustbin but could not replace it as the central focus of the exploitation of 
German scientists and technicians on the ground in Germany. When Dustbin closed at the 
end of 1946, Air Commodore Bennett, the Chief of British FIAT, considered that the 
establishment of an exclusively British camp along similar lines to be a matter of utmost 
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ƵƌŐĞŶĐǇ ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĞĂĚŝůǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ‘ǁŚŽŵŝƚŝƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĚƚŽŚŽƵse in 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŬŝĚŶĂƉƉŝŶŐ QďǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ
ŚŽƐƚŝůĞƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?523 Moreover, German experts who had been interrogated, often in Britain, 
but were now back in Germany awaiting a contract for long-term employment, would be 
ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ^ƵƉƉůǇĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨĐŽŶƚĂĐƚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů
ǁŚĞŶ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ ? ? ĂŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽƵůĚďĞ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ŽĨĨƐĞƚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ Ă
central detention camp.524 
A partial solution came in the form of a transit hotel, operated by T-Force, which 
went by the designation Operation Matchbox. It was opened on 16 January 1947 and two 
days later it already had 40 Germans in residence; by April, that number was 191, and by 
August, it was 280 (of which 119 were scientists or technicians, and the remainder were 
family members).525 Very often, the demand for Matchbox exceeded its capacity, which 
W^ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ĚĞĞƉůǇ ƌĞŐƌĞƚƚĂďůĞ  ‘since it means that many useful subjects will be 
irretrievably lost to us, and when the news of their fate goes round on the grapevine it will 
ďĞǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďůŽǁƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ ? ?526 All those who stayed at the hotel were afforded 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞůƵǆƵƌŝĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŚĞĂǀǇǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ?ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨƵĞůĂŶĚ ‘all 
amenities normaůůǇ ĞŶũŽǇĞĚ ďǇ ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?527 In addition, the 
scientists received a salary of RM 200, though this compared very unfavourably with the 
amounts offered by the Soviets, which ranged from RM 800 to 8,000.
528
 This is salient 
because the main purpose of Matchbox was not really to hold German experts for British 
exploitation, but rather to prevent them from going over to the Soviets, either willingly or 
otherwise.529 
dŚŝƐ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞŶŝĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ h^ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ Ă Ɛtrategy 
designed to withhold valuable German specialists from the Soviet Union through a variety of 
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means, and was reflected in the criteria which German experts had to meet before they 
were considered for inclusion in Matchbox. The three categories fit for inclusion were: 
a) Scientists and Technicians whom it is desired to deny to the Russians on account of their 
scientific or technical eminence in certain warlike subjects. 
b) Scientists and Technicians who, while not to be classed in Category (a), would 
nevertheless have a serious effect on Russian sponsored development and research 
should they be removed from, or denied to, the Russians. 
c) Scientists and Technicians who are valuable, not for their professional competence, but 
because they can give intelligence of value to us about Russian sponsored research and 
development.530 
Unfortunately, the fact that these guidelines did not focus very heavily on actual scientific or 
technical worth, meant that they were very open to interpretation by ambitious and 
enterprising German individuals of dubious exploitation value. For instance, EPES were 
bombarded by appeals from characters such as Ernst Schnubel, who claimed he had 
ŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚ Ă  ‘ĞĂƚŚ ZĂǇ dƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ
weapon, a defence against bombs (including atom bombs), and in peacetime against garden 
ƉĞƐƚƐ ? ǀĞƌŵŝŶ ? ůŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ǁŽƌĚƐ ?  ‘ŐĂŶŐƐƚĞƌƐ ? ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƐ ?ƌĞďĞůƐ ?ĞƚĐ ? ? ?531 
 Schnubel was obviously too eccentric to ever be taken seriously, but several others 
did slip through the net and were able to take advantage of the amenities at Matchbox 
which were often so hard to come by elsewhere in post-war Germany. This formed the basis 
of much of the criticism directed at Matchbox, such as that of Dr Bertie Blount, the Director 
ŽĨZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĂŶĐŚĂŶĚŽŶĞ ŽĨ ŝƚƐŚĂƌƐŚĞƐƚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘Ă
ƉůĂĐĞŽĨƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ĂƉůĂĐĞŽĨƚƌĂŶƐŝƚ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƌǀŽŶ^ƚƵĚŶŝƚǌ ‘ǁŚŽƉƌĞƚĞŶĚƐƚŽ be a physiologist but is universally regarded as 
Ă ƋƵĂĐŬďŽƚŚ ďǇƉŚǇƐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂŶĚďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?532 Blount also 
ĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚDĂƚĐŚďŽǆǁĂƐ ‘one of those unfortunate projects which are thoughtlessly entered 
into and leave a trail of dŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞŵ ? ?533 Though much of the denigration of 
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Matchbox was well-founded and valid, it acted as an essential component of British 
personnel exploitation in Germany, and would later prove very useful in facilitating the 
British employment of German experts. In the meantime however, the phase of short-term 
detention and interrogation was still firmly underway in Britain. 
 
Short-Term: In Britain 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the exploitation of German personnel on 
British soil had numerous antecedents through the interrogation and covert observation of 
senior prisoners-of-war who were interned in Britain, most notably at Trent Park in north 
London, where internees included some 59 Wehrmacht generals.534 This process was 
eagerly adopted for the purposes of scientific intelligence within two months of the end of 
the war in Europe. In the same way that the actions of Alsos did much to shape the future 
activity of exploitation teams on the ground in Germany, it was investigations into the Nazi 
atomic bomb project which laid the template for a wider programme of exploitation of 
scientific and technical personnel on the whole. From July until December 1945, Operation 
Epsilon was conducted, in which ten senior German atomic physicists who had been 
detained as part of the Alsos operations across Europe, including Werner Heisenberg, Otto 
Hahn and Max von Laue, were interned at Farm Hall, Godmanchester, fifteen miles north-
west of Cambridge.535 
 Here they were secretly wire-tapped in the hope that something of significance 
about the German bomb project, which the scientists would not reveal in interrogation, 
would be overheard, although by this stage Britain and the US were fairly confident that 
their own bomb project had been considerably further advanced than the German 
equivalent. The German physicists did not necessarily share this view and were quite 
shocked when news reached them of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
August. The internees were also completely oblivious of the eavesdropping going on, with 
,ĞŝƐĞŶďĞƌŐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚďƌĂǌĞŶůǇůĂƵŐŚŝŶŐŽĨĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽĨŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂŶĚƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘Oh no, 
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ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚĂƐĐƵƚĞĂƐĂůůƚŚĂƚ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƌĞĂů'ĞƐƚĂƉŽŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂ
bit old-ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?536 In many ways, the most important purpose of the Farm 
Hall detention was to keep these valuable human assets out of the hands of the Soviets and 
thus contribute towards the retarding of the h^^Z ?Ɛ atomic bomb project.537 
 In this respect, Operation Epsilon can be seen as both a precursor but also a 
microcosm of the personnel exploitation programme as a whole. It was conducted with the 
same general aims in mind, and also suffered from some of the same problems which beset 
the larger initiative. For instance, in September 1945, the internees started to become 
restive and Heisenberg even made suggestions that he would escape from Farm Hall and 
 ‘try to get in touch with some of his British scientific friends in order to ask them to make 
public the fact that these German sĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ŬĞƉƚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?538 In his 
biography of Heisenberg, David Cassidy noted that the major effort which the Allies 
expended to secure Heisenberg reinforced his greatly inflated sense of self-worth (though 
this was dealt quite a blow by the news of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan) and 
encouraged him to complain often about what he considered to be poor treatment.
539
 This 
situation was exacerbated when Otto Hahn was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 
December but could not attend the ceremony due to his secret internment (he only learnt 
of his award by reading about it in the Daily Telegraph), which prompted the British 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƌĞĐǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ
sensationalism, is whittled away before the matter leaks out, it will be less embarrassing if 
the German scientists turn nasty ?.540 In reality, by the time MPs began receiving letters from 
their constituents, mostly scientists, complaining about poor treatment of these esteemed 
German physicists, they had already been returned to Germany, often at the behest of the 
men themselves, including Hahn, who became the founding president of the Max Planck 
Society, and Heisenberg, who became Director of the Max Planck Institute for Physics.541 
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 Operation Epsilon may be representative of certain elements of the wider 
programme as a whole but its use in this respect is limited by its small scale and by the 
eminence of the men targeted. The experience of other German experts who were brought 
to Britain to be detained and questioned did not always mirror that of the Farm Hall group. 
While Heisenberg had dismissed the very thought of the British using so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘'ĞƐƚĂƉŽ
ƚĂĐƚŝĐƐ ? ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞůĞƐƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ?/ŶƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƌŶĞƐƚĞĂƌĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƚƌŽůůĞƌ'ĞŶĞƌĂů
of the Chemical Industries Branch ? ǁƌŽƚĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂƚ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ďƌĂŶĐŚ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌĞŶƚ
organisation, the Trade & Industry Division (part of the British Control Commission) 
complaining about the process for the removal of German specialists from Germany, which 
he outlined thus: 
Usually an NCO arrives without notice at the house or office of the German and warns him 
that he will be required. He does not give him any details of the reasons, nor does he 
present his own credentials. Some time later the German is 'seized' (often in the middle of 
the night) and removed under guard. 
ĞĂƌĚĞƌĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ‘ƐĂǀŽƵƌƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞƐƚĂƉŽŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚ QŝƐďŽƵŶĚ
ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨĂůĂƌŵ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ ĚŝĚŶŽƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƚǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ
foster.542 
Just over two weeks later, Bearder received a reply from Brigadier W.E.H. Grylls, the 
chief of T-Force, which curtly noted that, other than from Bearder himself,  ‘ŽŶůǇ one 
complaint has been received, although over 1,000 Germans have been evacuated through T-
&ŽƌĐĞ ? ? and added that Beardeƌ ?Ɛ Chemical Industries Branch was also the only division of 
the Control Commission which got special advance notification of any German who was to 
be taken. Grylls went on to say that his office was not  ‘ĂǁĂƌĞ of any Control Commission 
law, order or instruction that requires a British officer, NCO or soldier to present his 
credentials to a German under any circumstances whatever unless it be to a civil policeman 
on ĚƵƚǇ ? ? He concluded by making  ‘Ă strong ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ? against ĞĂƌĚĞƌ ?Ɛ tone and suggesting 
that he  ‘ŵĂǇ now wish to withdraw the ůĞƚƚĞƌ ? ?543 On the whole, the evidence suggests that 
ĞĂƌĚĞƌ ?Ɛ account of  ‘ĐůŽĂŬ and dagger ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? was exaggerated and far from accurate, 
and in reality this was simply another minor chapter in the ongoing saga of dispute between 
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those tasked with rebuilding German industry and those tasked with exploiting it.544 
Nonetheless, it is worth examining the process utilised when transporting German experts 
from Germany to Britain, as this was a crucial element in the satisfactory operation of the 
exploitation programme. 
The responsibility for handling the experts in transit was left mainly to T-Force, who 
had to locate the individual specialist, obtain security clearance for their movement and 
then escort them from their home all the way to a specified reception point in Britain. This 
involved a considerable degree of administrative work, especially as by mid-1946, 
approximately 20 German scientists were making this journey every week.545 Even 
contacting all the relevant agencies was no small task; T-Force reported that  ‘four Agencies 
in the UK and eight Agencies in Germany are concerned with the move of every 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ? ?546 
The procedure for each scientist usually involved giving them seven ĚĂǇƐ ? notice where 
possible, collecting them from their homes and taking them to BAOR HQ at Bad Oeynhausen 
for documentation, and then transporting them by train and boat, usually in parties of three 
or four escorted by a British military or civilian officer, to Britain. During the journey, the 
scientists shared the ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ? messing and accommodation facilities.547  
Escorting officers were told that the men they had custody of were not prisoners of 
war and  ‘ƵŶůĞƐƐ instructions to the contrary have been issued, you may assume them to be 
peaceable and co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? Furthermore,  ‘ĂƐ the value of their information depends to a 
certain extent upon their goodwill, they should be treated with reasonable consideration 
and should be adequately fed en route. ?548 However, these good intentions did not always 
easily manifest themselves, as related in the case of a  ‘ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ German ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? who 
was returning to Germany from Britain after interrogation. When he boarded the ship at 
Harwich,  ‘ƚŚĞ Captain insisted that the German should go below and he was taken to that 
part of the hold reserved for military prisoners returning to Germany under ĂƌƌĞƐƚ ? ?549 
Nevertheless, not all German scientists who travelled to and from Britain had such a bad 
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experience. In January 1947, the Board of Trade proudly circulated an extract from a 
censorship report which included comments from the wife of an unnamed scientist who had 
been brought to Britain; she said:  ‘dŚĞǇ have shown great concern for my husband. [They] 
took him to London personally and will bring him back personally for ŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ ? ? She also 
commented that in his absence, their home was protected from being requisitioned and 
they had been  ‘ŶŽďůǇ looked ĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? with  ‘ŚĞĂǀǇ-labour ration cards, ample fuel for the 
whole winter and a monthly remittance of RM 400 from the German ĂŶŬ ? ?550 
Once in Britain, in an effort to avoid potential public criticism, the German specialists 
were often housed out of view, in special interrogation centres, many of which had also 
served as POW camps during the war. The primary centre of this nature used by the British 
for scientific and technical personnel was Inkpot, based at the Beltane School in Wimbledon, 
directly south-west of London.551 Here, German experts could be housed and then visited by 
experts from various government departments who had an interest in their particular area 
of expertise  W staff from the Ministries of Aircraft Production and Supply, for instance, 
conducted interrogations on a vast range of topics, including radio control in guided 
projectiles, gas turbines, rocket fuels and parachute design.552 Inkpot provided only a 
temporary solution however and, at the end of 1946, the Beltane School site had to be 
relinquished to allow for an extension to the nearby Southlands teacher training college, 
and to replace it a BIOS Reception Centre was created. 
This was situated at Spedan Towers, in Hampstead;  ‘Ă very large, modern private 
house in its own ŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ ? and formerly the home of retail magnate John Lewis. German 
scientists who were to stay there, known as  ‘sŝƐŝƚŽƌƐ ? ?were informed that: 
This is run on the lines of a hostel and is administered by a small unarmed military staff. 
There are no guards or barbed wire fences and there are no restrictions on the amount of 
mail either sent or received. The Visitors are accommodated in single-tier beds in rooms 
holding two or three each. In addition the visitors have at their disposal a dining room, a 
large well-furnished lounge and a library. The number of Visitors living at Spedan Towers at 
any one time varies between 25 and 30. 
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The lifestyle enjoyed by Visitors at Spedan Towers was a largely pleasant one. They did not 
have complete freedom of movement, but board, lodgings and medical care were free, they 
were given a weekly cash allowance of 10 shillings (roughly £13 today), and 6 shillings (£8) 
worth of chocolate, cigarettes and similar items, as well as having access to a swimming 
pool, regular film shows, lectures on British culture and occasional tickets for concerts.553 
Not only were the experts themselves well looked-after, and protected from 
dismissal by their German employer during their period of interrogation, but their families 
also received numerous amenities, including an ample financial allowance, as well as 
increased rations and fuel allocations. The importance of this cannot be understated during 
a time when malnutrition and starvation were very real threats to the majority of ordinary 
German citizens.554 Some German experts attempted to take advantage of this system, 
however, and secure these benefits for friends and distant relatives too, which resulted in 
BIOS issuing definitions of who exactly constituted dependants  W wives, children,  ‘ĂŐĞĚ 
parents, sick relatives or any such members of the family who cannot fend for ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? 
or a nominated housekeeper in the case of a widower scientist with children.555 BIOS 
estimated that the total payment to each individual, including  ‘ƉŽĐŬĞƚ ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ? the 
allowance to his family and his own board and lodging, was about £6 (£150) a week.556 In 
return for this largely favourable treatment, the German experts were expected to co-
operate whole-heartedly with all interrogations conducted at the Reception Centre, as well 
as being prepared to travel (escorted, naturally) for short spells to other locations around 
Britain, for interviews in situ at various private firms and establishments.  
Despite this fairly comfortable arrangement, the British authorities decided to pre-
empt any complaints the German experts might have about their accommodation in a 
pamphlet issued to all Reception Centre Visitors, which explained, with a hint of accusation, 
that  ‘ƚŚĞ housing shortage due to air-attacks during 6 years of war makes it impossible to 
provide better acĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?557 This pamphlet was not sufficient to deflect criticism by 
some  ‘ǀŝƐŝƚŽƌƐ ? W Friedrich Uhlmann, who during the war had owned a metallurgical research 
                                                             
553
 TNA, FO 1031/9. Price adjustments calculated on: http://apps.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/ (accessed 
16 December 2014). 
554
 Reinisch, Perils of Peace, 179. 
555
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƉĞŶĚĂŶƚƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?dĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? 
556
 Ibid.,  ‘Minutes of 6th BIOS ZĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĞŶƚƌĞWĂŶĞůDĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
557
 TNA, FO 1031/19,  ‘Pamphlet for issue to personnel at /K^ZĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĞŶƚƌĞ ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 160 - 
 
and production factory, was brought to  ‘ĂƵƐƚĞƌĞ ? Spedan Towers in early 1946 and left in 
May,  ‘ŚŝŐŚůǇ ŝŶĐĞŶƐĞĚ ? by what he described as  ‘ŵŝƐĞƌůǇ ? and  ‘ŶŝŐŐĂƌĚůǇ ? treatment. He felt 
that in return for his considerable contributions to furthering the British hard metal 
industry, the amount of money paid to him and his family was  ‘ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ less than an 
ŝŶƐƵůƚ ? ?558 hŚůŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ case, however, appears to be an exception rather than the rule. The 
BIOS Reception Centre at Spedan Towers continued to operate at a steady rate throughout 
1947 but by the end of that year, the importance of short-term interrogation was 
considerably diminished, while the programme of recruitment for longer-term employment 
was in the ascendancy, and facilities were forced to change to reflect the shifting needs of 
the exploitation initiative as a whole. 
 
Long-Term: Defence Recruitment 
As can be seen in the policy of detainment and interrogation, in Germany as well as in 
Britain, the motivation was not always attempting to secure the greatest intellectual 
resources for Britain, but to deny those same resources to Russia. As Julian Lewis has 
convincingly illustrated, even by 1942, many of the more astute British policy-makers 
perceived the Soviet Union as the most likely opponent in a future conflict.559 Accordingly, 
fears grew about the power the Soviets would wield if they were allowed to acquire a large 
amount of German scientific and technical expertise. While detention prevented key 
German specialists from passing into Soviet hands in the short-term, it became necessary to 
initiate a project to pre-empt and then counteract the USSR ?s large-scale recruitment of 
military scientists, technicians and engineers.
560
 
 As early as August 1945, while the war against Japan was in its final throes, the 
discussion between Britain and the US shifted from the immediate exploitation of German 
science to hasten the end of the Pacific War to a broader, further-reaching arrangement. 
The British Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) noted that  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ is no doubt that very great 
advantage to our own defence research and development would be derived from bringing 
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to the UK a small number of high-grade experts to carry on their work in specialised ĨŝĞůĚƐ ? ? 
of which they included aerodynamics, hydrodynamics and power plants as preliminary 
examples. They did however mitigate this with three main concerns  W firstly, that in so doing 
they might allow a small part of German war potential to endure; secondly, that it would 
appear hypocritical when they were so strongly trying to deter their wartime Allies from 
pursuing a similar policy; and thirdly, that it might arouse public discontent in Britain at 
paying German scientists who so recently had played a key role in the war effort against the 
Allies. These concerns had little real bearing though, as they were prevailed over by the 
widely-held belief that  ‘ƚŚĞ Russians will in any event employ German technicians upon 
whom they can lay their ŚĂŶĚƐ ? ?561 
 Just over two weeks after this report was considered, and only two days after the 
end of the war against Japan, the key military ministries were already discussing which fields 
they would be most interested in exploiting and provisional numbers to be allocated to 
each. The Admiralty wanted 25 German experts in subjects such as hydrogen peroxide 
engines and optical crystals; the Ministry of Aircraft Production wanted 40 on topics such as 
supersonic aircraft and infrared-guided missiles; and the Ministry of Supply estimated it 
would need 85 covering rockets, ceramics, fuses and internal and external ballistics.562 This 
limited programme of employment, totalling only 150 German specialists, was approved by 
the British Chiefs of Staff at a meeting on 24 August 1945.563 This was then ratified by 
government ministers within a matter of weeks, where they agreed  ‘in principle that 
German scientists should be brought to this country to be employed on research in the 
national interest, provided that they are regarded as servants of the State, and subject to 
certain ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ? ?564 
 This programme became known as the DCOS Scheme, after its origins with the 
Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and that committee became the co-ordinating body for the 
recruitment of all German defence specialists to Britain in the post-war period. However, 
the scheme did not take off at any speed. By October 1946, when the programme had been 
in operation for just over a year, the Americans announced that they were extending the 
                                                             
561
 dE ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WŽůŝĐǇĨŽƌƚŚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
562
 Ibid., 17 August 1945. 
563
 /ďŝĚ ? ? ‘DŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨ ? ? ?th Ž^DĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
564
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 162 - 
 
limit of their German military specialist recruitment to 1,000 individuals; at the same time, 
the British had only managed to secure under contract 33 German defence scientists, a 
deficit which they attributed to the  ‘ƐůŽǁŶĞƐƐ of procedure for reception in h< ?.565 By April 
1947, there were 60 German experts employed under the DCOS Scheme with 28 more 
contracts pending.566 In November 1948, Sir Ben Lockspeiser, the Chief Scientist at the 
Ministry of Supply, reported that,  ‘ďƌŽĂĚůǇ ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? ? there were about 90 German scientists 
working at British defence establishments. He also registered his concern that, due to legal 
restrictions, it would be very difficult to extend any of these contracts beyond 1950.567 
 One of the main reasons why the British recruitment figures remained so low was 
because they were reluctant to use coercion (as the Soviets often did) and thus insisted on 
only bringing over German specialists who were  ‘fully prepared to work ĂďƌŽĂĚ ? so as to 
 ‘ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ their whole-hearted co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?568, and because they were unable to make 
offers which could compete with those of the Americans. Britain did, however, have some 
potential appeal for German scientists to the point where they  ‘might prefer less favourable 
terms from the British to apparently more attractive offers from the American and Russian 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?569 This was certainly the case for Hellmuth Walter, the submarine and rocketry 
expert whose Walterwerke facility in Kiel had been one of the most significant early 
exploitation targets, who had received offers from the Americans but felt he was too old for 
such an upheaval and opted to go to Britain instead.570 One of tĂůƚĞƌ ?Ɛ employees, 
Hermann Treutler, a peroxide fuel expert, had a slightly different, and more contentious, 
justification for coming to work in Britain after the war  W he still felt that Germans  ‘were the 
master race and Britain was part of our Anglo-Saxon ƌĂĐĞ ? ?571 Naturally, dƌĞƵƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ case was 
particularly extreme but it is indicative of the fact that for some German citizens the 
Western Allies were more palatable employers (and occupiers) than the Soviets, though 
usually on political rather than skewed racial grounds.572 
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 ƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ƐƵĐŚĂƐdƌĞƵƚůĞƌ ?ƐǁĞƌĞ ĚĞeply problematic because, as desperate as the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ ďƌŝŐŚƚĞƐƚ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ
technical talent, they were also deeply concerned about security in Europe, particularly with 
regard to a German military resurgence.573 dŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŵĂĚĞǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘nobody 
whose record indicates that he was a convinced Nazi should be brought to the UK to work, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŚŝŐŚ ŚŝƐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?574 Even within this clarification, the term 
 ‘ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ EĂǌŝ ? ƌĂŝsed its own issues, as highlighted by a Ministry of Aircraft Production 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ǁŚŽ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ  ‘ĞǆĂĐƚůǇ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƐŶŽ-ŽŶĞ ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ŬŶŽǁ ? ?575 
Furthermore, the commitment to this poorly-defined principle was not rock solid. As it 
became progressiǀĞůǇĐůĞĂƌĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐŚĂĚŶŽƐĐƌƵƉůĞƐĂďŽƵƚĂŶǇƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ  ‘ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚ ĂŶĚ
ƐŝŶĐĞƌĞ ?ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨĚĞŶĂǌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŵĂŶǇƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂǁĂǇĂŶĚ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŽĨ  
their rivals.576 Much of the literature on denazification suggests that the British commitment 
to it was far from thorough and sincere, and that in reality it was a mere administrative 
issue which Britain lacked the finances, manpower or wherewithal to see through.577 
Nonetheless, the British authorities suggested  ‘ĂƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĚĞŶĂǌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ůĂǁƐĂƌĞĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?578 
The perceived risk was not just restricted to Nazis. In August 1945, the British Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) expressed the opinion that all Germans, even those who 
ŚĂĚĐŽŵĞƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ^ŽĐŝĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐĂŶĚ:ĞǁƐ ?ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ůŽǇĂůƚǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ &ĂƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ ? ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚĂƚ ‘if there were any possibility of 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚďĞůŝŬĞůǇĂƐĂŶǇƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨŝƚ ?ƐŽůŽŶŐĂƐŝƚǁĂƐ
ŶŽƚEĂǌŝ ? ?dŚĞ:/ĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶŝĨĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶǁĂƐŶŽƚǀĞƌǇ
ůŝŬĞůǇ ?ŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ ‘ĂďƐŽƌďĞĚŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶŽƌďŝƚ ?ƉƌĞsented a genuine danger.579 
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Several of the agencies involved in exploitation prepared reports on the risk of any 
form of hostile German military revival, and how it could potentially be aided by German 
experts who had worked for Britain and gained in-depth knowledge of British military 
research projects. Even during the initial Anglo-American discussions about short-term 
utilisation of German expertise to contribute towards the war against Japan, British officials 
ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ ďŽƵŶĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƚƵƌŶĂny such scientists to Germany, either at the 
ĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞǁĂƌ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞĞĚĂƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞ ? ?dŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĞǇŐĂǀĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŚĂƌĚůŝŶĞ ?
which was in direct contrast with the initial American proposals, was this: 
In working in the United States or in this country German scientists will necessarily become 
acquainted in some measure with our techniques and it is obviously undesirable that such 
men should return to Germany armed not only with the knowledge they now possess of 
German science, but British or United States knowledge.580 
One suggestion for how to handle this risk came from the Scientific and Technical Research 
Board which proposed that all German scientists brought over to work in Britain be made to 
sign a document which  ‘renders them liable to prosecution if they disclose to unauthorised 
persons, details of the work on which they had been ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚ ? ? The Intelligence Division of 
the Control Council felt this would not be sufficiently effective and suggested in addition 
that each German expert be given an  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ƚĂůŬ ? on the importance of discretion and 
instructed to report any attempts to elicit secret information from them to the nearest 
Intelligence Division office.581 
E.E. Haddon, the Assistant Director of the Technical and Personnel Administration 
worried that the reduced level of German industry enforced by the occupying forces might 
lead to widespread unemployment and that  ‘scientists and technicians, particularly the first-
class brains, are likely to accept unemployment less placidly than the others and may form 
or join subversive political groups of which, with their intelligence, they will probably 
become ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ? He went on to advise that Intelligence Division among others should keep 
close watch on scientists, especially those who worked in fields which they identified as 
particularly dangerous: electronics, radar and biological warfare.582 The inclusion of 
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biological warfare on this list is interesting because, as has been shown, German research in 
this field was generally poor, particularly in comparison to parallel British efforts, and yet 
fear of a bacteriological attack continued to influence British policy, in much the same way 
as it had done during the war.583 The Research Branch of the Trade and Industry Division 
issued a similarly cautionary report in December 1946 which espoused the view that it was 
possible, and even likely, that if some of the scientists and technicians who had spent the 
greater part of their working lives on research and development in fields now prohibited 
under Allied occupation laws,  ‘ĨŝŶĚ that they can continue their work without detection, 
they may do so, partly in the hope of attracting the attention of foreign customers, and 
partly because of their intense interest in their ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?584 Efforts were made to tackle this 
by promoting research into peaceful fields; representative of the wider scheme, espoused 
by the British occupation authorities, to  ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝƐĞ ? Germany through a comprehensive 
but, in reality, ill-conceived programme of re-education.585 
 Despite the evident concern that all these reports and proposed solutions suggest, 
the risk of a native German resurgence was nearly always considered of secondary 
importance compared to extensive recruitment by the USSR and the combination of 
German expertise with Soviet manpower and physical resources.586 It was for this reason 
that Matchbox proved so essential as a way to secure German scientists and technicians, 
and to ensure they were not lured or deported eastwards, while the formal business of 
arranging contracts could be completed. In some cases, this was an extremely efficient 
procedure, as in the case of the Linke team. This was a group of six guided missile specialists 
evacuated from Berlin, brought through Matchbox, interrogated and then all offered 
permanent employment at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), Farnborough.587 
Intelligence Division believed that their removal from the eastern zone  ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ  Q affected 
Russian exploitation of German guided missile ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? This served the ultimate objective 
of Matchbox which was  ‘to remove from Russian influence and control, scientists and 
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technicians eminent in certain warlike subjects who were materially contributing, or could 
materially contribute, to Russian war ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?588 
However, Matchbox did not always satisfactorily serve its stated purposes. Scientific 
and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB) worried that offers of employment were not always 
suitably forthcoming from potential British employers for the German experts being held at 
Matchbox, who had been evacuated westwards from the Soviet zone. STIB registered 
understanding that before employment could be offered, the relevant departments had to 
be satisfied that no British individual could fill the position adequately but countered that  ‘ŝƚ 
should be remembered that unless Matchbox scientists and technicians can be suitably 
employed  Q there is every possibility that they will turn to their late Eastern ŵĂƐƚĞƌƐ ? ?589 
 Naturally, the situation which emerged from these circumstances was that 
numerous German scientists were held under Matchbox auspices lest they be seized by the 
Soviets but were offered no employment and so remained in an unenviable state of limbo. 
This was the case of Heinz Peukert who had participated in Operation Surgeon at 
Völkenrode but when that commitment ended in February 1947, he had been instructed by 
the Ministry of Supply that he could undertake no further work without their permission, 
and had returned to his home in the French zone of Germany. Seven months later, he wrote 
to the British authorities, restating his willingness to work in Britain, South Africa or Canada, 
and asking for a speedy resolution to his predicament, as he had no income and was 
encountering difficulty in obtaining a ration card. By December 1947, his case was still 
unresolved.590 
 The unpleasant experience of Peukert aside, Operation Surgeon proved to be, on the 
whole, one of the more successful British recruitment efforts, perhaps because a good 
understanding of the capabilities of the individual German experts involved had been 
reached during the work conducted at the  ‘^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? in Germany itself. The Ministry 
of Supply was also able to reduce the vast amount of time necessary to obtain clearance to 
bring a German expert to work in Britain to a much more manageable two months, and by 
late November 1946, the Air Division of the Ministry had already brought over 16 of their 74 
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target scientists (selected from a total list of 500), and they had begun work in Britain.591 
Even the streamlined process developed under Surgeon auspices involved multiple steps  W 
Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) scientists working at the  ‘^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? in 
Germany recommended which German experts they felt were worth recruiting to MAP, who 
in turn forwarded it to the Duchy of Lancaster, who then passed it on to the Control 
Commission, which might call in Air Division if necessary.592 Again, this is evidence that the 
British, though keen to secure the best scientists for themselves, persistently relied on 
convoluted administrative channels which hampered their recruitment efforts. By January 
1947, the Air element of the Ministry of Supply had effected the employment of 30 of their 
allotted 47 scientists under the aegis of Operation Surgeon, and these men went on to have 
a tangible impact on British aeronautics, especially in the field of supersonic aircraft.593 
 Most of the German specialists who were brought to work for military 
establishments in Britain after the war, under the DCOS Scheme or one of its smaller 
parallels, were subject to roughly the same basic contract terms. They were initially  ‘ůĂŶĚĞĚ ? 
for a period of six months which could be extended  ‘ĨŽƌ a further limited period if justified in 
the national ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? and often was. During this time they were always contracted to a 
government ministry or department, which meant that they were  ‘ipso facto a temporary 
government ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ? ?594 Despite this, they were still subject to the  ‘ƵƐƵĂů enemy alien 
ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? including movement only within a five mile radius, no ownership of a car, 
motorcycle or camera, only one letter home per week, no contact with the Press or 
attendance at party political meetings, and adherence to a curfew of midnight to 6am. They 
were, however, permitted to visit  ‘ůŽĐĂů licensed ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ? ?595 The salary scale offered to the 
experts covered quite a considerable range and was divided into six sections: Grade I to III 
for scientists and the same for technicians. A Grade I scientist (the highest rate) could earn 
between £700 and £800 p.a. (approximately £20,000 today), while a Grade III technician 
(the lowest) could only earn up to half that. The German employees were expected to pay 
                                                             
591
 dE ?s/ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ PŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵ ? ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
592
 TNA, FO 942/426,  ‘DWĂŶĚDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ^ƵƉƉůǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶZ&KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ? ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
593
 hƚƚůĞǇ ? ‘KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ? ? ? ? 
594
 TNA, FO 1031/19, Lt-Col. D.G. Edwardes to Maintenance Branch, ZEO, CCG, 23 November 1946. 
595
 dE ?> ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌ-departmenƚĂůDĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇKĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 168 - 
 
British income tax on this salary, and they were allowed to remit up to 50% of their earnings 
back to their families in Germany, where it was also subject to German income tax.596 
As in the case of German specialists brought over for short-term interrogation, the 
families of German experts employed in Britain were also fairly well looked after; alongside 
this 50% remittance, they were guaranteed protection,  ‘ĨŽŽĚ value of 2,300 calories for 
wives and children and a certain amount of heat and light for essential warmth and cooking 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? This was considered vital, as British exploitation agencies had noted, as 
though it were a somewhat unusual characteristic, that the scientists attached  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚ 
importance to the protection of their homes and families during their ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ? ?597 Certainly, 
the calorie allocation alone made it an attractive offer as, in 1946, Germany, and the British 
zone, with its lack of good agricultural land, in particular, was lurching dangerously close to 
a starvation crisis  W the average official ration for ordinary German citizens during this 
period was 1,630 calories, two-thirds of what it had been in 1939 and 1940.598 The German 
specialists were also permitted to take occasional leave (though not until their initial six 
months of employment was complete) to return to Germany and visit their families. On 
some rare instances, it was possible for family members to travel to Britain instead, 
particularly in cases where it was feared that if the expert returned to Germany, he might be 
at risk of kidnap by the Soviets (this was particularly pertinent if his home was in Berlin).599 
A policy was also considered wherein the wives and children of German scientists 
could be relocated to Britain on a semi-permanent basis. This initially encountered 
considerable opposition, largely due to wanting to avoid double standards  ‘ŝŶ view of the 
impossibility of permitting British Officers employed by the Allied Control Commission and 
British Army Officers to take their families to Germany at the present ƚŝŵĞ ? ?600 However, by 
January 1947, it was agreed that in the case of scientists whose contracts were being 
extended for a second term, their families could be moved to Britain to join them, as long as 
he was  ‘ƚŽ work there long enough to warrant the trouble and expense of getting his family 
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to ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? In addition, while they were living in Britain, the families were given assurances 
that  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ homes will be made available to them on their return and no furniture will be 
moved out during their abseŶĐĞ ? ?601 
Despite the seemingly generous terms of the contracts offered to the German 
specialists, this was a period of great change and hardship for the majority of the German 
population and areas of complaint soon presented themselves, particularly in terms of 
money and amenities for their families. Many experts expressed  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? at 
potentially having to pay both British and German income tax.602 A more serious issue arose 
following an explosion at the Rocket Propulsion Establishment at Westcott, near Aylesbury 
in Buckinghamshire in late 1947, which claimed the life of Johannes Schmidt and badly 
injured Heinz Walter, both of whom were German specialists who had been brought over at 
the end of the war under the DCOS Scheme. Dr ^ĐŚŵŝĚƚ ?Ɛ wife requested an increase in the 
pay-out of £2,920 (some £75,000 today), but the Treasury decided that it was not possible 
to  ‘treat Frau Schmidt more favourably than a British national  W a consideration which is 
emphasised by the fact that two established [British] civil servants were killed in the same 
explosion which resulted in Dr ^ĐŚŵŝĚƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĂƚŚ ? ?603 
Aside from these drastic occurrences, the biggest issue raised by German scientists 
was the uncertainty of their fate. In April 1948, Dietrich Küchemann, the eminent 
aerodynamicist who would later go on to become the Chief Scientific Officer at RAE 
Farnborough and a key figure in the design of Concorde, wrote a letter to the Ministry of 
Supply on behalf of all his German colleagues at the RAE, describing the present state of 
ĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ĂƐ  ‘ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů
ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŶŐ Ă ŵŽǀĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚĞ ŬĞǇ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ
ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚǁĞƌĞƉĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ‘ĂĐŝǀŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŽĨůŝĨĞĨŽƌƵƐĂŶĚŽƵƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
greater input into terms of contracts.604 Three months later, a similar letter was received by 
Sir Ben Lockspeiser at the Ministry of Supply from six scientists working for the government 
at the steam turbine firm of C.A. Parsons in Newcastle, stating that until this time they had 
 ‘ĞŶũŽǇĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽƵƚǁŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚůǇ ?ďƵƚƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŶŐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐůĂƌŝƚǇŽŶ 
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ƚŚĞŝƌĨƵƚƵƌĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚďĞĂƌŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?605 Küchemann received no response, and the 
reply that the entreaty from the C.A. Parsons group received was mostly full of 
equivocation. The Ministry of Supply were unwilling to commit to anything, or to give any 
 ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ instead that the scientists would be 
better off seeking employment by a private firm and perhaps naturalisation as British 
citizens at some point further down the line.606 
While German experts who had already been brought over were striving to secure a 
future for themselves and their families, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were contemplating the 
conclusion of their recruitment scheme. In July 1949, it was announced that: 
The DCOS Scheme for the recruitment of German scientists had now been terminated. It is 
assumed that the exceptional type of men, whom this scheme was intended to cover, have 
all been considered by now. Furthermore the special recruiting arrangements which 
formerly existed are no longer required since a routine procedure whereby anyone, 
government department, firm or individual can apply to employ Germans has now been laid 
on. 
Throughout its four years of operation, the DCOS Scheme had secured the recruitment of 
172 German specialists, and many of those stayed on beyond 1950 and became naturalised 
British citizens.607 This figure only reveals a comparatively small segment of the British post-
war recruitment of German scientists and technicians as it only accounts for those 
employed on government defence work; a far larger programme was created to exploit the 
best of German civil industry. 
 
Long-Term: Civil Recruitment 
As has been seen with the exploitation of facilities, documents and equipment which 
occurred on the ground in Germany, although the initial stated focus was to acquire only 
intelligence pertaining to defence technology, with the aim of strengthening Allied arsenals 
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at the expense of Germany ?Ɛ ? this was soon augmented and then outstripped by commercial 
and industrial exploitation. The same was true in the recruitment of personnel. It has been 
argued that even before the end of the war Britain was laying plans for an ambitious 
expansion of its export capacity, to be effected largely by transplanting export-relevant 
technologies, and the associated personnel, from Germany.608 As early as August 1945, 
during the initial DCOS Scheme discussions, Dr Charles Goodeve of the Royal EĂǀǇ ?Ɛ 
Research and Development department,  ‘raised the question of bringing German 
technicians to this country for use in industry not wholly connected with ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ? with 
particular reference to the instruments industry.609 'ŽŽĚĞǀĞ ?Ɛ query was dismissed at the 
time, as recruitment on defence matters alone would be a much easier policy to push 
through, but the concept as a whole did not disappear. 
 In September, the Board of Trade issued a memo commenting on the benefits to 
British industry, and even the war effort, offered by German craftsmen who had emigrated 
to Britain before the war, but cautioning that admitting German scientists and technicians 
so soon after the end of the war might seem to many to be  ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ and 
ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ? ?610 By December, these qualms had all but evaporated, and the Cabinet Office 
contacted the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington to inform them that  ‘ŝǀŝů 
Departments are so impressed with successful Combined arrangements made for Germans 
in the Defence field that they would like to follow similar procedure in the Civil &ŝĞůĚ ? ? It was 
also suggested that any exploitation of German specialists for civil purposes would follow 
the same technique as that used for defence recruitment.611 At this stage, it was considered 
desirable to develop a joint policy with the Americans for any form of civil-industrial 
recruitment and the Joint Staff Mission tasked Sir John Magowan, the Minister in Charge of 
Commercial Department at the British Embassy, and R.D. Fennelly, Head of the British Raw 
Materials Mission, both in Washington, to discover the extent to which the US was pressing 
ahead with any such scheme. 
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 The British were impatient to begin this phase of exploitation and gave the 
Americans one month from the official presentation of the British proposals to signal their 
participation and prepare to exchange target lists or else, the British warned,  ‘ǁĞ shall 
consider ourselves free to go ahead on a unilateral ďĂƐŝƐ ? ?612 In order to be in a position to 
press ahead with some urgency, whether in an Anglo-American arrangement or alone, the 
British authorities had already begun developing plans for the execution of such a policy. In 
November 1945, the Board of Trade convened a meeting to form a panel which would enact 
the personnel exploitation of German civil industry; roughly a non-military equivalent to the 
DCOS Committee. The product of this meeting was the formation of the Darwin Panel; 
named for its chair, Sir Charles Darwin, physicist, director of the National Physical 
Laboratory and grandson of the illustrious naturalist whose name he shared.613 The panel 
was comprised of members from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 
Board of Trade, Control Commission for Germany, Home Office, Treasury, German Economic 
Division, Admiralty, Security Services and the Ministries of Supply, Labour, Health, 
Agriculture & Fisheries, Aircraft Production, and Fuel & Power.614 
 The Darwin Panel did not wait to hear from Washington whether the scheme would 
be a combined or unilateral one, and instead began surreptitiously co-ordinating policy. It 
instructed all divisions of CCG(BE) that  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ should immediately become known to 
the Germans, by  “ďƵƐŚ ƚĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ ? ?while precise conditions of service are being worked out 
in ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? They also asked all Branches to submit the names of  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇ first class men 
known to them and who they consider would be suitable for employment in ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? 
though they emphasised that  ‘ƚŚĞ type of person required is the scientist or technical expert 
and not the  “ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? ƚǇƉĞ ? ?615 Another important tenet of the policy was the 
accessibility of the German specialists who were brought over. They were not to be 
employed  ‘ŝŶ the ordinary sense of the term by the firms with whom they work  Q but will, in 
a sense, be loaned by the government, roughly in the capacity of ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ? ? this was 
largely to ensure that their expertise was  ‘ŵĂĚĞ available to the whole of the scientific field 
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or the whole of industry, and not  Q to individual firms who could more or less copyright the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ?616 Although this was a necessary step, it did in fact hamper the early stages of 
Darwin Panel recruitment, as many Research Associations (who were among the only bodies 
who were actually allowed to hire German experts) considered it to be too much hassle to 
employ these men, or alternatively they were interested in only utilising them for a matter 
of weeks, which fell under the remit of BIOS interrogations and not Darwin Panel work.617 
Further reluctance came as a result of not wanting to employ a German of foreman level 
who would then be in a position to give orders to British workers.618 
 In the meantime, in Washington, the State Department, which had acted as the most 
consistent obstacle to a joint Anglo-American policy on civil-industrial recruitment, began to 
relent. On 21 August 1946, the US Chiefs of Staff circulated a memo, outlining their new 
policy  ‘to facilitate the entry into the United States, under the immigration laws, of a limited 
number of outstanding German and Austrian scientists and ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ? ?619 With US 
concordance, the British policy was able to increase in scale and speed. The Darwin Panel 
issued its first Comprehensive List of 132 German scientists and technicians approved for 
employment in Britain, which included: head toolmaker, highly-skilled spectrograph 
mechanic, chief camera designer, specialist in button manufacture, principal scientist in 
manufacture of gyroscopic gunsights, technical supervisor of alarm clock production, leather 
expert, superintendent of rubber department, authority on sugar beet, consultant on die 
design for turbine blades, and experts on needles and fishhooks, production of Rayon 
thread from viscose, and x-ray analysis, to provide just a fairly limited spectrum.620 
 The procedure utilised for Darwin Panel recruitment was very similar to that of the 
DCOS Scheme, and naturally there were a number of crossovers. Indeed, in January 1946, 
Sir William Palmer of the Lord WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ Committee (which had oversight of the Darwin 
Panel) commented that  ‘ŝƚ is almost impossible to draw a rigid dividing line between 
research for industry and for defence ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?621 All of those brought over under the 
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Darwin Panel were salaried on the same scale as those who came to Britain to do defence 
work, and their families were entitled to the same amenities. Another element common to 
both schemes was the degree to which bureaucracy and adherence to guidelines could 
severely hinder the process of recruitment, and this is especially clear in the case of Otto 
Reder, a talented German aeronautical specialist and expert in the field of helicopter 
technology. Reder was brought over to Britain in October 1946 to be interrogated under the 
BIOS Scheme and was then returned to Germany with only a vague assurance about future 
employment but asked not to take another job in the interim. In December, Reder wrote to 
L.R. Allum, the supervising officer of German scientists at RAE Farnborough, noting that he 
was  ‘Ɛƚŝůů awaiting very anxiously any news from your authorities about my eventual 
ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? and enquiring optimistically about when he and his family would be able to 
come to Britain, how much luggage they could bring, and how much notice he would have 
of his move. He signed off by saying  ‘/ am very sorry to give you so much trouble, after all 
the trouble you have already had with me, and I thank you for all your ŚĞůƉ ? ?622 
 What followed was a run of correspondence between the Fairey Aviation Company, 
who were extremely keen to secure RĞĚĞƌ ?Ɛ employment, and various government offices 
and agencies who appeared to be perpetually mired in bureaucracy. By May 1947, Major 
Malet-Warden, of FIAT Forward, contacted BIOS and described the situation in no uncertain 
terms: 
We are still without definite word of ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ engagement by Fairey Aviation Co Helicopter 
Dept. We cannot stall Reder off any longer than two more weeks as on financial grounds he 
will be compelled to seek other employment. Please treat as urgent or this office will not 
stand in ZĞĚĞƌ ?Ɛ way if he wants employment elsewhere.623 
In August, Reder was brought back to Britain and housed at Spedan Towers again, in order 
to prevent him being employed elsewhere, while the details of his recruitment by Fairey 
were hammered out. 
However, just as progress appeared to be being made in this case, a new obstacle 
presented itself  W in September, the German Division at the Board of Trade discovered that 
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ZĞĚĞƌ ?Ɛ name appeared on the US 16th Defence List and they were therefore unable to 
move forward at all on the matter of his recruitment.624 This further issue was, in fact, 
cleared up by Reder himself who stated that between January 1946 and January 1947 
(excepting his time as a BIOS interrogation subject), he had been employed in the Science 
Department at an unspecified American-run university in Berlin, and the head of that 
Department had informed him that he had been removed from all American recruitment 
lists. In October 1947, this fact was confirmed by Group Captain J.R. Wilson of the British 
Joint Staff Mission in Washington and Reder was finally released for employment by Fairey 
Aviation, one full year since he had initially been brought over by BIOS and promised future 
employment in Britain.625 
 However, not all cases were quite as convoluted and ŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĂƐZĞĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?
the initial limit placed on the Darwin Panel scheme of 200 specialists was reached easily by 
the end of 1946,626 and in May 1947, the scheme expanded significantly and the ceiling was 
lifted to 500.627 This expansion was necessary in order to allow for a major change in the 
British civil-industrial recruitment policy  W ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
which allowed individual companies to have unrestricted access to a particular German 
specialist for their own utilisation as they saw fit (as seen above with Reder and Fairey 
ǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ) ?WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĂŝĚ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?  ‘ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ ƉůĂŶƚ  Q
ƐĞŝǌĞĚ ĂƐ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ Žƌ ďŽŽƚǇ ? ? ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŽĨ ŝƚ ĐŽƵůĚďĞ ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚĞĚ  ‘ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďǇĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĞd that this was considered 
to be unsatisfactory by many:  
WƌŝǀĂƚĞĨŝƌŵƐǁŽƵůĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƉĂǇƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?ƐĂůĂƌŝĞƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ
keep the technical advice and information gained as their own property vis-à-vis their 
competitors. The Germans would also prefer to be employed by the private firms since there 
is a ceiling of £800 per year on the salaries paid to them by government departments. 
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Initial reaction to this was not positive; the Board of Trade did not feel it could work in 
tandem with the standard Darwin Panel scheme, and predicted further opposition from the 
Treasury, Home Office and other interested departments, but did concede that it might be 
possible as long as the private firms still allowed their German employees to publish their 
findings more widely, through learned societies for instance.628 
Discussions on the possibility of this exclusive exploitation scheme continued 
throughout early 1947, with the ever-important denial policy very firmly borne in mind, and 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ŐƌĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ƚƌĂĚĞ ďŽĚŝĞƐ ? ŚĂĚ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
ĂďƐŽƌďĞĚĂůůƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶĞǆƉĞƌƚƐƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞǁŝĚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ
of German knowledge and ideas will become increasingly dependent on employment by 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĨŝƌŵƐ ? ?629 This raised a couple of issues which the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
German Scientists (IDCGS) worked to smooth over. Firstly, it was decided to remove a clause 
which informed the German experts that they could be ejected from Britain at any time; the 
Home Office reserved that power over aliens at all times anyway, and it was felt that 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƐƵĐŚ  ‘ĐŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ  ‘ĨŝƌŵƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚeir chances of getting government 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƚĂĨĨ ǁĂƐ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ
would also be  ‘cases where a firm employing a German could not, for that very reason, be 
given work of particular secrecy or importancĞ ? ? /Ŷ ƐŚŽƌƚ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ŝŶ ĨŝƌŵƐ ŝƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ďƵƚ
ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇǀĂůƵĞŝƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?630 
Nonetheless, despite these reservations, the policy was formally approved by the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet on 14 May 1947. The Darwin Panel still played an 
important part in its execution. German specialists could not be recruited directly from 
Germany by private British firms, and so still had to spend an initial six month period in 
Britain on government contract. During this time, it was the responsibility of the Darwin 
WĂŶĞů ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ŐŽƚŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ?  ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌďǇƉŽƐƚŝŶŐ
him to a Research Establishment or by ĂƌƌĂŶŐŝŶŐĨŽƌŚŝŵƚŽǀŝƐŝƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨŝƌŵƐ ? ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐ
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would help him ƚŽ ďƵŝůĚ Ă ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ
ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚŝƐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĨƵůůǇ ƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ŚĂĚ ƚŚĞ
additional benefit of increasing the chances of the expert securing fair financial reward for 
his services to British industry on the whole.631 
dŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ ‘ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚƌĞǁƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ
between the German experts and their new British colleagues and neighbours into stark 
relief.
632
 General British perceptions of the German people during the initial post-war period 
were decidedly mixed, a combination of horror at the evil which had brought about the 
Holocaust, pity for the suffering now endured by ordinary German citizens in the aftermath 
of war and a sense of moral superiority as a victorious occupier in the position to re-educate 
and reform.
633
 More specifically, housing was in dire shortage and the Ministry of Health 
insisted that the German experts compete on the same equal terms as British citizens in 
their search for accommodation. Further problems which were foreseen included difficulties 
of assimilating the new German employees into British workplaces, and opposition from 
British professional staff organisations to the recruitment of foreigners.
634
 The British 
authorities knew that with the German scientists receiving increasingly attractive offers 
from the Soviet Union, among others, it was important to make sure that those experts 
already working in Britain were satisfied and felt like valued colleagues.635 This was part of a 
wider policy to carefully manage the way in which the recruitment of German experts in 
Britain was perceived in the press and public domain.636 
 In other cases, where neither the British government nor private firms could find 
employment for German specialists whom it was desired to keep out of Soviet hands, the 
authorities looked to foreign (but allied) countries to step in. Britain was especially keen to 
utilise Commonwealth countries, especially Canada, Australia and India,637 to share the 
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burden of recruiting German specialists, though they acknowledged that the Soviets would 
probably object to the employment of these men in countries they considered 
 ‘ƵŶĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ? ?638 Professor Willy Messerschmitt, the infamous aircraft designer, was 
considered too much of a security risk to be eligible for employment in Britain, but was 
ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚƌĂǀĞů ƚŽ /ŶĚŝĂ ƚŽ  ‘ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ƚŚĞGovernment of India in setting up an 
Aircraft /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?639 Kurt Tank, the eminent aeronautical engineer who had been head of 
design at Focke-Wulf from 1931 to 1945, was wanted by the Swedish Air Force, and 
although there were concerns about his research in Sweden ending up in Soviet hands, the 
Foreign Office concluded that  ‘ŝĨ  Q he was not on the  “ĞŶŝĂů >ŝƐƚ ? and not required by the 
Ministry of Supply, he should be allowed to go to ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ? ?640 
 In some cases, however, certain German specialists who the British wanted had 
already gone to a foreign country, which presented a different set of challenges. Perhaps 
the most interesting case study in this respect is that of a group of German hosiery machine 
needle experts, comprising two highly-skilled technicians and approximately 50 other 
workmen. They were suspected to have left Germany illegally and as of January 1947 were 
employed in Switzerland. There was a strong incentive to the British industry to capture the 
world market for hosiery machine needles, but the success of this venture depended on 
obtaining German machines and manufacturing technique  ‘ƐŝŶĐĞ the German industry was 
previously far ahead in this ƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?641 In considering the best course of action for obtaining 
these men,  ‘it was stressed that to show too much eagerness to get the men (or some of 
them) might defeat the project by causing the Swiss government to put difficulties in the 
way of their leaving ^ǁŝƚǌĞƌůĂŶĚ ? ?642 By May, no progress had been made and the team of 
men had received an offer from an Argentine firm which was willing to finance large-scale 
production in Argentina, and the British looked for a way to prevent this offer being taken 
up. It was concluded that  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ was no legitimate means of preventing the Germans from 
going to Argentina and that the UK must rely on offering greater inducements in order to 
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obtain their services in this ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?643 This proposed exploitation is especially interesting 
because it was driven with a purely commercial intent  W there were no real benefits for the 
nation as a whole, aside from replacing German market dominance in one small field with 
British. 
  
Overall, it is clear why many of those involved saw the interrogation and recruitment of 
German scientists and technicians as the most valuable phase of the post-war exploitation 
of science and technology. While visits to facilities in Germany and the examination of 
confiscated documents and equipment had loose antecedents in the conventional looting 
and plundering which traditionally accompanied the occupation of enemy territory at the 
end of a conflict, the interrogation and recruitment of individuals with specialist knowledge 
was all but unprecedented. This new development was the product of many factors: an 
intelligence network which had expanded considerably in wartime and which understood 
the benefits of human intelligence, domestic British industry which had built closer links to 
the state during the war and was now crying out for support and investment in return for 
the contributions it had made to the national war effort and, perhaps most importantly, the 
looming spectre of some future war, in which it was assumed that a ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ scientists and 
technicians would be as significant as its soldiers, sailors and airmen. 
Crucially, personnel exploitation represented a new element of forward planning  W 
while the removal of machinery and documents could be attributed to natural curiosity or 
thirst for reparation, the benefits of exploiting experts could have considerably greater 
longevity, especially if the specialists concerned could be employed on a permanent basis. 
Although it may have proved the most productive and innovative element of exploitation, 
the utilisation of personnel still had much in common with other aspects of the wider 
initiative  W it began with a military focus but soon shifted to a much more commercial angle, 
including the involvement of private firms; it was dependent on a vast and labyrinthine 
network of bureaucracy and administration, which often hindered more than it helped; it 
was a diverse and multifarious process, with parallel efforts active simultaneously in both 
Germany and Britain; and lastly it was inextricable from the web of foreign relations, 
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whether in terms of co-operation with the Americans or competition with the Soviets. It is 
this final point, concerning interactions between world powers, both at the policy-making 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The International Dimension 
 
As we have seen, Britain was certainly not the only nation pursuing exploitation at this time, 
and the United States, France and the Soviet Union all had very similar schemes. It is all but 
impossible to understand British exploitation in isolation, and it is essential to site it within a 
wider international context. As the emerging Cold War began to shape a new world order, 
shifting foreign relations had a direct impact on the way exploitation was conducted. While 
the United States remained a close, if not wholly trustworthy, ally to Britain, the Soviet 
Union was swiftly recast as a treacherous foe, while France occupied a middle ground of 
ambiguous allegiance. Ultimately the resources to be exploited in Germany were finite so an 
element of competition to obtaining the most valuable parts was to be expected. Tom 
ŽǁĞƌ ŚĂƐ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉůƵŶĚĞƌ ? ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƉůŝƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŐŚƚ ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ
alliance,644 while Alec Cairncross and others have argued that reparations (of which 
exploitation was one component) proved to be the biggest bone of contention between the 
former Allies.645 Conclusions such as this should be treated with caution however; there 
were bigger, ideological issues involved while long-term strategic concerns often played a 
decisive role. The competitive process of exploitation was, in itself, potentially divisive but it 
was also a product of the rapidly-polarising geopolitics of the immediate post-war period.  
 In his work on the Russian occupation of Germany, Norman Naimark asserts that 
British and American exploitation can only be understood in terms of the relationship with 
the Soviet Union.
646
 Certainly, one of the key aspects of the Cold War was the arms race 
between East and West, as both sides quickly established that an advantage in the science 
and technology of warfare might give them a crucial edge at the negotiating table as much 
as on the battlefield. This arms race was christened in the struggle for the spoils of 
Germany, with all participants realising that a shortcut to technological superiority might be 
found among the exposed ruins of the Third Reich. This lends considerable credence to 
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EĂŝŵĂƌŬ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŶĞǀĞƌŚĂǀĞ ƌĂŶŐĞĚƐŽǁŝĚĞůǇŽƌ ůĂƐƚĞĚƐŽ ůŽŶŐ
had the spectre of another global conflict not been looming on the horizon.647 
 The main thrust of this chapter, therefore, is to contextualise British exploitation on 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚĂŐĞ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ƚŚƌĞĞ ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ ĂůůŝĞƐ  W the USA, 
France and the Soviet Union  W coloured the planning and execution of exploitation, and led 
to some of its greatest successes and failings. It is important to note that there were often 
differences between official policy (decided by those who were perpetually mindful of 
geopolitical considerations) and the actions taken by those on the ground (for whom 
pragmatism was essential to overcome various practical obstacles); for example, the 
competitive friction between Britain and the US at the higher policy-making levels, 
experienced most acutely by the new Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was not always 
reflected in the mostly cordial Anglo-American interactions in the field.648 This chapter will 
address matters of policy, and the grassroots competition and co-operation, in tandem. 
ĂĐŚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽŽŶĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶǁĂƌƚŝŵĞůůŝĞƐ W the USA, France and 
the Soviet Union. On the whole, this chapter will show how scientific and technical 
exploitation fitted into the wider framework of the new post-war world, both within 
Germany and in broader global terms. 
 
The United States 
In wartime, the relationship between Britain and the United States was the closest of any of 
the Allies, leading John Baylis to argue that it was so intimate and informal that traditional 
state sovereignty was eroded and replaced by a common Anglo-Saxon identity and 
purpose.649 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ǁĂƐ ƐĞƚ ĂƐŝĚĞ
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂǇůŝƐ ?ĐŽƌĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĚŽƵďƚ
that, in wartime, good communication and frequent consultations meant that many Anglo-
American actions were taken bilaterally. This was certainly true of many aspects of scientific 
and technical research which took place during the war, not least the atomic bomb project. 




 DĂƌƚŝŶ &ŽůůǇ ?  ‘ ‘dŚĞ ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ  Q ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ŝƐ ŚĂƌĚ ǁŚĞŶ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƵƐ ? P ƌŶĞƐƚ
Bevin and Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƚƚŚĞĚĂǁŶŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ? ?Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 10 (2012). 
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Although the Manhattan Engineer District (the codename given to the project) was an 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĂĨĨĂŝƌ ? ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ‘dƵďĞ ůůŽǇƐ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ǁĞƌĞ
involved closely too. As a result, when Manhattan head Brigadier Groves put together the 
Alsos initiative, though it was US-led, it operated in close alignment with the British too.650 
Unsurprisingly, this attitude of Anglo-American collaboration carried over into the origins of 
the scientific and technical exploitation programme proper. When the Combined 
Intelligence Priorities Committee (CIPC) was first proposed, it rested firmly on the 
assumption that it would be responsible for gathering intelligence for the benefit of both 
nations. Despite this, there was a simmering sense of competition beneath the surface, and 
the British were keen to have the committee chaired by one of their own, partly because it 
was to be based in London and would utilise intelligence primarily from British sources, and 
also because they imagined that the US would institute and lead a similar committee in 
Washington to handle similar matters in the Far East, and they wished to have balance.651 
 When the CIPC came into existence (quickly becoming CIOS), balance was actually 
achieved by having an American military chairman, Brigadier-General T.J. Betts, and a British 
civilian deputy, R.P. Linstead. This was palatable to the British as, for the time being, there 
was no parallel organisation in the US tasked with Japanese investigations. The British 
certainly had their own ideas for how exploitation should proceed, and this was a topic for 
discussion at many different committees and staff meetings throughout Whitehall in 1944, 
but they were constantly aware of their commitment to their allies. Alastair Balfour of the 
tĂƌKĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐŝǀŝůĨĨĂŝƌƐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚǁƌŽƚĞƚŽ>ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ-Colonel Alexander Geddes, at the 
ĞƉƵƚǇ ŚŝĞĨ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ŵƉĞƌŝĂů 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ^ƚĂĨĨ ?Ɛ ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ? ĐĂƵƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ Śŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
premature to submit any outline blueprint for exploitation to SHAEF before the Americans 
had a chance to do so ĂƐ ‘^,&ŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĂũŽŝŶƚĂĨĨĂŝƌ and I feel we should be treading on 
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐŐƌŽƵŶĚŝĨǁĞǁĞƌĞƚŽƐƵďŵŝƚŽƵƌƉůĂŶƐƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůůǇ ? ?652 
 CIOS operated fairly effectively in its Anglo-American format under the jurisdiction of 
SHAEF during the last year of the war and the first two months of peace, but as its necessary 
dissolution drew closer, officials on both sides of the Atlantic began to consider how to 
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proceed on a more unilateral basis. For the Americans, this meant pushing forward on a 
scheme to bring German experts over to the United States for work on a number of military 
projects to aid in the Pacific War  W a theatre in which American efforts dwarfed those of its 
allies.653 Constrained by their close relationship with Britain, they pestered their ally for 
their assent to such a scheme, which the British gave on 14 June 1945, with the key proviso 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the knowledge so obtained will be available not only to interested United States 
ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ďƵƚ ŽƵƌ ŽǁŶ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ? ?654 dŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ǀŝĞǁ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘it 
seemed most unlikely that any research and development work could fructify before the 
ĞŶĚŽĨ ƚŚĞ :ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞ ǁĂƌ ?ďƵƚ ƚŚĞǇŬĞƉƚ ƚŚŝƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ďŝŐŐĞƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐ
that of allocation  W that is, a system to ensure that the best German brains were fairly 
distributed between the two nations. At this juncture, CIOS was considered to be a suitable 
body to adjudicate on these matters but it was an issue which would bedevil Anglo-
American relations throughout this period.655 
The British began considering this issue with even greater concern in the immediate 
run-up to the demise of SHAEF. On 4 July 1945, nine days before the Supreme Headquarters 
ceased to exist, the British Chiefs of Staff sent a note to the Joint Staff Mission in 
Washington, acknowledging that, on account of their greater commitment to the Pacific 
War, the Americans should be given preference on any exploitation material in cases where 
the quantity was insufficient to meet both US and British demands, but mitigated this by 
ŝŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ  ‘not be given carte blanche to remove equipment, scientific 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĂŶĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŬĞĞƉĂŶĚƐŚĂƌĞƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŽĨĂůů
that they did evacuate.656 The Deputy Chiefs of Staff committee shared this sentiment too, 
when, in a meeting held the next day, they warned of the Americans conducting a 
 ‘ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƉŝƌĂƚŝĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ QǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƉƌŽǀĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ
any relative British procedure, and also expressed concern that German scientists taken to 
the US may well be reluctant to subsequently come and work in Britain.657 
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 That is not to say that the US attitude was more aggressively acquisitive than the 
British. This became especially clear when the British wanted to open personnel exploitation 
up to include German specialists who had no connection with defence, and were met with 
considerable reluctance on the American side, especially from the State Department. This 
disinclination was the result of a number of sticking points, including concerns about 
immigration (defence scientists had been brought over as prisoners-of-war, a categorisation 
which could not be extended to civilian experts) and potential accusations of hypocrisy, 
regarding US efforts to deter Latin American countries from recruiting Germans while doing 
it themselves.658 EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽďƐƚĂĐůĞƐƚŽďĞ
delaying, rather than prohibitive, factors and turned their mind to concerns about a fair 
allocation policy for these civil-industrial specialists. Officials at the Board of Trade, who 
ǁĞƌĞ ŵĂƐƚĞƌŵŝŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŽƌƌŝĞĚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘influence 
ǁŝĞůĚĞĚ ďǇ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ? ƚŚĞƌ ĨŽƌĞ ? Ă  ‘h< ?h^ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ
would allocate demands for scientists on a non-competitive basis. Otherwise we might find 
ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐŽƵƚďŝĚďŽƚŚŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƐĂůĂƌŝĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?659 
 Unsurprisingly, personnel exploitation was the area of the greatest competition 
between Britain and America, largely because it was difficult for any one individual to be 
effectively exploited by more than one nation. In other areas, however, co-operation was 
more evident. Investigations in Japan, for example, were being primarily conducted by the 
Americans, as had been predicted, but they were more than happy to share the fruits of 
their labours with the British, through BIOS channels.660 BIOS also received reports, though 
usually only single copies, of any interrogations of German scientists carried out in the US.661 
Policy on documents and archives was developed on an Anglo-American basis in order to 
facilitate the easiest possible exploitation of this material by representatives of both 
countries. For maximum convenience, the records of the German government were held at 
the Ministerial Control Centre at Kassel which was situated practically on the border 
between the British and American zones of occupation.
662
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 Generally speaking, it was the agents and organisations in the field which showed 
the greatest propensity for co-operation between Britain and America, especially seen in 
contrast to the policy-makers in London and Washington with their more adversarial 
approach. Paul Maddrell has highlighted general collaboration in scientific intelligence-
gathering on the ground during the period of occupation, much of which was based on the 
sharing of information and the mutual imitation of technique.663 Furthermore, in the 
conclusion to an official history of T-Force, it was noted that the unit had  ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
striking and happy occasions for Anglo-American co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?664 FIAT, meanwhile, being 
ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƵŶŝƚ ďĂƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ǌŽŶĞ ?  ‘ŚĂĚ ďƵŝůƚ ƵƉ Ă ŐŽŽĚǁill with the 
Americans, which is of immense value to the Control Commission, and to Ministries and 
ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h< ? ?665 This was important as FIAT was handling roughly 80 individual 
British visits to the US zone every week, most of which lasted for an average of three 
weeks.666 
 These British visitors to the American zone were subject to strict rules and 
regulations, many of which were in place to avoid incidents which could jeopardise friendly 
and collaborative relations between the two countries. According to orders issued in July 
1945, the visiting investigators were instructed not to drive any unlicensed or captured 
enemy vehicles, nor to leave US military vehicles unattended at any time, they were to stick 
to non-fraternisation restrictions in their encounters with German civilians, and they were 
ƚŽůĚ ƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƚĂůů ƚŝŵĞƐ ?  ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽƵƌƚĞƐǇ ?ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ Ă ĚƉƌŽƉĞƌǁĞĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƵŶŝĨŽƌŵ ǁŝůůďĞ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ? dŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞĂĚǇ ĨŽƌ
inspection and were not permitted to deviate from approved routes, without recourse to 
the appropriate authorities.
667
 Writing in his memoirs after the war, R.V. Jones, the Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐŚĞĂĚŽĨƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?who briefly travelled to Europe with the Assistant 
Directorate of InƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ  ?^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ )ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ƌĞĐĂůůĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌŽŶĞ ǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽŐŽ ŝŶ
ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶǌŽŶĞ QĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůďĞĐĂƵƐĞŶŽŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌǁŽƵůĚĂĐƚ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?ũŽŬŝŶŐůǇƐƵƌŵŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌĞĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ‘ƐƚĞŵŵĞĚĨƌŽŵŚĂǀŝŶŐ
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Ă ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?668 When these American guidelines were not met, it could have 
serious repercussions. At the beginning of 1946, the Americans became increasingly 
reluctant to allow British reparations teams to enter the US zone, and the reason given was 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh^ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ‘were aggrieved by the conduct of certain of our reparations assessment 
ƚĞĂŵƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ǁŚĞŶ ǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?669 One aspect of this poor conduct was British 
assessors informing German workers that their factory was due for reparations which 
supposedly reduced worker efficiency and output and risked sabotage.670 
On the other hand, engineer Eddie Aspden, who visited Germany in the autumn of 
 ? ? ? ?ŽŶĂ /K^ ƚƌŝƉ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ Žŝů ĞŶŐŝŶĞƐ ? ĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘greater restriction was placed on 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ǌŽŶĞ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŚĞ ĚŝĚ ĐŽŶĐĞĚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŵŽƌĞ
helpful.
671
 In fact, he reflected the views of many of his fellow BIOS investigators, in having 
ůŝƚƚůĞ ďƵƚ ƉƌĂŝƐĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? ďĞƚƚĞƌ-funded military occupation, and its abundant 
amenities: 
Conditions in the American zone were much more comfortable than those in the British, 
where we had to use our sleeping kit the whole of the time, and to wash and shave in cold 
water. A bath was almost out of the question. Laundry too was difficult, though in both 
zones. Rations for the road were very good in the American zone, where it was possible to 
buy the American Army K-rations, a carefully balanced meal packed into a sealed carton and 
graded breakfast, dinner and supper. We consumed quite a number of these. In the British 
zone, however, we were provided with bully beef sandwiches, frequently wrapped in 
newspaper.672 
These comments on the general conditions of each zone were actually indicative of a larger 
truth  W that the American zone was far better-appointed than those of the other Allies, on 
account of its economic strength, which affected the lives not only of US soldiers and British 
visitors, but the German civilian population too.673 Partly as a result of these economic 
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variations, and despite striving towards roughly the same goal, the British and American 
exploitation efforts also differed in many aspects of procedure and implementation. 
 This disparity in approach became especially clear in July 1945, when FIAT attempted 
ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă  ‘^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ WƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ƚŽ ĂƉƉůǇ ƚŽ ďŽƚŚ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
investigators. It gave rise to considerable protest from the British and led FIAT to conclude 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘what may be a perfectly reasonable and sound procedure for the Americans appears 
ƵŶǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĂďůĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŚĞŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? ?674 Ultimately, this was essentially 
ũƵƐƚ ĂŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ?  ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ƚŽ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚ ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ĐĂŶďĞ ƐĞŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĨƌŽŵ ŶŐůĂŶĚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇďƌŝĞĨĞĚ ?
whereas the US teams needed greater co-ordination upon arrival.675 Another benefit of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚ ƐĞŶĚŽǀĞƌ ĂƐŵĂŶǇŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐĂƐ ƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ?
while the US had to be considerably more frugal. This too fed into the evolution of different 
methodologies. At a BIOS meeting in May 1946, Derek Wood of the Board of Trade 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚŝƐ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘it was sometimes difficult for the Americans to appreciate 
the necessity for perhaps 60 British investigators to visit the same target when only 6 had 
exploited it from the US anglĞ ? ?676 
 These differences did not prevent Britain from learning from, and even imitating, the 
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝŶĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?
disposal, they were often able to take bold new steps first, and once their success had been 
proven, the more tentative British were able to follow suit. The US created a major 
detention and denial centre for German scientists and technicians, and their families, at 
Landshut in Bavaria towards the end of 1945. Conditions at the Landshut centre were 
reportedly dire, which concurs with accounts of many prisoner-of-war camps in the 
American zone, which suffered from woeful shortages of shelter, food and sanitation.677 
Nonetheless, Landshut allowed the US Army to keep an eye on their prizes, arrange for 
convenient travel to America and prevent any of the experts falling into Soviet hands.678 This 
arrangement certainly impressed the British and in January 1946, FIAT (Br.) strongly 
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recommended ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ  ?Ă ? concentration area in [the] 
British zone similar to that operated ďǇ h^ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ Ăƚ >ĂŶĚƐŚƵƚ ?.679 As discussed 
elsewhere, the Americans also led the way in reactivating the German hotel industry to 
facilitate easier travel to Germany for investigators and industrialists  W an initiative which 
was far less successful when the British attempted to emulate it some months later.680 
 Not all interactions between the US and British were as positive or as productive as 
those described here. There were occasions when a lack of co-ordination, especially over 
valuable and sought-after targets like chemical warfare installations, led to confusion and 
redundancy.681 Beyond this, though, there was also a genuine rivalry; a continuation of the 
often fractious relationship beƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
war.
682
 On many, if not most, topics, both sides were willing to share intelligence, resources 
and access but, as part of the scramble to assert a new global identity in the post-war world, 
the compromises of the wartime alliance were discarded, and replaced by fertile ground for 
contention and conflict.683 ůĂƌĞŶĐĞ >ĂƐďǇ ŚĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ĂƐ  ‘ƌĞƐŽůƵƚĞ
ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĂĐĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƐƉŽŝůƐ ? ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ Ă ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐ 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƋƵŽƚŝŶŐ h^ DĂũŽƌ-General Hugh J. Knerr as 
saying that the British were uninterested in co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐďĞƐƚ
ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŵƉŝƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ŵŽƚŝǀĞ ? ?684 This reflects a prevalent view among 
contemporary Americans that Great Britain could not be trusted on account of their 
apparently avowed imperialism; while, in a Gallup poll of July 1948, 14 per cent of British 
respondents stated their belief that the USA were trying to dominate the world (though, to 
qualify, a staggering 70 per cent felt that world domination was the goal of the USSR).685 
This was all indicative of the British struggle to adjust to their new role as junior partner in 
the Anglo-American alliance.686 
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/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
exploitation, the British expended considerable effort trying to wrangle a fair allocation 
policy. This was built around the principle of 40% each to Britain and the US, and 10% each 
to France and the Soviet Union, on all samples of  ‘secret weapons ?. In addition, preference 
ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ  ‘in all cases where there are insufficient samples, 
personnel or equipment available to provide for development to be continued 
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?dŚĞĞƉƵƚǇŚŝĞĨƐŽĨ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ĞǀĞƌ
ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h^ĂŶǇŬŝŶĚŽĨ  ‘ďůĂŶŬĐŚĞƋƵĞ ? ? ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌŚĂǀĞ  ‘Ă
suitable allocation machine to decide which country is best fitted to pursue development in 
ĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŚĂǀĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚĂƉƉůǇ ? ?ďƵƚǁŽƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŽƌĂŝƐĞƚŚŝƐ
issue would be to add weight to American complaints that they were being 
uncooperative.687 It seemed, however, that these allocation arrangements were a token 
gesture to the British which the Americans simply took little or no notice of. This was clear 
in May 1945 when sixteen ships carrying 100 V-2 rockets from Antwerp to New Orleans 
were intercepted and forced to halt by the Royal Navy in the North Sea. The captains of the 
Navy ships demanded that, in accordance with the allocation agreements, fifty of the 
rockets be handed over to them. The Americans refused, and continued to refuse, even 
when the Foreign Office sent a direct request to the State Department, and eventually the 
British relented and the ships continued on their way, their precious cargo intact.688 
 When it came to the exploitation of documents and material, with the exception of 
the special case of V-2 technology, the Anglo-American relationship was mostly a 
harmonious one. The exploitation of personnel, however, provided frequent opportunities 
for friction. The American equivalent of the British DCOS and Darwin Panel recruitment 
schemes was Project Paperclip which targeted the employment of around 1,000 German 
scientists and technicians in a variety of fields, most of which with some direct military 
utility. Paperclip was a child of many parents but it was primarily co-ordinated by the Joint 
Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA), an organisation which, like its counterpart BIOS, had 
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come about following the dissolution of CIOS.689 KŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
supremacy gave them a considerable edge in recruitment, allowing them to offer much 
better terms than the British could. In June 1946, Piers Synott, Under-Secretary of State for 
the Admiralty, voiced concerns about this in a letter to G.H. Curtis at the Treasury, worrying 
that dissatisfied German scientistƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ŚĂŶĚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Americans, as well as the Soviets and French.690 
 The Americans also did much to frustrate British recruitment efforts, sometimes 
deliberately and sometimes through generally obtuse behaviour. For instance, when BIOS 
wanted to bring a group of IG Farben employees who were in US custody in Germany to 
Britain for two months of interrogation, the Americans refused, stating that they would only 
release three of the men, and for a seemingly arbitrary three-week period.
691
 In addition, 
the British were left in a weak position when the US decided to shift the Dustbin detention 
centre from an Anglo-American operation to a unilateral one  W a process they conducted 
gradually by steadily increasing the restrictions on, and obstacles to, British access to the 
detainees until, desƉŝƚĞŶŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǁĞƌĞ ůĞĨƚǁŝƚŚ  ‘virtually no 
control in any matters appertaining to this Detention Camp ? ?692 The effects of these 
American efforts to limit British exploitation potential can be seen in the recruitment figures 
 W by October 1946, the USA had contracted approximately 240 German scientists and 
technicians, the British only 33.
693
 Of some 2,500 aeronautical specialists in Germany in 
1945, within two years 12 per cent were in American hands while Britain barely had 1 per 
cent.694 Not all of this can be attributed to American treachery though; on account of 
resources the British scheme was necessarily smaller, and Britain was a less attractive 
prospect for many targeted Germans than the United States. 
 As with the competition over physical material, the biggest bone of contention 
between Britain and America in personnel exploitation was rocketry, in this case the V-2 
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specialists. The post-war discovery of German plans to launch a long-range guided missile at 
New York by 1946 spurred on fears of such an attack on US soil, possibly with an atomic 
warhead, and prompted key changes in American strategic defence policy.695 When the 
British first tried to move German rocketry experts to Cuxhaven for Operation Backfire, they 
found that the Americans were reluctant to let them go, with the US Forces headquarters 
ĞǀĞŶ ŝƐƐƵŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ĂŶĚ ^ĞǀĞŶƚŚ ƌŵŝĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶŽ s-weapon 
engineers or scientists will be allowed to leave the US Occupied area without authorities 
fƌŽŵƚŚŝƐŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ? ?696 The Americans, who had no real interest in the supposedly joint-
led Backfire, were pressing ahead with their own investigations of rocketry and did not 
acknowledge the special importance which the British had granted to the operation. 
Of the 500 German personnel involved in the project, only 79 were scientists, and of 
these, the US had requested that 26 be transferred to them immediately. Major-General 
A.M. Cameron, the officer in charge of Backfire, felt he had to make every effort to meet the 
US requirements, eventually handing over 14  W ĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂĚĞ  ‘ĂĨƚĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůů
available substitutes and acceptance of a lower standard of technical skill being available for 
ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?697 Even after this concession, the Americans were not sated and the British 
had to be dogged in their efforts to keep hold of the remaining twelve, who they described 
ĂƐ  ‘ŬĞǇŵĞŶ ? ?dŚĞK^ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĂŶĚ surmised that, as 
the Japanese war was over, the only use the Americans might make of these scientists was 
in a long-term research project. Therefore, they concluded that: 
Under these circumstances we cannot believe that their retention at Cuxhaven, for what 
would probably be a maximum of 2 months, could seriously inconvenience the United States 
Chiefs of Staff, whereas their withdrawal at this juncture would prejudice the success of 
Backfire into which much hard work and valuable effort has been put.698 
In this instance, the British were able to retain the men which they required and the 
operation was able to proceed, but it is indicative of the fierce competition emerging 
between Britain and America for the best technical experts in Germany. 
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 dŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƵŶƐĐƌƵƉƵůŽƵƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƌŽĐŬĞƚƌǇ
and aeronautics experts besides their interference with Backfire. In late August 1945, it was 
noted that a USAAF officer had simply turned up at RAF Völkenrode (one of the sites utilised 
ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚ ?  ? ?'ĞƌŵĂŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐ ?  ‘ ?ŽĨ
which we had previously agreed to turn over to the Americans for work on Japanese war 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ? ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ǁĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ? ? ĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ Z& ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ
 ‘ĚĞůĂǇŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?699 This action is even less justifiable as by this point the Japanese war had 
been over for almost two weeks. Elsewhere, another USAAF representative, Lieutenant 
ZŽƐĞŶďĂƵĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐƵƌƌĞƉƚŝƚŝŽƵƐůǇƌĞŵŽǀĞĚŽŶĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ
who was not on the original list of personneů ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚǁŽŵŽƌĞ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚǁĞƌĞ ĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŶ  ‘ŝŶ ƐĂĨĞ ĐƵƐƚŽĚǇƚŽ
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƌĞŵŽǀĂů ? ?700 This skulduggery does not suggest a harmonious relationship between 
two of the closest wartime Allies, and thĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƉĂƌŽĐŚŝĂůǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƉůĞĂƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞh^ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŽǁŽƌŬ ? ?701
 In reality, much of the difficulty which plagued the Anglo-American relationship 
throughout exploitation had its roots in shifting world power status. In October 1940, when 
Sir Henry Tizard travelled to the USA with new British scientific and technical developments, 
he got the strong, and accurate, impression that the British had far more to offer the 
Americans than vice versa.
702
 By 1945, however, on account of the fortunes of war, the 
United States was the technologically superior power, which led to two opposing schools of 
thought on American exploitation  W firstly, that as they were so industrially advanced, they 
would be able to more easily make use of the captured science and technology or, 
conversely, that as they were so advanced, they had far less to learn from their vanquished 
foe.703 Either way, the US ended the war economically, diplomatically and militarily more 
powerful than Britain, and acknowledged that Britain was almost entirely dependent on 
America for its very survival, making it even more surprising that the US relied so heavily on 
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deception and trickery to try and secure the best spoils for themselves.704 Nonetheless, of 
its relationships with the other members of the Grand Alliance which had won the war, 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? tƌŝƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ
April 1945, R.P. Linstead, the deputy chair of CIOS, worried that this co-operation with the 




In the immediate post-war years, France occupied a curious position on the world stage  W 
having been defeated then occupied and split by Nazi Germany in 1940, it could not be 
considered a major member of the wartime alliance dominated by Britain, the United States 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ ? KŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞ ďĞŐĂŶ ? ŚĂƌůĞƐ ĚĞ 'ĂƵůůĞ ?Ɛ ďƵůůŝƐŚ
nature allowed France to half negotiate, half force their way back to the top table of 
international politics.706 One key element of this was the securing of an occupation zone in 
Germany, albeit one notably smaller than that of the other Allies, which in turn entitled 
France to a seat on the quadripartite Control Council and granted it a say in all matters 
pertaining to the future of Germany.707 While many expected the French to pursue a harsh, 
vengeful policy against their great European enemy, in reality they were remarkably willing 
to reintegrate Germany into a Western alliance. This was in part because many senior 
French leaders expressed genuine concern, in private at least, about the threat of the Soviet 
Union sweeping across Europe, and they sought to build closer links with Britain and 
especially the US in the name of greater national security. However, the presence of 
powerful communist elements in the French coalition government meant that, in public, 
these senior figures could not take such a strong anti-Soviet line, and instead showed a 
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willingness to cultivate cordial relationships with both sides.708 This outward impression 
caused the US, and by extension the British, authorities to view France with caution, fearing 
that it might soon align itself outright with the USSR.709 Nonetheless, British Foreign Office 
personnel, including the post-war Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, viewed collaboration with 
France (and other western European allies) as one of the three pillars of British foreign 
policy, along with the transatlantic partnership and the Empire and Commonwealth.710 
In terms of exploitation, after almost five years of Nazi occupation, the French were 
more in need of a boost to their military-scientific research complex than any other major 
power.711 They saw the extraction of German resources as a way both to relieve the French 
taxpayer of the costs of occupying their old enemy and to overcome the economic 
stagnation which France had suffered in the interwar years. In the words of Philippe Livry-
Level, a Resistance hero and post-war centrist politician, in a National Assembly debate in 
March 1946  W  ‘ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĞƌĞ Ă ůĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ƵƐ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚ ? ?712 Their position as an occupying 
power allowed them to conduct exploitation of their own, and not just rely on the 
unwanted scraps discarded by the three larger powers, as was the case for smaller members 
of the United Nations, such as the Netherlands and Norway. However, they did not begin as 
participants but rather as subjects, with facilities across France which had been maintained 
and utilised under the Nazi occupation investigated by CIOS teams sent over in the 
immediate aftermath of their liberation. French protests about this fell on deaf ears in 
Britain and America  W as William Hitchcock has put it, at this stage, France remained a dim 
and distant star in the international constellation.713 
Perhaps as a result of this, and perhaps from a desire to not let their wartime 
occupation translate into being left behind in the race for the spoils of Germany, the French 
were quick off the mark in exploitation, and their policy was resourceful and unscrupulous 
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in equal measure.714 For a start, they turned their struggle for recognition as a major post-
war power into an advantage  W having not been represented at the Potsdam Conference, 
they concluded that they were not bound by any decisions made there, allowing them to 
proceed practically unilaterally in securing advance deliveries of reparations from their 
zone.715 They also used their shared border with Germany to their benefit. When German 
scientists refused to come to France for fear of the hostile attitudes of the native 
population, the French allowed them to live on the German side of the Rhine but ferried 
them across every day to work in laboratories in France.716 The French also saw no need to 
limit themselves by working too consistently alongside any one power, often preferring to 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ĞŶũŽǇŝŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚĂůůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚ ?ďĞŝŶŐ ?ƚƌƵƐƚĞĚďǇŶŽŶĞ ? ?717 
They certainly had the potential to be a valuable ally to the British, especially in the 
early days of exploitation. Indeed, in April 1945, CIOS received word from its French 
equivalent, the Committee of Scientific Co-ordination of National Defence, suggesting that 
the two organisations co-operate closely. The French felt they had much to offer: troops to 
ŐƵĂƌĚ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ƐŬŝůůĞĚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚ ƚŚĞŵ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ  ‘ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂŶĚ
ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ QƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐĂŶĚĚĞƉŽƌƚĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŶƌĞƚƵƌŶ ?
ƚŚĞǇŚŽƉĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽ-ordination of research plans and 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂŶĚůůŝĞĚĨŝĞůĚƚĞĂŵƐ ? ?718 
Although collaboration on this scale was never achieved, with the British and 
Americans unable to fully divest themselves of their misgivings about the French, they 
eventually relented and partly ĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂůůǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ Ă ǁŽƌŬĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ
largely reciprocal relationship was established, albeit one tinged with a persistent edge of 
suspicion.719 When the Intelligence Group of the British Element of the Control Council 
divided foreign countries into three groups on account of security, France were placed in 
the second group, along with, among others, Eire, Norway and Greece, which entitled them 
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ƚŽ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůďĞĂƌŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉ ƚŽĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  ‘ŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?720 This 
gave them greater access than the Soviets but less than the USA, India and the Dominions; a 
categorisation indicative of Anglo-French relations on exploitation. Brian Balmer has written 
on the way that security classification is more than just an indication of scientific content  W it 
can also be an expression of the strength, or fragility, of collaboration between nations.721  
For instance, in June 1945, it was agreed that France would be provided with a copy of the 
CIOS Black List  W however, tŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ?ůŝƐƚǁŚŝĐ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ
ƚŚĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ?ůŝƐƚǁŚŝĐŚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
items to be investigated. Not only was this second list not directly issued to the French but 
S,&ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐĂƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽŝŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĚŽŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ
ŝƚƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?722 This lack of trust was also evident when the War Office ĚĞĐƌĞĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶŽ
information on German Chemical Warfare developments during the war should be passed 
ŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ? ?723 On the other hand, the French were given copies of the majority of 
CIOS and BIOS Final Reports which were filed by investigating teams;724 a courtesy which 
ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ĂƐƵŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘not any lack of 
goodwill on the part of the French, but the absence of any adequate organisation for 
ĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?725 The semblance of open co-operation which was maintained throughout 
concealed a more uncertain relationship between Britain and France.726 
EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƌĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨŵƵƚƵĂůĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐǌŽŶĞƐŽĨŽĐĐƵƉation 
was held to by both sides, as noted by Brigadier R.J. Maunsell of FIAT at a BIOS meeting held 
at the end of August 1945.727 By December, a system was in place for reciprocal visits, 
wherein BIOS Liaison Officers, from specific ministries and departments, handled the French 
assessors.
728
 As with trips to the US zone, British exploitation teams travelling to the French 
zone were expected to abide by a set of specific bureaucratic rules. Firstly, they were to 
obtain authorisation from a Liaison Officer at Höchst, near Frankfurt, then proceed to 
Offenburg, deep in the French zone and just across the border from Strasbourg, where they 
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would be handled by French FIAT, and receive the necessary passes.729 They were expected 
ƚŽďĞ ‘ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ ?ďĞĚĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ŐĂƐŽůŝŶĞ ?
billets and meals will be provided by the French authorities during their staǇŝŶƚŚĂƚǌŽŶĞ ? ?/Ŷ
addition, they were forbidden from removing any documents, material or equipment 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ  ‘ƉƌŝŽƌ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚŽĨd-^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?&ƌĞŶĐŚƌŵǇŽĨKĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?730 Monica Maurice, who 
travelled through the French zone en route from Frankfurt to Cologne on a BIOS trip in May 
1947, felt that the implementation of these regulations was ineffectual, as the control 
ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽŶƚŚĞďŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǌŽŶĞƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞƌĞŽŶůǇƚŽ ‘make quite sure we 
ĐĂŵĞ ŽƵƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞŶĚ ? ?731 These restrictions were significant as investigations into 
foreign zones made up a sizeable component of British exploitation activity in the eighteen 
months after the end of the war  W between June 1945 and October 1946, 1,601 BIOS and 
British Reparations teams visited targets in the French and American zones.732 
French exploitation teams were subject to similar regulations when visiting the 
British zone and their frequent failure to comply caused much consternation in the British 
element of FIAT. They protested particularly strongly about scheduled French teams never 
ĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐŽƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŽ,Y ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ ‘a source of extra work and worry for all concerned 
and in addition it often means that other teams are unnecessarily delayed in getting 
ĐůĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?733 In some cases, though, the British authorities made considerable effort to 
ensure these visits went well. When a group of French industrialists wishing to examine the 
Volkswagen factory and subsidiaries in Wolfsburg for reparations purposes arrived in the 
British zone in December 1945, S.G. 'ĂůƉŝŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘they be 
ŐŝǀĞŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŵŽƌĞŽƐƚĞŶƚĂƚŝŽƵƐĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶǁĂƐ
ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇƵƐĞĚ ?,ĞƚŽŽŬƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞĂƐŚĞĨĞůƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
between [EconomiĐŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚDĞĐŚĂŶŝĐĂůŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐƌĂŶĐŚ ? ?734 
The British were not only concerned with their relationship with the French on its 
own merits, but also how it made Britain appear in comparison with other nations. When 
the initial arrangements were still being developed, Brigadier Maunsell insisted that Anglo-
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&ƌĞŶĐŚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ĐŽƌĚŝĂů ? ? ďƵƚ ǁŽƌƌŝĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨ ƚŚĞ &ƌĞŶĐŚ ĂƉƉůǇ ĨŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ
receive, permission to visit the American zone and have access to records but are refused 
the same facilities by FIAT (British), it will inevitably place the British in an unfavourable 
ůŝŐŚƚ ? ?ǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĚŝĚƌĞĨƵƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐŽƵůĚƐƚŝůůĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌĞĐŽƌĚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ &/d ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽŽůĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ? ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ  ‘Žďǀŝously 
ĂŶŽŵĂůŽƵƐ ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ƐŽŽŶŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽďĂĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?735 Despite this 
comparison, American relations with the French were not wholly harmonious either. In April 
1945, the US-led Alsos mission launched Operation Harborage which aimed to sweep into 
the German towns of Hechingen, Bisingen and Haigerloch, forty miles south of Stuttgart, 
and seize or destroy any atomic research equipment, and remove any specialists, before the 
frontline troops arrived. This was important because these ƚŽǁŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘in the line of 
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƌŵǇ ?736 and the head of Alsos, Brigadier-General Leslie Groves, was 
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘nothing that might be of interest to the Russians should ever be allowed to 
ĨĂůůŝŶƚŽ&ƌĞŶĐŚŚĂŶĚƐ ? ?737 
This attitude of equating the French with the much more serious Soviet threat had 
some legitimate grounds  W for instance, in late 1944, de Gaulle had signed a mutual 
assistance pact with Stalin  W but in reality, the Soviets viewed France as little more than a 
British and American pawn, as displayed by their refusal to cede any of their occupation 
territory in Germany in order to create a French zone.
738
 Nonetheless, suspicion of closeness 
to the Soviet Union had a direct impact on the approach which Britain and the US took 
towards France during exploitation. In a JIC report from May 1946, it was noted that French 
attempts to entice German scientists should be monitored carefully, not only on account of 
 ‘ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂŶǆŝĞƚǇĨĞůƚĂƐƚŽ&ƌĞŶĐŚůĂĐŬŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ
of French co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?739 One year earlier, before the war had even 
ended, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff had reached similar conclusions and, as such, informed 
^,& ƚŚĂƚ  ‘we do not wish other secret weapons, such as new rockets, rocket assisted 
ƐŚĞůůƐ ? ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚŐůŝĚĞƌďŽŵďƐ  QĂŶĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƚǇƉĞƐ ƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ &ƌĞŶĐŚ ?  ?ƵŶůĞƐƐ ?
ƐĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂƌĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ŽƌĂƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚ
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ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŶǇƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚŝŶĞǆĐĞƐƐŽf [US and British] requirements should be 
ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ ? ?740 Two months later, in July 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff expanded on this 
policy, making it clear that no allocation of scientific and technical intelligence material 
should be made to the French uŶƚŝů ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ  ‘have been satisfied and 
ƚŚĞŶŽŶůǇŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?741 
In practice, this bred an atmosphere of suspicion which in turn gave rise to 
clandestine behaviour which would become all too common under the hostile conditions of 
the Cold War. In Berlin, Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section (EPES) officers were given a 
ůŝƐƚŽĨŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚŽŶ^ŽǀŝĞƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂŶĚǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƚŽůĚƚŽ ‘ƉĂǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ
to the obtaining of information on similar activities carried out by ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŝŶĞƌůŝŶ ? ?742 In 
August 1946, the head of EPES, Lieutenant-Colonel P.M. Wilson wrote to his superior, R.J. 
DĂƵŶƐĞůů ?ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘the possibility of leakage of Top Secret information 
ƚŽƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ? ?,ĞĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞthe EPES office in Berlin with the French element 
ŽĨ &/d ĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚ ŝƚƐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ Ăůů dŽƉ ^ĞĐƌĞƚ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ Ăƚ
present carried out by this Section to a special office to which only British and American 
personnel will have accesƐ ? ? ,Ğ ĂůƐŽ ƐƵŵŵĞĚ ƵƉ ƚŚĞ ĐƌƵǆ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝŶ ŶŐůŽ-French 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶŚĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚǁĞ ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƚŽĚŽĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůĨŽƌ
us in regard to finding Germans and in giving clearances for their evacuation from the 
&ƌĞŶĐŚǌŽŶĞ ƚŽh< ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ  ‘ĂŶǇ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĞ ƉůĂĐĞŽŶ ƚŚĞ &ƌĞŶĐŚ  QǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ
unfavourable effects on our relations with them, and their co-operation in locating for us in 
ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǌŽŶĞ ? ?743 In short, the British had to rely on the French but they felt unable to 
trust them. 
Even in the areas where the British were reliant on French co-operation, it was not 
ĂůǁĂǇƐĂƐĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞǇŚŽƉĞĚ ?ǀĞŶďǇ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ‘the French authorities took many 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐƚŽŐŝǀĞĐůĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŽŶĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŶŐ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌǌŽne, but the British 
still felt it was inadvisable to apply any pressure on the French to try and expedite the 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ  ‘ĂƐ ŝƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ŽďƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŵ ůĂƚĞƌǁŚĞŶ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
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&ƌĞŶĐŚŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ? ?744 Not only could French agencies be truculent in releasing 
German specialists in their custody to their allies, they were also quite devious when it came 
to trying to poach targeted experts who were held by Britain or America. In one example, 
French intelligence officers infiltrated a guarded American transit hotel in Bad Kissingen, 
Bavaria and went from room to room, talking to the scientists, casting doubts on their 
prospects in the United States and offering them a much better future in France. By the 
time they were discovered and escorted away, they had successfully managed to convince 
some of the specialists to go with them.745 
In another instance, the French displayed a remarkable lack of scruples when they 
seized Otto Ambros while he was on his way to trial for war crimes. Ambros, the senior IG 
&ĂƌďĞŶĐŚĞŵŝƐƚǁŚŽŚĂĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁ
nerve gases and who had links to unethical human experiments and slave labour, was being 
interrogated by an Anglo-American team at Gendorf in Bavaria when a warrant for his arrest 
arrived from SHAEF. According to this warrant, he was to be immediately transported to the 
Ashcan detention centre at Mondorf-les-Bains in Luxembourg. The route took him through 
the French zone, where he was held by the French and set to work for them at 
Ludwigshafen.746 It took considerable diplomatic protest on the part of the Americans to 
finally secure his release back into their custody.747 dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞũƵƐƚƚǁŽĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
remarkably comprehensive programme of poaching German experts from their wartime 
ĂůůŝĞƐ ?ůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ&ƌĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǀĞĞƌŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐůŽƐĞ
collaboration and deep suspicion, was an unsteady one. However, no matter how fierce the 
Anglo-French competition got over the best spoils of Germany, it pales in comparison when 
set against British relations with the real adversary of the post-war period  W the Soviet 
Union. 
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The Soviet Union 
In the improbable wartime alliance, the Soviet Union was certainly the most anomalous 
element. Since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent civil war, relations 
between the Soviet Union and the West had been largely unfriendly and characterised by 
suspicion and one-upmanship, and they were only forced to collaborate in the Second 
WorůĚ tĂƌ ďǇ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ďĞƚƌĂǇĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ǁŚĞŶ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƌďĂƌŽƐƐĂ ǁĂƐ
launched in June 1941. Under these inauspicious circumstances, a marriage of convenience 
was reached, where parties set aside, or at least veiled, ideological differences, racial 
stereotypes and varying strategic aims in order to unite for a common cause  W the defeat of 
Nazi Germany. Once that aim had been achieved, or even before, when it looked 
increasingly likely, the already unsteady foundations of the alliance began to tremble and 
shake.748 Those differing strategic aims, which had been buried away in the name of 
international unity, returned to the fore in Soviet planning, as they did in Britain and the 
USA too.749 
 The Soviets disliked, mistrusted and feared the Germans with remarkable vigour, a 
product of two world wars involving two brutal German incursions onto Russian territory, 
and they sought to use the balance of power at the end of the war to ensure these 
sufferings would not be repeated.750 This guided much of their policy in Eastern Europe, 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇWŽůĂŶĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŽǇĂů ‘ďƵĨĨĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁĂƐĂŚŝŐŚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŝƚĂůƐŽ
shaped their actions towards their zone of Germany, namely striking a balance between 
punitive measures, such as dismantling, and restorative ones, necessary to ensure Germany 
was peaceful and self-sufficient.751 On the ground, Soviet soldiers were the worst 
perpetrators of crimes against the German population, with incidents of rape, pillage and 
murder horrifyingly commonplace.752 George F. Kennan, the senior American diplomat, later 
ǁƌŽƚĞŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ‘ƐǁĞƉƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐůĞĂŶŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚ
ŚĂĚŶŽƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĚĂǇƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŝĂƚŝĐŚŽƌĚĞƐ ? ?753 British exploitation teams even heard 
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first-hand stories of the horrors of Soviet occupation  W the works manager at the 
Dominitwerke in Brilon, Westphalia, described the effect of the presence of 1,500 Russian 
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ĨŽƌ Ɛŝǆ ǁĞĞŬƐ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘as good as an air raid except that the ceilings remained 
ŝŶƚĂĐƚ ? ?754 
 At a policy level, much Soviet thinking was centred on the principle that Germany 
should never again be allowed to reach a position where it could launch an attack against 
Russia. Any form of German resurgence had to be explicitly on Soviet terms, and so German 
economic recovery was viewed with great caution. Moreover, as they had invested so much, 
not just in terms of human lives but also economically, in the war against the Nazis, they felt 
they had a right to strip Germany of all it had to offer.755 In many ways, this mirrored the 
British attitude towards Germany who, even as late as 1949, was still considered by many in 
Britain to be the biggest threat to peace in Europe.756 However, British attitudes were 
forced to change by a number of factors, not least a desire to see Germany return to self-
sufficiency in order to reduce its ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ŐƌŽƐƐůǇ ŽǀĞƌƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚ
resources. 
 In addition, some British intelligence and security experts had never stopped 
thinking of the Soviet Union as the real enemy even while the war was still being fought. 
This view became more and more widespread and popular as the post-war period matured 
and developed, largely because it also became the prevailing opinion of the most powerful 
nation in the Western bloc  W the United States. The Americans, relative newcomers to a 
Europe still governed by lingering grievances and enmities between the former Great 
Powers, and with a foreign policy unencumbered by this weighty heritage, within a year had 
recast the Soviet Union into the role of enemy with one hand, and repositioned Germany as, 
if not quite an ally, then at least as a tool to be wielded against Soviet ambitions with the 
other.757 Some have argued that it was actually the British who led the way on this 
reconfiguration of the world order, deliberately attempting to influence American policy 
towards the USSR, and to prevent the USA from reverting to isolationism as they had in 
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1919.758 Either way, the British public did not find it difficult to adapt to this realignment  W 
by September 1946, a Gallup poll revealed that 61 per cent of British respondents felt that 
the alliance between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union had disappeared, while less than a 
quarter thought it was still intact.759 Julian Lewis has observed that British military planners 
adjusted to the breakdown in Anglo-Soviet relations with foresight, prudence and 
exceptional rapidity.760 These planners even began conducting assessments of what military 
strategy would be most appropriate for defeating the Soviets should it come to war 
between East and West, concluding that the use of weapons of mass destruction would be 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂĐƚ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ůĂŶĚ
forces.761 This meant that the British and Americans became very concerned about any 
^ŽǀŝĞƚĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƉĂƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶƚƵƌŶŵĂĚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞ
opening gambit of the distinctly research-driven Cold War arms race.762 
 dŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂůĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐǁĞƌĞŚĂƐƚǇĂŶĚŚĂƉŚĂǌĂƌĚ ?ůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌe than an 
extension of the widespread looting conducted by the untrained peasant troops of the Red 
Army, who stripped factories and laboratories of their valuable equipment in such a chaotic 
and careless fashion that much which was of value was lost.763 In addition, the transport 
available to move the materials back to the Soviet Union was insufficient and large 
quantities were simply abandoned at railway sidings, to the double fury of the wastefully 
deprived German population.
764
 This did not last long though and soon the Soviets were 
marshalling an exploitation programme to rival those of Britain and America in terms of 
scale and thoroughness. They also began taking a keen interest in the activities of their 
rivals, most notably the removal of anything of scientific or technical worth from the areas 
of Germany which British and American troops had seized in the last weeks of the war but 
which were due to be handed over to the Soviets for occupation. 
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At the Potsdam Conference, Stalin directly challenged President Truman on these 
removals.765 Truman had come prepared for such an exchange and responded that the 
ƌĞŵŽǀĂůƐ  ‘ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŵĂĚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ
ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ Q ,Ğ ĂĚĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽ ƉĞople had been removed by the American 
ƌŵǇ ? ?766 He also promised to have a full investigation into these removals conducted by the 
US Military Governor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, which duly took place and concluded that, 
 ‘ǁŝƚŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞĚŝĚĞǀĂĐƵĂƚĞ equipment and personnel from the Russian zone 
ĂƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞSoviet accusations true, they were actually a 
little underestimated.767 Truman unsurprisingly felt no need to share these findings with 
Stalin or the Soviets. An EPES report filed a year later, in August 1946, went further and 
noted that the British evacuated 250 German experts and their families from the future 
Soviet zone, while the number handled by the Americans was closer to 2,000, surmising that 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝon is now regarded with favour by British and American authorities, 
especially in view of the valuable results which have been obtained in the exploitation of 
'ĞƌŵĂŶĞǀĂĐƵĂƚĞĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ?768 
 A note appended to this report by R.J. MaƵŶƐĞůůŽĨ &/dǁĂƌŶĞĚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚƌĞŶƵŽƵƐ
ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞSoviets were making to induce the evacuated specialists to return to their 
zone. It detailed that: 
Every effort is now being made by the Russians to persuade the evacuees to go back. 
Russian methods of persuasion include the offer of lucrative terms of employment and if 
these are not accepted the victimisation of the families of evacuees still in the Russian zone 
and the confiscation of their property.769 
These carrot-and-stick tactics would later become characteristic of the whole Soviet 
recruitment effort, but their strong protests about these British and American removals 
concealed, perhaps deliberately, the fact that they had done something very similar in parts 
of Berlin before they were handed over to Western occupying forces. In the district of 
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Dahlem, for instance, the Soviets lured away the bulk of the scientific workforce at the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes for Biology, Biochemistry, Chemistry and Anthropology, using 
offers of lard to prove that they were serious about looking after these men and their 
families.770 
 These initial mutual poaching attempts were just the first phase in what became a 
fierce struggle for the spoils of Germany between the two fast-emerging Cold War camps. In 
the conclusion to a FIAT intelligence report from August 1946, the unnamed author 
expressed his feeling ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁĞ ŵĂǇ ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ
between Russia and the Western powers: a completely open race for the best talent and 
skill GermanǇŚĂƐƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ? ?771 The British and American side of this race was spurred on by 
an overwhelming concern about what could happen if the Soviet Union was able to 
maximise the benefits of exploitation. A Joint Intelligence Committee report from May 1946 
revealƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨĞĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ ? ‘ĂůĂƌŐĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ
'ĞƌŵĂŶ ďƌĂŝŶƉŽǁĞƌ ǁŝůů ŚĂǀĞ ŐŽŶĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŶŽ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ ? ?772 
dŚĞǇĂůƐŽǁŽƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘the alliance of German brainpower and Russian resources may well 
ƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?773 In reality, the 
extent to which German experts contributed in a significant way to Soviet technological 
development after the war is unclear, muddied as much by contemporary secrecy and 
national pride as by subsequent historiography, much of which has been based on only 
limited access to the pertinent files.774 
 As with all international interactions on exploitation, the biggest sources of 
contention were linked to the most significant technological advances achieved by German 
researchers ?dŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂůůŽǁĞĚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂŶǇ ‘dŽƉ^ĞĐƌĞƚ ?^ĞĐƌĞƚŽƌŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ?
British documents relating to the V-weapons or rocketry in general,775 and in terms of the 
allotment of specimens of these secret weapons to the Soviets, it was decreed that they 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ŚĂŶĚĞĚ ŽǀĞƌ ƵŶƚŝů ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ĂƐŬĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞŶ  ‘should always be 
                                                             
770
 Naimark, Russians in Germany, 209. 
771
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WĞƌŝŽĚŝĐ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞZĞƉŽƌƚEŽ ? ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
772




 ƐŝĨ^ŝĚĚŝƋŝ ?  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ PŽůĚtĂƌ ?dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇdƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ?ĂŶĚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů /ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?Osiris, 24 (2009), 
122-3. 
775
 dE ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘K^WĂƉĞƌƐ ? ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 208 - 
 
subject to reciprocal action, not necessarily in kind but in equitable exchange of 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂƚĞƌŝĞůŽƌǀŝƐŝƚƐ ? ?776 The Americans even considered destroying the Mittelwerk 
underground V-2 factory near Nordhausen before the area was handed over to the Soviets, 
ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ  ‘preclude resumption of production within Ă ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ƐŚŽƌƚ ƚŝŵĞ ? ?777 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĂĐƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ ‘ƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞƌĞƉĞƌĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŽŝƚǁĂƐ
called off, though as much specialist equipment as possible was removed before the 
handover, and relevant German experts were relocated to Cuxhaven, deep within the 
British zone.778 /Ŷ ůďĞƌƚ ^ƉĞĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ŚĞ ƌĞĐŽƵŶƚƐ Ărumour that the Soviets had 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝǀĞĚ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŬŝƚĐŚĞŶ ƐƚĂĨĨ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ h^ ƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉ Ăƚ 'ĂƌŵŝƐĐŚ-Partenkirchen in 
southern Bavaria to pass a secret offer of employment to Wernher von Braun, while he was 
briefly held there after the war.779 
 Unsurprisingly, another area which gave rise to considerable conflict and 
competition was over the German atomic research programme. Britain and the US were 
obviously very concerned that the West should maintain a monopoly on atomic weapons in 
order to give them a greater edge at the negotiating table with the USSR, but intelligence on 
the Soviet atomic bomb project was notoriously difficult to gather.780 As they had little faith 
in Soviet science to develop an atomic bomb of their own accord, the withholding of any 
German material, equipment or personnel with connections to atomic research became of 
paramount importance.
781
 Brigadier Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, 
described prominent German atomic physicist Werner Heisenberg as of greater worth than 
ten divisions of German soldiers and predicted that if he fell into Soviet hands, he would 
ƉƌŽǀĞ ‘ŝŶǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?782 Alsos was at the forefront of the efforts to prevent the Soviets 
deriving any benefit from German atomic science, an endeavour which included denying 
them access to any relevant substances as well as personnel  W in March 1945, following 
intelligence gathered by Alsos operatives, the US Air Force bombed a thorium and uranium 
processing plant at Oranienburg, while in April, an Anglo-American team removed some 
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1,200 tons of uranium ore from a salt mine near Staßfurt and shipped it back to Britain.783 
Both Oranienburg and Staßfurt were due to fall within the Soviet zone, and this marked the 
first incidence of the denial of fissile materials being employed as an atomic non-
proliferation measure  W a tactic which has persisted, but not proved widely successful, 
throughout the Cold War and up to the present day.784 
 The Soviets knew that to hesitate would be to lose out in the atomic exploitation 
race so they quickly established their own atomic investigative organisation which has been 
ĚƵďďĞĚ  ‘ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ůƐŽƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ůĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶ E<s ůŝĞƵƚ ŶĂŶƚ-colonel, Avraamii 
Zaveniagin, who brought an approach more driven by intelligence-gathering than by 
scientific curiosity. In fact, many Soviet scientists were reluctant to participate, fearing that 
they would be replaced by the very German experts whom they helped to recruit. Although 
the Soviets soon discovered that they had missed out on the most talented of the German 
physicists (who by this stage were interned at Farm Hall, near Cambridge) they were able to 
benefit from the fact that many others did not wish to go to the USA as they felt that they 
had nothing to offer to the vastly advanced American project and did not want to rely on 
charity. The Soviet bomb project, meanwhile, was only slightly ahead of German research 
and therefore the German experts felt they could contribute more to it.785 Certainly this 
competition for German expertise was the first phase in the close relationship between 
espionage and atomic physics which existed throughout the Cold War, and gave both sides 
ample experience.786 
 Certainly, concerns about atomic secrecy did not disappear after the initial mad rush 
for spoils which took place in 1945. For instance, when the Farm Hall scientists returned to 
Germany after their period of internment in Britain had ended, they were placed under 
 ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƐƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞ ? ? ĐŽĚĞŶĂŵĞĚ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ^ĐƌƵŵ ,ĂůĨ ?dŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ
1947 and 1948, as fears of these scientists being kidnapped, murdered or swept up by the 
Soviets in the instance of a land invasion of the western zones of Germany grew. However, 
it also came in for considerable criticism, including by the US Military Governor Lucius Clay, 
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who felt it was foolish to have these vital individuals living freely in Germany, but under 
almost prohibitively expensive surveillance. It was suggested that it would be better to 
either incarcerate them or move them permanently to Britain or the US.787 
 The particularly high-priority examples of rocketry and atomic physics aside, the 
early stages of East-West relations on exploitation attempted, on the face of it at least, to 
maintain a sense of cordiality and civility. While some on the Western side advocated a 
strongly collaborative approach, such as the British FIAT chief, R.J. Maunsell, who called for 
 ‘ďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĨƵůůĐŽ- ƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?788 but with some excluded topics such as chemical warfare, the 
prevailing view in the months following the end of the war was that some form of reserved, 
partial co-operation was the best option, including an insistence on reciprocity for any 
exchanges. For example, Admiral Sir Harold Burrough, the British Naval Commander-in-Chief 
ŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƌĞƉůŝĞĚƚŽDĂƵŶƐĞůů ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƐďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐ ‘ƉĂƐƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶ
ƚŚĂƚ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŐŝǀĞ ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ Ă Ĩŝƌŵ
reciprocal bĂƐŝƐ ?ǁŝƚŚĂůů ‘ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƚŽďĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚďǇZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?789 
 The official policy which was handed down by the British Chiefs of Staff in September 
 ? ? ? ? ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ŵƵĐŚ ƚŚŝƐ ůŝŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂ  ƌŝƚĂŝŶ  ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
latitude in permitting conducted Russian visits to German intelligence targets within our 
ǌŽŶĞĨŽƌƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚƐ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?790 Areas 
which were not open for exchange with the Soviets included bacteriological warfare, 
applied nuclear physics, supersonic aerodynamics, control of guided missiles, anything on 
chemical warfare, the work of IG Farben and all diplomatic and political documents. 
Problems were found with this scheme almost immediately. The economic intelligence 
division of the Military Government wrote to the JIC, describing the exclusions as 
 ‘ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚůŝƐƚŝŶŐƐĞǀĞƌĂůƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚĞůůŝŶŐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ P 
In particular, the exclusion of Russians from all IG Farben plants and the ban on any 
reference to this cannot be effected while there is a quadripartite enquiry into the 
ramifications of the IG Farben. It is also going to be very difficult to avoid discussion about 
the control of guided missiles when the Russians have been asked to attend the Backfire 
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demonstrations. Again, there seems little point in restricting information on the new poison 
gases Sarin and Tabun when the plant for their manufacture is in the Russian zone. Other 
examples could be mentioned, but these are typical. 
It was also noted ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝƐƚǁĂƐƐŽĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƚŚĂƚŝĨ ŝƚǁĂƐĂĚŚĞƌĞĚƚŽůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ ? ‘ǁĞ
are bound to create a feeling of suspicion in the minds of the Russians and all to very little 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ? 791 
dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂŶǇƉƵƐŚĨŽƌƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐŝƚǇǁĂƐĨŽŽůŝƐŚĂƐ ‘ŝƚ is likely that 
ǁŽƌƚŚǁŚŝůĞ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶǌŽŶĞĂƌĞĨĞǁ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐƐƚŝůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
 ‘ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶ ǁŚĂƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ǌŽŶĞ ? ?792 This was not a new 
concern but in fact reflected a similar point which had been raised by the British at the 
Potsdam Conference, that  ‘even if a more general undertaking for reciprocal exchange of all 
information were made and loyally observed by the Russians, we should not expect to 
ŽďƚĂŝŶŵƵĐŚǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ ? ?793 Moreover, early experience showed that 
the Soviets were not particularly willing to loyally observe the terms of reciprocity, with 
representatives of the Chemical Industries Branch of the CCG(BE) ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the 
position with regard to Russian visits to ŽƵƌǌŽŶĞŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƵŶƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇ ? ?794 This was in 
no small part because the Soviets kept sending new teams without allowing for British 
ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ǀŝƐŝƚƐ ? ƚŚƵƐ ƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ĐŚĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘Ă ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ŐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƚĂŬĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?795 Sometimes obstructions were not created by the Soviets, but rather by the 
security-conscious British authorities  W Monica Maurice, who led a BIOS trip to Germany in 
1947, recorded ruefully that one member of her team was offered a  ‘ŚĞĂǀĞŶ ƐĞŶƚ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŽǀŝƐŝƚƚŚĞSoviet ǌŽŶĞ ‘ďƵƚǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚ ? ?796 
/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?/K^ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ‘some difficulty had 
ďĞĞŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌŝƚŝƐŚƚĞĂŵǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚƚŽ
the Soviet ǌŽŶĞ  ‘ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ǁĞůů ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? ? dŚĞ ƚĞĂŵ ůĞĂĚ ƌ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ
 ‘ĐŽƵƌƚĞƐǇ ĂŶĚ ŐŽŽĚ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? ŚĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ŵĞŶ ŚĂĚ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă
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letter of thanks be sent to the Russian Liaison Officer in Berlin.797 Investigations into IG 
Farben offered another occasion for greater co-operation, and in January 1946, British 
officials chose to visit three IG facilities under Soviet control (at Auschwitz, Staßfurt and 
Bitterfeld) in return for Soviet visits to three facilities in the British zone (at Düsseldorf, 
Uerdingen and Leverkusen).798 This was, in part, the legacy of a proposed Quadripartite IG 
Investigation Working Committee (QIIWC) which had been plagued by a number of issues, 
including the lack of a dedicated detention centre and conflict with the Nuremberg Trials, 
ĂŶĚŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐĚŝƐƐŽůǀĞĚĂƐŝƚ ‘has not now and never has had official sanction, 
ĂŶĚŝŶĨĂĐƚŚĂƐŶĞǀĞƌĂĐƚĞĚŽŶĂƋƵĂĚƌŝƉĂƌƚŝƚĞďĂƐŝƐ ? ?799  
As the post-war period progressed, incidences of collaboration between East and 
West became fewer and further between and restrictions on British investigators in the 
Soviet zone became much tighter. Monica Maurice noted that though they were permitted 
to travel through the Soviet zone to get to Berlin, they were not allowed to stop anywhere 
en route.800 They were also not permitted to travel through the Soviet zone after dark, and 
there were Red Army sentries posted every two or three miles along the roads to make sure 
these rules were acknowledged.801 It was also during this time that the British and 
Americans began to take a greater interest in exactly how the Soviets were conducting their 
own exploitation programme. As early as July 1945, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐŽĨĨĞƌƐŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞĂůƌeady been made 
over the Russian-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚƌĂĚŝŽ ? ?802 while in March 1946, the US branch of FIAT produced 
ĂƌĞƉŽƌƚĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶĞƌůŝŶ ? ?dŚŝƐ
report comprehensively detailed the way in which these organisations contributed towards 
^ŽǀŝĞƚ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞ
scientific and technological life in Berlin. The three Western powers, for their own part, are 
apparently unaware of the nature and extent of ƚŚŝƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?803 
                                                             
797
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨ ?th /K^DĞĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? 
798
 TE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘DƵƚƵĂůsŝƐŝƚƐƚŽ/'&ĂƌďĞŶWůĂŶƚƐ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? 
799
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘YƵĂĚƌŝƉĂƌƚŝƚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?For more on the fate of IG Farben in occupied 
Germany, see Raymond Stokes, Divide and Prosper: The Heirs of I.G. Farben under Allied Authority, 1945-1951 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), esp. chapters 2-4. 
800
 IWM, 99/76/1, Private Papers of Monica Maurice, 22 May 1947. 
801
 IWM, 09/21/1, Private Papers of Gilbert A. Hunter, January 1946. 
802
 dE ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘BritiƐŚZĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
803
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚ^ƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇĐƚŝǀĞŝŶĞƌůŝŶ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? 
- 213 - 
 
Despite this, British and American exploitation agencies took solace in their belief 
that the German people had a fundamental dislike of the Soviets and were therefore 
generally reluctant to work for them. In January 1946, Brigadier C.F.C. Spedding of Research 
Branch dismissed claims that it was risky to let desirable German specialists live too close to 
the border of the Soviet ǌŽŶĞ ? ‘since popularity of Russian zone is inversely proportionate to 
ŝƚƐƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? ?804 A Civil Censorship intercept from August 1946 revealed that, upon receiving 
an offer to go and work for the Soviets, German rocket scientist Helmut Reichstein felt that 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ĂĐƋƵŝĞƐĐĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ
some real ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚĞŶ ŝƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?805 Reports such as these gave the 
Western powers an inflated sense of confidence, leading one FIAT intelligence assessment 
to conclude ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?  ‘ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ
them are ours for the asking  W ŝĨǁĞĂƐŬ ? ?806 
However, the Soviets actually had many ways to make their offers attractive to a 
wide range of German experts. By the end of 1946, the British began to recognise that their 
own commitment to fairly thorough programmes of denazification and disarmament was 
 ‘ŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĚƌŝǀŝŶŐ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐƚŽǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ  Q
ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŶŽƐƵĐŚƐĐƌƵƉůĞƐ ? ?807 The extent of Soviet commitment to denazification has been 
disputed,808 but there are clear examples of their active recruitment of fairly obvious and 
committed Nazis, such as physical chemist Peter Adolf Thiessen, who had been a senior 
figure in the Nazi scientific hierarchy, the holder of several Nazi Party awards and had been 
a member of the Party since 1933  W ŝŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ŚĞǁĂƐŶŽŵĞƌĞ  ‘ĨĞůůŽǁƚƌĂǀĞůůĞƌ ?ŶŽƌŽŶĞŽĨ
the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŽ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ
recruit.
809
 When the British tried to understand how such a man as Thiessen could be happy 
to go and work for the SovietƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĞǇĚƌĞǁǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚĚŽŶĞƐŽ ‘ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ
ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞŶĞǁĞĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚŐƌĞĂƚŶĞƐƐǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞůƉŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
which made a pact with Hitler against Britain in August 19 ? ? ? ?810 Such a move certainly did 
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dŚŝĞƐƐĞŶ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌŶŽŚĂƌŵ Wwhile working in the Soviet Union, he was even able to add the 
Stalin Prize to his collection of Nazi accolades.811 
For other experts, especially those with a less tainted political background, there 
were other elements of the Soviet offers which they found appealing. The Soviets offered 
salaries ranging from RM 800 to 8,000 a month, which completely dwarfed the average 
British offers of RM 400, and they augmented this with generous double ration packages.812 
The Soviets also used a system of payoks to entice their targeted specialists  W these were 
variously-sized parcels of much sought-after items used to sweeten the deal, ranging from 
five cigarettes at one end of the scale to two cases of foodstuffs at the other.813 As the food 
shortages in the British zone worsened in 1946, more and more German experts began 
ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ĞĂƐƚǁĂƌĚƐ ĨŽƌ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ǁŽŶĚĞƌĞĚ  ‘whether the 
prospects of physical starvation weigh as heavily with these men as the virtual certainty of 
mental starvation if they remain in wĞƐƚĞƌŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?814 This was in reference not only to 
the Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨƉŝĐŬŝŶŐĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐďƌĂŝŶ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐŚŝŵŝŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚŽĨƚĞŶ
not offering him any financial recompense or job prospects in return, but also in reference 
to the ban on any warlike industries in the western zones, which included fields such as 
aeronautics and rocketry, in which many of the relevant experts specialised.815 In March 
1946, Heinrich Waas, a German naval technician, compiled a report for the JIC, in which he 
ƐĂƌĚŽŶŝĐĂůůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǀŝĞǁƐŽŶůůŝĞĚƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ P ‘ŽŶĞĐĂŶŽĨƚĞŶƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚ
an agreement exists between the British and Americans on the one hand, the Russians on 
the other, to drive all valuable technicians out of the wĞƐƚĞƌŶǌŽŶĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ? ?816 
The British and Americans consoled themselves by suggesting that the German 
scientists which the Soviets were able to recruit were fairly insignificant individuals. Some 
government officials felt that Britain had secured some of the truly outstanding German 
researchers, too much emphasis was being placed on the  ‘ĂŝĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĂďĞƚƚŽƌƐ ?, and that 
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ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇ ŵŝŶĚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ůĞƐƐĞƌ ůŝŐŚƚƐ ĚŽ ŐŽ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?817 EPES, 
meanwhile, noted that the SovietƐŚĂĚƚĂŬĞŶ  ‘ĐŚŝĞĨůǇƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌƐ  QĂŶĚ ůĞĨƚ
ďĞŚŝŶĚ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŚŽƉĞĚ
would limit the amount of long-term benefit the Soviet Union could derive from 
exploitation.818 /ƚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ŵŽƐƚůǇ ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ ŵĞŶ ?  ‘ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ
ƵƐƵĂůůǇŵŽƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞƌŝƐŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?ďƵƚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĨŽƌĞƐŝŐŚƚǁĂƐƐŚŽǁŶƚŽ
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐǁŝůůŶŽƌŵĂůůǇďĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌƐ in about ten years it is 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚũƵƐƚĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞŵŝŶǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŽĚǁŝůůƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƵƐ ? ?819 
The Soviets however were not content with simply siphoning off a sizeable number 
of able German scientists and technicians of all levels using attractive offers of continued 
work in their particular field, good pay and rations allowances, real opportunities for 
professional development, and a working environment characterised by respect and good 
relations with their supervisors. Under the Cold War conditions of heightened paranoia, 
ƚŚĞǇďĞŐĂŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŶŐĂŵŽƌĞĚƌĂƐƚŝĐǁĂǇƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐďĞƐƚ
and brightest for themselves. In the autumn of 1945, the German press in the British and 
American zones ran numerous sensationalist stories about the Soviet kidnappings of 
countless German specialists; much of which was little more than a thinly-veiled 
propaganda attempt to counter the many positives of Soviet recruitment.820 Nonetheless, 
these fears were felt very acutely by British exploitation officials, as shown by the continued 
monitoring of the Farm Hall scientists upon their return to Germany, mentioned above. 
The fears were also not totally groundless. In the autumn of 1946, the Soviets began 
moving small groups of German specialists forcibly from the eastern zone to the Soviet 
Union proper. In many cases, they did so covertly, in order not to incite their targeted men 
to flee or to arouse too much suspicion in the West. In one example, the British Scientific 
and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB) recorded that during deportations from the Junkers 
works around Magdeburg and Dessau, the presence of German police and Red Army 
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚƐǁĂƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂǁĂǇĂƐ  ‘ĂĚƌŝǀĞ  QďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚůĂĐŬDĂƌŬĞƚ
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ƌĂĐŬĞƚĞĞƌƐ ? ?821 However, it was at 4 a.m. on Tuesday 22 October 1946 that the real extent of 
ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚĚĞƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶĐĂŵĞƚŽůŝŐŚƚ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ ‘ǌĞƌŽŚŽƵƌ ?ĨŽƌKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶKƐŽĂǀŝĂŬŚŝŵ ?Ă
well-planned and neatly-executed mass forced evacuation scheme. It was co-ordinated and 
led by General Ivan Serov, who was a Deputy Commissar of the NKVD under Lavrentiy Beria, 
^ƚĂůŝŶ ?Ɛ ĨĞĂƌƐŽŵĞ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ƉŽůŝĐĞ ĐŚŝĞĨ ? ŽŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵĂŐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ
exploitation fell very much in the domain of intelligence and espionage as opposed to the 
civil service, as was the case in Britain.822 
The immediate goal of Osoaviakhim was to move huge aviation, rocketry, and other 
weapons research and production facilities from Saxony and Thuringia to the Soviet Union. 
These Nazi-era facilities had been rebuilt and the staff was primarily German, under the 
supervision of the Soviets, who were well aware of the perils of conducting military research 
in Germany, given the relatively porous frontiers between the various zones of occupation 
and the supposed four-power prohibition of such research.823 The aim therefore was to 
relocate these men from Germany, where, despite already being in Soviet employ, they 
were at risk of poaching by another occupying nation, to the USSR where they were almost 
completely safe. Firms whose employees fell under the remit of Osoaviakhim included 
BMW, AEG, Junkers, GEMA, Askania, Kabelwerk Oberspree, among many, many more. 
The process for each individual who was included in Osoaviakhim was much the 
same across the board: 
The man concerned was awakened by Russian soldiers in the early hours of the morning and 
informed that he would be leaving for Russia immediately. In many cases the man was 
permitted to take with him his family and as much of his furniture as could be loaded into 
one third of a railway freight wagon.824 
These men and their families were then moved by lorry and private car to the eastern 
outskirts of Berlin, where they were loaded onto 92 trains, totalling some 700 coaches, at 
the stations of Friedrichshagen and Köpenick. The destinations of these trains were major 
cities and industrial centres in the USSR, including Moscow and Odessa, and the Germans 
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aboard were vaguely told that their journeys would last from three to seven days.825 
Needless to say, at no stage in the proceedings were the German detainees given any choice 
in the matter. The deportations continued throughout 22 October and were still ongoing at 
5pm that evening, with trucks loaded with scientists, their families and their household 
possessions arriving at the railway stations every three to four minutes. The scale of the 
operation was unprecedented, involving roughly 2,300 German specialists (plus their 
families)  W it has been estimated that approximately 84 per cent of the German scientific 
workers deported to the Soviet Union in the years after the war were taken in this 
operation.826 
 There is no doubt that Osoaviakhim was meticulously well planned and prepared for. 
In the months leading up to it, the Soviets had lured many German experts who worked in 
their zone or sector of Berlin, but lived elsewhere, to relocate closer to their workplace, by 
offering much larger and more comfortable accommodation at a fraction of the cost. With 
the dire housing shortage in Germany at this time, especially in Berlin, it was considered 
 ‘ƐŵĂůů ǁŽŶĚĞƌ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĨĞǁ ĐŽƵůĚ ďƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĨƵƐĞ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ŽĨĨĞƌ ?827 In 
addition, Red Army commando units and troops with trucks were posted to street corners 
and important locations during the night, in order to pre-emptively deter any resistance 
which might be provoked.828 Even these measures were not enough to dissuade certain 
 ‘ƌƵŐŐĞĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽďƵĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƚƵĐŬŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŽƌh^
^ĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?ƚŚƵƐĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƐŽŵĞǀĞƌǇ ŝƐŬǇ ?ĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞůy fruitless, raids outside 
of their own zone, sometimes using German police officers to bring the specialists in 




 Some individuals still remained undaunted, such as Dipl.-Ing. Zumpe, chief of the flak 
rocket department at GEMA in Berlin, who turned up to work as usual on the morning of 22 
October, where the Russian director informed him he was to go to the USSR for work. 
Zumpe immediately acquiesced, knowing that to refuse could prove fatal, and arranged for 
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Soviet transport to fetch him, his wife and their possessions from their home in the British 
Sector the following morning. Before they could do so, the Zumpes concealed themselves at 
Ă ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛ Ăpartment nearby and watched as a succession of different Soviet officials and 
soldiers attempted to locate them. In the meantime, he managed to contact the British 
element of EPES, who arranged to evacuate them, by air, to Frankfurt, just over a week 
later. EPES also recorded the story of Dr Ulrich Capeller, a physicist from Jena in Thuringia, 
who was loaded onto a train by the Soviets, but managed to jump off while it was moving 
during the night and make his way back to Berlin, where he immediately made himself 
known to the British authorities.830 
 Unsurprisingly, despite its secretive origins, the full extent of Osoaviakhim soon 
came to the attention of the shocked British and American exploitation agencies, and to the 
wider public too. Horror stories appeared in the Western press, which the Soviets dismissed 
ĂƐ ‘ĐĂůƵŵŶŝŽƵƐĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĚĂŵĂŐĞǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĚĞƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ
threatened to wreak to their public image in Germany by arguing that their operation was 
no worse than the removals made by the Americans and British from areas due to be 
handed over to the Soviets in the summer of 1945. One story from the time runs that 
Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovsky, the head of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, 
snidely told Colonel Frank ,ŽǁůĞǇ ?ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶƚŽĨĞƌůŝŶ ? ‘/ĂŵŶŽƚĂƐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ
Americans and British at what hour of the day or night they took their technicians - why are 
ǇŽƵƐŽĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŚŽƵƌĂƚǁŚŝĐŚ/ƚŽŽŬŵŝŶĞ ? ?831 
 Despite the uproar from the Western powers, Osoaviakhim was only really 
concerned with the evacuation of German specialists already in Soviet hands and its 
repercussions for Britain and the US were, in reality, predominantly positive. The majority of 
German scientific and technical experts were so shocked by Osoaviakhim that EPES was 
almost immediately swamped by a great number of  ‘callers, correspondents and other 
ĞŶƋƵŝƌĞƌƐ ? Ăůů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ Ăŝŵ ŝŶ ǀŝĞǁ ?  W to escape the possibility of deportation and 
remove themselves as quickly as possible to the western zones, the United Kingdom or the 
h^ ? ‘KŶĞŵĂŶǁĞŶƚƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŽĂƐŬƚŽďĞĂƌƌĞƐƚĞĚĨŽƌŚŝƐŽǁŶƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ?832 The FIAT Forward 
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office predicted that if more serious threats of deportation arose, this stream of applicants 
was  ‘ůŝĂďůĞƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂĨůŽŽĚ ? ?833 Desperation was truly commonplace  W at a Zeiss plant in 
Jena, the removal of so many personnel as well as nine-tenths of the equipment led to a 
spate of suicides.834 More generally though this was a golden opportunity for the Western 
powers, especially Britain, to reverse the flow of German specialists heading eastwards on 
account of generous Soviet inducements, and maximise their own exploitation potential.835 
What Osoaviakhim allowed Britain and the US to finally realise was a policy of denial, 
which had been in the pipeline, albeit putatively, since the end of the previous year. In 
December 1945, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Control Council for Germany (JIC-
' )ŚĂĚ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ EĂǀĂů /ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚƌĞǁĂ  ‘somewhat 
sinister light on Russian activities vis-à-vis 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽĐĂůůĨŽƌ
 ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ĂƚĂ ŚŝŐŚ ůĞǀĞů  QĂƐ ƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ,D'ǁŽƵůĚǁŝƐŚ ƐƚƌĞŶƵŽƵƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽďĞ
ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ĚĞŶǇ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?836 It was May 1946 before the 
main JIC considered these reports in full, and they concluded that, as a result of the 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨ^ŽǀŝĞƚƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ‘ďǇƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ ? ? ? ?
a large proportion of German brainpower will have gone to the Russians and there will be 
ŶŽ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ ? ?837 Osoaviakhim lent considerable credence to these fears and in 
December, almost exactly one year after the JIC-CCG had submitted its initial report, the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by ƚƚůĞĞ ?  ‘agreed in principle that it was 
necessary to deny to the Russians those German scientists and technicians, within our 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŽĐŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŽƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƵƉŽĨZƵƐƐŝĂŶǁĂƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?838 
 W this marked the first ministerial approval of such a policy.839 dŚƵƐ ďĞŐĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞh^^Z ?ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŽůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚǁŝĚĞƌĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶ
ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ ? ĂƐ ĞƐƉŽƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ 'ĞŽƌŐĞ <ĞŶŶĂŶ ?Ɛ  ‘>ŽŶŐ
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dĞůĞŐƌĂŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ dƌƵŵĂŶ octrine  W that is, to prevent Soviet expansion at every 
opportunity.840 
The practical implications of this new development were almost immediately 
evident. While previously the only criterion for securing a German scientist or technician 
had been whether he had some contribution to make to British science, this was now 
expanded to include any expert who could offer something of value to the Soviet Union. In 
April 1947, the newly-formed Ministry of Defence estimated that there were approximately 
290 such scientists within the British zone, but this figure got considerably larger as time 
wore on.841 The most obvious manifestation of this new policy was the creation of the 
Matchbox holding centre, which has been discussed in the previous chapter. Generally 
speaking ?ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨDĂƚĐŚďŽǆǁĂƐ ‘to prevent or damage Russian sponsored scientific 
ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ŽĨ Ă ǁĂƌ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŵŽǀĂů ŽĨ ŬĞǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ?
Intelligence Division produced a report which suggested that the work of the design and 
development departments of a number of important aircraft firms, including Junkers, 
Heinkel and BMW, reconstituted under Soviet ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ  ‘ƌĞƚĂƌĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽŵĞŐŽŽĚƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƐĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?842 FIAT meanwhile felt about 
the best that could be said of denial policy was that, ǁŚŝůĞ ŝƚ  ‘may have delayed Russian 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝƚŚĂƐŚĂƌĚůǇƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶǀĂůƵĞŽĨ [securing] a first 
ƌĂƚĞŵĂŶ ?ĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚĂŶǇŚŽǁ ?ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŝŶƐĂǀŝŶŐƚŝŵĞ ? ?843 
 Denial policy gradually became something of an obsession for the British exploitation 
agencies  W it became unthinkable to let any German scientist of any calibre slip through the 
net lest he turn towards the East  W which in turn opened the whole policy up to ample 
criticism. Bertie Blount, the Director of Research Branch, was one particularly persistent and 
ǀŝƚƌŝŽůŝĐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐ ? /Ŷ DĂƌĐŚ  ? ? ? ? ? ŚĞ ǁŽŶĚĞƌĞĚ  ‘ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŽĨ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ƵƉ
DĂƚĐŚďŽǆǁĞƌĞĞǀĞƌĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĚŚŝƐďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ  ‘ƋƵŝƚĞĂ
ďŝŐ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƐŚŽǁ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ Žƌ ŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ŵƵƐƚ ĨĂůů ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌ ? ?
ĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŽŽŶĞƌŽƌůĂƚĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƐƚ QǁŝůůďĞƋƵĞƌŝĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂŐŝŐĂŶƚŝĐƌŽǁ ? ?
On the other hand, he worried that if they tried to save money by being more restrictive on 
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ǁŚŽ ǁĂƐ ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŽ DĂƚĐŚďŽǆ ? ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƌĂŶĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďůĂŵĞĚ  ‘ĨŽƌ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞǀĞƌǇ
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶǁŚŽĐƌŽƐƐĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?844  
 ůŽƵŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ǁĞƌĞ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƉĂƌƚ ? ĨĂŝƌ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůŝĚ ? ďƵƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝly to 
Matchbox, which was only the front line of the denial initiative. Efforts along similar lines 
were being made back in Britain to create employment for German scientists and 
technicians which would prevent them from having cause to go and work for the Soviets. 
The Darwin Panel, which was only concerned with recruitment for civil-industrial work, 
ůŽŽŬĞĚ ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŽĨ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ QŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞŶǇƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?845 The needs of denial were also 
a strong positive argument when the Inter-Departmental Committee on German Scientists 
was pushing to allow private firms to employ German specialists exclusively.
846
 Even in 
Operation Bottleneck  W a scheme to outsource some of the work of British firms to the 
surplus labour force in Germany  W ŝƚǁĂƐŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ďǇƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?
 ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚ ?ŚĞůƉƚŽĂƌƌĞƐƚƚŚĞŝƌĚƌŝĨƚƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?847 
Unsurprisingly, this ongoing wrangling over the fates of innumerable German 
scientists and technicians, which became a major post-war preoccupation for British 
exploitation officials both in Britain and in Germany, gave rise to a considerable increase in 
the use of espionage and subterfuge  W a development which would come to characterise 
scientific intelligence throughout the secrecy-heavy years of the Cold War.848 One suggested 
tactic for British agencies wanting to contact German experts living in the eastern zone was 
ƚŽ ǁƌŝƚĞ Ă ůĞƚƚĞƌ ŽŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌ Ă ĨĂůƐĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ŶĂŵĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ DƵůůĞƌ ?(or 
Schmidt or Wolff) and send it to a private address in the British or French sector of Berlin  W 
 ‘the owners of such houses should be selected for trustworthiness and should be offered 
cigarettes etc. as an inducement to cooperate ? ? dŚĞ ůĞƚƚĞƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ƐƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘DƵůůĞƌ ? ŚĂĚ
been offered work in an Allied country, and that they were looking for other men for this 
same work, with emphasis to be laid on the  ‘excellent conditions and good and fair 
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞĂŶŽƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽǁŽƌŬŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?
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This letter would then be forwarded on to the desired German expert to await his 
response.849 There is no evidence that this elaborate strategy was ever employed, let alone 
that it was successful. 
Another option was to send a loyal German to enquire directly with the targeted 
specialist but as a travel permit, including stated purpose of journey, was needed for a 
German civilian to enter the Soviet zone, this was not always practicable.850 Moreover, it 
could be quite hazardous for ordinary German citizens to aid the British exploitation efforts. 
Henry Mecklenburg, who ran a hotel in the British Sector of Berlin which was used as a 
transit point for German scientists on their way to Matchbox, had several close encounters 
with the Soviet security services. His night-porter was detained by the police, questioned by 
a Soviet agent and told to report back on the British officers who visited the hotel, with the 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ  ‘ZĞĚƌŵǇĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝĨŚĞ ĚŝĚŶŽƚ ĐŽŵƉůǇ ?DĞĐŬůĞŶďƵƌŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ĨĞůƚŚĞ
was about to be attacked by two uniformed Russian men on one occasion when walking 
home late at night with his wife but the timely arrival of a British Volkswagen scared them 
off.851 The Soviets often acted with remarkable impunity in their attempts to counteract 
British exploitation. On the night of 18 October 1946, the British Military Train from Berlin to 
Hannover was halted while passing through the Soviet zone and, despite the armed guard, a 
number of German passengers were removed from a sealed coach, often used to transport 
scientists recruited by FIAT and EPES. On this occasion there were no such scientists aboard, 
but the Soviets had obviously hoped there would be, as they had turned up with enough 
ŵĞŶƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶŐƵĂƌĚƐ ‘ŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽƵƚŶƵŵďĞƌĞĚ ? ?KŶůǇƚŚĞŐƵĂƌĚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ
to avoid an international incident coupled with his uncertainty as to how to act in these 
extraordinary circumstances ? ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ĐĂůŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŐƵĂƌĚ ĐŽŚŽƌƚ ǁĂƐ
strengthened thereafter.852  
  
In conclusion, the British exploitation programme can only be fully understood through the 
lens of international relations. The most important elements of this are undoubtedly the 
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perceptions of the Soviet Union and the initial suspicion and hostility of the nascent Cold 
War. As soon as the war with Germany ended, and in fact even while it was still being 
fought, British intelligence operatives became very aware that the new enemy was likely to 
be the Soviet Union; a reversion to the East-West hostility of the interwar years and even 
the nineteenth century. The new ideological divide and the absorption of both Britain and 
the western zones of Germany into the American orbit simply brought the conflict into 
sharper contrast. Denial policy and Operation Osoaviakhim are both examples of the two 
camps focusing all their attention on the next war, and not the last. Shaped by the 
significant role which new weapons and forms of warfare had played during the Second 
World War, it was evident that any future conflict would be decisively affected by the 
technological fruits of scientific labour. Therefore, exploitation of German expertise can be 
seen as the first phase of the Cold War arms race. 
The situation was not, however, just a simple black-and-ǁŚŝƚĞ ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
position was further complicated by the general difficulties of asserting a new role in the 
post-war world. Faced with various options  W stronger ties with a western European bloc, 
reliance on the new United Nations organisation, reinforced cohesion with the Empire and 
Commonwealth, or subordination to an ascendant USA  W Britain had to settle for the latter 
as it provided the most immediate assurances of security and support, crucial in a time of 
economic powerlessness and strategic uncertainty.
853
 France was struggling with similar 
issues as Britain, albeit from a position of even greater weakness, compounded by domestic 
political wrangling, but tackled them differently  W they were obstinate and insistent, even 
though their limited resources made such an approach all but unsustainable. As a result of 
these new national identities, in terms of exploitation, Britain found itself competing with a 
materially-poorer but more avaricious France, and collaborating inconsistently with the 
United States, who were only willing to share the spoils when it did not pose even the 
smallest threat to their new global dominance. 
This shifting balance of competition and co-operation between Britain and its two 
close allies, France and the USA, shows the value which every country placed on scientific 
and technical superiority. Nonetheless, within three years of VE-Day, they were all preparing 
to fight the same future war; that is, against the Soviet Union. By this stage, denial policy 
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reigned supreme; the three Western occupying powers were willing to set aside their 
differences and work together in order to shore up their resistance to Soviet ambitions. This 
was as clear in exploitation as it was in the decision to merge the three western zones in 
June 1948. In short, exploitation was intrinsically shaped and guided by the realignment of 
world power which took place in the immediate post-war period, and it is for this reason 
that the exploitation policy of any nation, no matter how much its origins may lie in 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Principles and Pragmatism 
 
^ƚƵĚǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌƉůĂĐŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ
against the backdrop of shifting post-war foreign relations, but it is also necessary to 
contextualise the policy on a domestic level, in order to understand how such a significant 
and potentially controversial programme was situated within the contemporary political 
environment of Britain in the years surrounding the end of the Second World War. As has 
been explored in previous chapters, it is evident that although exploitation had its earliest 
roots in the clandestine world of military intelligence, it was soon brought under the control 
of the civil service. As such, this policy did not exist in a vacuum; rather it was influenced by 
a wide range of external factors, including the varying commitments of the immense 
undertaking which was the British occupation of Germany, the need to uphold moral and 
legal principles while also seeking reparation for the costs of the war, and, of course, the 
perennial thorn in the side of policy-makers: public and press reaction. Indeed, exploitation 
was shaped both by the high-minded principles on which the British occupation mission was 
founded and by the pragmatism which such a complex and multifaceted situation swiftly 
necessitated. Elements on both sides of this divide played a part in bringing exploitation to 
its eventual conclusion in the latter part of the occupation period. 
 Several of these areas will be examined in this chapter with a view to creating a 
rounded picture of the political context in which the programme of exploitation was 
developed, prioritised, co-ordinated, and finally brought to a close. Firstly, one of the main 
issues which affected decision-making throughout was the awareness that exploitation was 
but one, comparatively quite small, aspect of the general British occupation policy in 
Germany. As Adam Tooze has noted, western Germany was where the European dilemma 
of coming to terms with the past, encouraging economic growth, and satisfying the urgent 
demands of the Cold War was felt most acutely.854 British occupation policy had to reflect, 
and attempt to reconcile, these diverse intentions. Aspects of this policy with which 
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exploitation had direct links included the control of science, the process of denazification, 
and efforts to demilitarise, disarm and partially deindustrialise the British zone of 
occupation, all of which were, in one way or another, geared towards preventing Germany 
from ever again posing a threat to world peace. What this ultimately resulted in was a 
ĚĞůŝĐĂƚĞďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐĂĐƚ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƌŝƚĂŝŶƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĂďŽƵƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
technique from the last war while preventing them from waging the next. Secondly, it is 
necessary to examine the other major issue of conflict  W reparations. While some have 
ĚƵďďĞĚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƐ  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?855 the accuracy of this can be called into 
question  W ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚ
was not always present in exploitation. UnsurprisiŶŐůǇ ? ƚŚŝƐ ƌĂŝƐĞĚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ?
ŵŽƌĂů ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚŽĨ ƚŚĞƵŶƐƚĞĂĚǇ ůĞŐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
they did so. 
 Thirdly, it was neither possible, nor entirely desirable, to hide the programme of 
exploitation from the British public indefinitely, despite its covert origins. Publicity was 
necessary to maximise the utilisation of the information gleaned from investigations in 
Germany. However, the public, and especially the press, could pose awkward questions 
about the policy, and the idea of offering German citizens, who until so recently had been 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂǀŽǁĞĚĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ?ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚ the potential to be 
enormously toxic in the public domain. It was not just the newspapers which reflected this, 
but on occasion it also became a topic of debate in Parliament, as Westminster examined 
tŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?Ɛ ŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
political climate which led to the end of exploitation in the late 1940s, and how this was 
influenced by the other factors which this chapter covers  W occupation commitments, 
reparations arrangements, and public opinion. Ultimately, this chapter aims to present a 
wide-angle view of exploitation, situating it within the British political landscape of the 
immediate post-war years. 
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Occupation Policy and Exploitation 
Substantial though the administrative endeavour expended on exploitation was, it was still 
only one part of a wide array of policies and measures necessary for Britain to successfully 
run its zone of occupation in Germany. It has been said that of the allocation of German 
territory between the Western powers at the end of the war, the Americans got the 
scenery, the French got the wine, and the British got the ruins.856 Certainly, it was true that 
the British zone contained some of the territory which had been most severely ravaged by 
Allied bombing in the latter years of the war, including both the industrial heartland of the 
Ruhr and the important port city of Hamburg. As such, the expense of sustaining and 
governing such an area was considerable; in October 1946, the British element of the 
Control Commission employed some 26,000 people,
857
 and the estimated cost of the British 
occupation for that year alone was £80 million (sŽŵĞ ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶŝŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŵŽŶĞǇ ) ?ŶŽƐŵĂůů
sum as Britain teetered on the brink of economic insolvency in the immediate post-war 
years.858 Therefore, one of the primary aims of British occupation policy was to restore 
German self-sufficiency while simultaneously ensuring that Germany remained peaceful and 
amenable.859 However, this latter priority faded as the target of British enmity shifted from 
Germany to the Soviet Union, and the idea of building Germany up as a bulwark against 
Communist expansion gained traction.860 Three key policies which both fit into the wider 
strategy mentioned above and coexisted in close proximity with exploitation, and which are 
therefore worthy of examination here, are the control of science, denazification, and 
industrial disarmament or demilitarisation. 
 Control of science was considered especially important as the lessons of the war had 
taught all involved how large a contribution new weapons could make to the course of a 
conflict.861 In the House of Lords on 29 May 1945, Baron Robert Vansittart, the renowned 
Germanophobe, bemoaned how inadequate British responses to German advances in 
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military technology had been during both the First and Second World Wars. He complained 
that the only remedy which had been found to the threat of the V-weapons had been to 
overrun the launch sites  W  ‘ƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌŽĨŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇĂŶĚŶŽƚŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? W and warned that, as 
the range of long-distance weapons increased, such a solution would not always be 
available. From this, and coloured deeply by his personal pƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐ ?ŚĞ ƐƵƌŵŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘in 
ĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐĂůůǇŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĂů ?/ ƚŚŝŶŬŶŽƉƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ ? ?862 His 
attitude was shared by many other Peers, and by some civil servants too  W in June, the 
Economic and Industrial Planning Staff (EIPS) produced a report which commented that Nazi 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŚĂĚ  ‘succeeded in focussing every aspect of scientific activity, within the 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨĂƉůĂŶŶĞĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽǁĂŐŝŶŐǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝt was the only nation which 
 ‘ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƚǇ [sic] ? ?dŚĞ /W^ ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ
should be taken into account when deciding how to deal with German science after the 
war.863 
 Quite how this control and restriction was to be implemented was a topic of fervent 
discussion, and a plethora of committees and agencies were established by the British to 
develop and enforce these measures of scientific control. Alongside the German Science and 
Industry Committee (GSIC), the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB), and the 
Scientific Committee for Germany, was Research Branch, who had arguably the most 
challenging task. They were charged not only with monitoring any potentially dangerous 
German scientific research, but also with preventing too many German scientists leaving the 
British zone (especially for Soviet employment), showing a clear convergence of interest 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞŶŝĂů ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ůĞĚƚŚĞŵ ƚŽ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ Ă  ‘conception of 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ  ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĚŽŝŶŐ
ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĐĂŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ĂůŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ůŝŶĞ ? ?864 This positive strategy, formulated loosely, 
meant ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂƐŵƵĐŚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĂůůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
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which increase the prestige of Western democratic ideals  W in particular, interchange of 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐǀŝĞǁƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?865 
 The negative side of this approach, meanwhile, was officially codified in April 1946, 
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞůůŝĞĚŽŶƚƌŽůŽƵŶĐŝůŝƐƐƵĞĚ>ĂǁEŽ ? ? ? ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŽƌďĂĚĞ ĂŶǇ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ Žƌ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ  ‘ŽĨĂ ǁŚŽůůǇ Žƌ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌy 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂŶǇŶŽŶ-warlike research which would require the use of facilities which 
could also be used for military research.
866
 This became the guiding principle for British 
policy on the control of science in Germany. Topics which were banned included research in 
the chemical, rubber, steel and synthetic fuel industries, as well as the manufacture of 
civilian aircraft out of concern that such work could conceal more sinister research on flying 
bombs, rocketry, or dispersal methods for bacterial warfare.
867
 In terms of positive 
inducements to peaceable work, some hoped that British industry may be able to help by 
placing research contracts with German firms. However, it was felt that while British 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐǁŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘benefit by the fruits of paƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ/K^ĂŶĚ
ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ĚŽƵďƚĞĚ ǀĞƌǇ ŵƵĐŚ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŝƐŚĞĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ? ?868 
 It is definitely important to note that, while the policies of exploitation and control of 
science often came into contact, they were separate initiatives with differing aims and 
methods. In July 1945, an EIPS memorandum stated:  ‘Ă distinction should be drawn 
between the control of German research pure and simple, and the positive exploitation of 
the results of German research for the benefit of this country and the United Nations 
generally. ?This separation did not mean that the two programmes had no impact on one 
another. For example, many German scientists who had remained in Germany and were 
suffering under the restrictions imposed on their disciplines voiced resentment at what they 
considered to be the unjustly preferential treatment afforded to those scientists who had 
been recruited by the Allies. Their disenchantment was exacerbated by the belief that many 
of the men who had gone to Britain and the US were in fact lesser minds, who had risen to 
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prominence in the Third Reich merely on account of their unscrupulous political 
opportunism.869 As mentioned with reference to the role of Research Branch above, the 
biggest conflict came with denial policy, and there was a concern among many British 
officials that strict implementation of Law No. 25 would leave many German specialists out 
of work bƵƚǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚ ‘ĨŝŶĚĂƌĞĂĚǇŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐ ? ?870 
 Similar concerns arose with regard to the programme of denazification which the 
British aimed to implement in their zone. All four occupying powers used various tactics to 
remove all traces of Nazism from public (and, to a lesser extent, personal) life in 
Germany.871 This mission, often characterised as something of a moral crusade, soon 
faltered over issues of practicality. It became necessary to limit denazification in order to 
facilitate reconstruction in Germany and to allow the occupiers to build working 
relationships with the German people.872 ƐƚŝŵĞǁĞŶƚŽŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽƐŚĂƉĞĚďǇ ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŽĨ
ǀŝĞǁ ?ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŝŶŚŝŐŚƉůĂĐĞƐ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨEĂǌŝƐŵĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ? ?873 
The British approached denazification with particular pragmatism and soon gained a 
ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ƚŽƵĐŚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?dŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ
ascertain  W on one hand, some have argued that Britain simply did not see the complete re-
education of an entire country as a feasible aim, and did not have the resources to even 
try.874 On the other, some have suggested more prosaic considerations, such as the British 
belief that low-level Nazis would be more amenable to taking orders than clear anti-Nazis 
(many of whom were communists and socialists), especially in minor but necessary 
administrative positions, or that too firm a commitment to denazification could hamper vital 
German economic recovery.875 Even the moral rectitude of the policy could be called into 
question  W William Boulton, the head of the British Legal Division in Germany (the 
organisation ultimately responsible for denazification), ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝƚĂƐ ‘ĂƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂŶĚĞǀŝů
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ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?876  W and Winston Churchill also expressed his disapproval of the scheme, opining 
that  ‘ƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞ ƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŽĨ Ăůů ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐ ? ? ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǀĞŶ
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐďŽůĚĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚƌŝŐŚƚǁĂƌƚŝŵĞůĞĂĚĞƌǁĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂƉŽƐƚ-war pragmatist.877 In any 
case, denazification was a Sisyphean task, the conduct of which was likely to satisfy 
nobody.878 
 The denazification of science was arguably one of the more difficult elements of the 
policy as a whole. Large swathes of the German population believed they would be 
exempted from harsh retribution, either because of their (rarely convincing) anti-Nazi 
credentials or because their skills and experience would be essential for post-war 
administration and reconstruction.879 Although on the whole this belief was quickly revealed 
to be a delusion once denazification measures took effect, the official history of the British 
ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƐŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞĨŽƌǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐůĂƐƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞ ?
experts.880 This certainly included German scientists, who the occupiers believed had 
generally not supported Nazism, or had in some cases directly opposed it. In September 
1946, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff voiced the opinion that denazification of science would 
ŚĂƌĚůǇďĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽŝŶƚof view the records of scientists as a class were 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ŐŽŽĚ ? ?881 The US National Academy of the Sciences took this even further, 
expressing the belief that the scientific community had withdrawn into their ivory tower 
during the Third Reich and thus coŵƉŽƐĞĚ ĂŶ  ‘ŝƐůĂŶĚ ŽĨ ŶŽŶ-ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
regime.882 Others preferred to view the situation in more practically beneficial but abstract 
terms  W scientists, especially physicists, were to be seen as little more than tools, and tools 
could not be Nazified or denazified.883 This view translated into practical action, or the 
distinct lack of it. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society, for instance, was left to largely denazify itself, 
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which led to it further promoting the view that all German scientists had either resisted the 
Nazi regime or were victims of it.884 
 The exploitation initiative also provided ways to limit the severity of denazification. 
John Gimbel has noted that FIAT was sought out by many German specialists as a source of 
employment when their political records prevented them from finding work through more 
conventional channels.885 As this shows, the utilisation of German science was often seen as 
more important than a thorough process of denazification, and especially so when the Cold 
War spectre of Soviet recruitment loomed large.886 In October 1946, Bertie Blount of 
Research Branch (who was a persistent critic of the failings of exploitation policy) 
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂĐŝĚůǇ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĚĞŶĂǌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
policy, as carried out by the clever young men of Intelligence Division, is being in driving 
ĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐŽĨŽƵƌĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ? ?887 ůŽƵŶƚ ?ƐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĞĐŚŽĞĚ
by Herbert Cremer, a chemical engineer and member of the Scientific Committee for 
Germany, wŚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĞŝŐŚƚŽĨ ĨŽůůǇ ? ƚŚĂƚďǇƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂůĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
[inter-Allied] denazification agreement, we should be helping to drive German scientists into 
the hands of the Russians, who themselves treated the same agreement with complete 
ĐǇŶŝĐŝƐŵ ? ?888 This was not a wholly accurate appraisal of the situation  W as we have seen, this 
 ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂůĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚǌŽŶĞĂŶĚ ?ĂƐDĂƌǇ&ƵůďƌŽŽŬŚĂƐ
noted, retribution for Nazi-era crimes was often meted out far more harshly in the eastern 
zone889  W but that the very idea of it was seen as inimical to successful exploitation is the 
salient point here. 
 Both control of science and denazification were aimed primarily towards ensuring 
that Germany could never again wage an offensive or aggressive war. The third aspect of 
this endeavour was a policy of widespread demilitarisation and disarmament, of industry as 
well as of the armed forces. A Gallup poll of January 1947 showed that 43 per cent of British 
respondents felt Germany would become an aggressor state again, though almost half of 
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those could give no reasoning behind this judgement, while only 23 per cent believed 
Germany would become a democratic, peace-loving nation instead.890 This was coloured in 
no small part by memories of the aftermath of the First World War, when the core of 
German militarism had been left intact. Furthermore, a shortage of relevant information 
ŚĂĚŚŝŶĚĞƌĞĚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂĚĞŝƚ ‘ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽďĞƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĂůůƚŚĞǁĂƌ
material iŶ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚ ? ?891 There was to be no repeat of the mistakes of 
1918-19 and the first step in this process was to determine exactly what needed to be 
destroyed or confiscated. The given dĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ǁĂƌ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ǁĂƐ P  ‘any material of 
whatever nature and wherever situated, intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air, or 
which is or may be or has been at any time in use by, or intended for use by, the armed 
forces, civil defence, or other formations or organisations. ?892 With the aid of this 
remarkably broad classification, handling conventional war material was fairly 
straightforward, certainly when compared to the more troublesome subject of German 
industry. 
 In September 1945, the Cabinet approved British policy on industrial disarmament 
whŝĐŚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝƚĂƐ ‘ŽĨƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚǀĂůƵĞƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďǇůĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĨƌƵŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƌĞĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚ
ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ  ‘ŝŶ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ĨƵƌŶŝƐŚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ Žƌ ĂǀĞƌƚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?893 Any factories or 
plants directly associated with weaponry or war material had to be liquidated, and there 
were three ways by which this could be achieved  W they could be destroyed, dismantled and 
taken as reparations, or converted for use in the peacetime economy.894 Of these, the 
ŵŝĚĚůĞ ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ƐǁŝĨƚůǇ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ǁĂƌ
potential. One clear reason for this was that dismantling represented something of a 
compromise between the ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ ĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ǁĞĂŬĞŶŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ŵŝlitary power and 
maintaining its economic viability.895 So naturally obvious were the links between 
demilitarisation and reparations that the official British policy statement contained a clear 
distinction between the two, and the assertion that disarmament meĂƐƵƌĞƐ  ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ
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ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐŚĞŚĂƐĚŽŶĞ ? ?896 There were serious risks to this approach, however, most notably 
the concern that if industrial dismantling was carried out too thoroughly, it could cause 
economic crisis and incur greater expenditure for the occupiers, or that it would engender 
protest among the German workforce and local populace.897 
 Once again, those with an eye to exploitation soon began to consider how policies of 
ĚŝƐĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ĂůƐŽ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ďĞƐƚ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ
technological spoils for Britain. The Ministry of Aircraft Production saw the two efforts as 
complementary, especially in terms of recruitment, believing that putting potentially 
dangerous German experts under American or British control would prevent them from 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌĞĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ  ?Žƌ^ŽǀŝĞƚǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ )  ‘ǁŚŝůĞĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ƚŝŵĞŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƚŽŽƵƌŽǁŶǁĂƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?898 On the other hand, there 
was an anxiety that German scientists would only stay in the British zŽŶĞŝĨ ‘ĐŽŶŐĞŶŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ?
ĐŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ
who have devoted themselves to aerodynamics, ship design, or other subjects in which 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝƐ ĨŽƌďŝĚĚĞŶ ? ?899 Additionally, Britain acknowledged that a strong and 
profitable Germany was more resistant to communism, which thrived on hunger, chaos and 
poverty.900 Most occupation officials therefore disagreed with punitive dismantling, and 
preferred a humanitarian and practical reconstructive approach instead.
901
 In short, all the 
main policies aimed at limiting German war potential  W control of science, denazification, 
and industrial demilitarisation  W fell to the wayside in the wake of the change of thinking 
which placed the Soviet Union above Germany in the list of threats to peace and security. 
Exploitation, meanwhile, was much more in line with this newly dominant viewpoint so 
more often than not triumphed over those other initiatives with which it came into conflict. 
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Reparations, the Law, and Morality 
Unsurprisingly, the element of British post-war policy towards Germany which experienced 
greatest concomitance with exploitation was the drive for reparations. As early as March 
1944, Lieutenant-General Ronald Weeks, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŵŝŐŚƚďĞ  ‘ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ
ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚǁŝůůďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĞǆĂĐƚĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?902 To be sure, the reparations 
scheme encompassed the removal of equipment, documents and other material from 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ĨĂĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ďƵƚ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ ǁĂƐ
encountered with the utilisation of expert personnel and their specialist knowledge, both of 
which were practically unquantifiable. The value of so-called intellectual reparations was, 
almost by definition, impossible to calculate, and it was very easy, in theory at least, for 
Germany to limit the benefit obtained from them by the creditor nations.903 In fact, 
quantifying the spoils of exploitation soon became a major sticking point, as the British 
officials were keen to take as much as possible, without having to debit it against their 
internationally-allocated reparations account. This naturally raised questions of the morality 
of exploitation, especially whether Britain could justify all it had extricated from Germany in 
terms of recompense for the aggressive war which Germany had both started and lost. The 
officials sought answers for these uncomfortable moral questions in the letter of the law, 
assuming that if they could find a legal mandate for exploitation, through reparations or 
otherwise, then any challenge to their right to exploit could be easily deflected or defended 
against. 
 As with many oƚŚĞƌ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞƐ ? ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĂƐ ƐŚĂƉĞĚ
considerably by the experience at the end of the First World War. The approach adopted 
then had proved immensely unsuccessful for a number of reasons, not only failing to make 
Germany pay adequately for the war, but also generating much bitterness in Germany, 
which Hitler and the Nazis were able to turn into support for their programme of national 
rejuvenation.904 The main lesson learned was that it was ineffective to demand reparations 
in direct financial form  W instead, payment in kind was to be encouraged.905 Initially, this 
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would take the form of capital equipment, dismantled and shipped abroad, and then this 
would be followed by annual deliveries of goods from current German production.906 The 
USA actively pressed for patents, secret processes, and technical know-how to be included 
as part of these reparations in kind, as their post-war economy was enormous, and at risk of 
overproduction and huge surpluses, so bringing in ordinary machinery or goods from 
Germany was not only uninteresting but actually undesirable.907 It is also worth noting here 
that, following extensive discussion at the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union was 
ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƐŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽƚĂů ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ little more than a 
formality as, by that point, they were already busily stripping their zone of anything of 
value.908 
 The exploitation programme was affected by the quest for reparations in two main 
ways  W on the one hand, reparations provided a very useful panacea, justifying all physical 
removals from Germany and thus granting some legitimacy to exploitation; on the other, 
reparations were strictly governed, both domestically and internationally, often tying the 
hands of acquisitive exploitation agents. To examine the positive, complementary side of 
the relationship first, it was quickly established that equipment and documentation 
ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚ ĂŶ  ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚ ďǇ /K^ ? ĂŶĚ
that the value of this intelligĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĨŽƌ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ? ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?909 In addition, exploitation teams were 
permitted to visit sites earmarked for reparations right up until the point when they were 
handed over to the recipient power and sometimes even up until dismantling actually 
began.910 On occasion, incomplete exploitation could lead to a particular facility being 
selected for reparations, as was the case with the Thyssen steel plant in Duisburg, which 
could prodƵĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŽŶƐĂ ŵŽŶƚŚŽĨ  ‘special extra low-ůŽƐƐ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞƌ ƐƚĞĞů ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĂŶĐŚĨĞůƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚďǇ/K^ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĞŝƚŚĞƌ
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the plant continued to operate under British supervision, or that it should be brought to 
Britain in its entirety, both of which were forms of reparations.911 
On the other side of the coin, the relationship had great potential to be fractious. In 
KĐƚŽďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ K^ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘anxious to get as much 
equipment as ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŶŽǁ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ ŝƚĞŵƐ ĂƌĞ ĨƌŽǌĞŶĨŽƌ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?912 
Once reparations policy came into force, there were three permissible ways in which 
material could be removed from Germany: it could be taken as reparations, as long as it 
passed through all the necessary official international channels; it could be paid for in 
ĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚ ĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇ ĂƐ Ă ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ĞǆƉŽƌƚ ? Žƌ ? ŝĨ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ďŽŽƚǇ ? ? ŝƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ
 ‘ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ? ?913 Naturally, for the 
exploitation agencies, this last option was the most attractive. However, the material in 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŚĂĚ ƚŽƋƵĂůŝĨǇĂƐ  ‘ďŽŽƚǇ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƌŽƵƚĞ ƚŽďĞ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ  W the given definition of 
ďŽŽƚǇ ǁĂƐ P  ‘ƌŵƐ ? ŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ? ĂŶĚůů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉment 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ) ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĞƌĞƚŽ ? ? tŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
entailed in real terms was any equipment found within research establishments concerned 
solely with warlike subjects, as well as certain industrial items required as prototypes or for 
further examination in Britain.914 Nonetheless, the exploitation officials constantly searched 
for new ways to remove equipment without having to go through the restrictive reparations 
channels. 
For example, when the Board of Trade tried to push for scientific equipment, such as 
microscopes and chemical balances, to be removed as reparations, they came up against 
opposition from Research Branch, who insisted that there was too great a shortage of such 
equipment in Germany. The Board ŽĨdƌĂĚĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝƚƉƌŽďĂďůĞƚŚĂƚ ‘the Germans have 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇƉƵůůĞĚƚŚĞǁŽŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞǇĞƐŽĨZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĂŶĐŚ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?ďƵƚĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚ
ĂŶǇƉƌŽƚĞƐƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĨƵƚŝůĞ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŽĨĨĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞŵŽƌĞůŽŶŐ
drawn-out and loƐŝŶŐďĂƚƚůĞ  Q ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŶŽŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨŽƌƚŶĞĞĚ ďĞ ĞǆƉĞŶĚĞĚ ? ?915 Instead, it 
was hoped that some of this equipment could be ƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ  ‘as a result of the limitation or 
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ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ůŝŶĞƐ ŽĨ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ƚŚƵƐ ĞǆĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ
restrictions.916 Elsewhere, the Ministry of Aircraft Production argued that all material taken 
under the aegis of Operation Surgeon, from establishments such as LFA Volkenröde, should 
ďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ‘ďŽŽƚǇ ? ? ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨŝƚƐĂĐƚƵĂůƉƵƌŽƐĞ ?917 Another tactic, which was used 
when reporting to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (established in Brussels to handle the 
allocation of reparations to the claimant nations), was to point out that all information 
obtained from removed material was made internationally available in the published 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽĨ /K^ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞŵŽǀĂůƐ ĐŽƵůĚ  ‘not be regarded as 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĂƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ?918 
There were, however, some items which no amount of semantic manipulation could 
help secure. For example, a gas turbine discovered at the Reichswerke at Watenstedt near 
Brunswick had no conceivable military application so could not be taken as booty, but it was 
unique in Germany which meant that it was barred from being claimed for reparations. 
ƐŝĚĞĨƌŽŵƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ ‘ĂǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽďƌĞĂŬĂůůƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐ ? ? which was considered 
doubtful, the only solution that could be devised was to have Britain lead a quadripartite 
investigation into the turbine  W a convoluted suggestion which reveals how exploitation 
could all too easily become hamstrung by strict reparations rules.919 A further issue arose in 
the field, between exploitation investigators and Reparations Assessment Teams (RATs)  W 
which were dispatched by the Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution (RDR) Division  W 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĂƐ ďŽƚŚ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐƐ ǁĞƌĞhandled by the same military authority.920 This 
contact soon gave rise to friction, not least because the RAT trips (of which there were three 
or four going out every day in early 1946, each one consisting of around three members) 
shared resources with their BIOS counterparts, and had priority on both accommodation 
and transport.921 
However, the overriding factor which influenced the relationship between 
exploitation and reparations was, as with the other occupation policies detailed above, the 
international dimension. During a discussion by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff committee on 
                                                             
916
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƌĂĨƚ>ĞƚƚĞƌƚŽďĞƐĞŶƚƚŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ? ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
917
 TNA, FO 942/426, W.J. Deveen to G. Whitham, 31 August 1946. 
918
 dE ?d ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ZĞƉůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞůĞŐĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝ ŐĚŽŵ ?, 9 September 1946. 
919
 TNA, FO 1012/421, Ritchie to Prentice and Brig. Spedding, 13 March 1946. 
920
 dE ?&K ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘sŝƐŝƚƐŽĨ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐƚƐƚŽ^ƵƌǀĞǇWůĂŶƚĨŽƌZĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?, 19 October 1945. 
921
 TNA, BT 211/116, L.E. Chazanovitch to D. Wood, 18 January 1946. 
- 239 - 
 
increasingly obstructive reparations restrictions, Sidney Kirkman, Deputy Chief of the 
/ŵƉĞƌŝĂů'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ƚĂĨĨ ?ǀŽŝĐĞĚŚŝƐ ĨĞĂƌƐ  ‘that by too much red tape we should damage our 
own interests while the other AůůŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ  “ďŽŽƚǇ ? ? ?
The remark was met with widespread agreement among other members of the 
committee.922 With the passage of time, this debate diminished in importance as the focus 
of exploitation shifted overwhelmingly towards recruiting and utilising specialist German 
personnel, while reparations fell sharply out of favour, thus losing what little merit it had 
retained as a cover-all justification for equipment and material removals. One reason for 
this fall from grace was that the reparations scheme was engendering increasingly hostile 
foreign public opinion, particularly in Germany, and Britain had come to appreciate the 
importance of keeping the German people on side if they were to form a bulwark against 
Soviet expansion. Lieutenant-General Brian Robertson, the Deputy Military Governor of the 
British zone, wrote in February 1947 of his concerns that the discrepancy  ‘ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽƵƌŽǁŶ
economic requirements and oƵƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ŵĂǇ ůĞĂĚ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ƚŽĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƚƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞŵŽƵƐĞ ? ?923 Indeed, the 
&ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĨĨŝĐĞĨĞůƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌ ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŽƌůĞƐƐĞƌĞůĞŵĞŶƚ
of organised reƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶworkers tasked with dismantling factories for 
reparations.924 Beyond Germany, there were those who expressed the opinion that the real 
purpose of the British reparations plan was to limit German competition in world markets 
for the ƐĂŬĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŽǁŶƐĞůĨŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?ĂŶĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĨŝƌŵůǇƌĞĨƵƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
House of Lords.925 
Perhaps of greater importance was the fact that reparations were not serving their 
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽƵƉŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ^econd World War. 
Britain was spending approximately £80 million a year on its zone in Germany, and claiming 
no more than £29 million in reparations  W in the opinion of Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Britain had ended up paying reparations to Germany.926 In most cases, it was 
clear that the removal of an established plant was a far greater loss to Germany than it was 
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a gain to the recipient nation.927 This did not fit in with plans to rebuild a strong and 
prosperous Germany. This was certainly the case with the Volkswagen plant in Wolfsburg, 
the size and quality of which impressed British experts, but also gave them concerns about 
how its introduction to Britain might throw domestic automobile manufacturing into 
turmoil, as well as the potentially injurious effect it could have on any German economic 
revitalisation.928 Generally speaking, it was swiftly realised that the small benefit derived 
from dismantling factories for reparations was dwarfed by the benefit of reconstructing 
German industry, both for national self-sufficiency and general European security in the face 
of potential Soviet aggression. As John Farquharson has put it, despite pressure from the 
Treasury and the Board of Trade for extensive financial compensation to be extracted from 
Germany, those who pushed for greater German economic reconstruction carried the day, 
and it is difficult to find a time when reparations was granted precedence in the British 
zone.929 
One of the great benefits afforded to the exploitation scheme by the push for 
reparations was that it provided it with some form of legal grounding. The concept of 
reparations has roots in international law, based on the principle that the victors and the 
vanquished enter into a contract by way of a peace treaty, and this obliges the defeated 
nation to pay, in one form or another, for losing the war  W a clear example of this is the 
Treaty of Versailles at the end of the First World War, despite the opprobrium which this 
agreement attracted both in Germany and abroad. At the end of the Second World War, 
Germany as a nation state technically ceased to exist, so no peace treaty could be signed 
ĂŶĚ  ‘de facto ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƌƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ
wanted from the territory they controlled.
930
 Intellectual reparations were especially 
problematic as they did not offer direct redress for actual losses suffered during the war by 
the victors.931 Booty, as we have seen, was far more flexible than reparations, but the Allies 
were ultimately answerable to one another on how much they took from Germany. In 
October 1945, the Economic Division of the Control Commission persuaded the Treasury to 
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ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨ ‘ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝĞƐ ? ?ƵƉƚŽƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ‘ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?ĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ  ‘ƚŚĞůůŝĞƐŚĂǀĞŶŽĐůĂŝŵƐŽƌ QŝĨƐƵĐŚĐůĂŝŵƐĞǆŝƐƚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇ
ƐĂĨĞůǇďĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ?932 
Another legal issue which presented problems to the exploitation officials concerned 
German patents, with many believing that the British acquisition of these commercial 
secrets would have more profound consequences for the German economy than the 
destruction or dismantling of industrial material.
933
 Indeed, many of the larger German 
firms, such as IG Farben and Siemens, began to demand payment from the British for the 
information which they had given up. These requests had little weight behind them as 
Article 12 of Control Council Proclamation No. 2 (issued as additional terms to the German 
ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ) ƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůůǇ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ  ‘Ăůů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?
ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ǁĂƌ ?  ‘ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ Žƌ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?934 As such, this element of the issue was rather easily handled  W all CCG 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůǁĞƌĞŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŶǇƐƵĐŚĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĨŽƌƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶ
ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ Ĩŝƌŵ ƌĞĨƵƐĂů ? ?935 This reflected an inherent hostility among the British 
authorities towards any attempts by the German people to restrict or challenge their ability 
as occupiers to exert their will over their zone of occupation. In March 1947, the Control 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŶŽ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĂŶǇ
legislation which might seem to cast doubt on our complete freedom to dispose of BIOS 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐǁĞǁŝƐŚŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŽƌĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?936 Similarly, when Erich Klabunde, an SPD 
member of the Hamburg Bürgerschaft, made a statement accusing the British of conducting 
ƵŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶĂƐƐĞƚƐĂŶĚƚŚƵƐŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ‘the deepest 
ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ůŝĨĞ ? ? d-&ŽƌĐĞ ,Y ďŝƚƚĞƌůǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ  ‘ŵŽƐƚ
ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽ ‘ũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŝƌůĞŐĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ? ?
ĂŶĚ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ <ůĂďƵŶĚĞ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ  ‘Ă ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐ
WŽǁĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? ?937 
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A different side of the problem arose when German firms began to protest about 
their industrial secrets being made freely available to domestic rivals, after exploitation. This 
prompted considerable consternation among the British occupation authorities. On one 
hand, there was the opinion that Britain would be abusing its position as an occupying 
power iĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĨŝƌŵƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚ  ‘ƚŽ ƵƚŝůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ  ?ŶŽƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
patented, and therefore not actionable at law), divulged to Allied investigators without 
ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽǁŶŝŶŐĨŝƌŵ ? ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ďĂŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƵƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽuld 
ŚŝŶĚĞƌ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ ? Žƌ ůŝŵŝƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ŽĨ ǀŝƚĂů ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
insulin.938 Either way, the BIOS reports were publicly available from HMSO, so the 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁĂƐ  ‘ŶŽ ůŽŶŐĞƌ Ă ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ? ?939 If the technical material in 
question was patented, however, the German owners were in a slightly stronger position. 
Control Commission policy stated that any other German who used information in a BIOS 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƉĂƚĞŶƚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁĂƐ ‘ůŝĂďůĞĨŽƌŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƉĂƚĞŶƚĞĞ ǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚĞŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŝƐ
ƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ? ?940 This does show that the benefits of exploitation were not only derived by 
foreign occupiers but could also be of use to domestic rivals.941 
Exploitation was not only challenged in legal terms, but also came under criticism on 
moral grounds. Unsurprisingly, defeating a country as completely as Germany had been by 
May 1945, to the point of unconditional surrender and total occupation by foreign powers, 
and ƚŚĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇƌĞŵŽǀĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇůĂƌŐĞƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
specialised equipment and documents, but also many of its brightest minds and a wealth of 
scientific and technical know-how, prompted many questions about the moral conduct of 
the victorious Allies. The response which came from those in power in Britain, the USA, the 
Soviet Union and France was that these were reparations  W a concept which had a strong 
legal basis and much historical precedent, and thus minimised any further criticism. 
However, the moral question surrounding reparations is more complex than this defence 
strategy suggests, and it is worth examining here, by taking advantage of the clarity, and 
trying to avoid the pitfalls, offered by retrospective analysis. 
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ŐŽŽĚƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞOxford English 
Dictionary ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǀĞƌď ‘ƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚ ?  WƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŝƐ ‘ƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƐĞŽĨ ?Ă
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĞƚĐ ? ) ?ĚĞƌŝǀĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŝƐ ‘ƚŽƵƚŝůŝƐĞor take advantage of for 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĞŶĚƐ ? ?942 The connotations traditionally associated with the post-war exploitation 
of German science and technology tend to reflect an emphasis on the second definition, but 
for those involved in the planning and execution of the programme, it is the first definition 
which would have seemed most apt. Clarence Lasby believes that the exploitation officials 
ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĞŶƐĞ W  ‘ƚŽŐĂŝŶǀĂůƵĞĨƌŽŵƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? W a 
point which is reinforced by the subsequent decision to replace it with the far less 
ƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝǀĞ ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?  ‘ƵƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?943 Others argue that the notion that Germany was 
 ‘ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŚŽůĚƵƉǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŐĂŝŶƐŵĂĚĞďǇƚŚĞ
exploitation scheme are compared to the cost to Britain of supporting its zone of occupation 
and fending off disease, starvation and unrest  W if all exploitation did was offset some of the 
costs of sustaining the German population, how immoral can it be judged to have been?944 
Certainly, minimising the burden of occupation on the long-suffering and war-weary British 
taxpayer was often rolled out as a rationale for the exploitation programme.945 
The main justification offered up for exploitation by the officials concerned was that 
it was  ‘ƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐǁĞƌĞŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽƉĂǇĨŽƌůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?946 These 
were the words of Charles Ellis, the scientific advisor to the War Office, spoken to his 
colleagues on the Deputy Chiefs of Staff committee in November 1945. He felt that this 
approach would help to improve British public reception to the employment of German 
experts in Britain. These sentiments were echoed on the ground in Germany; in January 
 ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚƌŽů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘the right of the Allies to use information 
collected by Allied investigating agencies such as BIOS is one of the consequences of 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇůŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?947 /ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ƚŚĞŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁĂƐ ‘ƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƐƉŽŝůƐ ?ďƵƚ
the reality was slightly more complex than that. The Allies had the right to exploit Germany 
not simply because it had lost the war, but because it had lost a war which it had started. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that materials and equipment taken by Germany from 
countries which it had occupied during the war, such as France, were, where possible, 
ƌĞƐƚŽƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞƌŵŽǀĂůƐǁĞƌĞĚĞĞŵĞĚǁƌŽŶŐĂŶĚŝŶ
need ŽĨƌĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞůůŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƐƚ-war removals were not, because Germany in 1945 
was not an innocent victim, but the original perpetrator. All of this ties in with the notion 
ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶƉƌŽŵƵůŐĂƚĞĚĂŶ ŝŵĂŐĞŽĨŝƚƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƌĂƐ  ‘ũƵƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
latter half of the 1940s.948 
Another aspect of the morality debate concerns denazification. As discussed above, 
ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐďŽƚŚĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌ ?ƚŽĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐŵ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĂŵŽƌĂů
crusade for many of the occupiers. However, as has been shown, sticking too closely to the 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚĞŶĂǌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĞŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ĨŽůůǇ ? ĂƐ ŝƚ ŵĞĂŶƚ
Britain might lose out on the best German experts to its supposedly less scrupulous allies.949 
In the House of Lords on 12 March 1946, the Lord Chancellor, William Jowitt, responded to 
criticism by Lord Vansittart of the employment of politically questionable German 
individualƐ ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ďǇĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐ  ‘I am willing to risk their being Nazis  W and I think they 
probably are  W so long as they are highly skilled technicians who will teach our people 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ŬŶŽǁ ? ?950 Expediency trumped morality in no 
uncertain terms.951 
Overall, the story of the occupation period is that pragmatism consistently prevailed 
over principles. Moral missions such as completing a comprehensive purge of all Nazis from 
public life or claiming full financial recompense for the cost of the war fell to the wayside, 
especially for Britain, because of a shortage of funds and the growing fear of the Soviet 
Union. Instead, policies of German reconstruction and a western European defence strategy 
became far more popular and viable.952 Initially, exploitation benefited from this 
pragmatism, offering a clear and cost-effective way for Britain to profit from victory in the 
war and improve its armouries in preparation for any future conflict against the USSR, but 
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later, when it threatened both healthy Anglo-German relations and the pace of German 
economic recovery, it fell out of favour just as quickly. As a pragmatic, rather than idealist, 
initiative, it only remained desirable while the circumstances surrounding it remained 
unchanged. 
 
The Public Domain 
The narrative of exploitation has, thus far, focused primarily on official policy and the work 
of military officials and civil servants, both in domestic and international terms. The British 
non-governmental actors have been few and far between, amounting to no more than a 
handful of industrialists, privately-employed scientists, frontline soldiers, and some others. 
These groups either had no influence whatsoever, and were involved only through 
obedience to instructions from above, or were able to exert influence only because they had 
been inducted deliberately into the inner workings of the scheme by those in higher 
authority. What this discourse has therefore neglected to account for is any factors which 
lay beyond the control of the policy-makers and their operatives  W the clearest example of 
this is popular opinion, or how the notion of exploitation played out in the public domain in 
Britain. It is necessary to examine this, particularly through press response to the policy, in 
order to place exploitation in sufficient context, and to understand its broader ramifications. 
 The importance of public opinion was in the minds of policy-makers from an early 
stage, which arguably presents a marked contrast with many other, more secretive 
intelligence operations. At a Department of Scientific and Industrial Research meeting in 
:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ‘it was recognised that public opinion might be offended by proposals to employ 
'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝĨ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ
 ‘ƐƵƉĞƌŶƵŵĞƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ ŶŽƌŵĂů ƐƚĂĨĨƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ŚĞƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŶŽ
ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ŽƵƚĐƌǇ ? ?953 When the DCOS committee discussed recruitment in August, the chair, 
First Sea Lord Charles Kennedy-WƵƌǀŝƐ ? ǁŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŽ ŬŶŽǁ  ‘what difficulties, if any, [were] 
anticŝƉĂƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ůŽĐĂů ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽƐƚĞĚ ? ?
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?,ĞŶƌǇ,ƵůŵĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞƐ ĂƌĐŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŵŝƌĂůƚǇ ?  ‘ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŝƚ
was important to be prepared to answer the argument that these Germans would be taking 
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ŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐũŽďƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŚŽƵƐĞƐ ? ?,ĞǁĂƐ ƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƉůĞŶƚǇŽĨ
vacant jobs and that German scientists would not be displacing British subjects.954 
Nonetheless, in the report which emerged from this meeting, one of the three potential 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂƐ ‘public criticism of the employment, presumably 
with remuneration, of Germans who so recently directed the main German scientific effort 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƵƐ ? ?955 
 Accordingly, the government departments responsible for exploitation followed a 
course of strategic publicity  W a tactic which used the control of secrecy to pre-emptively 
defend the government from any potential criticism.956 On 19 December 1945, Stafford 
Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade, delivered a carefully drafted public statement to 
the House of Commons. Cripps announced that: 
It is the Government's policy to secure from Germany a knowledge of scientific and technical 
developments that will be of benefit to this country and to make such knowledge available 
to those who can use it. This step seems desirable since although we were generally ahead, 
there are certain fields in which the Germans held a temporary lead. As part of this policy it 
ŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚ QĂƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ
highest grade for service in this country. 
/Ŷ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ ŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ ? ƌŝƉƉƐ ĂĚĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘our American and Russian Allies are 
ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?957 In choosing to characterise the aggressively acquisitive process 
ŽĨ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŐůŽďĂů ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ  ‘'ƌĞĂƚ
WŽǁĞƌ ? ƐƚĂƚƵƐŚƵŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?ƌŝƉƉƐŚŽƉĞĚ ƚŚĞscheme would be more palatable to 
Parliament and the general public alike, especially when considered in the light of 
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁƉŽƐƚ-war world.958 Pre-empting 
other potential criticism, he also reassured his aƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŶǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ƵŶŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶŶŽĐĂƐĞǁŝůůĂ'ĞƌŵĂŶďĞƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ
ĐŽƵůĚ ĞƋƵĂůůǇ ǁĞůů ďĞ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚ ďǇ Ă ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?959 Despite this public statement, a 
degree of secrecy persisted; the following March, when Arthur Lewis, MP for West Ham 
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Upton, asked Cripps if he would release a list of the names, qualifications and political 
histories of the German experts being brought to Britain, Cripps refused on the grounds that 
ŝƚ  ‘would not be praĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ  Q ŶŽƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ŝƚ ďĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?960 In this 
instance, it is clear that secrecy has been used not in the interests of security but to shield 
the project from moral opprobrium.961 
Another tactic which was devised to manage public reaction was the use of the 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ŽĨ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ  ?Z/ZKƐ ) ? ǁŚŽ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ǁĞůů-
informed about the principles of the scheme and would be deployed to visit British firms 
and issue reassurances, such as that none of the German recruits were pro-Nazi and that no 
British jobs would be lost. The RIROs were also instructed to make a report if they became 
ĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă
'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ? ?962 A similar procedure was enacted through co-ordination with the Trade 
Unions Congress (TUC) which, by the end of the war and following the 1945 election of a 
Labour government, had become an indispensable forum of debate on all industrial 
matters.
963
 Trade unions had plenty of reasons to be hostile towards an influx of migrants, 
fearing that it could keep wages low and harm their efforts to obtain better working 
conditions.964 Union consultation took place at a high level  W the Board of Trade met directly 
with Sir Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC, for instance  W and then 
information was filtered down to local branches, to ensure that all unions concerned were 
 ‘fully acquainted with the reasons for the adoption of the scheme, so that they would be 
able to inform employees of the factories to which Germans would be attached and also 
ŵĞĞƚƵŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ?965 
Exploitation officials also took an interest in the role of the press; more specifically, 
they aimed to restrict their access to all elements of the programme. No press were 
ĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƵƐƚďŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĐĂŵƉ ? ůĞƐƚ ƚŚĞǇ ĞŶĚĞĚ ƵƉ  ‘seriously prejudicing 
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ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?966 Similarly, EPES officers were warned to be 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐĂƌĞĨƵůŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽ ‘ĐŚĞĐŬƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůly and thoroughly 
ĂŶǇĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞƐƐŵĞŶĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞ ? ?967 The German scientists were warned along 
these lines too. All the experts in residence at the BIOS Reception Centre in Hampstead 
ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘give any statement to the Press or any other Person or write any 
article or grant any interview to any person concerning his service or otherwise give or 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĂŶǇƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŚĞƌĞƚŽ ? ?968 Some members of the press were permitted to 
visit the chemical warfare experimental station at Raubkammer while Porton Group No. 1 
was conducting its on-site investigations, but the journalists were deliberately given very 
few details about the nature of the new agents which had been discovered there.969 
Despite these measures, the British newspapers did indeed report on exploitation, 
though perhaps not with the alarmism or opprobrium which the officials had anticipated 
and feared. On 29 June 1945, The Times printed a lengthy article from their military 
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞĚ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ^ĞĐƌĞƚ tĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ
information on seven categories of German military research which had been discovered at 
the end of the war, including chemical warfare, radio and optical equipment, and jet 
aircraft. It also detailed the actions of the British operatives responsible for uncovering this 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚ ‘ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁŝƚŚŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
or concealment of research ǁŽƌŬ Žƌ ƉůĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ŬŝŶĚƐ ? ? ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ
 ‘ŵŽƌĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ĚĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ŚŽƉĞ ? ?970 Then, at the end of August, most of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ /K ^? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ
President Truman on the subject. The Manchester Guardian wrote that British and American 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůůŝĞĚ ĂƌŵŝĞƐ ? ŚĂĚ ƵŶĞĂƌƚŚĞĚ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ ǁĂƌ ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚǀĂůƵĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂƌĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ :ĂƉĂŶďƵƚĂůƐŽ  QĂƐĂĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ
factor in post-wĂƌ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?971 In all the articles, as with the 
two mentioned here, the emphasis was on the admirable boldness of the agents involved, 
and the value of the material which they had gathered. 
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Much greater opposition was deployed by the press, in reflection of the public 
mood, when the first group of German scientists arrived in Britain in January 1946.972 These 
23 submarine experts arrived by ship in Barrow-in-Furness, on the Cumbrian coast, and 
were to work in the shipyards of Vickers-Armstrong. The Daily Mail announced their arrival 
with typical aplomb, running a front-ƉĂŐĞ ƐƉůĂƐŚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ  ‘,ƵƐŚ-Hush Germans 
>ĂŶĚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?ĂŶĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞŶƚƌĂŶĐĞĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ďĞŚŝŶĚĂƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐƵƌƚĂŝŶŽĨǁĂƌƚŝŵĞ
ƌŝŐŝĚŝƚǇ ? ?973 It also rĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚĂ  ‘ǁĂǀĞ ŽĨĂŶŐĞƌ ?ǁĂƐ ƐǁĞĞƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚŽǁŶŽĨĂƌƌŽǁ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚŝƉǇĂƌĚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ  ‘ƚŚĞĂƌƌŝǀĂůŽĨ ĨŽƌŵĞƌĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞƐƚŝůů
pro-EĂǌŝ ? ?dŚĞ ŝŶƚƌĞƉŝĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞƌ ƌĞĐŽƵŶƚĞĚŚŽǁƚŚĂƚǀĞƌǇŶŝŐŚƚŚĞŚĂĚƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚƚŽZŽĐŬ
Lea, the  ‘ĚŽƵďůĞ-fronted, three-storeyed, red-ďƌŝĐŬĞĚ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ
ďĞŝŶŐŚŽƵƐĞĚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƐŚŽĐŬ ?ƚŚĂ   ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽŐƵĂƌĚŽŶĚƵƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ǁƌŽƵŐŚƚŝƌŽŶŐĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞǁŝĚĞŽƉĞŶ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŝŶŚŝƐƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŝŶůǇ-veiled 
suspicion, when he rang the doorbell, the door was opened by a senior WRNS officer, who 
 ‘ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚĂůůŽǁŵĞŶĞĂƌƚŚĞŐůĂƐƐ-panelled door, through which peals of laughter could be 
ŚĞĂƌĚ ? ?974 Naturally, the sense of outrage simmering below the surface of this article has to 
be attributed, to at least some degree, to journalistic flair and the quest for a good story. 
However, as it turned out, this Daily Mail reporter was not the only one scandalised by the 
arrival of these German experts, and their accommodation at Rock Lea. 
On 11 January, the Manchester Guardian reported that there had been protests by 
both the Co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ zŽƵƚŚ ůƵď ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ dŽǁŶƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ 'ƵŝůĚ ŝŶ ĂƌƌŽǁ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ
accommodation of the scientists in Rock Lea, and that the latter had written to the local MP 
to register their disapproval.975 Four days later, the Daily Mail printed a letter from an 
anonymous correspondent in Glasgow, writing under the nom de plume  ‘sĞƌŝƚĂƐ ? ? ǁŚŽ
ĐŽŶŐƌĂƚƵůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌĨŽƌŝƚƐĞǆƉŽƐĠŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƉampering of the German 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ŝƚ ƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ĂŐĞ-ŽůĚĐƵƐƚŽŵ ?ŽĨ  ‘ĨŽƌŐŝǀĞĂŶĚ ĨŽƌŐĞƚ ?ĂŶĚ ůĂŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ
that this very attitude was responsible for the failed policy of appeasement before 1939. He 
went on: 
                                                             
972
 Lasby, Project Paperclip, 169-70. 
973




  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĂƚĂƌƌŽǁ ? ?Manchester Guardian, 11 January 1946, 8. 
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Less than a year ago these same German scientists were racking their brains to invent means 
of exterminating us and now we bring them safely to our island and give them the finest 
ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ĂŶǇ ŽůĚ ƚŚŝŶŐ ǁŝůů ĚŽ ĨŽƌ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ? ƐĂŝůŽƌƐ
and airmen.976 
In fact, it rapidly became clear that the major grievance the British public, both local and 
national, had about the scientists in Barrow, was the apparently luxurious lodgings which 
they had been given. As a result, following the protests from local groups, Walter Monslow, 
ǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ZŽĐŬ >ĞĂ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďĂĐŬ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ  ‘ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ŝŶ ůƵǆƵƌǇ ? ? ĞǀĞŶ
ĚĞŝŐŶŝŶŐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽĐŽŶƵƚŵĂƚƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĨůŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞŶ ‘ĚŝĚ
Ăůů ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶǁŽƌŬĞǆĐĞƉƚŵĂŬŝŶŐ ďĞĚƐĂŶĚĐŽŽŬŝŶŐ ? ?,Ğ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚŚĞ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ
that their work here  Q ŵƵƐƚŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇďĞƚŽƚŚĞďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨĂƌƌŽǁŝŶƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ?977 
In retrospect, the Barrow incident appears to have been little more than a storm in a 
teacup. After this initial flurry of indignation, it vanished from the papers and the public 
consciousness, and later developments were met with no such censure. This supports John 
ZĂŵƐĚĞŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂpredisposition towards pragmatism in the medium term is an 
integral part of the British psyche and one which decisively coloured British perceptions and 
treatment of the German people after the war.978 Indeed, in March, when The Times 
reported that 200 German scientists and technicians were being brought over by the Board 
ŽĨdƌĂĚĞƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶ  ‘ĂƉƵƌĞůǇĂĚǀŝƐŽƌǇĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ƐĞĐƵƌĞĨŽƌ
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƚŚĞďĞƐƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐǁĂƐŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶŽŶ
ƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞĂŶĚŶŽƚŽŶ ŝƚƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚǇ ?979 Certainly, not all members of 
the BriƚŝƐŚ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ  ‘sĞƌŝƚĂƐ ? ? tŝůůŝĂŵ WƌŽĐƚŽƌ ? ƚŚĞ >ĂďŽƵƌ DW ĨŽƌ
Eccles in Manchester, received a letter from a constituent in February 1946 which showed 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƌĞĐǇ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ  Q  ?ŝƐ ?ŶŽƚŽŶůǇ Ĩettering 
ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ďƵƚ ďĞĚĞǀŝůůŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?980 John Hynd, the Minister for 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂ ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚDWƐƚŽƐŽŽƚŚĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽŶƚŚŝƐŵĂƚƚĞƌ
by assuring them that the German detainees were not being mistreated, that they were 
ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚĂƐƐŽŽŶĂƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘the 
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ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĂƌŝƐĞ ŝŶ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞƐĞ
ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?981 Comparisons with other countries also drove public critiques: in March, 
the Daily Express printed a letter from W. Steed, of north London, which referred to the 
employment of Wernher von Braun by the United States, then asked, with evident 
ƌĞƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ‘ĂƌĞǁĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶĚŽŝŶŐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĞĐƌĞƚŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?982 
This changing discourse can, in part, be ascribed to the growing fear of the Soviet 
Union and concerns about their recruitment of German scientists. On 29 October 1945, the 
Manchester Guardian, Daily Mail, and Daily Express all published a story, citing statements 
made by Günther Hillmann, acting director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, which 
ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘^ŽǀŝĞƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽŶƚŚĞĂƚŽŵďŽŵďŝƐďĞŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇƉƵƌƐƵĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ
of German scientists and with German ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚĚĂƚĂ ? ?,ŝůůŵĂŶŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ZƵƐƐŝĂŶƐŵŝŐŚƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĂƚŽŵŝĐďŽŵďǁŝƚŚŝŶƚǁŽǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƵƐĞĚƚŚŝƐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵĂƐ
an opportunity to condemn harsh restrictions on science in the western zones as the reason 
so many German experts were going over to the Soviet Union.983 One year later, The Times 
reported on Operation Osoaviakhim, and made four distinctions between the Soviet and the 
British-American exploitation programmes  W one, that the Western Allies favoured 
interrogation over recruitment; two, that the German experts in Britain and America were 
all there willingly; three, that the numbers in the West were far fewer than those taken by 
ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĨŽƵƌ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ůĂƚĞƐƚ ĚĞƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ ďŽƚŚ ŝŶ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ĂŶĚ
ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ? ?984 Despite some general criticism of British involvement in exploitation, the press 
were quick to demonstrate how much worse and more dangerous the Soviet approach was. 
However, in an uncharacteristic example of strongly-expressed opinion, in October 1946 The 
Times described  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĂůůŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ?ĂƐ ‘ĚŝƐƚĂƐƚĞĨƵůĂŶĚĚŝƐƚƵƌďŝŶŐ ? ?985 
The public domain was not just a potential source of criticism for the exploitation 
programme, it was also somewhat necessary for its ultimate success. The reports filed by 
CIOS and BIOS investigators were of no value if they were not adequately circulated to the 
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firms and individuals who could best make use of them. In Britain, the publication of all 
reports was handled by His DĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĞƌǇ KĨĨŝĐĞ  ?,D^K ) ? ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚĞŶĐĞ Ăůů ŶŽŶ-
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞŶ ƐĞŶƚ ƚŽ ůŝďƌĂƌŝĞƐ ? ƚƌĂĚĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ,D^K ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƐĂůĞƐ
offices.986 By July 1947, the Board of Trade noted that some 2 million copies of the 2,000 
different reports prepared by British and American agencies had been sold or distributed.987 
For those looking to buy reports outright, the costs varied hugely, from 2d. (roughly 38 
ƉĞŶĐĞƚŽĚĂǇ )ĨŽƌ  ‘dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶDĂƌŐĂƌŝŶĞ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƚŽ  ? ?Ɛ ?  ?ƌŽƵŐŚůǇ
 ? ? ? )ĨŽƌ ‘ ^ƵƌǀĞǇŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶĂŶ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ ? ?988 
However, direct sales of the reports were never intended to represent the bulk of 
circulation; instead, the greater part of the burden was to be shouldered by libraries. In 
early 1946, the Board of Trade developed a template letter to be sent to all public libraries 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐĂŶďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ ‘faced with the problem 
of making the Technical Intelligence that our industrialists have obtained from Germany 
aǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ? dŚĞ ůĞƚƚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ďǇ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ
ůŝďƌĂƌŝĞƐĐŽƵůĚ ‘ƉůĂǇĂĐŽŶƐƉŝĐƵŽƵƐƉĂƌƚŝŶďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŵĂůů
ŵĂŶ ? ?989 By the spring of 1948, 66 libraries and eleven Chambers of Commerce held a 
collection of reports for reference; these were located across the country, from Aberdeen to 
Plymouth, and from Ipswich to Swansea, with twelve locations in London alone.990 It is 
interesting to note that the security classification of certain material could vary depending 
on its eventual use  W two reports on the same piece of technology or scientific research 
could be classified completely differently, for example as Top Secret for a military 
application, but as unrestricted for any peaceful, civilian use.991 
Despite all this publicity, insufficient awareness of the scheme and its benefits was 
perceived as a significant issue throughout 1946, at least in Parliament. In February, Thomas 
Moore, MP for Ayr Burghs, accused the Board of Trade of disadvantaging British businesses 
by withholding reports from them, while there was wide circulation in the US; President of 
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the Board, Stafford Cripps, responded by rejecting the very premise of this complaint.992 
Then, in June, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, John Belcher, was challenged 
on the subject by Frederick Erroll, MP for Altrincham and Sale, and Leslie Solley, MP for 
dŚƵƌƌŽĐŬ ?ƌƌŽůůƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚĂůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ
ƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚ^ŽůůĞǇĂƐŬĞĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ  ‘ĂŶǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĂƚĂůůǁŚǇƚŚĞ
Government should not advertise to the people in the various industries that this 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ? ? ĞůĐŚĞƌ ƌĞƉůŝĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŽĂƌĚ ŽĨ dƌĂĚĞ ǁĂƐ ĚŽŝŶŐ ĞǆĂĐƚůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ?
revealing that arguably the problem was not the ignorance of British business to the 
information on offer, but rather the ignorance of Members of Parliament to the true 
breadth of its dissemination.993 Nonetheless, new methods were sought to expand publicity 
and, on 10 December 1946, an exhibition of the work carried out by BIOS opened at the 
ŽĂƌĚŽĨdƌĂĚĞŽŶDŝůůďĂŶŬ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ‘ƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĨƵůůĞƐƚƵƐĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŶŽǁĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂďŽƵƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐŝŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŚĞĂǀǇ
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ?994 In opening thĞ ĞǆŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶ ? ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ƌŝƉƉƐ ĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐŵĂůůĞƌ ĨŝƌŵƐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŽĂůůŽǁƚŚĞ/K^ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ƚŽŚĞůƉƚŚĞŵƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞ
ƚŚĞůĂƚĞƐƚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?995 The exhibition then moved on to visit 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂů ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?996 during its run, this touring 
exhibition attracted representatives from 20,000 firms.997 
As a point of comparison, it is worth briefly examining public reaction in the United 
States. The American people had no real objection to the short-term utilisation of a few 
German experts on military topics, but opposition grew considerably when it was suggested 
that some German experts would be employed in the long-term, and rose even further 
when the idea of these German specialists receiving US citizenship was mooted. A Gallup 
poll taken in December 1946 put the following question:  ‘/ƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ
bring over to America one thousand German scientists who used to work for the Nazis and 
have them work with our own scientists on scientific problems. Do you think this is a good 
                                                             
992
 Hansard, HC Deb, 25 February 1946, vol. 419, c. 1554. 
993
 Hansard, HC Deb, 3 June 1946, vol. 423, c. 1589-90. 
994




  ‘ZĞƉŽƌƚƐŽŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĂŶĚ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐWƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ?Nature, 158 (1946), 867-8. 
997
 &ĂƌƋƵŚĂƌƐŽŶ ? ‘'ŽǀĞƌŶĞĚŽƌǆƉůŽŝƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
- 254 - 
 
ŽƌďĂĚŝĚĞĂ ? ?dŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŝƚĂďĂĚŝĚĞĂĂƚĂƌĂƚŝŽŽĨ ? ? P ? ?998 The press in the 
USA took an even more inflammatory approach than in Britain and, instead of emphasising 
the technical and financial benefits to the US of Paperclip, the newspapers preferred to 
ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƉĞƚƐŽĨ
,ŝƚůĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶĞ ĂƐ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇ ůŝŬĞ Ă ǇŽƵƚŚĨƵů,ĞƌŵĂŶŶ 'ŽĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?999 As in Britain, 
however, much of this opposition melted away once the harsh realities of the Cold War and 
the possibilities of future conflict became increasingly apparent.1000 
Generally speaking, public reaction to the exploitation programme in Britain 
followed a fairly familiar trajectory. Initially, as early discussions by policy-makers had 
predicted, there was a certain degree of uproar, fuelled in no small part by sensationalist 
reporting in the press. However, the primary source of the outrage was not that these men 
were scientists who may have played some part in the war effort against Britain, but rather 
that they presented added competition for jobs and homes, and because they were 
Germans, who were often viewed with mistrust and hostility in Britain at this time.1001 As 
time went on, what little opposition there was dissipated swiftly and harmlessly on account 
of two main factors: firstly because of growing evidence of how much value could be 
derived from these men and their expertise (a cause advanced by the exploitation officials 
themselves); and secondly because of the growing threat of the Soviet Union. In this latter 
respect, the trend in public opinion mirrors very neatly those which can be observed in 
demilitarisation and denazification, reparations policy, and Anglo-German relations as a 
whole. 
 
The End of Exploitation 
As we have seen, throughout the relatively short period during which exploitation was a key 
policy aim of the British occupation authorities, it was regularly driven into conflict with 
other concurrent initiatives, many of which were concerned with the rebuilding and 
rehabilitation of western Germany in the face of changing international and domestic 
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pressures. Both John Gimbel and John Farquharson have characterised this as a dispute 
between governors and exploiters, though Farquharson convincingly challenges the more 
adversarial connotations of this, when applied to the British zone.1002 Ultimately, it was this 
dispute, and the somewhat inexorable triumph of the governors, which led to the eventual 
demise of the exploitation programme. In Britain, the governors were led by the Foreign 
Office, with support from the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany in 
Berlin, while the exploiters were able to count on support from the Board of Trade (which 
was ostensibly representing the interests of large swathes of British industry) and the 
Treasury, led by the staunchly anti-German Chancellor, Hugh Dalton.1003 
Unsurprisingly, these debates were not confined to the domestic politics of 
Whitehall, and the international dimension played an important role too. The departments 
which sought an end to exploitation in both Britain and the US looked to each other to 
advance their own cause, in the hope that if one country decided to curtail or terminate 
exploitation missions then the other would have to follow suit, especially as the movement 
towards a bizonal economic merger gained momentum.
1004
 As bizonal fusion began in 1947, 
pressure to reduce the burdensome costs of the occupation mounted, and the most likely 
solution was to facilitate the economic reconstruction of the western portion of 
Germany.1005 In February, E.G. Lewin of Research Branch wrote to the Economic Sub-
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ'ƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽŶƚƌŽůKĨĨŝĐĞŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶǁĞƌĞ ‘ĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŚĂƚ
we should try to reach agreement with the Americans and French that technical 
investigations such as BIOS and FIAT teams should be wound up simultaneously in all three 
western zŽŶĞƐ ? Wthe given date for this conclusion was 31 March 1947.1006 
One month later, the three Western Allies issued a joint proclamation which 
confirmed that technical investigations had been taking place in Germany since June 1945 
(though, as we have seen, they actually began long before that) and acknowledged that 
 ‘ŵĂŶǇ ůůŝĞĚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚĞĂŵƐ ŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŽƌƐ ǁŚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ƉƌŽĨŝƚĞĚ Ĩrom 
facilities offered them by zŽŶĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝgations were 
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 ‘ƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽĂůů ? ?dŚĞŵĂŝŶŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ, 
however, and ran thus: 
British and US and French authorities, having regard to the current German economic 
situation in the western zones and to increasing difficulties of providing accommodation 
etc., have decided to bring all technical investigations in field under BIOS and FIAT auspices 
to a close after 15 May 1947. No industrial technical investigators of the above organisations 
will be permitted to enter British, US and French zones of Germany and all these industrial 
technical investigations will be terminated by 30 June 1947.1007 
The dissolution of BIOS followed this proclamation fairly swiftly. By the beginning of 
November, it had been incorporated with the Technical Intelligence Section and the Board 
of Trade Documents Unit, all subsumed into the Technical Information and Documents 
Unit.1008 However, the reality did not always match so closely the lines laid down in the 
inter-Allied statement, which had been offered mainly for public consumption, in Germany 
and elsewhere. 
 T-Force, the logistics arm of the exploitation programme, continued to operate long 
after June 1947. This continuation was justified in a number of ways. One main line of 
argument was that T-Force was simply collecting documents from German firms which had 
been included on lists of requirements before the deadline for the end of technical 
investigations. In fact they published further such lists on 16 October, 22 October and 8 
December 1947, and frankly admitted that some of the firms concerned may not know they 
still had materials to deliver, but asserted that this would not be accepted as a satisfactory 
excuse for non-compliance.1009 T-Force also argued that it had numerous other 
responsibilities to attend to in Germany  W these included the removal of equipment 
earmarked as reparations or booty by BIOS investigators, the chaperoning of reparations 
teams throughout the British zone, and the facilitating of visits of property owners wishing 
to inspect their interests in Germany.1010 Additionally, T-Force felt it had a part to play in 
ĚĞŶŝĂů ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ  Q ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĨŽƌ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ? ůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ ?
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐůĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƚhat failure to 
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ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐǁŽƵůĚĞŶƚĂŝů ‘ƉƌŽďĂďůĞůŽƐƐƚŽƚŚĞh<ŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶŝůůĂĨĨŽƌĚ
ƚŽ ƐƉĂƌĞ ? ?1011 Despite all these excuses, T-Force was disbanded on 1 August 1948, and its 
remaining responsibilities handed over to Regional Administrative Offices and the Joint 
Export Import Agency.1012 
As suggested by the mention made of it by T-Force when trying to justify their 
continued existence, denial policy had the greatest lasting power of any element of the 
exploitation initiative. In fact, it ended up outlasting the programme from which it had 
originally emerged  W the DCOS scheme was not terminated until July 1949,1013 and 
Matchbox continued to operate until February 1951, after the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic as nation states.1014 The 
unnaturally long life of the denial policy is attributable, almost entirely, to the increasing 
fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union and its intentions towards the West. In March 1949, it 
was considered important tŽ ‘guard against the possibility of German scientists having to be 
ůĞĨƚŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐĂŶŝŶǀĂĚŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƐŽĂ ‘ŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶ ?ǁĂƐ
ĚƌĂǁŶ ƵƉ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ ŽĨ Ă ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇƵƉĚĂƚĞĚ ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ
who wouůĚŚĂǀĞĂƌĞĂůǀĂůƵĞƚŽĂŚŽƐƚŝůĞƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚĂƐŵĂŶǇĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ tĞƐƚĞƌŶĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ  ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?1015 dŚŝƐ  ‘ƌŝƚŝĐĂů >ŝƐƚ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ^ĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ƐŽŵĞ  ? ? ĂƚŽŵŝĐ
specialists, as well as approximately 20 experts in other key subjects, such as aerodynamics 
and biological warfare.1016 Despite the intention to keep this list up-to-date, this did not 
always translate into reality. Bertie Blount, Director of Research Branch, highlighted the 
inclusion of one ĂĞƌŽŶĂƵƚŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚǁŚŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽŶ ŚŝƐŽǁŶ ĨĂƌŵ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ
ƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞůĞƐƐǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂƐĂŶĂĞƌŽĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŝƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?
ůŽƵŶƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŵĞŶƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŝƐǁĞƌĞƌĞĂůůǇ ‘ǁŽƌƚŚǇ of special treatment in an 
ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ? ?1017 
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ŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĚĞŶŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂŝŵǁĂƐ
not just to prevent Soviet utilisation of German scientific and technical expertise but also to 
learn what German experts knew about science and technology in the USSR, particularly 
with links to military use. Therefore, the third category of individual to be included in 
Matchbox was:  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ? ŶŽƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
competence, but because they can give intelligence of value to us about Russian sponsored 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?1018 In time, this evolved into a major part of British scientific 
and technical intelligence-gathering on the USSR, largely through Operation Dragon Return, 
which was operated by the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch and which 
questioned defectors, refugees, and ex-POWs returning to the western half of Germany 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ ? Ɛ WĂƵů DĂĚĚƌĞůů ŚĂƐ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƉŽƐƚ-war penetration of 
Soviet military capability by British intelligence was a by-product of its effort to complete 
ƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽǀĞƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?1019 dŚĞƐĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƚŽĨŝůůŝŶƐĞǀĞƌĂů ‘ďůĂĐŬŚŽůĞƐ ?
in intelligence coverage of the Soviet weapons programmes.1020 One shortcoming of this 
approach though was that the British and American intelligence services became overly 
reliant on German experts as sources of information on major Soviet military-scientific 
projects which led them to believe that the Soviets would not be able to successfully 
detonate an atomic bomb before 1955 at the earliest. When they actually managed to do so 
in August 1949, it came as a huge shock to the West.1021 Denial policy also eventually drew 
to a close, in part because of the changing attitudes of German scientists. The benefits of 
the Anglo-American reconstruction of science in Germany, coupled with fear of the USSR 
and another war, drove the German experts to actively seek closer ties with the West  W the 
Soviet Union had become a dangerous threat, not a desirable alternative, and therefore 
there was no longer any need for Britain and the USA to forcibly deny these men to the 
Soviets.1022 
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In conclusion, the narrative of exploitation within the political debates surrounding the 
British occupation of Germany is one of both conflict and co-operation, evident both in the 
formulation of policy and the discourse in the public domain. The primary British aim in their 
zone of occupation was to maintain European peace and security, firstly by minimising the 
potential for a resurgence of German militarism and then by defending against any future 
aggression from the Soviet Union. In the first phase, principled policies of demilitarisation 
and denazification, as well as a punitive approach to the extraction of reparations, were in 
high favour and, with these, the exploitation programme was either able to coexist 
comfortably or ensure a higher priority. In the second phase, it soon became clear that the 
best way to protect against Soviet belligerence was not to strip Germany of all of its 
military-ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǁŶƵƐĞ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ
rebuild Germany as a strong ally in a crucial strategic location in Europe, which would have 
the beneficial side-effect of German self-sufficiency, thus alleviating a major financial 
burden on the British Exchequer. In comparison with this new approach, exploitation 
seemed outdated and counter-productive and, in accordance with the other Allies, the 
British exploitation programme was gradually shut down. The only vestiges which remained 
were those which offered direct contribution to the defence strategy against the Soviet 
Union, such as denial policy, but these soon became unnecessary as well. Ultimately, this 
reaffirms the point that exploitation was just one single thread in the fabric of British 
occupation policy, which itself changed considerably throughout the immediate post-war 
period, in part because of the swing in priority from moral mandate to pragmatic necessity, 











Defining the exact moment when exploitation came to an end is difficult. If it is viewed as 
simply a particularly intensive chapter in a longer narrative of technology transfer between 
Germany and Britain, as posited by Volker Berghahn, then it can be seen to gradually evolve 
from the enforced process of scientific and technical utilisation which this thesis has 
examined to a more equitable exchange of ideas between two sovereign nations.
1023
 
Similarly, if it is understood, as Paul Maddrell suggests, only in terms of its relationship to 
the worsening East-West relations of the nascent Cold War then, as the last chapter 
showed, many of its techniques and procedures were simply co-opted into serving the 
rapidly swelling demand for intelligence on the Soviet Union, and denial policy simply 
became an early form of scientific non-proliferation.1024 For the purposes of this study, 
however, exploitation concluded with the end of true British occupation and the formation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949; this is therefore coterminous with the 
period of transition (as discussed in the introduction) which began in 1943 and places 
exploitation as part of the shift Britain made from the Second World War into the Cold War, 
and from its position as a world leader to a second-tier power. Exploitation had changed 
considerably from its inception to its denouement and would have been almost 
unrecognisable to those who had instigated its first activities, in vastly different conditions, 
during the war. Building upon the earlier work done in this area by John Gimbel, this thesis 
offers new insight into this understudied phenomenon, itself part of the historiographically 




 Firstly, that the relationship between exploitation and the post-war geopolitical 
landscape is deeply intimate, and that the programme can therefore only be understood 
within this Cold War context. While the exact start date of the Cold War and the point at 
which Anglo-Soviet relations sunk to a position of hostility both remain subjects of ongoing 
historical debate, what is clear is that exploitation was a central element of this worsening 
relationship. Exploitation was shaped by, and to some extent shaped, Cold War hostilities. In 
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terms of the latter, although there were a great number of factors which drove the 
increasing polarisation of the Cold War, exploitation certainly exerted some influence. 
British and American actions to remove German specialists and equipment from the parts of 
Germany which they temporarily occupied at the immediate end of the war, before the 
official zonal boundaries were adhered to, came under particularly pronounced criticism 
from the Soviet representatives at the Potsdam Conference. Similarly, Soviet deportations 
of German experts, particularly those which took place en masse under the auspices of 
Operation Osoaviakhim in October 1946, provoked strong protest from Western officials, 
and reinforced their belief that the Soviets were not to be trusted and would be relentless in 
their pursuit of greater power.  
 In terms of the former, a policy which began with the wartime intention of ensuring 
that Nazi Germany possessed no weapon with which they could attack Britain without equal 
retaliation retained its chief goal but changed its target to the Soviet Union, BriƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
important wartime ally. This was of course indicative of wider changes but, put simply, the 
USSR had been substituted for Germany in British perceptions and ? ĞĐŚŽŝŶŐ :ƵůŝĂŶ >ĞǁŝƐ ?
interpretation of British planning more generally, exploitation responded to this change 
swiftly and sensitively.1026 It soon coloured nearly every aspect of the exploitation 
programme, wherein all assessments of targets, especially expert personnel, focused on 
their potential benefit to the Soviet Union rather than to Britain. Denial policy was the most 
obvious manifestation of this transformation as it operated on the assumption that it was 
more valuable to deny German scientific and technical expertise to the Soviet Union than it 
ǁĂƐƚŽƵƐĞŝƚƚŽĂƵŐŵĞŶƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĂƌŵŽƵƌŝĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ the 
Cold War arms race, which is arguably one of the defining features of the period, necessarily 
begins in the contest for the scientific spoils of Nazi Germany which took place under the 
aegis of exploitation.  Overall, this thesis concurs with Norman NĂŝŵĂƌŬ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
Anglo-American exploitation programmes can only be understood in terms of the deepening 
rivalry between East and West which became the Cold War.
1027
  
 Secondly, that exploitation must be further contextualised within the complexities of 
British occupation policy, which was largely characterised by a struggle between moral and 
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ideological aims on the one hand, and pragmatism and necessity on the other. Britain 
entered the post-war period as an occupier on German soil, determined to decisively 
ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽǁĂŐĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞǁĂƌĂŶĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƐŽĐŝĂů ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶĚ
political changes took place within Germany which would ensure that Britain would never 
need to enforce these restrictions militarily. Within this mindset, exploitation was able to 
thrive. Not only did it provide a clear method of demilitarisation, and one that allowed 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ƚŽ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ǁĂƌ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ĂůƐŽ
provided the most reliable source of financial recompense for the costs of the war  W a 
genuinely viable form of reparations  W critical as the British occupation proved a costly 
affair, creating a financial burden which neither the Treasury nor the British taxpayers were 
able or willing to shoulder. Furthermore, the practical and economic value of exploitation 
meant that it triumphed over other, more morally-driven and less profitable initiatives with 
which it came into conflict, such as denazification or the implementation of post-war justice. 
This was reinforced further by the contest with the Soviets and the attendant fear that an 
 ‘ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ďƌĂŝŶƉŽǁĞƌ ĂŶĚ ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŵĂǇ ǁĞůů ƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?1028 
 However, as with any project which is valued primarily for its pragmatic benefits, it 
can quickly fall from favour if priorities and objectives change. In this instance, it was the 
drastic deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations which proved pivotal. As this decline was 
mirrored by a similarly rapid and necessary rapprochement between Britain and Germany, 
wartime animosity and post-war commitments to comprehensively demilitarise and extract 
reparations were abandoned remarkably quickly in favour of building Germany up both as a 
buffer to potential Soviet territorial ambitions in Europe and as a self-sufficient nation which 
would no longer need to rely on subsidies which Britain could ill afford to provide. While the 
increased fear of Soviet intentions had provided a short-term boon to British exploitation, 
by fuelling denial policy and widening the criteria for recruitment of German experts, it soon 
became clear that exploitation was an obstacle which was preventing Germany from 
rebuilding. Not only would the financial benefit of an independent, self-sufficient Germany 
be far greater to Britain than that derived from a relatively small number of dismantled 
factories and recruited specialists but, as a prosperous, rehabilitated nation, Germany could 
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help resist the magnetic attraction of recruitment which many German scientists and 
technicians felt towards the USSR, without too much British involvement. In pragmatic 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ?ďǇůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞŽĨĂŚŝŶĚƌĂŶĐĞƚŚĂŶĂŚĞůƉƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
broader strategy in occupied Germany  W an opinion shared by Ian Turner in his wider 
assessment of British policy towards German industry.1029 As such, exploitation must be 
understood as a product of its time, specifically the aforementioned period of transition, 
wherein the exact and unique conditions existed to allow this programme to arise, survive, 
and often triumph among numerous other concomitant and sometimes conflicting 
endeavours, but which also ultimately led to its demise. 
 Thirdly, that exploitation, despite its aura of controversy, should not be seen purely 
through a sensationalist lens but should instead be examined as a deliberate policy, entered 
into soberly and with due consideration of the wider ramifications, and characterised not by 
intense government secrecy but rather by the usual hallmarks of civil service control  W an 
overreliance on bureaucracy and a plurality of opinionated input  W both of which do little to 
support the idea that exploitation was conducted as part of some great conspiracy. It is 
worth acknowledging here that exploitation was indeed often carried out under a shroud of 
secrecy though the significance of this should not be overestimated. After all, it was a 
mission tasked with strengthening Britain at the expense of its enemies (first Germany and 
then later the Soviet Union) and was supervised, at least initially, by the Joint Intelligence 
Sub-Committee, the most senior body in the British intelligence community  W a modicum of 
concealment and obfuscation was to be expected. Nonetheless, the available records show 
that nearly all major government departments  W the Home Office, the Ministry of Supply, 
the Foreign Office, and many others  W were both aware of its existence and, to some extent, 
involved in its operation, and it was authorised and directed by a command structure 
extending to the uppermost levels of British government, including the Cabinet and the 
office of the Prime Minister. This hardly suggests some sinister conspiracy. 
 However, there are other reasons why a sensationalist approach has been adopted 
by many lurid jourŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?&ŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĞŶĞŵǇ ?Ɛ
secrets has inherent connotations of deception and espionage, particularly when observed 
from a viewpoint either during or since the Cold War. The difficult experiences which 
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exploitation officials had with an often hostile contemporary press, with whom they were 
instructed not to discuss their work, has further worsened the public image of the scheme. 
In addition, the nature of the Third Reich has played a role in crafting a particularly 
unsavoury depiction of post-war exploitation. As we have seen, the political records of the 
specialists recruited by Britain after the war were often ignored and many of the most 
ferocious critiques of exploitation focus on the idea that Nazi scientists, implicated in 
various crimes, were offered jobs rather than being prosecuted, and were praised rather 
than denounced. Prominent figures such as Wernher von Braun have contributed to this 
narrative immeasurably. Certainly this selective blindness towards political pasts is a 
significant part of the story of exploitation, but it ignores the many instances where proven 
Nazis were deliberately not offered post-war jobs in the West, irrespective of their 
utility,1030 not to mention the co-operation, including the sharing of evidence, shown 
between exploitation agents and war crimes investigators.1031 Generally speaking, in order 
to present a fair and accurate picture of exploitation, it is necessary both to recognise these 
clandestine and insalubrious portrayals of the programme  W perhaps as part of its 
subsequent cultural history  W but also to debunk them by showing that exploitation was a 
generally legitimate, if somewhat ethically dubious, element of British post-war policy. 
 &ŽƵƌƚŚůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝon programme, despite being arguably the smallest 
ŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƵƌŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?ŝƐŶŽůĞƐƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĂŶŝƚƐŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ?^ŽǀŝĞƚŽƌ
French counterparts. As with the third point above, this is essentially a case of dispensing 
with a misconception while still acknowledging the reasoning behind it. That the British 
emerged from the Second World War in a weaker position than when they entered it is a 
fairly well-established fact and it is clear that Britain lacked the financial resources to pursue 
an exploitation programme on a scale to match the Americans or Soviets. The French efforts 
were perhaps more equally-sized in terms of resources but outstripped the British with 
regard to avarice and the range of tactics (many rather underhand) which they were willing 
ƚŽƵƚŝůŝƐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĂŝŵƐ ?^ŽǁŚŝůĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞ
been the least extensive, it justifies closer examination as part of a wider historiographical 
trend on the subject, as evinced most clearly by Michael Neufeld in what he describes as a 
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 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? tŚŝůĞ EĞƵĨĞůĚ ůŽŽŬƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ŽĨ ůĞƐƐ ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
nations, such as Brazil, India and Mexico, as well as Britain and France, his core idea  W that it 
is necessary to move past the simplistic representation of exploitation as merely the 
movement of German rocketry experts to the USA and USSR and challenge the idea that 
Project Paperclip is synonymous with the programme as a whole  W holds true for this thesis 
too.1032 
In addition, the British initiative is also worth examining on its own merits because it 
is unique. The organisations charged with its execution, primarily the British Intelligence 
Objectives Sub-Committee and the T-Forces, have no exact parallels in any other national 
programme, and the sheer volume of investigators sent from Britain to Germany, including 
many drawn directly from private industry, was far greater than those deployed by the 
hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-war situation differed from that of any of its 
wartime allies in a more general sense. While the USA and the Soviet Union were adjusting 
to new positions at the top of the geopolitical power structure, Britain was forced to come 
to terms with its  ‘ůŽƐƐŽĨŐůŽďĂůƉƌĞ-ĞŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚdemotion to the role of junior partner in 
the increasingly unsteady Anglo-American partnership, while still seeking ways to exert 
influence.1033 Furthermore, the British economy went through a period of particular 
weakness directly after the end of the war and therefore needed to stimulate innovation 
while being in no position to invest in costly original research. Exploitation offered a 
solution, of sorts, to both these problems  W it gave Britain access to new science and 
technology with no need to fund large-scale domestic research projects, and these new 
developments, particularly with regards to rocketry and atomic power, offered a way to 
reassert British authority and maintain a place at the top table of international politics. In 
ĨĂĐƚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐs at the end of the war which makes 
understanding its exploitation programme all the more important. 
And finally, that exploitation was not simply a one-way street, in which Britain 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚĞĚĂƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ benefited, and 
Germany suffered, from exploitation has been considerably exaggerated. To be sure, the 
British exploitation programme was both large and comprehensive, covering a wide range of 
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topics in both the military and civil-industrial spheres, and certain new techniques or pieces 
of equipment were adopted as a result. As has been shown, Britain was not able to secure 
the services of a huge number of German specialists on a long-term basis and so this did not 
constitute an especially fruitful channel of exploitation. There were only a handful of areas  W 
most notably chemical warfare and rocketry  W where Britain learnt a significant amount 
from German expertise. True assessments of the financial value of British exploitation of 
German science and technology have been attempted on numerous occasions since the 
programme began to wind down and have generated remarkably scattered results, not least 
because in most cases an ideological or political agenda has muddied the data. For example, 
in 1948, Gustav Harmssen, ƌĞŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĨĨĂŝƌƐ ĂŶĚ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶ dƌĂĚĞ, 
prepared a report on reparations in which he estimated the total value of the patents, 
industrial secrets, and similar assets removed from Germany by all the occupation forces to 
be about $5 billion.1034 Michael Howard, who served with T-Force in Germany, recalled 
being told that the figure of British spoils alone was close to £2 billion.1035 More recent 
appraisals put the figure more in the region of £30 million but this is probably a serious 
underestimation.1036 Ultimately, a correct valuation is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
arrive at on account of several complicating factors, not least political motives, the blurred 
distinction between booty and reparations, and the near-unquantifiable worth of so-called 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? W that is, the futility of attaching financial value to an idea. 
In reality, the total economic worth of the material, information, and brainpower 
which Britain extracted from Germany after the war is almost irrelevant. What matters is 
that the officials involved obviously felt that the process was beneficial enough to pursue to 
the extent which they did, perhaps because financial gain was actually of secondary 
importance to the more urgent needs of strategic defence  W ƵƐŝŶŐ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƌĞƚƐ ƚŽ
bolster British arsenals while simultaneously denying them to the Soviets. Furthermore, the 
other element of this debate is that, as convincingly argued by John Farquharson, 
irrespective of the actual amount of removals conducted by Britain, Germany gained more 
from the occupation than it lost. Indeed, British payments to its own zone in Germany 
totalled some £140 million by April 1947, far in excess of any realistic estimations of the 
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receipts from reparations.1037 Werner Abelshauser has even argued, quite believably, that 
the dismantling of industrial capacity involved in exploitation was a virtual prerequisite for 
ƚŚĞtĞƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƉĞŶĞĚ
the way for rapid renovation and streamlining of the industrial capital stock.1038 Although it 
is important to remember that exploitation was embarked upon with a desire to punish and 
restrict Germany, and later continued with little regard for its potentially negative effects on 
the German economy, its ultimate legacy was perhaps more mutually beneficial than initial 
assumptions suggest. 
Overall, the British exploitation of German science and technology in the years 
surrounding the end of the Second World War was a substantial and important aspect of 
British occupation policy, despite what the paucity of existing research would suggest. As a 
subject, it sits at several intersections: between various nations  W Britain, Germany, the 
Soviet Union, the USA and France; between different periods  W the Second World War, the 
occupation, the Cold War; and between several historiographical approaches  W histories of 
international relations, science and technology, intelligence, and defence. As such it is able 
to shed light on a number of different phenomena while remaining an interesting and 
complex subject in its own right. This thesis provides a history of British exploitation from its 
primitive and nebulous origins, through its period of greatest and most fervent activity, to 
its gradual but inexorable decline as the occupation itself came to an end. In addition, it 
contributes one slender but revealing strand to the multifaceted history of the immediate 
post-war period, which was a critical transitional phase for not only Germany and Britain, 
but also for Europe and the wider world, and one which it is vital to appreciate in order to 
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GLOSSARY 
All abbreviations, acronyms and codenames are as they appear in the original source 
material. 
 
30 Assault Unit Also known as: 30 Commando, 30 Advanced Unit, 30AU  W Admiralty-
sponsored intelligence commando unit. Brainchild of Ian Fleming, assistant to the Director 
of Naval Intelligence. Active in North Africa, the Mediterranean, Operation Overlord, and 
the invasion of Germany. Precursor to exploitation by way of technique and objectives. Had 
a reputation as piratical and careless  W ŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĚ ? ? ?/ŶĚĞĐĞŶƚƐƐĂƵůƚhŶŝƚ ? ? 
Abwehrkommando  W Advance intelligence commando unit of the German Abwehr (military 
intelligence). Used often during the early stages of the war, a component of Blitzkrieg 
tactics. Served as an inspiration for 30 Assault Unit and other exploitation operations.  
Alsos ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů'ƌĞĞŬǁŽƌĚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƐĂĐƌĞĚŐƌŽǀĞ ? ?ĂƉů ǇŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂŵĞŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŽƌ ?
Leslie Groves  W Anglo-American (but US-led) scientific intelligence mission, with a particular 
focus on nuclear physics and the German atomic bomb project. Brainchild of Brigadier-
General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, and led by Professor Samuel 
Goudsmit and Colonel Boris T. Pash. Active in Italy, France, and Germany; disbanded in late 
1945. One of the first iterations of the exploitation programme and a main inspiration for 
later, expanded efforts. 
British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (BIOS)  W Whitehall committee responsible 
for co-ordinating the British scientific and exploitation efforts after the war. Emerged from 
the disbanded Anglo-American CIOS (see below) in July 1945. Comprised of representatives 
from the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of 
Supply, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power, the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research, and the Government of the 
Dominion of Canada. Chaired initially by Professor R.P. Linstead. Did not have its own pool 
of investigators but was tasked with developing lists of targets, making arrangements for 
investigators to visit the sites in Germany, and for collating and making available their final 
reports. 
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Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS) Briefly initially known as the 
Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee (CIPC)  W Anglo-American committee responsible 
for co-ordinating the British and US scientific and exploitation efforts during the latter part 
of the war. Comprised of representatives from seven British and seven American 
departments: (British) Foreign Office, Ministries of Economic Warfare, Supply, and Aircraft 
Production, and the Intelligence sections of all three Armed Services; (US) State 
Department, Foreign Economic Administration, Office of Strategic Services, OSRD and the 
ƚŚƌĞĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐ ?/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?Chaired by Brigadier T.J. Betts (US Army), with Professor 
R.P. Linstead (British civilian) as vice-chair. Did not have its own pool of investigators but 
was tasked with developing lists of targets, making arrangements for investigators to visit 
the sites in liberated Europe and Germany, and for collating and making available their final 
reports. Disbanded, with SHAEF, in July 1945. 
Control Commission for Germany (British Element) (CCG(BE))  W British component of the 
Allied Control Commission; responsible for administering the British zone of Occupied 
Germany. Headquartered in Bad Oeynhausen, near Hannover. Worked in concert with the 
administrations of the other main Allies (USA, France, Soviet Union) through the Control 
Council in Berlin. 
Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA)  W British government office responsible for 
the British occupation of Germany (and, briefly, Austria), based in Whitehall. Enacted policy 
through the CCG(BE) (see above) and the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). 
Darwin Panel  W British committee tasked with facilitating the recruitment of German 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ŝŶ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ĨŝĞůĚƐ ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ ůĂƚĞƌ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  W the 
employment of German specialists directly by private firms. Comprised of representatives 
from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Board of Trade, Control 
Commission for Germany, Home Office, Treasury, German Economic Division, Admiralty, 
Security Services and the Ministries of Supply, Labour, Health, Agriculture & Fisheries, 
Aircraft Production, and Fuel & Power. Chaired by Sir Charles Darwin, director of the 
National Physical Laboratory. 
Denial policy  W Efforts by both the British and the Americans to minimise the benefits which 
the Soviet Union was able to derive through exploitation, often by preventing them from 
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securing the services of German experts who were deemed valuable. This approach came to 
define much of the Anglo-American exploitation programme in its latter years of operation. 
Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS)  W British committee comprised of the deputy chiefs of staff 
from the armed forces. Responsible for many matters but, in terms of exploitation, their 
largest contribution was the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘K^ ƐĐŚĞŵĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
recruitment of German experts in military fields. 
Dustbin  W Detention centre located at Schloß Kransberg, near Frankfurt-am-Main. Initially 
operated on an Anglo-American basis, but later migrated to exclusive American control. 
Detainees were primarily German scientific and technical experts who the Allies wished to 
interrogate and potentially recruit; among the most eminent was Albert Speer. 
Enemy Personnel Exploitation Section (EPES)  W Component of FIAT (see below) specifically 
tasked with the detention, interrogation, and recruitment of German scientists and 
technicians. Its forward section was particularly active in Berlin and the Soviet zone, and 
responsible for securing the services of German specialists located in these areas. 
Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT)  W Anglo-American organisation responsible for 
many of the logistical demands of exploitation on the ground in Germany. With the 
dissolution of SHAEF, it was split into separate but co-operative British and American 
elements. Crucially, it facilitated the visits of British investigators to the American zone and 
vice versa. The British element was headed up by Brigadier R.J. Maunsell. 
Inkpot  W British detention centre for German scientists and technicians, based at the 
Beltane School in Wimbledon, London. 
Operation Backfire  W Anglo-American, but overwhelmingly British-led, project to assemble 
and test-fire V-2 rockets off the coast of northern Germany at Cuxhaven. Conducted 
primarily by German personnel with British supervision and observation. Achieved three 
launchings, two of which were successful. Considered a great achievement within the British 
military. 
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Operation Matchbox  W Key element of British denial policy (see above), based around a 
transit hotel where German scientists and technicians could stay in order to prevent their 
recruitment by the Soviets. 
Operation Osoaviakhim  W Major Soviet operation which saw approximately 2,300 German 
scientists and technicians (along with their families) deported, often forcefully, from the 
Soviet zones of Germany and Berlin to the USSR. It took place in the early hours of 22 
October 1946 and was conducted by the Soviet security service, the NKVD. It had largely 
positive implications for the British (and Americans) as it scared many German experts and 
encouraged them to actively seek employment in Britain or the USA. 
Operation Paperclip  W dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵĂũŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ
and technicians. Co-ordinated primarily by the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA). 
Estimates suggest some 1,500 German experts were recruited under this scheme, dwarfing 
the parallel British efforts. 
Operation Surgeon  W British scheme to exploit German aeronautical expertise after the war, 
both through the examination and evacuation of equipment and facilities and through the 
interrogation and recruitment of scientists and technicians. 
Research Branch  W Component of the CCG(BE) (see above) which was responsible both for 
controlling German science after the war as well as enacting elements of denial policy. Had 
a close relationship with exploitation, which could be both complimentary and conflicting. 
T-Force  W The British military element responsible for most of the logistical workload of 
exploitation. They travelled with the Allied advance across Europe after D-Day and were 
tasked with seizing and securing key facilities so that they could subsequently be visited by 
CIOS or BIOS (see above) investigators. They also played some part in the detention of key 
German individuals, the evacuation of German equipment, and the provision of transport 
and accommodation for investigators. 
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